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Foreword 
Since 1968 there has been a series of 12 conferences for applied economists 
interested in trans-Pacific trade, investment, and other aspects of cooperation 
and development. The series, known as the Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference, staged its most recent meeting at the Bayshore Inn in Vancouver, 
7-11 September 1981. Previous conferences have been held in Japan (1968, 
1973), the United States (1969, 1977), Australia (1970, 1979), Canada (1971), 
Mexico (1974), New Zealand (1975), Thailand (1976), and South Korea (1980). 
These meetings dealt with a wide range of topics relating to trade, international 
investment, transfer of technology, employment, and adjustment problems. 
The Pacific Trade and Development Conference series has had an impact in 
political as well as academic circles. Senior Japanese and Australian economists 
associated with the conference played a major role in organizing the Pacific 
Co-operation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia, in September 1980, at which 
for the first time government officials, business executives, and academics met to 
consider the means for fostering regular consultation on Pacific economic 
cooperation issues. That meeting proposed the establishment of a tripartite 
committee to study and make informed recommendations to government about 
areas of concern where unilateral and even bilateral approaches have generated 
problems for Pacific economic relationships in the past. 
The theme of the Vancouver conference was renewable resources in the 
Pacific area. There were 48 participants from 13 countries in the Pacific and 
from three international organizations. Financial support for the meeting came 
mainly from the International Development Research Centre, the Max Bell 
Foundation, the Canadian Department oflndustry, Trade and Commerce, and 
the Asia Foundation. Local arrangements and hospitality were supported by the 
Canadian Department of External Affairs, the British Columbia government, 
the B.C. forest industry, and four banks, the Bank of Tokyo, the Royal Bank of 
Canada, the Bank of Montreal, and the Bank of British Columbia. 
We wish to express appreciation to these groups and other members of the 
host committee: Gordon Munro of the University of British Columbia and 
Parzival Copes of Simon Fraser University. Also to Susan McLintock who 
coordinated the preparation and distribution of papers and the staff support 
during the conference. 
The conference organizers are very grateful to the International Develop-
ment Research Centre for all the publication's arrangements and for input into 
the conference by Jeffrey Fine of the Social Sciences Division. 
H.E. English and Anthony Scott 
5 
Preface 
Canada's vast store of natural resources and its role as a major trading 
nation made it a particularly appropriate venue for the 12th Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference, which focused on renewable resources. Growing 
support by the International Development Research Centre for research into 
trade, natural resources, and renewable sources of energy complements the 
conference's focus. 
As IDRC President Ivan L. Head said in his introduction, international 
trade has a profound effect on the economic welfare of the developing countries 
of the Pacific rim. Over the past decade, it has provided the foundation for rapid 
growth in a number of the countries in the region. Now, however, because of 
prolonged economic recession and growing protectionist sentiments in the 
industrialized countries, it is in danger of being curtailed - a possibility that 
would seriously impede the opportunities for development in the area. This 
economic concern is typical of the kinds of issues that PACT AD meetings have 
been addressing for the past 12 years, bringing together an informal, but closely 
knit, group of scholars from the Pacific rim. 
The Social Sciences Division of IDRC recognizes the value of such 
exchanges, and it is encouraging research into economic issues, by supporting 
projects to examine the relationship between trade policies and changing com-
parative advantage in the developing countries of East and Southeast Asia. 
Projects dealing with various aspects ofrenewable energy, fisheries, and forestry 
are also foreseen in the next few years. 
The Centre is grateful to Professor Ted English of Carleton University, the 
convener of the conference, for his contribution to a stimulating meeting and to 
the preparation of this volume. 
6 
David W. Steedman 
Director 




International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada 
The themes - and the benefits - of trade and 
development are closely linked. The contribution 
of trade to the economies of the vibrant Pacific 
basin nations is sfriking. For example, foreign 
trade measured as a percentage of gross national 
product (GNP) is 33% in the Philippines, 38% in 
Indonesia, 39% in Thailand, 79% in Malaysia, 
and 189% in Singapore. The record of these five 
countries and their geographic neighbours offers 
demonstrative evidence that participation in the 
markets of the world contributes to the economic 
buoyancy of all and to the development, particu-
larly, of the industrializing countries. 
Canada has long understood that pheno-
menon. It is one of the world's major trading 
nations and has been for many years. Some $0.25 
of every dollar circulating in this country derives 
from the sale abroad of goods and services. The 
standard of living is dependent upon the eco-
nomic performance of the country's trading 
partners. If they are in trouble, so is Canada. If 
their economic outlook is bleak, so is ours. There 
is not, therefore, the slightest question in my 
mind that it is in the sound business interest of 
this country - indeed of all industrialized coun-
tries - to contribute to the development of the 
Third World. 
In many respects, development of the South 
will enhance trading opportunities for those in 
the North; in other respects, a failure to develop 
will lead to unexpected complications every-
where. Food production and consumption are at 
once an example of both phenomena. As living 
standards rise worldwide, demand for more and 
better food rises as well. The opportunity is 
created, through adequate incentives, for 
increases in agricultural and fisheries production 
and in sales for the producers from North and 
South. If planning is not wise, however, those 
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demand increases can create major difficulties 
worldwide. 
Evidence abounds that economic affluence 
contributes to changes in eating preferences. As 
per-person incomes rise, diets change to include 
larger percentages of meat. Because meat, com-
pared with cereal grains, is an inefficient vehicle 
for transformation of solar energy into calories, 
pressures mount on the land available for cultiva-
tion. The amount of arable land is finite; if not 
employed efficiently, through both the employ-
ment of science-based agricultural techniques 
and the dedication of areas to balanced cropping, 
the supply-demand gap will widen and inflation-
ary pressures will continue to mount. 
The effects of rising prices will be felt every-
where. Because poultry, cattle, and swine con-
sume feed grains that. are often not grown in 
developing countries, the South turns to coun-
tries such as Canada and the United States to 
obtain them. This demand pushes up the price of 
feed in these countries, and thus the price of meat. 
Tragically, those who· suffer the most are the 
poorest persons in the developing countries, as 
resources in those countries are dedicated to the 
production of feed for animals that will grace the 
tables of the well-to-do instead of being 
employed to deliver more food at affordable 
prices to those in greatest need. 
The problem is not a small one. According to 
the World Bank, one-third of all wheat and one-
half of all grains imported by developing coun-
tries are used as animal feed rather than food for 
humans. More and more fish, too, are being con-
verted into animal feed. As Canadians learn from 
every trip to the food markets, food prices are 
escalating. They may well rise even more dramat-
ically in the decade ahead because of demand 
from the Third World. 
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In the longer term, the problem could become 
much more serious. The caloric efficiency of food 
intake drops dramatically as grain and fish are 
passed through an animal rather than eaten 
directly by humans. In rough terms, 2.5 cal of 
grain are required to produce 1 cal of chicken 
meat, 4 cal for 1 of pork, and 8 cal for 1 of beef. As 
those suffering from cholesterol problems know, 
it does not follow that eating more meat leads to 
better health. It does follow, however, that in a 
world facing a shortage of arable land, an 
immense increase in the consumption of meat 
will lead to an unsustainable demand on land. If, 
added to that type of demand, there continues the 
trend to fuel cropping (the cultivation of land 
with crops dedicated not to food but to the pro-
duction ofliquid fuels), the world will face a crisis 
of alarming proportions. 
Food is only one of the essential elements in 
development, important components of interna-
tional trade, and major factors contributing to 
North-South interdependence. 
Another such is energy. As with food, energy 
demands may soon exceed this planet's capability 
to fulfill them. Innovative research, wise plan-
ning, effective implementation, and honest inter-
national cooperation will all be necessary to 
avoid catastrophe. Eight years ago, E.F. Schu-
macher extrapolated population growth and 
energy consumption. His findings have been 
challenged but not disproved. He assumed that 
populations in North and South would grow at 
annual rates of 1.25% and 2.25% respectively 
until the year 2000 and that, in the same period, 
per-person fuel consumption would increase by 
2.25% annually in the North and 4.5% annually 
in the South. That being so, world fuel consump-
tion would reach, in the year 2000, 2300 Mt coal 
equivalent - some four times the figure con-
sumed in 1966. Schumacher argued that such a 
consumption pattern was simply not plausible 
and that alternative life-styles would be required, 
with all the social trauma that such a change 
demands. 
Whether or not one accepts Schumacher's fig-
ures or his conclusions, the energy issue already is 
one of critical importance to all nations - indus-
trialized, newly industrialized, and developing. 
Most critically affected are the last group for they 
must bear the burden of high imported-oil prices, 
paid for in foreign exchange, as well as respond to 
the noncommercial fuel requirements of the 80% 
of their population living in rural areas. It is an 
awesome double requirement and one that was in 
part addressed by the recently concluded United 
Nations conference on nonrenewable sources of 
energy held in Nairobi, Kenya. 
It is estimated that as many as 2.5 billion peo-
ple now depend for almost all their energy needs 
on wood, agricultural residues, and dung. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) calculates that a billion 
persons are able to meet their minimum fuel 
requirements only by cutting wood in excess of 
sustainable supply. This means that each day 
forests are being cut, soil is drifting, rivers are 
silting, and deserts are advancing. The Brandt 
Commission forecast, at present rates of deple-
tion, the loss of fully one-half of the world's 
forests by 2000, with horrendous environmental 
and climatic consequences. F AO estimates that, 
to arrest this trend at present population growth, 
fuelwood demands, and forest depletion, more 
than 2.3 billion people will have to use alternative 
fuels by the year 2000. 
At Nairobi, Canada's Prime Minister Trudeau 
announced new elements in the country's 
response to the energy requirements of the devel-
oping countries. One of those elements was an 
increase of funds available to the International 
Development Research Centre in the amount of 
$10 million over the next 5 years. These funds will 
permit IDRC to intensify and broaden the sup-
port it now offers to cleveloping countries for 
research into energy and energy-related prob-
lems. Many techniques using renewable energy 
are relatively recent and are still emerging, as are 
questions about them. Indeed, the energy needs 
of the developing countries are more readily 
described than are programs ofresearch designed 
to meet those needs. 
Quite clearly, the "energy problem" is only 
partly technical. It cannot be segmented from the 
social, economic, and political context in which it 
occurs. Solutions made without reference to all 
these environments are unlikely to succeed. An 
immense amount of investigative work is 
required into rural energy demands and con-
sumption, into noncommercial energy practices, 
and into small-scale technologies appropriate for 
application in developing countries. 
Some examples of what one needs to know are: 
• Whether a particular energy problem is 
supply- or demand-related (the difficulties faced 
by rural dwellers are as much a problem of 
poverty as they are of new energy sourcing); 
• How energy policies in developing countries 
can be motivated by factors other than urban 
requirements and foreign exchange deficits, 
which are currently the primary motivating 
factors; 
• How the technical knowledge that is now 
available can be adapted to developing country 
requirements; and 
• How different societies can be reoriented 
toward conservation, a key factor in increasing 
energy - particularly liquid fuel - supply. 
IDRC is proud to have been asked by the 
Government of Canada to undertake this task. 
The Centre was created by Parliament in 1970 as 
a means of enhancing indigenous research com-
petence in developing countries and of contribut-
ing to solutions to Third World problems. 
Research supported by the Centre must be prac-
tical and dedicated toward those who live in the 
rural areas. The Centre's task is to assist in the 
identification of research issues, in the choice and 
refinement of methodology, in the monitoring of 
progress, and in the evaluation of results. 
IDRC was pleased to have been given an 
opportunity to contribute to the staging of this 
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conference on renewable resources. The major 
subjects discussed - fisheries, forests, and 
energy - figure prominently in the Centre's 
work, and contributions to the meeting by 
developing-country scientists, development-
agency personnel, and developed-country eco-
nomists are an essential component of the 
dialogue IDRC seeks to encourage. 
Specific issues addressed by participants have 
strong implications for developing countries. The 
diversity of these issues - ranging from protec-
tionism in trade, through the effects of the intro-
duction of a 200-mile extended fisheries jurisdic-
tion for coastal states, to new approaches to 
energy production - is matched by the diversity 
in perspectives of the contributors. The message 
that no country or group can act in isolation is 
abundantly clear. That many nevertheless 
attempt to do so is a reflection of the shortsight-




Intensive, Extensive, and Optima/Development of Forestlands 
Anthony Scott 
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
What are the major economic considerations for a country with vast undeveloped forestlands? 
The economics literature on forest development has few answers to this question, because authors 
generally have focused solely on either the clearing and use of the forest in support of other sectors of 
the economy or the regeneration and preservation of the trees. Both focuses are incomplete; they do 
not deal with issues that are basic to development of a forest economy. This paper attempts to single 
out the policy options available and to spell out their effects. 
Quelles sont Jes perspectives economiques majeures d'un pays qui possede de vastes surfaces 
forestieres inexploitees? On trouve peu de reponses a cette question dans Ia litterature sur l'economie 
forestiere, Jes auteurs preconisant generalement soit le defrichement et I'amenagement des zones 
deboisees au profit d'autres secteurs, soit Ia regeneration et la conservation des arbres. Ces deux 
approches sont incompletes et ne rendent pas compte de nombreux points essentiels au developpe-
ment de I'economie forestiere. La presente communication tente de degager d'autres alternatives 
possibles, et !es incidences eventuelles de leur mise en pratique. 
Forest industries and forest trade have played 
an important role in the economic history of 
many countries. Because the trees stand in the 
way of land use for settlement, the industry is 
often regarded as a by-product of economic 
growth and not as interesting to economists as 
the rise and decline of mineral, fishing, or manu-
facturing industries. 
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention 
to the special characteristics of the forest and to 
the way that these characteristics have (or ought 
to have) shaped forest-sector development. 
The Economist's View 
The Forest Frontier 
To the researcher considering the role of the 
forest sector in trade and development, a most 
striking characteristic is the neglect of the forest's 
role by the authors of handbooks and mono-
graphs. General economists have been blind to 
both the trees and the forests in their analyses of 
development of today's emerging economies, a 
blindness that contrasts sharply with their full 
descriptions of agriculture; coal, iron, copper, 
and other minerals; water resources; oil and gas; 
and even fisheries. 
Of course, there are good specialists writing 
''' about forestry. Some of them are present at this 
conference. Furthermore, there are statistical 
organizations, especially at the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations 
(F AO), that keep track of wood growth, produc-
tion, and trade. But too many of these specialists 
have seen the world's forests as the forum for the 
procurement of wood, cellulose, or timber for the 
markets and industries of other economies. A 
typical subtitle of such a work would be "Patterns 
and trends in resource supplies" - supplies to the 
purchasing country. "Policies" may also be men-
tioned, but they are the restrictive policies about 
cutting, or exporting, that may impede supply to 
users and processors elsewhere. Many of the 
works do not provide the reader with an answer 
to the question of how the see-sawing of logging 
and shipping affects those who gain employment, 
materials, or revenue from the activity on the 
forest frontier. Perhaps the World Bank studies 
of country development prospects are the only 
important exceptions. 
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Within economics, the other class of writer 
should be identified. Forest economics is an old 
subject, the most distinguished, probably, of all 
the resource-economics fields. Since the 18th cen-
tury, formal theory has been coupled with practi-
cal writing by those in need of timber, charcoal, 
or household fuel to create a long tradition of 
study of the best conditions for forest protection 
and renewal as well as the best cutting age. But 
this literature, which would turn forestry into a 
branch of agriculture, deals with a minor aspect 
of the headlong progress of Wes tern procurement 
through the mature forests of Europe, South 
Asia, North America, and now the Pacific rim. 
Development: Demand and Supply 
From a nonspecialist's point of view, wood is 
not difficult to find and exploit. Trees and forests 
are ubiquitous, visible, and self-reproducing. 
Almost any tree or limb will do for weapons, 
fence building, and rough structures. Further-
more, fastidious cabinetmakers, joiners, carpen-
ters, boat-builders, farmers, and papermakers 
have learned to adapt their procedures and prod-
ucts to the supplies available. Thus, although 
there is some need for exploration for new forest-
material sources, the forest-product industries 
are not so completely preoccupied with the pro-
cess of exhaustion as are the mining industries. 
Indeed, the general progress of the world forest 
industry can be traced with the tools of analysis 
developed by Adam Smith, Malthus, and 
Ricardo for world agriculture, particularly the 
conc·epts of intensive, and extensive, margins. 
The agricultural parallel is surprisingly close. 
At one time, before the "agricultural revolu-
tion," wood, clay, and stone were the universal 
materials. As the world's population, incomes, 
tastes, and technologies built up the demand for 
wood and paper products, and as a growing 
demand for farm products led to the conversion 
of forests to farm land, adjustments and adapta-
tion became necessary. Although consumers sub-
stituted other materials for wood, especially as 
fuel, harvesters could afford to turn to more 
remote locations, driven by the depletion of old 
stands and drawn by the clearing of newly settled 
regions: this was and is the extensive margin. To a 
certain degree (but less than in agriculture), they 
could also afford to progress along an intensive 
margin in the direction of plantations and 
orchards. But the return on the required silvicul-
tural and protection systems was low so long as 
the background technology on the extensive 
margin was available. Before investing in forest 
regeneration, it paid to find new materials to 
replace wooden articles, fuels, and fibres. By the 
mid-20th century, it is possible to imagine a tech-
nology freed from dependence on cellulose in any 
form. Technological requirements for every 
wood product are nowadays rarely absolute: 
manufacturers and consumers can be guided by 
price in their choices of inputs. This easy consum-
er substitution weakened any incentives to invest 
in planting and growing new forests or planta-
tions. Better to investigate technologies for har-
vesting on rough terrain. Powerful harvesting 
methods and alternative transportation systems 
have broadened the number of sources from 
which wood can be obtained. The conversion of 
rare species into veneers and oflarge timbers into 
plywoods and laminates has increased the yield 
per tree. 
This stylized history suggests two important 
forest-industry-supply characteristics that are 
not encountered so overwhelmingly in agricul-
ture (or, indeed, in mineral production). The first 
is a characteristic of intensive forestry. Because 
the harvest is rotational instead of annual, the 
producer must incur heavy financial (or implicit) 
carrying costs while waiting for the trees to 
mature. There is a crippling capital intensivity 
endurable only when the rotational period is very 
short, interest and other opportunity costs very 
low, or forest benefits extremely high (examples: 
naval supplies of oak, teak, and pine; forests 
grown for the hunt or shelter of other plants or 
animals; aesthetic and hobby-tree growing; pro-
duction for bark, cascara, nuts, leaves, rubber, 
and syrup; and soil-, water-, or wind-control tree 
belts). Most mature forests have grown naturally 
on lands that have not been needed or on which 
development for other uses would be costly. 
Land preparation, planting, fire control, thin-
ning, and spacing have rarely (and in most places 
never) been practiced. Forest communities either 
are dependent on other products that flourish in 
the forest (such as game) or are temporary, being 
concerned only with the harvesting of wood. Of 
course, in some regions there is farming-forestry 
in which the people move between harvesting and 
farming and land improvement with the seasons. 
But such equilibria are rare. Even in the most 
primitive areas, industrial wood production is 
not !about-intensive but depends on off-peak 
employment of equipment or animal power; 
farmers treat their wood production as a by-
product, or spare-time, activity. A minor aspect 
of this is that, in political and national social life 
generally, intensive forest-growing interests are 
rarely as important as the social movements and 
groups that speak for farmers. Those who speak 
for the "forestry industry" are usually connected 
with extraction: cutting, moving, and processing 
both cultivated and "volunteer" stands. 
If one moves from the intensive to the exten-
sive margin, one finds a second special character-
istic: "bulk" or great mass per unit of final value. 
Many of the world's mature forests consist of 
trees that are so large or heavy as to be both costly 
to sever and extremely difficult to transport over-
land. This "inaccessibility" accounts for their 
survival. To the extent that they escape the 
hazards of flood, disease, and fire and the local 
demand for firewood or farmland, they await 
envelopment within the extensive margin. 
Inaccessibility and bulk yield to technology 
when the commercial rewards become adequate. 
No tree appears to have been too big to resist the 
patient cutting methods combining hacking, 
stripping, firing, blasting, and uprooting devel-
oped by even the most undeveloped societies. 
Until this century, logs that were not too large 
were transported whole over long distances by 
draft animals or flotations in rivers and inlets. 
They were processed into lumber or fuel at or 
near the final market. Otherwise, sawmills and 
other plants eliminated the bulk, beginning the 
manufacture of specific products near the forest 
where loads and rafts converged for shipping to 
distant markets. Although some local manufac-
ture has always been one feature of wood export, 
it has not been the prevailing pattern. At the 
logging site, bulk reduction has usually been 
limited to debarking, delimbing, shortening, or 
squaring. One reason is that logging operations 
continually move but mills do not have the capac-
ity to follow. Once loaded or floated, timber may 
as well be carried all the way to the final market, 
as innovations overcome the costly transporta-
tion problems produced by bulk. Rivers are 
cleared and flumes, railways, canals, and roads 
constructed. Thus, the forest frontier, which at 
one time might have been at or near the seacoast, 
gradually pushes into the hinterland and up the 
mountainsides. The extractive industry renews 
and transforms itself more easily than it renews 
the forest. Increasing values challenge the inge-
nuity of local industry and investors to find ways 
to bring out logs previously thought to be beyond 
reach. The mechanical technology on which they 
can draw is all-powerful. Nothing but cost pre-
vents the removal of every stick of wood, no 
inatter how difficult the location. Heavy-duty 
trucks, tractors, overhead cable systems, helicop-
ters, and balloons have brought every stand 
within reach, bringing both the labour to the tree 
and the tree to market. Only costs matter. In 
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Harold Innis' language, forestry looks outward, 
to the sea and to foreign markets. It is not a 
society-building industry. 
On the one hand, users have economized on 
the utilization of rare and costly woods, turning 
to more accessible or ubiquitous materials, 
including lower quality woods, but also steel, 
aluminum, cement, and plastics. In the forested 
regions, rising populations and higher standards 
of living have increased local demand for wood 
for fuel and for construction materials. This local 
demand may yield to export demand but more 
often has reduced the amounts offered for 
export, perhaps because local suppliers are not 
able to protect their stands from local and rural 
"poaching." 
On the other hand, the slow growth of trees has 
forced suppliers to turn to increasingly costly 
sources, moving from region to region and spe-
cies to species. Some investment in regeneration 
has also been undertaken. 
The outcome has been increased prices for 
wood. Locally, wood as fuel and building mate-
rial has become harder to get. Worldwide, the 
price of timber and pulp has increased steadily 
since the 1870s, suggesting that the response of 
substitute products and new harvesting methods 
has been inadequate to keep wood from becom-
ing a scarce material. 
Although the evidence of increasing wood 
costs is limited for the most part to the United 
States, the USA is a major importer and exporter 
of various forest products. The evidence is strik-
ing because investigators have found that the 
increasing price trend for forestry is different 
from that of other materials and is considered to 
be indicative of both absolute and relative 
increasing scarcity in that the prices, costs, and 
rents of wood products have all been rising rela-
tive to those of consumer goods, the GNP price 
index, and the indices for farm, mineral, and fish 
products respectively. Evidently, although U.S. 
consumers have found many replacements for 
wooden materials, the rate of substitution has 
been slow and reluctant. They have been willing 
to pay higher prices, thus justifying the producing 
industry's turning to higher cost sites, salvaging 
lower quality trees, and investing in replacement, 
thinning, and protection (Potter and Christy 
1962; Barnett and Morse 1963; Smith 1979). If 
U.S. trends are similar to those of the rest of the 
world, it is not surprising that the forest frontier 
has moved from Asia and North America and is 
now to be found around the Pacific rim, from 
Alaska and Siberia to New Zealand and South-
east Asia. 
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Instability 
The pace of development is far from steady. To 
see why, it is useful to consider how the world 
forest-product industry might make unrealisti-
cally smooth adjustment to expanding demand. 
Growing markets reflect a continually increasing 
consumption of all dimensions and species of 
timber. Producers respond by increased cutting 
from accessible stands and by opening untouched 
mature forests elsewhere. If costs and prices rise, 
old plans are revised, and the industry penetrates 
to more inaccessible stands and invests more in · 
the salvage of lower quality trees; in the newly 
opened regions, the industry initially invests 
more in harvesting, transportation, and infra-
structure than it had in the older, cut, regions. 
Old and new regions can be producing simul-
taneously, and the transition from one region to 
another can be drawn out, even though the har-
vesters' philosophy is similar to that in mining: 
cut and get out.Users are comparatively uninter-
ested in the geographical origin of the lumber 
they buy, relying on their importing merchants' 
and mills' searching and arbitration among a suc-
cession of exporting regions. 
This model of smooth adjustment to depletion 
and development is quite unrealistic. One reason 
is that the various dimensions and species of trees 
are not perfect substitutes. For example, final 
users do exhibit quality preferences and may 
choose new materials rather than accepting (or 
paying for) the best replacements offered by deal-
ers. Thus, in some supplying regions, the trade 
may persist in its search for exportable timber for 
many years; in other regions, it may depart after 
only a small percentage of the stands have been 
removed. Cabinet hardwoods provide good 
examples of this selective and jerky progress. 
A second reason is that demand for timber is 
closely associated with cyclical capital-goods 
production of, for example, railway ties; housing; 
falsework; scaffolding; and ships. Consequently, 
worldwide demand may be cyclical. Thus, the 
timber trade does not exert a steady demand but, 
instead, imposes uncertainty and discontinuity, 
forcing harvesters to delay or to accelerate their 
moves to new regions. 
A third reason is that harvesting for export 
may suddenly be reduced to satisfy a new local 
intermediate demand for a reliable flow of wood 
and chips from investors in processing plants. 
This requires the process of cut-and-get-out 
harvesting to be replaced by the longer term 
commitment of existing mature stands. The new 
industries may even motivate regeneration for a 
f~rther cutting cycle. 
A fourth reason is similar to the third: exports 
may be interrupted by new local consumer and 
final demand. In North America for example, 
urban building competed with a marginal foreign 
demand for the same lumber. Elsewhere the 
demand for woods like teak, eucalyptus, and 
mahogany has declined and increased again, in 
response to changes in local business conditions 
and tastes. Some exporters have also to contend 
with intensified local demands for wood as fuel, 
especially by rural consumers turning to wood 
from kerosine, fuel oil, and even gasoline. I 
A final reason is that tropical regions may not 
be environmentally stable sources of supply. 
Perhaps one-third of the world's forestland is in 
"open woodland," in grassy and savanna environ-
ments. Important sources of leaves, poles, graz-
ing, and fuel, sometimes burned for pasture or 
cultivation, open woodlands are now disappear-
ing permanently under population pressure for 
food and fuel. 
This leaves the temperate mixed forests and the 
tropical moist forests as the main sources around 
the Pacific rim. They are now under assault by 
the wood-products industry, and their clearing is 
having structural effects on the quality of the 
forest-growing stock, soils, and habitat and on 
the stability of water runoff. The old forest is not 
simply being modified by cutting or distributed 
trees and stands; the environment is in many 
places being transformed. Modification, a result 
of selective logging· and shifting agriculture, 
results in a resumption of forest successional 
changes and localized land-structure adjust-
ments. Transformation is a characteristic of 
widespread and unselective total removal of 
cover followed by the appearance of agricultural 
settlement, urbanization, or a wasteland-like 
rebuilding of the forest community at an early 
stage of soil building and vegetal succession. This 
distinction is emphasized by Barney (1980: 
131-132) who presents a disturbing picture of its 
effects: 
Nutrient depletion will be increased as greater 
volumes of wood will be removed. Ecological 
diversity will be lowered, and consequent popu-
'In this essay I do not dwell on other energy uses of 
biomass. Two of these may become more important: 
the use of wood wastes and chips for electricity genera-
tion (Helliwell and Cox I 975) and the use of charcoal 
for industrial processes (Nef 1964). Forest depletion in 
Britain was caused by the search for charcoal, and it has 
been argued that the coal-using elements of the indus-
trial revolution arose because of charcoal shortage. It 
may be that local industries will again revert to this very 
hot, pure fuel. 
lation explosions of pest plants and animals are 
likely to occur. Water yield and quality are likely 
to suffer if large areas are intensively cutover, as 
very little is known about how to forestall water 
problems in the tropics. The few techniques for 
water conservation that have been developed are 
seldom implemented, as the institutional struc-
ture is lacking. Effects of intensive forest use on 
soil structure and soil micro-organisms in the 
tropics are virtually unknown, but are almost 
certain to be negative. The commercial and 
environmental quality of the second-growth 
forest that will follow intensive forest use is 
another unknown. It will be lower than the qual-
ity of second growth that now follows selective 
logging, unless improved silvicultural tech-
niques are developed and implemented. 
The disturbances are not confined to the cut-
over areas but can spread out to cause river 
siltation, loss of groundwater supplies, and dam-
age to or loss of fish, botanic species, and birds 
and animals. 
The smooth adjustment of the world forest 
industry to the movement of the extensive margin 
from region to region would require that, in the 
tropics, the rapid rates of stand growth would 
permit its continuing reentry into export 
markets. A combination of selective logging and 
protection of young stands to maturity would 
ensure this natural rotation. But today's clear-
cutting promises a more dangerous disconti-
nuity. The tropical zone evidently cannot stand 
the surges of demand emerging as temperate 
forests play out, and either by planning or by 
neglect, its possible sustained output (per cen-
tury) may turn out to be as low as the temperate 
zone's. 
Thus, although forests may have an almost 
agricultural capacity to provide steady flows of 
wood and cellulose to world markets, they are 
likely to do so in ratchet-like fashion. The con-
suming countries may, by widespread purchases 
from numerous regions, succeed in smoothing 
out the lurching supplies. But a producing nation 
would not be well advised to rely on this industry 
as a source of steady employment or public 
revenue. 
Forestry Development 
The generalizations in the preceding sections 
have emerged from a historical and developmen-
tal examination of the economies within which 
forestry activity has been or is important. Here, I 
narrow the point of view to compare two devel-
opmental patterns between which the countries 
of Southeast Asia must choose if their future 
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forestry activities are to be more than autumnal 
gleaning among the gullies and stumps. 
Extensive Margin 
The extensive margin in forestry may be exam-
ined on two broad levels: the extension of the 
timber-producing area within a geographical 
region and the movement of timber production 
within particular countries as traditional forests 
are cleared. 
Immediately after World War II, all countries 
of Southeast Asia were characterized by under-
development in timber production, Small 
volumes of logs and sawn wood were exported 
from the Philippines and Malaysia, but produc-
tion was generally limited to supplying the needs 
of the indigenous population. Slow but steady 
increases in harvesting ensued during the 1950s 
and 1960s, with total exports continuing to be 
dominated by Malaysia and the Philippines. 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, despite increasing 
prices for all wood products, Philippine timber 
production failed to increase, and its total 
volume for export actually decreased. Malaysia 
had substantially increased both production and 
export volume. However, it was Indonesia that 
markedly shifted its production frontier. With a 
vast inventory of old-growth forests, it increased 
total production fourfold, between I 967 and 
1973, and now dominates the export trade 
around the Pacific rim (Table 1). 
A continuing reliance upon Indonesia has been 
forecast, with further expansion within the 
forests of the Philippines and Thailand limited by 
past harvests. The Malaysian province ofSabah 
has also already been extensively harvested, 
although it still has some unexploited areas that 
are under present prices and conditions commer-
cially inaccessible. Sarawak and Peninsular 
Malaysia, although exploited, have fairly large 
remaining stands of merchantable forest. Other 
future suppliers include Papua New Guinea and 
the Solomons. Both have been only lightly ex-
ploited, owing, for the most part, to the high costs 
of harvest. As the· real price of wood continues to 
rise, these regions should contribute substantially 
to world exports, especially of logs. Their har-
vesting costs are primarily the costs of transport-
ing the timber - a symptom of extensive forestry 
and, hence, of forest depletion. 
A new constraint on the extensive margin in 
Southeast Asia is the assignment ofland to forest-
ry. Hitherto, regardless of the standards of har-
vesting, it could be presumed that the area avail-
able would remain unchanged. Now food and 
fuel production challenges the claims of wood 
....: 
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exportation. Indeed, the short-run incentives for 
rapid replacement of trees by food crops have 
become overwhelming. The high expectations of 
the Green Revolution have proved illusory, as 
only one-half the last 20 years' increase in food 
supply can be attributed to more intensive agri-
culture. The other half has come as a result of 
agricultural expansion, virtually all at the 
expense of productive and commercially accessi-
ble forestlands (Barney 1980). 
In the Philippines, of the 14 Mha of original 
productive forest, 3 Mha had, by 1971, been lost 
through "legal" allocation to agriculture, with an 
additional l Mha deforested by shifting cultiva-
tors. Since that time, the losses to shifting cultiva-
tion have accelerated significantly. Conservative 
projections for the 1970s suggested that, of the 
annual loss into agriculture of 200 000 ha of 
forestland, 180 000 went into shifting cultivation 
(FAO 1976). Estimates indicate denudation of a 
total 5 Mha by 1978 (FAO 1979). 
Thailand is experiencing even more drastic 
forest clearing. Despite efforts to reduce defores-
tation through reforestation and conservation 
programs, the total stocked area suitable for 
commercial Jogging decreased by more than 8 
Mha between 1973 and 1977, an annual decrease 
of 10%. The remaining forestland, 13 Mha, is no 
more than was projected in 1970 for total com-
mercial forest in 1990 (F AO 1979). Shifting agri-
culture - estimated at 500 000 ha each year 
(Persson 1974) - and legal reallocation can be 
expected to deplete Thailand's productive capac-
ity in the future. Indeed, Barney (1980) projected 
total forestland to fall below 9 Mha in 1981 and 
to be effectively cleared as early as 1987. 
In Peninsular Malaysia, despite the absence of 
large-scale shifting agriculture, the productive 
commercial forest (3.3 Mha in 1979) is being 
harvested at a rate of 450000 ha/year. About 
80 000 ha/ year are reallocated directly to agricul-
ture. Total commercially accessible timber area 
in Sabah and Sarawak amounts to 5.2 Mha, of 
which at least 400 000 ha are designated for legal 
conversion to agriculture. Shifting agriculture 
affects 350 000 ha annually (F AO 1979). Such 
figures suggest that Malaysia will also face a 
severe drop in wood supply in the near future. 
Indonesia, with its vast expanse of commercial 
timber, is least affected by high levels of produc-
tion. Total operable forests are estimated at 42 
Mha, of which 18 Mha are slated for legal con-
version to agriculture. Slash-and-burn cultiva-
tion, having already depleted 30 Mha of former 
forestland, now affects an additional 150 000 
ha/year. The permanent forestlands, however, 
should allow Indonesia, over the next 20 years, to 
maintain or increase its total production (F AO 
1979). 
The past trends in forestland conversion for 
the entire region are astonishing; extrapolated 
into the future, they are ominous. The projected 
foodstuff requirements for this region will 
increase annually to the end of this century at 
between 3% and 4%, reflecting in part the 
expanding population levels, with a correspond-
ingly greater proportion of young people and 
higher real incomes (Barney 1980). The physical, 
economic, and social constraints blocking 
Southeast Asian societies from applying Green 
Revolution technology suggest that gains in food 
yields will be marginal and smaller than in the 
previous 20 years. Thus, an even greater percent-
age of food requirements must come from the 
extensive margin, or be imported. 
A final factor inducing countries to speed their 
deforestation is government concern for the bal-
ance of payments and for foreign-exchange earn-
ings. It is obvious that the temptation to realize 
the implicit capital gains represented by old-
growth forests may be irresistible, similar in kind 
to the windfalls of new oil discoveries. The alloca-
tion of forestland contains elements that compli-
cate exchange-balance choices - for example, 
the problems of satisfying increasing domestic 
demands for food, fuel, and paper products. As 
has already been shown, the forests must pay for 
most of the increased food consumption, if not by 
yielding land to farms then by providing logs to 
pay for foreign food. Similar foreign-exchange 
alternatives arise for _fuel and paper: either the 
forest provides fuelwood and chips for paper to 
domestic markets or it is stripped to pay for 
foreign oil and paper. For paper, the choice may 
be even more unfavourable to forest conserva-
tion, for domestic paper production involves· 
both heavy capital imports for new plant and 
equipment and reduced wood-export earnings. 
In brief, the extensive margin in Southeast 
Asia is cramped not only by problems of access 
and cost but also by new alternative uses of the 
land for food, fuel, and foreign exchange. So far, 
the most significant of these has been the conver-
sion from forests to fields, and this process is 
substantially outside the market. It is probable 
that the process will be completed in the next 20 
years: all suitable arable land will then have been 
denuded. After that, the progress of forestry will 
be governed by its own relative costs. 
These costs, as one would expect in the mining 
phase of harvesting old natural forests, will be 
largely those incurred in new areas (both in pres-
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ent producing regions and in new regions such as 
Papua New Guinea). In the next paragraphs, I 
turn to the determinants of the/u// costs of pro-
ducing new wood at the intensive margin. There 
is in fact a wide range of choices. Harvesting itself 
can be made more thorough and less selective; it 
can also be conducted in a fashion to encourage 
faster natural germination and growth. Beyond 
this are variants of plantation forestry, involving 
soil preparation, planting, spacing, thinning, 
protection, and log selection. These offer excel-
lent possibilities for growing immensely greater 
volumes of wood per unit of land. But the time-
lag is long. Thus, the producing region's problem 
at the extensive margin today is to decide how 
much land to keep in good growing condition to 
profit from the eventual depletion of other old 
forests and from the switch to the intensive 
margin. 
Intensive Margin 
The extensive margin cannot maintain or 
increase supplies of industrial and household 
wood. Materials for an ever-expanding wood 
products demand will be found on the intensive 
margin. By intensive margin, I mean not only a 
recourse to techniques similar to those in growing 
annual crops but also a less ambitious and more 
discretionary use of increased inputs in regions 
where most of the forest is young or is made up of 
stands rejected earlier. 
Many of the established silvicultural tech-
niques were first conceived in an agriculture-
forestry setting - artificial planting; thinning; 
weeding; and the introduction of fertilizers, 
pesticides, and irrigation. The application of 
these techniques will eventually lead to a fully 
determined or controlled forestry sector. Timber 
exploitation will become forest husbandry where 
humans using science and technology master 
nature (Scott 1962). Yet, if the objective, as the 
forester suggests, is to forestall the deforestation 
of the countryside by maximizing total produc-
tion of commercially valuable timber from each 
unit of land, then emphasis must also be placed 
on the efficiency and intensity of the harvest. 
Thus, two aspects of intensive production must 
be examined: the application of silvicultural 
techniques and the focus on efficient harvests. 
The intent of silviculture is to increase the 
commercial stock per hectare or, perhaps more 
specifically, to increase the mean annual incre-
ment (MAI) to usable stock. The techniques can 
be divided into two approaches: polycyclic ( selec-
tion) and monocyclic (plantation) systems. 
Polycyclic systems generally entail repeated 
harvesting of a mixed-aged forest where technol-
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ogy is aimed at increasing the survival and 
growth rates of desired commercial species by 
reducing the competition for space and nutrients 
through the elimination of noncommercial 
stands. Inducing the natural regeneration of spe-
cific species has proved disappointing in trials so 
far, although enrichment planting (the seeding of 
commercially valuable species on spots devoid of 
usable timber) and group planting(regional seed-
ing with the allowance for natural regrowth) have 
shown some success. 
In contrast, monocyclic systems eliminate the 
age mix as well as unwanted species. Land is 
usually cleared, then planted with pine, teak, 
eucalyptus, etc. The crop (or stock) is then inten-
sively managed until harvest. 
Recent literature has contained much debate 
about the relative efficiencies of these two sys-
tems and natural regrowth, and concerning crite-
ria for choosing between them. Here, I will briefly 
survey the arguments, which are focused more on 
the physical, than on the economic, attributes of 
each system. 
The production objective is to supply sufficient 
raw materials to maintain the timber industry as 
a permanent feature of national economic devel-
opment and diversification. Low annual yields 
per hectare are considered to reduce employment 
opportunities, retard the creation of necessary 
infrastructure, and reduce the wood-processing 
sector. Higher yield than is possible with natural 
regeneration is therefore thought imperative. 
A polycyclic system can produce yields three to 
four times those of natural regrowth. Thus, for 
many foresters, the rather low establishment 
costs together with relatively high yields per hec-
tare clearly indicate that the polycyclic system 
" ... shows a promising future" (Chai Domingo 
1975). 
The MAI for insular Southeast Asia in 1970 
was 1.2 mJ /ha (an average 5 mJ /ha for second 
growth forests and 0.1 ml/ha for virgin timber-
land). FAO projections of this increment rise to 
2.8 ml/ha in 1980 and to 4.5 ml/ha by 1990, 
reflecting increased use of silvicultural 
techniques. 
The development of polycyclical forests has 
encountered greater problems than expected. 
The large rise in energy costs in the 1970s meant 
fertilizers and pesticides increased substantially 
in cost. Furthermore, many of the technical 
aspects of planting, thinning, weeding, and the 
like were developed in and for temperate cli-
mates. These techniques may not suit tropical 
areas and the tropic-specific technology now 
being developed may not provide substantial 
increases in harvestable wood. Perhaps the over-
riding difficulty with polycyclic systems, how-
ever, is that the harvesting techniques entail the 
destruction of relatively large areas surrounding 
the stands of trees. Thus, the advantage of mixed-
age forests - the fact that the harvesting of 
potentially valuable but as yet immature timber 
may be postponed until growth is complete -
may be nullified. 
Monocyclic systems in general have manage-
ment practices of much greater intensity, magni-
fying both the advantages and the difficulties. 
The incentives for forestry to follow in the foot-
steps of monocultural agriculture, to become 
eventually a totally managed crop, are indeed 
inviting. Given an industrial yield, averaging 
annually, 20 mJ /ha (pine plantations yield more 
and fast-growing hardwoods such as eucalyptus 
may yield 25 m3 /ha), the entire industrial 
demand projected for roundwood in the year 
2000 could be met by 100 Mha of plantation land, 
or less than 4% of the world's forested area. And 
this, state the optimists, without any of the tech-
nical innovations that have characterized the 
development of intensive agriculture (Sedjo 
1981). 
The technical disadvantages of highly intensive 
plantations, however, are great. Although the 
effects of a monoculture on soil and water condi-
tions are not understood, preliminary evidence 
suggests breakdowns in land productivity, loss of 
humus, desertification after cutting, and destabil-
ization of water flows by the disturbance to 
moisture-absorbing watersheds. In addition, the 
plantations' lack of biologic diversity, both in 
timber crop and flora-fauna mix, can threaten 
the fragile tropical ecosystem. Considerable risk 
to the crop arises from the intense infestations of 
insects and from disease. 
No conclusion has been reached by foresters in 
this debate. Yet, to the economist, the arguments 
(particularly those emphasizing the monocyclic 
systems' superiority in MAI) are peculiar in that 
they tacitly assume that volume increment equals 
value increment. Yet, in forestry, as in other 
enterprises, national prosperity calls for a plan to 
maximize the net returns to inputs, for a focusing 
upon the systems' benefits and costs not merely 
on their incremental physical capabilities. 
The benefits associated with each system are 
simply the sum of the total value of wood prod-
ucts produced, measured by their future market 
prices, and the total value of the social benefits 
accruing to the system (these may include envi-
ronmental effects, the value of employment as a 
social good, and the like) measured by their rele-
vant social shadow prices. 
The costs are the total value of all inputs -
wages, capital, managerial expenses, etc. These 
have been most neglected in the forestry-systems 
debate. Two are particularly important. The first, 
often the bulk of capital investment, is not the 
establishment cost or the maintenance cost of a 
particular system but the opportunity cost of 
retaining the growing stock as standing timber. 
Faustman clearly recognized as far back as 1849 
that even if its opportunity cost for some other 
productive activity (say agriculture) is zero, 
forestland still has an opportunity cost; one can 
harvest early to cultivate a faster-growing stock. 
This cost of holding capital is rarely included. 
The second is a cost more recognized in forest 
husbandry: the act of waiting or, more succinctly, 
time, measured through the device of compound 
interest. Total input costs are compounded for-
ward to the day of harvesting, or, equivalently, 
future benefits are discounted back to the pres-
ent. This is not the place to discuss the difficulties 
associated with measuring future wood values, 
social shadow prices, or even the discount rate to 
be applied. Given the long rotation periods of 
nonplantation systems (50-70 years), virtually any 
positive interest rate will result in a drastic cost. 
Suffice it to say that including the capital costs 
of holding forests and of waiting for the returns 
on inputs is believed to cause any benefit-cost 
comparison of the two systems to favour the 
monocyclic system with its relatively shorter 
period of investment ( 10-20 years) over the non-
plantation alternative (50-70 years). 
Yet, this outcome is far from certain. Even a 
long rotation forest with low yield per hectare 
may prove the best in economic terms if future. 
log prices are expected to be high and rising or 
establishment costs are sufficiently low. Like-
wise, fast-growing, high-yielding plantations, if 
characterized by high cultivation costs or low 
per-unit future prices, may be poor financial 
investments. The World Bank policy of extend-
ing long-term, low-interest loans for forest devel-
opment implicitly alters this discounting factor 
and so increases the benefit-cost ratio of long-
period systems. 
However, many forest planners have tended to 
ignore the cost of time as an input. For example, 
enrichment planting has been considered eco-
nomically viable because initial investment costs 
of M$610/ha are lower than plantation man-
agement costs (M$943/ ha). Yet, if rotations of60 
years and 20 years respectively are assumed with 
an historically low real interest rate of 3%, then 
the compounded cost of enrichment planting is 
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more than M$3700/ ha compared with 
M$ l 730 /ha for the plantation. This comparison, 
based on extreme assumptions, suggests how dis-
astrous may be the neglect of capital costs and 
how great may be the political and managerial 
incentives to neglect the well-meant advice of 
those who want to save the forests in the most 
costly way. 
As for consideration of social costs (and bene-
fits), forest planners rightly give weight to non-
commercial goals when comparing the two 
systems. But they do so in a nonquantitative 
manner. Thus, they tend to favour a regimen that 
adds to economic and social stability rather than 
to cut-and-run forest harvesting, which is said to 
be both socially disturbing and unjust from a 
distributional point of view. Economists are 
rightly critical of these all-or-nothing justifica-
tions of systems, but so far they have contributed 
less than their science is capable of. 
The real payoff from benefit-cost studies of 
alternative systems comes from optimization: 
modifying or combining rival systems to increase 
their net benefits. For example, some attempts 
have been made to offset the waiting costs of the 
monocyclic system by cultivating farm crops 
between trees (taungya). A farmer is given an 
area to clear and sow. The forest department 
plants trees on the same plot. Weeding and fertil-
izing are by-products of farming, which is con-
tinued about 3 years. By then, the tree should be 
well enough established to withstand the ele-
ments. Not yet sufficiently studied, this type of 
project may well represent a better use of land 
and other resources than does farming or inten-
sive forestry alone. 
Indeed it is not yet clear that intensification of 
tree culture will ever require the plantation 
approach. Roger Sedjo (1981) is optimistic, 
recently writing that plantations are " ... the 
most profound phenomenon being experienced 
in the forest resource area." But will they be a 
significant source of wood? Even if the proposed 
world plantation area of21 Mha for the year 2000 
is achieved, this can supply only 10-20% of pro-
jected annual demand. Actual conversions to 
plantations have, in general, fallen far short of 
proposals. In Peninsular Malaysia, total conver-
sions between 1976 and 1979 were only about 
50% of proposed plantings. In Sa bah in late 1976, 
some 240 000 ha were set aside for fast-growing 
plantations; yet by 1979 only 550 ha had been 
seeded (FAO 1979). Even FAO projections for 
insular Southeast Asia indicate that total culti-
vated forests, including enrichment planting, will 
increase by fewer than 100 000 ha between 1980 
and 1990 (FAO 1970) - and this in a region that 
22 RENEW ABLE RESOURCES 
in 1978 produced more than 75 x 106 m3 of indus-
trial roundwood. Thus, the application of silvi-
cultural and agrisilvicultural techniques and the 
introduction of industrial plantations can only be 
viewed as long-term remedies for shortages. 
The opposite end of the producing spectrum, 
that is, the harvesting of timber, may give greater 
reason for optimism about intensification as a 
means to profitable increased supply. Part of the 
incentive for silvicultural use and plantation 
development is the prospect of greater homoge-
neity of commercially merchantable timber. 
Tropical forests are notorious for their great var-
iety of timber species; Sarawak forests, for 
example, comprise 600 major species and Papua 
New Guinea at least 200. In addition, an undesir-
able age mix is often present in tropical forests, 
particularly those of virgin timber. At present, 
much of the timber ofuncommercial diameter is 
simply left to be destroyed by the slash-and-burn 
operations of prospective farmers or is lost dur-
ing felling of larger, more desirable trees. Selec-
tivity in species and age mix have resulted in what 
may be considered, from a forester's point of 
view, a serious underutilization of forestland in 
much of Southeast Asia. In Peninsular Malaysia, 
for example, only 35-40% of the standing timber 
is harvested as a wood product and, in areas 
slated for agriculture, quick clearing results in a 
loss, for commercial purposes, of 80% of the 
timber (FAO 1970). 
This waste has perhaps the greatest potential 
for increased wood production from presently 
harvested forests. The recovery of secondary spe-
cies and small-diameter woods is not a dramatic 
intensification. It involves evolutionary, not 
revolutionary, changes in the practices ofloggers 
and consumers, and research on the possibilities 
inherent in exploitation rather than in silvicul-
ture. Parallels with agriculture recur, this time 
with the study of the Green Revolution. What is 
needed is economic research on the profitability 
of more thorough recovery. The focus on the 
logging enterprise would supplement that on a 
hypothetical, perhaps mythical, tree-growing 
enterprise. 
Benefits from Forest-Sector Development 
If an island were suddenly faced with offers to 
clear its forests and export the products, the 
government - whether it had the power to reject 
the demand or not- would like to know whether 
to use its policy instruments to encourage or dis-
courage a logging and clearing industry. What 
benefits, or costs, would be perceived and what 
other conditions must be satisfied to achieve net 
benefits? I have found little economic literature 
on this question. I have, therefore, drawn from 
works on other industries in developing coun-
tries: mining, agriculture, and manufacturing. 
Social Effects 
By "social benefits or costs," I refer to the net 
gains from the different sorts of society that come 
with different policy "packages." At one extreme 
is the forest society, characterized by hunting, 
slash-and-burn farming, and a nomadic way of 
life for a small, scattered population. Inter-
mediate is the forest-husbandry society, engaged 
in planting, protecting, thinning, harvesting, 
transporting, and milling trees - a small but 
settled rural population. At the other extreme is 
the cleared-forest society, typical of much of the 
Americas, where land use involves farming, 
industry, with a forest fringe waiting to reinvade 
any areas abandoned by the industrial-residential 
economy. 
Thus, to reap social benefits from forestry, a 
society must choose where to place itself within 
this spectrum. The choice is unfamiliar and rarely 
debated; yet decisions are made, explicitly or 
implicitly. For example, when a public forest is 
felled or when conservationists keep forests free 
from farming and urban development a choice is 
being made about the intermediate case. Whereas 
the selected policies seem usually to be part of a 
quest for a better natural environment, there is 
good evidence that they are also elements in 
building a better regional social system. In British 
Columbia, for example, successive Royal Com-
mission reports to the provincial government on 
a public-lands policy of perpetual-uniform-
sustained-yield emphasized contribution to social 
stability more than profitability. 
The cleared-forest extreme is more familiar, 
involving abandoning the forested way oflife but 
retaining a small forest industry and some lands 
in parks and reserves for recreation and observa-
tion. The recreational and economic benefits of 
setting aside forested areas are plentiful and rela-
tively sophisticated. 
What my island community needs is a body of 
expertise to discuss these society-type conse-
quences of forest decisions. Present literature, 
valuable as it is, may not help. An essentially 
urban, Western society debating how much of its 
remaining wild lands to preserve from intense 
industrial or residential development is not pro-
viding the necessary analysis for a developing 
society that may yet choose to eschew agriculture 
and urbanization (Burch 1977). 
Environmental Effects 
The forest produces not only wood of various 
dimensions and qualities but also water flows, 
animal pasture, recreation, and an environment 
for flora and fauna. Any help or hindrance given 
by forestry operations to these multiple uses is 
usually thought of as forest externality. It often 
makes just as much sense to think of wood pro-
duction as an externality of watershed protec-
tion, soil erosion, avalanche prevention, farming, 
range management, or wildlife conservation. 
Although some of these joint products of the 
forest are strictly commercial, others are environ-
mental services of forestry outside the market-
place worthy of special political consideration in 
decisions on forest policy. They are usually con-
sidered because they are important to local 
people. But, because of their possible effects on 
carbon dioxide, air circulation, humidity, parti-
cles and chemicals in the atmosphere, the policies 
may be important to neighbouring countries and, 
indeed, to the whole world (D'Arge 1976). 
Most forest environmental effects are the 
result of the rate of logging, burning, and clear-
ing. At some logging rate, no adverse environ-
mental effects will result, and a good way of 
dealing with much environmental damage in 
frontiers is to slow down production not to give 
up or postpone it altogether. The important thing 
is that a country should consider alternative rates 
of forest depletion and regrowth. 
Stability 
Among the problems of a forest economy is 
that its chief exports, timber products, are prey to 
extreme· fluctuations in demand and price. Log-
ging communities are not only nomadic but also 
prone to intense booms and depressions. 
Demand for timber below that expected trans-
lates into reduced employment and increased 
average capital costs - costs that are partially 
offset in the harvesting sector by the accumulat-
ing volumes (and presumably values) of commer-
cial timber from the uncut areas but that are 
unmitigated in the processing sector. 
In a world of unstable timber markets, then, 
part of the price for developing a forest-based 
economy may be instability, although some prod-
ucts of the forest, notably fuelwood, pulp and 
paper, and recreational facilities, are less affected 
by external cycles and may indeed be less 
depression-prone than mining, manufacturing, 
or service industries. Furthermore, forest hus-
bandry and protection, by offering some 
employment even when markets are poor, may 
tend to stabilize the larger economy. Of course, a 
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forest-products exporter does not have to accept 
market instability passively. It may join with 
other producers to form a cartel and thus help 
make the price. The newsprint industry is fre-
quently alleged already to indulge in interna-
tional price-fixing, and it is conceivable that a 
cartel could force industrial buyers to take fixed 
quantities annually, thus stabilizing employ-
ment. It is more likely, however, that price-fixing 
would make employment and output fluctuate 
even more widely. On balance, a country that 
chooses to rely on forests must expect to be 
dependent and unstable. It cannot even choose -
as with a farm economy - to be self-sufficient 
unless it wishes only to eat game and fish, berries 
and bark, burn twigs, read paper, and take shelter 
in wooden buildings. Furthermore, the forest 
industry is typically vertically integrated, with 
developing economies supplying raw materials 
and developed economies supplying the capital 
and know-how. Hence, the markets will be far 
from perfect. Raw material may be transferred 
outside the country in exchange for bookkeeping 
entries in the accounts of multinational firms. 
Within the country, too, forests will be allocated 
by administrators and politicians to loggers in 
return for investment, bribes, or political 
favours. The forest may seem to melt into world 
markets with little public return. These dangers 
provide good reason for a nation to move slowly 
into trade while forest-alienation pricing and tax-
ing are developed. Whereas the slow but repeated 
discovery of minerals often gives a host nation 
many decades over which to learn how to dispose 
of mining rights profitably, the visibility of 
forests may mean that they are sold and under the 
axe before a good public sale of'lease policy can 
emerge. 
Employment 
In Canada, 54 000 wage earners and another 
20 000 small contractors, woodlot owners, and 
reforestation workers produce 1.57 >< 10s m3 
roundwood annually or about 20 000 m3 per 
worker. (Half of this production comes from the 
industrially organized British Columbia region. 
In 1950, half came from Ontario and Quebec, 
where part-time and farm workers brought in 
much of the harvest.) These workers amount to 
about one-quarter of the total labour force 
directly involved in wood products, there being 
about three workers in sawmills, plywood mills, 
and various pulp and paper mills for every one in 
the woods, and perhaps as many more involved 
in related transportation, materials handling, 
and supplying industries. 
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Operations in the woods were once labour 
intensive, although further processing and finish-
ing has always required equipment and struc-
tures. In North America, today, much of the 
harvesting is done mechanically. Softwoods yield 
easily to machines, and many new machines have 
been invented to replace the former teams of 
humans and beasts who worked for days to fell, 
buck, and remove a large tree. Sawmills and ply-
wood plants now tend to use more workers per 
unit of wood than does logging. In pulp and 
paper, however, capital is heavily utilized. In 
pulp mills, the atmosphere is like a hydroelectric 
generating station; the workers are separated 
sometimes by hundreds of metres of mostly 
automatic machinery. 
Because labour intensity is not inherent in the 
material or the market, it varies from country to 
country. Trees are cut, on smallholdings or by 
contract in large forests, by labour-intensive 
methods in areas where real wages are low and 
capital is scarce. The observant economist would 
guess that a logging function has a smoothly 
changing rate of substitution between inputs. 
Opportunities for Local Capital and Enterprise 
Although much of the forest industry is verti-
cally integrated, the forestry sector offers consid-
erable opportunities for local participation. 
Operations in the woods are everywhere being 
subcontracted to local cutters and transporters, 
and plantations provide an opening for local cap-
ital and unskilled labour. A country that does not 
have the managerial skill and the ability to accept 
the serious risks inherent in running plantations 
could consider joint ventures for the purpose. 
Pulp and paper plants are another possibility and 
are particularly attractive because their profit-
ability is not as closely linked to on-the-spot 
managerial skill as is that of sawmills. The skill, 
care, and frugality in the use of raw material 
determine the competitiveness of a sawmill, and 
experienced hands are abundant at the final 
market. 
These considerations will suggest to the 
decision-makers in the island economy that one 
option is to combine a forest-harvesting economy 
with a policy of compulsory local processing in 
milling timber and also in making pulp and paper 
and furniture. Many governments use their 
forests as an instrument for encouraging indus-
trial develop.ment. But a local-processing policy 
is like a protective quota. The round logs are sold 
for what they can get from local millers. Thus, the 
rent from the trees is diverted to mill profits (and 
wages) while the forest owner (usually the general 
taxpayer) gets a smaller royalty or tax revenue. 
The milling industry dies if the forest is cleared, 
and ifthe government shortens its life by acceler-
ating the permitted rate of logging. However, a 
local-processing policy may actually discourage 
the annual rate of logging- for example, iflocal 
processors offer too low a price for the raw mate-
rial or if investors demand a guaranteed flow of 
wood for a stated number of years (Pearse 1976). 
The absence of open log markets in new log-
ging communities combines with the declared 
risk aversion of investors to persuade the 
government to give the required guarantee. In my 
opinion, forest investors extravagantly exagger-
ate their need for certainty in this respect. Expe-
rience in Europe, eastern Canada, and southern 
United States, and elsewhere shows that sawmills 
and pulp and paper mills can, if they must, sur-
vive by bidding for wood in an open market. 
Naturally, they prefer not to have to do so and 
take great pains to persuade host governments to 
assign them large blocks of public forestland in 
return for large-scale investment. Their demands 
are sometimes said to be a response to political 
risk, but collectively they entrench government 
power and so add to political risk. The foreign 
investors are putting their trust in the political 
dedication of a forest to their investment, rather 
than in a traditional property right or in an open 
market. Their insistence on dedication, like all 
vertical integration, tends to narrow the market 
and thus becomes the justification for a non-
market wood allocation. Sometimes the fault lies 
with local governments, however, their enthusi-
asm for development leading them to agree to 
more than is required. The alternative methods of 
log disposal from public lands have been dis-
cussed by McKillop and Mead (1976) and by 
Pearse (1980). 
Backward Links 
Like those of other natural-resource industries, 
such as fishing and mining, the basic operations in 
forestry generate a demand for relatively simple 
products. Because both husbandry and harvest-
ing are scattered over marginal areas, the greatest 
demand is for trucks and the routes to drive them 
on: roads, bridges, and other works of the civil 
engineer. These must be built and maintained. 
Although local enterprises may be forced to 
import the needed equipment and systems, they 
can sell and stock them; offer repairs, tires, and 
parts; and build special assemblies such as trail-
ers, cranes, cradles, wharves, chutes, and so on. 
Furthermore, if the woods operations are 
remote, buildings or whole villages or camps may 
be needed with the catering, merchandising, and 
maintenance trades that constitute infrastructure. 
Typically these have been boom towns, lasting 
only as long as the logging operation. The back-
ward links, like a large bubble, create both 
incomes and skills but not for long. The burden 
of this instability may be passed backward 
through the forest-product industry to a variety 
of mushrooming industries. 
Considerations such as these are often used to 
support politically imposed, sustained-yield poli-
cies that would ameliorate the economic impact 
of cut-and-get-out industry practices. The econ-
omist's judgment on these policies should depend 
on his or her estimation of the mobility and versa-
tility of the labour force. Boom towns often 
become ghost towns with stranded secondary 
industries. But this outcome, distressing as it 
appears, matters less than what happens to the 
skills of those who acquired them during the 
active period. The question should be whether 
these skills can easily be put to work elsewhere. 
If, on this criterion, the industry's boom-and-
bust behaviour is likely to be serious, a govern-
ment can force the industry to bear the burden of 
construction and displacement of "company 
towns." This approach, of course, limits not only 
the disturbance to the host economy but also the 
benefits to its local enterprises. 
Regional Development 
Each nation has problem regions in which 
growth lags behind the national average. Forest-
ry investment can play a major role in economic 
and social development of such regions if 
demand has caught up with the high costs or low 
quality of the local forest product. In British 
Columbia and Quebec, the forest industry has 
been a major employer and basic activity in 
otherwise inactive areas. Indeed, because it is a 
renewable resource, the forest promises con-
tinued direct and indirect demand in isolated 
regions far from large markets or sources of 
supply; it may be said to be an excellent instru-
ment for regional development. It can meet the 
usual tests: it can employ a fair number of local 
people or attract outsiders who can become per-
manent residents; it can gradually expand its 
purchases from local firms; and it can offer 
infrastructure in the form of roads, bridges, and 
communities that may be of use to other indus-
tries entering the region (Gillis and Beals 1980). 
In their contracts for timber rights, governments. 
can insist on these conditions without utterly de-
stroying the profitability of logging and milling. 
Logging alone, however, cannot exercise much 
developmental force. Manufacturing of ply-
wood, cut lumber, pulp and paper, and specialty 
wood products is required for development to 
GENERAL STUDIES: SCOTT 25 
have any magnitude. The demands of these pro-
cessing industries for prolonged supplies may 
tend to slow a region's rate of cutting so that the 
developmental boom matures into a permanent 
increase in regional output, instead of a hectic 
construction-and-clearing episode. 
Economists should remember that using the 
forest industry as an instrument of development 
has its own drawbacks and costs. Slow cutting, 
while permitting the local establishment of large, 
processing industries, deprives other regions of 
raw materials or industries that might bring a 
greater development. The principle of compara-
tive advantage suggests that exporting round 
timber is, at times, better for the whole economy 
than propping up an isolated region by compul-
sory full exploitation of its forest resource. In 
particular, the main national gain from the forest 
industry may often take the same forms as in oil 
and gas: revenue receipts from royalties, land 
payments, and taxes. These will be largest when 
the forest is sold at its highest price. A good test is 
whether a nation, exporting roundwood for a 
good price, would choose to siphon the proceeds 
into its most backward regions to assist their 
development. If it preferred to help the retarded 
regions' people in some other way, a logging-
export ban should be avoided. 
Transfer of Technology 
Backward links to suppliers and forward links 
to processors are intimately related to issues in 
the transfer of technology. Because such activi-
ties as timber harvesting, milling, and advanced 
processing require adaptation of standard inter-
national techniques to regional species, terrain, 
climate, labour, and market, a policy to encour-
age local processing may not only diffuse tech-
nology along the forest frontier but also mean 
that the techniques are ingeniously adapted. 
Little systematic information is available 
about the global transmission of new knowledge. 
Multinational corporations transfer and licence 
their new sales and processes to their own subsid-
iaries and associates, and sales of modern equip-
ment are often accompanied by training. Users 
learn about new processes from their customers, 
employees, and moneylenders, or read trade 
magazines. Both appropriate technology and 
induced local innovation become diffused 
through complex knowledge networks that, with 
the exception of the multinational-firm channel, 
require considerable investigation. 
It is not enough for new ideas to promise more 
than existing methods, someone must convince 
capitalists and moneylenders that they are worth 
investing in and that they will fit into the tradi-
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tional rhythms of the local society. Techniques 
that change family life, status, hours of work, or 
skills may be unacceptable. 
These considerations largely determine the 
rate of modernization in forestry, as in other 
sectors. The Jogging and transporting stages 
probably become modernized fairly rapidly. In 
the first place, the migration of Jogging from 
stand to stand and forest to forest provides 
numerous opportunities for reconsidering 
methods. Second, new workers may be undertak-
ing logging in each new region, uncommitted to 
and perhaps unfamiliar with traditional 
methods. Third, the costs of energy and machin-
ery are substantial enough to encourage technical 
change in the various substages of Jogging. 
Finally, risk is a weaker deterrent in forestry than 
. in peasant agriculture. Whereas farmers face the 
all-or-nothing risk that a new crop or technique 
will fail and expose their families to starvation, 
small logging is often a secondary or off-season 
activity. Large-scale operations, at the other 
extreme, are the preoccupation of more diversi-
fied and well-financed contractors or owners for 
whom the risks of new methods are Jess 
inhibiting. 
More sophisticated stages of forest produc-
tion - plantations, pulp and paper mills, veneer 
and plywood plants - can also benefit quickly 
from innovations if a government engages in 
astute joint ventures. Much of the technology is 
available in packages, the stipulations of which 
are often open to negotiation. Common stipula-
tions include wood-supply guarantees, tax con-
cessions, industrial-relations arrangements, and 
the right to use foreign personnel. Many of these 
stipulations are put forward by would-be inves-
tors as means to avoid risk. 
The transfer of technology goes beyond the 
immediate forestry industry to the consumers. 
The growth of a logging industry is likely not only 
to increase local timber purchases but also to 
spark the invention of new processes for using 
forest products in place of traditional materials. 
A new lumber-export trade, for example, may 
not only encourage the house-building industry 
but also induce it to invest in methods that use 
lumber rather than other materials. Indeed, 
because the further processing and using indus-
tries are often the same industry, the whole conti-
nuum of technical advance must be considered as 
one. 
Nathan Rosenberg(l972) is helpful on all these 
matters: 
In order to exploit the vast forest resources of 
the country, the United States in the first half of 
the nineteenth century brought to an advanced 
stage of perfection a whole range of woodwork-
ing machines .... During this same period per 
capita lumber consumption in the United States 
may have been as much as five times as high as in 
England and Wales. 
By the 1950s American woodworking 
machinery was generally acknowledged by 
Europeans to be the most sophisticated and 
ingenious in the world. The relatively limited 
degree to which these machines were adopted in 
Europe, however, seems to have reflected the 
fact that they were, in many ways, wasteful of 
wood- a consideration much less important in 
the United States than in Great Britain in the 
first half of the nineteenth century. 
A similar profligacy in wood consumption 
persisted within the household so long as wood 
supplies were locally abundant.Under these cir-
cumstances, fireplaces were designed to accom-
modate large logs, an arrangement which was 
wasteful of fuel wood but economized upon the 
labor-intensive activities of cutting or chopping 
wood. [As wood became scarce, better furnaces, 
stoves and fireplaces were installed to use pieces 
of wood more efficiently.] 
Five points on the transfer of technology are 
worth reiterating. First, much wood technology 
is simple, being based on cutting tools and trans-
portation systems and can be easily transferred to 
a developing economy. Second, being simple and 
standardized, it can easily be picked up by local 
people and diffused into other industries. Third, 
the logging and husbandry industries adapt to 
local problems by inventing new variants on for-
eign methods. Fourth, some processing technol-
ogy, such as that in pulp and paper mills, is 
sophisti~ated and will have to be obtained from 
specialized consulting engineering firms and fac-
tories. The technology is normally obtained in a 
package, the components of which should be 
examined closely by the host country. Fifth, the 
processing and consuming industries adapt to 
wood availability and price by inventing new 
methods and products. 
Comparative Advantage 
The mere possession of large, forested areas of 
acceptable quality does not justify turning an 
economy to forest products activities. Other uses 
of labour and capital may be more rewarding. 
The different labour-capital-land ratios within 
forestry and between forestry and other indus-
tries determine whether, and to what extent, the 
forestland should be developed. 
If neither labour nor capital were mobile inter-
nationally, then the greater a country's forest 
endowment (adjusted for quality), the more 
likely it would be that capital will find its way into 
forest production instead of general manufactur-
ing or agriculture. In the capital-intensive parts 
of forestry (pulp and paper manufacture, for 
example), factor ratios are quite inflexible, so 
that low wage rates in developing countries are 
unlikely to lead to increased use oflabour. But in 
logging, low wages may induce the retention or 
adoption of labour-intensive techniques, espe-
cially if subcontracting or payment by piece rates 
is the practice. 
If capital, but not labour, were mobile, as it is 
with multinational corporations, joint ventures, 
or financing by foreign customers, the national 
capital endowment would be augmented, and 
both capital-intensive methods in the woods and 
a mix of processing that involves capital-
intensive products would be encouraged. Infra-
structure, forest protection, and "waiting" for 
new rotations in a permanent-yield enterprise are 
also likely candidates for absorbing foreign capi-
tal, or for diverting capital from manufacturing 
and services. The fear of loss of tenure or of plant 
expropriation could lead investors to behave as 
though they were working under conditions of 
extreme capital shortage: cut-and-get-out forest-
ry combined with minimal investment in process-
ing and transportation. Fuel would continue to 
be the leading domestic output of the forest 
endowment. Of course, to counter this, a 
government might adopt an all-or-nothing 
development strategy, refusing to grant firms 
access to the forests without an agreed undertak-
ing of both long-term husbandry and investment 
in large pulp mills. 
Thus, a country that finds its forests within the 
price range of world demand could experience 
restructuring of its economy in a fashion that 
depends upon the availability of capital. A 
capital-poor country without access to foreign 
enterprise could mine its forests, shipping logs as 
final product, without regard to further crops. 
Very fast production would, however, be unlikely 
because the capital shortage would deprive the 
industry of the roads, ports, and other infrastruc-
ture needed for sudden deforestation. 
If the same country were better endowed with 
capital, the demand for wood products would 
tend to_ draw capital and labour from agriculture, 
manufacturing, and services, and increase 
investment in more selective and less damaging 
logging and capital-intensive processing mills. It 
is obvious from examining old developed econ-
omies that investments in processing plants, in 
complementary skills, and in marketing channels 
might be more durable than the forest. A demand 
for housing, certainly, would survive. Then the 
export trade in wood might swing around to an 
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import trade, to keep the final-demand industries 
in business. 
If the developing economy cannot supply capi-
tal, then the absence or poor quality of some 
types of infrastructure will raise the costs or lower 
the attractiveness of investment. In the case of 
mining, this dearth would probably raise the 
price that must be obtained in the world market 
for production to be worthwhile. Even with min-
ing, however, the operations would be smaller-
scale, i.e., less production per year per unit of 
natural resource, than they would be if capital 
were more plentiful. The reason is that capital 
scarcity can be revealed in another way: by with-
drawing "waiting" from the enterprise and min-
ing as rapidly as divisible labour and capital will 
allow. This is a partial application of a famous 
double-effect of capital scarcity in exhaustible 
resource production: although the scarcity tends 
to increase the impatience of resource holders to 
remove ore, at the same time it tends to ration the 
capital equipment needed to increase the removal 
rate. The final direction of output change is 
unpredictable unless one has full knowledge of 
the capital costs and production functions. 
Higher interest rates could actually justify an 
increased rate of investment. 
The same model applies to forestry, where pro-
cesses have smoother production contours and 
the range of techniques is wider than in mining. 
Under capital scarcity, the forest complex would 
have two characteristics. First, processing would 
tend to be confined to the most labour-intensive 
products: round or squared logs, posts, or large-
dimension unplaned lumber; the fuller utilization 
involved in plywoods, pulp and paper, and the 
whole wood-chip economy would be avoided. 
Second, operations in the woods would be of a 
most destructive nature, the enterprises endeav-
ouring to economize on road building, protec-
tion, and waiting and to avoid the expense of 
logging in such a way as to encourage the later 
further growth of immature trees and the regen-
eration of clearcut lands. Political risk, also seen 
as a cost of capital in developing countries, could 
work the same way. 
Finally, if both labour and capital were inter-
nationally mobile, capital shortage would not 
prevent investment in reforestation and planta-
tions nor in capital-intensive processing plants. 
Annual forest output would probably be within 
the bounds of the legal (or profitable) annual 
allowable cut - that rate of output that would 
allow production to continue indefinitely. Forest-
ry could encroach heavily on land previously 
allocated to farming, pasture, or hunting. In 
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other words, if capital and labour are in elastic 
supply, the chief shift in comparative advantage 
is from agriculture to forest products and sectors 
linked to it. The rest of the economy would be 
unchanged. 
This discussion of the adaptation of a country 
to the introduction of a forest-product industry 
can be extended into a three-stage analysis of the 
balance of payments or the terms of trade. To do 
this, one must know the cause of an export boom. 
I have suggested a cause that seems important in 
the Pacific region: rising incomes exhaust other 
sources of supply. Magee and Norman postulate 
a rise in demand, following Harold Innis's staples 
theory in mentioning a technological break-
through that increases derived demand. Innis and 
others also suggested changes in tastes, transpor-
tation, and techniques of raw-material exploita-
tion. Stage II may be a period of full-out produc-
tion, in which there may be rising costs and com-
petition from similar forest economies in other 
societies. Here, with respect to forestry, I have 
suggested that costs need not rise if capital is 
sufficiently available for the supplier to enter at 
once on a sustained yield of highly processed 
wood products. Otherwise, the supplier will be 
essentially mining the forest and must run into 
increased costs, inviting competition. In their 
stage III, Magee and Norman and I agree that 
substitution of "synthetic" materials with the 
same desired characteristics for an indirect utility 
function may move materials production from 
the forest to developed countries or to countries 
rich in some ubiquitous input that is the chief 
input into the synthetic. 
A country that develops a wood-products 
industry that has about the same factor composi-
tion as its previous leading industries will have an 
adjustment problem in terms of trade but should 
easily accommodate the change. In contrast, if 
the logging sector and its linked processing indus-
tries have factor compositions different from 
those in the sectors it supplants, the change might 
result in a redistribution of the national "pie" for 
labour, capital, and land. 
The redistribution is likely to start with an 
export boom that appreciates the currency and 
thus exposes other industries to invigorated 
competition. If these industries are land-
intensive, the shift of labour and land from agri-
culture to forestry may be speeded up, but it does 
not usually take a change in the terms of trade to 
drive marginal farmers into higher-paying forest 
or millingjobs. Large areas of land would proba-
bly not be switched from food crops to trees: 
rural poverty might actually reduce migration 
from the farms, increase land hunger, and inspire 
politically directed farm encroachment into for-
ested areas. 
The impact on manufacturing would depend 
on the sources of capital. A capital inflow for 
pulp and paper mills and other forest investment 
would accentuate the rate of exchange but reduce' 
the migration of capital from other domestic 
industries. Later, foreign dividends, rents, or 
interest payments might have the reverse effect. 
If there were no such capital mobility, the rise 
of the forest industry and the export boom 
would, if there were investment in infrastructure 
and pulp mills, weaken manufacturing and tend 
to lower the real wage relative to capital rental. 
My previous suggestion that large exports could 
result from small rates of investment - the cut-
and-get-out approach - indicates the endless 
possibilities among national structural reactions 
to the growth of a forest sector. The similarities 
between forestry and mining and oil production 
(Gregory 1976; Kindleberger 1961) should not 
blind one to the fact that forests are a renewable, 
or potentially perpetual, resource like agricul-
ture. Whereas structural adjustments made for 
mining will have to be reversed when the minerals 
become depleted, a forest industry is permanent 
if developed for sustained yield - a development 
that depends on profitability as measured by 
product price, land rent, and capital availability. 
Revenues and Tenures 
Many who have studied the place of mining 
and forestry in developing countries assert that 
the main benefits from natural resource produc-
tion are public revenues. Why do they make this 
claim? 
When roundwood is exported, there may be 
few benefits to the state or its economic develop-
ment apart from various forms of revenue. The 
chief reason is that, because most land is poten-
tial forest, the system of farmland taxation has 
been widely applied to forested land. Further-
more, the system of personal taxation has been 
applied to year-round earnings, whether from 
farming or logging. Consequently, the yield of 
the forest to public revenues tends to look small. 
In at least one type of forest economy, this 
revenue is indeed small. When property rights to 
the forestlands have not been securely assigned or 
when it is too costly for either private owners or 
public forest managers to enforce their exclusive 
rights, rental and taxation opportunities are lost. 
Both forest production and forest-product con-
sumption go undeclared and untaxed. 
In general, no forest operator has an incentive 
to report exploitation of the forest. In the 
extreme, the common property problems recog-
nized in the fisheries literature will occur: an eco-
nomically inefficient exploitation of forest 
resources with a dissipation of rents. 
What is missing is some system of tenure and 
taxation. Where rights to the forests have not yet 
been alienated, if politically feasible, it may 
increase economic efficiency to assign rights ran-
domly, giving away the forestlands outright, 
imposing an appropriate tax-collecting scheme, 
and leaving the burden of enforcement on the 
new owners. If such drastic and clear alienation 
of public lands were infeasible, a government 
could insert regulatory and financial controls at 
the export or processing stage to ameliorate the 
property-less and lawless regime in the woods. 
When trees and wood in various sizes and degrees 
of finish are forced to pass through the markets, 
the reported values as well as the volumes acquire 
some acceptable meaning to statistician and tax 
collector alike. Indeed much official forest 
finance today involves the laborious procedure in 
which stands are appraised or assessed back-
wards by the net values that emerge only in the 
final stages. 
Public forest revenue is complicated by the fact 
that much forestland is publicly owned. In gen-
eral, public ownership gives the authorities a 
choice among (or a combination of) five types of 
revenue: 
• The forest, trees, and soil may be sold out-
right into private ownership. Thereafter the pub-
lic revenue derived from forest operations will 
usually be confined to taxes on production, 
income, land, or inheritances (wealth). 
• An annual or periodic licence or lease may 
be sold to operators or loggers, permitting them 
to enter the forests and cut trees over a specified 
area. The fee or rental tends to be a flat rate per 
unit area, regardless of forest quality. 
• A royalty or an amount of money per physi-
cal unit of wood removed can be paid. If there has 
been an appraisal, then the royalty can be 
expressed in percentage terms. 
• The right to remove certain or all trees from 
the stump can be sold at a price that usually 
depends on an appraised value. 
• A contractor can be hired to cut the trees for 
the public agency. 
Each of these techniques has enforcement and 
collection costs as well as compliance costs for 
the operator. I have arranged the revenue sources 
in order from the least costly to enforce to the 
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most expensive. In new forest economies where 
little apparatus exists for enforcement, 
measurement, or evaluation, the authorities 
often dispose of most of their rights by sale of the 
forest. Licences and leases are almost as simple to 
administer and comply with. Royalties require 
knowledge of the annual operations in the 
woods, whereas timber sales and contractors 
require detailed measurement, estimation, and 
monitoring. 
A second way of comparing these methods of 
alienation is to examine their fertility. The timing 
and amount of revenue obtainable need not differ 
greatly between them if they are used with dis-
crimination. However, outright sale or disposal 
of the forest at an early date tends to be unremun-
erative; fairly often, early disposal at a low price 
is regarded as a means of encouraging new forest 
operations. Licences and leases too are fre-
quently handed out at a flat rate that does bring 
in an annual renewal revenue, sometimes for 
many years, but often at a low rate. Royalties 
often bring in more and are more often levied at 
special rates for special sites or species. Timber 
sales (or "stumpage") and hiring contractors to 
cut for the public can in principle capture all the 
rent or surplus from the operator. 
A third way of comparing them is in their 
impact on operator behaviour. Some charges, for 
example, fail to reward good forestry practices or 
give a strong incentive to take a short-term, nar-
row, view of the forest's potential. I will cover· 
these effects only briefly, as they are the subject of 
an extensive specialized literature. This literature 
is somewhat overblown because revenues may be 
linked to tenures, stipulations in the tenures, and 
regulations and orders that have a greater effect 
on forest practices than mode of levying the 
revenue. The ideal is private ownership. This 
gives the operator incentives to grow, protect, 
and harvest trees in a way that will maximize the 
present value of the property. Trees at the time of 
'acquisition are both potential crop and produc-
tive capital. 
Compared to this ideal, all other tenures are 
temporary or are feared to be temporary. They 
lack the power to induce the harvester to log in 
such a way as to assist regeneration in the manner 
that an owner would select, and the public agency 
either must impose regeneration-assisting log-
ging practices or must take care of regeneration 
and protection itself. Because of the costs of the 
latter, public forest revenue is overstated, for part 
of it must be reinvested. 
Licences and leases do not give certainty about 
access to trees in the next few years, or in future 
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rotations; therefore, the holder has an incentive 
to cut and get out. Furthermore, the annual 
licence fee is a carrying charge additional to 
implicit interest for "waiting," protection costs, 
and a risk premium; these will all tend to shorten 
the holder's estimate of the ideal cutting age. Of 
course, tenure could be guaranteed for a long 
period; for that matter, licences and leases could 
be perpetual, in which case there would be little 
difference between the jdeal and the tenures, 
apart from the licence fee. 
Forest alienation by royalty can be shown to 
have a small effect on the choice of cutting age 
even though the fees are not carrying charges; 
usually, however, the practice is that the operator 
is given only a few years in which to log, pay the 
royalty, and get out. Hence, the only effect of a 
royalty is likely to be high-grading. In the selec-
tion of sizes, species, or sites for harvesting, units 
of the crop that cannot carry the specific royalty 
charge per unit will be left behind. Probably, too, 
they will be damaged because selective logging 
usually harms other trees and sites. The public 
forest service must prevent, or treat, land and 
capital destruction. 
Timber sales by stumpage usually have no 
effect on cutting age because the operator is given 
only a short period within which to log. If the 
stumpage fee is correctly set, there may also be no 
incentive to high-grade. As a harvesting tenure, 
therefore, timber sales for stumpage lack only the 
characteristic of encouraging regeneration 
practices. 
Finally, I should say a little more about public 
ownership; the advantages of ownership cannot 
be divorced from the obligations. The owners 
must pay to make sure that they are collecting all 
the rent that is in excess of the amount needed to 
cover the real costs of harvesting and to make 
sure that their, or their tenants', employees are 
looking after. the long-term needs of the forest as 
a source of future crops. Either the tenure must 
contain provisions that somehow tend to be self-
enforcing in these two respects, or the owners 
must play an active role in monitoring and in 
operating in the woods. One way to handle these 
costly functions is to maintain a forest service 
that employs experts to perform these services. 
The danger of a forest service is that it may apply 
costly theories of forest regeneration, protection, 
or harvesting and that it may even be corrupt. 
Many people advocate keeping the forests public, 
whether run by a forest service or not; the reasons 
cited are to reduce the risk that the public will lose 
all the rent in one unwise transaction and to make 
more flexible the adjustment of forestland for use 
in pasturage, watershed protection, fuel supply, 
and recreation. 
I think one should be a little skeptical about 
such generalizations. Although they are roughly 
correct as description, there are viable alterna-
tives. There is no absolute reason that private 
owners cannot be compelled to pay taxes that 
transfer the rent to the public purse; nor is there 
any reason that they cannot be bribed or regu-
lated in such a way to provide the alternative or 
extra forest services needed by the society. Prob-
ably apprehen~ions about administrative diffi-
culties, political susceptibilities to landed inter-
ests, enforcement costs, and the political power 
of the forest bureaucracy provide, among them, 
the explanation for the permanence of public 
forests rather than regulated private ownership. 
I will now consider revenues from regulated 
private forests. The owners are usually subject to 
taxes and to regulations about cutting in some 
places. (The State of Washington has a law to 
compel conservation of private forestland.) The 
owners must pay to protect their property from 
thieves and trespassers; to maintain healthy 
crops; to finance thinning and spacing, road 
building, and harvesting; to cover implicit or 
explicit interest as well as price variability. How-
ever, I want to discuss only their taxes. 
There are four main types: 
• Taxes on private or corporate income from 
forest operations - the rules for such taxes usu-
ally make some arbitrary distinction between 
increase in value of the standing capital and 
revenue from the crop by dealing in a special way 
with "capital gains." 
• Death duties - the need for liquidity to pay 
these duties may cause the owners, especially if 
they are landed families, to cut the trees for cash 
to keep the land. 
• Property taxes - these can be a heavy carry-
ing charge, inducing owners to shorten rotations 
or to cut and get out completely after one crop. 
Various intricate formulas and concessions have 
been worked out to prevent "double taxation" of 
the land, its roads and other improvements, its 
forested capital, and its intermediate and final 
crops. 
• Yield taxes - these can take the form of 
output taxes, royalties, or severance taxes on 
physical or value units. 
The principles I have used in discussing the 
forms of tenure and charge on public lands can 
also be applied to these four types of tax on 
private lands. The reader will see that income, 
corporation, and death taxes tend to be neutral, 
having little or no effect on the timing of cutting, 
the incentive to high-grade, or the profitability of 
long-term investment in repeated cropping. 
(However, the actual rules and definitions for 
these taxes can have discouraging or even disas-
trous effects on forest practices.) Property taxes 
are usually criticized as rewarding short-horizon, 
cut-and-get-out forestry. Yield taxes tend to be 
neutral with respect to timing but discourage the 
use of marginal stems or sites. In other words, a 
lump-sum tax on the present value or "rent" 
would, in the absence of uncertainty, be the least 
distorting type of forest tax. The income or net 
royalty tax can be a good substitute. 
To the economist, the tax or charge and the 
tenure are all-important. There are two reasons. 
First, most of the benefits will be smaller ifthe tax 
distorts harvesting or forest management. They 
may fade away entirely ifthe tax and tenure erode 
the incentive to keep the forest intact. Thus, the 
benefits of forest activity depend on complemen-
tary tenure and tax policies that may bring only a 
small revenue. Second, the other benefits may be 
too small, relying on income-destroying obsta-
cles to free trade and to efficient private perfor-
mance. If so, only the public's share of the rent 
can be considered to be a benefit at all. 
More should be said on this second point. It 
may be that from the highest point of view, the 
economy of an "island" or isolated forest society 
would benefit most by a depletive policy. The 
rent from the first crop, like the rent of a mine, 
may be all that is worth realizing. Later growth 
may be just a delayed bonus, a free bequest to 
later generations. If this is so, there is little to be 
said for establishing an elaborate processing 
industry, encouraging dependent backward 
links, or spending on infrastructure apart from 
what can be quickly started and later abandoned. 
That is an extreme case; few forests are so struc-
tured that no part of them will repay careful and 
costly harvesting and some planting, protection, 
and road maintenance. The intermediate cases 
put the greatest burden on the design of the 
revenue system. A way must be steered between 
taxes like mining taxes that capture much of the 
rent for the state (there being no future after the 
resource has been exploited once) and those like 
agricultural or manufacturing taxes that encour-
age husbandry, conservative attitudes, long-run 
investment, and selective logging. The choice 
between these two extremes will dictate both the 
amount of public revenue and the benefits in the 
form of growth and employment that can be 
obtained from the forest. 
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Fig. 1 illustrates the policy choices. The 
assumptions are that most of the nontax benefits 
from forestry have some sort of present value 
placed on them by the state; that most of these 
benefits accrue from a permanent forest industry, 
renewed and cropped so that yield is sustained; 
that another separable benefit is net public 
revenue, from the proceeds of which many of the 
other benefits could be provided by other means. 
The diagram shows combinations of net public 
revenue and long-term forest renewal that bring 
equal discounted total benefits to the state. 
The bell-shaped curve shows the assumed pos-
sible net revenue yield of forest policy. It is 
assumed that the net yield is greatest when only 
part of the forest is managed for long-term crop-
ping and renewal, for both tax-revenue and 
public expenditure reasons. 
The best position is at X. In many forested 
regions Xis very close to the peak of the revenue 
curve, and the other benefits are therefore some-
what incidental to revenue maximization. But 
where forestry is found to be an instrument of 
development, the indifference curves will have a 
steeper slope, the optimum position will be to the 
right, and the revenue obtained is only one of the 
benefits of forest policy. Forestry will be brought 
under control to take place alongside agriculture 
as an important permanent activity. The steep 
slope of the indifference curves conveys a finding 
that, at the margin, forestry is more important for 
what it does for development than for the money 
\\\ 
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Fig. 1. Policymaking onforest renewal. 
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that could be gained from liquidation. In other 
words, money would not buy what the forest 
contributes by other means to national welfare. 
Conclusion 
This paper indicates the wide range of choice 
available to developing countries fostering a 
forest industry. Forest operators have flexibility 
in that neither the land-labour-capital ratio nor 
the time pattern for growth and processing is 
fixed. There exists not only a wide variety of 
mixtures of forest rotations, processes, and prod-
ucts but also an extensive array of tried and 
untried techniques that can be adapted to local 
terrain, costs, markets, skills, climate, etc. 
There is room for choice in how long to make 
the forest rotation, how much to invest in silvicul-
ture and protection during each period, how 
much of the existing stands to harvest, how much 
of the land to allocate to agriculture and wood 
production, and what techniques to use in replac-
ing national stands and plantations. 
Although many forest economists see these 
choices important only in their relationship to a 
continuous wood supply for developed-country 
markets, the forests - and decisions about 
them - are instruments of national develop-
ment. A decision to take advantage of high prices 
. today involves a sacrifice of development tomor-
row. Yet, it may be one of the only options for a 
developing economy whose forests represent a 
badly needed source of foreign exchange. A 
commitment to a continuing forest economy, 
involving slow liquidation and replacement of 
trees, is a choice with great promise for develop-
ing countries with substantial forest resources. 
I am indebted to James Johnson for participation 
that went well beyond the obligation of research assis- · 
tance and to John Bene for comments based on pro-
found experience. 
Editors' note: Discussion for this paper was combined 
with that for the following one and begins on page 48. 
Optimizing the Use of Ocean Fish Resources 
in the Context of Extended National Jurisdictions 
Parzival Copes 
Centre for Canadian Studies and Institute of Fisheries 
Analysis, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada 
The 200-mile fishing limit has created opportunities for improved use of the oceans' fish 
resources by bringing most of them under the authority of coastal states. Overexploitation of many 
stocks has been halted, but much remains to be done in developing national management systems 
that are socioeconomically rational and administratively effective. The new legal regime has created 
new problems of boundary determination and transboundary stock management. It has left unre-
solved the problem of fisheries management on the remaining high seas. It has favoured coastal 
states relative to distant-water fishing states and, in general, has brought immediate benefits to the 
former. In the long run, improved fisheries management made possible by the 200-mile limit may 
provide benefits on a global scale. 
L'instauration d'une zone de peche de 200 milles a contribue a ameliorer !'exploitation des 
ressources halieutiques, dont presque toute la reglementation releve des etats riverains. On a ainsi pu 
eviter la surpeche de diverses especes mais ii reste encore beaucoup a faire pour mettre au point des 
systemes de gestion rationnelle au niveau economique et administratif. Le nouveau cadre juridique a 
fait apparaitre de nombreux problemes, notamment dans la determination des frontieres et la 
gestion des stocks transfrontaliers. Par exemple, la gestion des pecheries en de~a des 200 milles reste 
sans solution. Les etats riverains qui en general, tirent des revenus rapides des peches, se voient done 
plus favorises que !es pays eloignes des cotes. A long terme, la gestion plus rationnelle des peches 
maritimes rendue possible par la determination de la zone de 200 milles, pourrait offrir des avantages 
a tous !es etats pecheurs. 
A new international fisheries regime, based on 
coastal state control of 200-mile fishing zones, 
came into effect in 1977.I This development has 
momentous consequences for the use of fish 
resources. It has brought most of the world's fish 
stocks under national jurisdictions, where they 
may be rationally managed, in contrast to their 
previous uncontrolled exploitation. The new 
regime holds promise for improved conservation 
and, in the long run, better economic returns 
from fishing operations. Meanwhile, many exist-
ing fish harvesting and marketing operations are 
facing problems of dislocation, and the balkani-
zation of fishing jurisdictions is generating 
numerous boundary problems with negative side 
11n international fisheries affairs the nautical mile is a 
common unit of measurement. It is equal to 1.151 stat-
ute miles or 1.852 kilometres. Throughout this paper 
the term "mile" means nautical mile. 
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effects. The national property rights, established 
by the 200-mile limits, are also having a signifi-
cant impact on the distribution of benefits 
derived from the use of ocean fish resources. 
The Enclosure of the Oceans 
Hugo Grotius, the renowned Dutch jurist, 
wrote in 1625 in his treatise, De lure Belli ac 
Pacis: " ... the extent of the ocean is in fact so 
great that it suffices for any possible use on the 
part of all peoples for drawing water, for fishing, 
for sailing" (Johnston 1965: 166). This notion 
was used by Grotius and his followers to reject 
national claims to jurisdiction over large stretches 
of the seas, such as those advanced by Spain and 
by Portugal. It was held that the vastness of the 
oceans precluded effective enforcement of 
national rights, except over a narrow coastal 
margin measured by the limit of a cannon shot 
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(Christy 1975). Thus, the 3-mile territorial limit 
emerged as a standard in international law. This 
limit was also accepted in respect of fisheries 
jurisdiction. It was not seriously questioned until 
after the Second World War. 
For centuries, Grotius' notion that the world's 
marine fish resources were virtually inexhausti-
ble endured, although it was acknowledged that 
heavy fishing in a limited area could deplete local 
stocks. During the 20th century, a clearer percep-
tion of the limits of the world's fish supplies grad-
ually emerged. Scientific exploration demon-
strated that new stretches of the oceans were 
relatively barren. After the Second World War, 
advanced technology, in combination with a vast 
expansion of fishing fleets, increased fishing 
capacity to levels undreamed of in previous 
times. Pressure on the commercially more attrac-
tive stocks mounted rapidly. By the 1960s, many 
of these stocks were threatened with serious 
depletion. 
Unfortunately, the legal framework for the 
oceans made it difficult to do anything about 
overfishing. Outside the narrow territorial limits 
in which coastal states exercised jurisdiction were 
the "high seas," over which no authority held 
sway and to which all nations had unimpeded 
access for purposes of fishing. The common-
property resource literature has demonstrated 
convincingly that open-access fisheries are sub-
ject to massive external diseconomies that take 
the form of overexploitation.2 The primary 
reason is that fishing operators have no property 
rights to the resource. They have no incentive to 
conserve fish stocks for optimum exploitation 
over time, because any fishes that they leave in 
the water are liable to capture by rival operators. 
As a solution to overexploitation, fisheries 
economists generally have called for a limitation 
on fishing effort. Where stocks are entirely within 
waters under the jurisdiction of a single state, the 
government can introduce public management 
that conserves fish stocks by curbing effort. In 
fact, over the last few decades an increasing 
number of fisheries falling under jurisdictions of 
individual states have limited access and effort 
management. 
The absence of authority to limit access on the 
high seas has left fish resources in international 
waters prey to unrelieved overexploitation. 
Attempts to manage fishing effort for various 
stocks of fish on the high seas through interna-
tional commissions have been largely ineffectual. 
2The basic theory was introduced in seminal articles 
by Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1957). 
Whereas such commissions have sometimes been 
successful in achieving mutual agreement among 
fishing nations, banning particularly destructive 
fishing practices, they have generally not been 
successful in curbing fishing effort. Member 
countries rarely agree on the shares each should 
receive from a limited catch, particularly when 
there is a threat that nonadhering nations, as 
"free riders," will take unlimited catches with 
impunity. 
World fishing pressure was greatly increased 
after the Second World War when large distant-
water fishing fleets were established by several 
countries, of which Japan and the USSR were the 
most prominent. The fleets consisted of powerful 
and technologically sophisticated fishing vessels, 
together with supply and other support ships. 
Many of these fleets were highly mobile and 
capable of exploiting fish stocks around the 
globe. The success of distant-water fleets in tak-
ing increasingly large harvests of valuable fish in 
competition with local fleets was viewed with 
alarm by countries off whose coasts the distant-
water fleets were operating. Thus, a basic conten-
tion arose between coastal nations and distant-
water fishing nations. Coastal states concluded 
that the only way to curb overexploitation was 
for them to manage the stocks along their shores; 
they advanced the proposition that, on equity 
grounds, they should be accorded preferential 
rights to adjacent fish resources, particularly 
when local communities were dependent for their 
livelihood on such resources. 
Generally, new rules in international law may 
be introduced either through the adoption of an 
internationally negotiated convention (treaty 
law) or through the wide recognition of claims 
made by individual countries (customary law). In 
fact, a combination of the two was used to 
advance the claims of coastal states to extended 
fisheries jurisdiction (Moore 1980; Copes 1981 b), 
culminating in a general recognition of the 200-
mile fishing limit in 1977. 
The confinement of the coastal states' jurisdic-
tion to the traditional 3-mile territorial sea was 
challenged with increasing force and frequency 
after World War II. The Truman doctrine, pro-
claimed in 1945 on behalf of the United States, 
posited coastal-state rights to the resources of the 
continental shelf (Watt 1979). It did not claim 
coastal-state entitlement to the fish in the super-
jacent waters. But the doctrine did propose that 
coastal states should be entitled to establish 
fisheries conservation zones in waters along their 
coasts provided the rules did not discriminate 
against any countries fishing in the area. 
Encouraged by the Truman doctrine, a 
number of Latin American countries in the late 
1940s and early 1950s laid claim to a full 200-mile 
jurisdiction in fisheries (and other) matters (Hol-
lick 1977; Watt 1979). During the next 2 decades, 
similar claims were put forward by others. How-
ever, there were no major maritime or industrial 
powers among them. Indeed, the major powers 
resolutely resisted the claims. With a few excep-
tions (Peru, Ecuador, Iceland), no serious 
attempts were made to enforce the claims. 
Claims for modest extensions of coastal juris-
diction fared better. Claims for a 12-mile territor-
ial limit - although not recognized by some 
major powers such as the United States - were 
passively accepted. By the early 1970s, the 12-
mile limit was claimed by a majority of coastal 
states so that it had become, in effect, a new 
international standard. Attempts were also made 
to change international law through the adoption 
of global conventions. To this end, the First Law 
of the Sea Conference was held in Geneva under 
United Nations auspices in 1958. Fisheries ques-
tions constituted a significant part of the agenda, 
but many other important matters concerning 
the use of the oceans were also under 
consideration. 
The conference passed a set of conventions, 
one of which was the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas, which was subsequently ratified. It set 
forth a number of high-minded principles about 
the use of the living resources of the oceans for 
the benefit of all but achieved little change in 
fisheries exploitation practices. One modest 
change came about through the companion Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, which recog-
nized coastal-state rights to the continental shelf. 
This brought with it an exclusive right of the 
coastal states to explore and exploit" ... living 
organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is 
to say, organisms which, at the harvestable state, 
either are immobile on or under the seabed or are 
unable to move except in constant physical con-
tact with the seabed or the subsoil." Many stocks 
of molluscs and crustaceans were thus brought 
under coastal-state ownership. 
Significantly, members at the First Law of the 
Sea Conference failed to agree on an appropriate 
width for jurisdictional limits. The Second Law 
of the Sea Conference, in Geneva in 1960, failed 
to pass any additional convention, but some 
promising new approaches did receive substan-
tial support. Particularly noteworthy were pro-
posals for the recognition of a "functional" juris-
diction for limited purposes, such as fisheries. 
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Strong resistance to wide zones of jurisdiction 
came from major maritime powers, who feared a 
loss of freedom for navigation on the high seas. 
Past practice had been that coastal states held 
sovereign jurisdiction over all matters within 
their territorial seas. If coastal states were given 
wider limits for specific functions only - such as 
fisheries exploitation - the universal right to 
freedom of navigation would not be jeopardized. 
Canada worked hard to promote the concept of 
functional jurisdiction (Gotlieb 1964) and at the 
second conference proposed a "six-plus-six" rule, 
entitling coastal states to a 6-mile territorial sea 
with an extra 6-mile zone in which the coastal 
state would control fisheries. The proposal failed 
to gain the required two-thirds majority by a 
single vote. 
Acting on its own proposal for a functional 
fisheries jurisdiction, Canada in 1964 unilaterally 
proclaimed a 9-mile fishing zone beyond the 3-
mile territorial sea. There was no challenge to this 
position, as the total did not exceed the increas-
ingly common limit of 12 miles. Canada extended 
its fisheries jurisdiction still further in 1970, when 
a full 12-mile territorial sea was proclaimed and 
"fisheries closing lines" were established to 
enclose large bodies of water that were sur-
rounded mostly by Canadian territory (Gulf of 
St. Lawrence, Bay of Fundy, Queen Charlotte 
Sound, Hecate Strait, and Dixon Entrance) .. 
Canada claimed only exclusive fishing rights in 
these additional waters, thus maintaining the 
feature of functional jurisdiction. 
The overexploitation of many of the commer-
cially attractive fish stocks became increasingly 
apparent during the 1960s (e.g., in both northeast 
and northwest Atlantic waters) and heightened 
the concern of coastal states, who regarded with 
alarm the growing share of the harvest taken by 
distant-water fleets. To this was added the con-
cern of newly independent states of the Third 
World, who feared depletion of stocks in their 
coastal zones by distant-water fleets before they 
acquired the capacity to utilize those stocks 
themselves. These concerns were an important 
element in the pressures that led to another 
attempt for international agreement through the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which was convened in 
1973. 
UNCLOS III was meant to produce a conven-
tion of a grand new design, covering all impor-
tant aspects of a legal framework for the world's 
oceans. The task proved even more arduous than 
anticipated. Working through a long series of 
sessions, the conference members appeared close 
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to agreement on a formal Draft Convention 
(United Nations 1980a) by early 1981. However, 
a decision by the new Reagan administration in 
the United States to engage in a thorough reap-
praisal of the draft has led to indefinite post-
ponement of a conference vote. 
The first full session of UNCLOS III, which 
was held in Caracas in 1974, provided a forum in 
which coastal fishing nations were able to express 
their concerns and press their case to consider-
able advantage. Most of the developing countries 
(i.e., those with coastlines) together with a signif-
icant group of developed countries argued the 
coastal state case for extended fisheries jurisdic-
tion. The distant-water fishing nations were out-
numbered. Thus, the 200-mile fishing zone 
quickly became the standard of expectation and 
the basis of negotiation at the conference. That it 
would be universally accepted at an early date 
was soon considered a foregone conclusion. 
The formulations developed at UNCLOS III 
for coastal state control of fisheries focused on 
the concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ). In this zone, coastal states would 
control exploitation both of seabed resources 
and of the living resources (fisheries) in the 
"superjacent" waters. The former, of course, were 
already under coastal state jurisdiction as a result 
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf. 
Unfortunately, a number of nonfisheries items 
on the agenda proved quite contentious, slowing 
the work at UNCLOS III. Anxious about the 
depleted fish stocks, many coastal fishing states 
had decided by 1976 that they could not wait for 
the conclusion of the conference and the ratifica-
tion of a convention before taking action to pro-
tect coastal fish resources. Encouraged by the 
apparent consensus on a 200-mile fishing zone 
that had emerged at the conference, they gave 
notice of their intention to proclaim 200-mile 
limits. Many reluctant countries were persuaded 
to join in. By the end of 1977, most of the world's 
coastal nations had claimed 200-mile zones, 
including all the major maritime powers, as well 
as most of the industrialized nations and the great 
majority of the developing countries that 
possessed coastlines. 
Some of the countries have confined their 200-
mile claims to fisheries matters, whereas others 
have claimed a full EEZ or complete territorial 
rights. The last claims, undoubtedly, will remain 
subject to challenge, but there can be no doubt 
that, from 1977, the 200-mile coastal state fishing 
jurisdiction achieved international recognition. 
The coastal states that had not proclaimed 200-
mile zones by the end of 1977 have mostly done so 
since. The enclosure of ocean waters within 200 
miles of land for fisheries purposes is now virtu-
ally complete. 
World Fisheries Production 
F AO data indicate that world fish production 
has increased persistently - with only minor 
interruptions - since World War II. The total 
world catch rose from 17.7 Mt in 1948 to 65.0 Mt 
in 1978.3 A detailed scrutiny, however, shows 
that output has dropped in some areas. The catch 
for the northwest Atlantic declined from a record 
4.6 Mt in 1968 to 2.8 Mt in 1978. Considering the 
continued high levels of fishing effort that were 
applied in this area after the decline set in, one 
can only conclude that the stocks of commercial 
fish in this area have been seriously depleted. It is 
noteworthy that the northwest Atlantic has been 
a major target area for distant-water fishing 
fleets. 
In other areas - the northeast Atlantic, the 
eastern central Atlantic, the Mediterranean and 
Black Sea, and the northeast Pacific - harvests 
have also declined after a period of historically 
high catches. All of these areas are characterized 
by mature, technically advanced local fisheries, 
by distant-water fishing activities, or by both. 
The signs suggest that here, too, the stocks are 
being overexploited. 
The rise in the overall world fish harvest, 
despite a decline in the catch from several stocks, 
simply indicates that additional fisheries or pre-
viously unexploited stocks are being opened. 
This is made possible by advances in technology 
and expanded investments in fisheries, both 
adding to fishing capacity. Population growth 
and increasing real incomes are raising the 
demand for fish products continuously, provid-
ing the incentive for an expansion of fishing 
activity. 
There are limits to sustainable output from 
wild stocks of fish. The conditions of unlimited 
entry that have applied to most fisheries until 
recently have meant that many of the commer-
cially attractive stocks have drawn so high a level 
of fishing effort that they have been depleted to 
the point of falling annual yields. This condition, 
in fact, is more widespread than F AO statistics 
suggest because the opening of new fisheries 
often masks the decline in catch from existing 
fisheries. Overexploitation tends to affect partic-
ularly the most valuable fish stocks, for these are 
JU nless otherwise indicated the data in this pa per 
have been taken from FAO yearbooks of statistics. 
the stocks that have a potential for yielding 
higher rents if exploited at optimum output 
levels. As the theoretical literature in fisheries 
economics indicates (Gordon 1954), this poten-
tial rent tends to be dissipated by overexploita-
tion in open-access fisheries. 
Not all declines in fisheries output should be 
blamed on overexploitation. Pollution or habitat 
degradation and occasionally nature appear to 
blame. For example, the spectacular collapse in 
1972 of the Peruvian anchovy stocks (by far the 
world's largest single fishery in terms of physical 
yield) was largely the result of natural circum-
stances (Caviedes 1975), although exacerbated 
by excessive exploitation. 
There has been much speculation regarding the 
ultimate potential for food production from the 
oceans (Carroz 1973). No accurate estimates are 
available - or possible. One FAO paper specu-
lates that the annual production of living organ-
isms in the oceans is of the order of 100 000 Mt 
but notes that most are small microscopic plants 
and much of the rest is zooplankton (FAO 1970: 
282). Only a tiny proportion is represented by 
species of fishes and other animals of a range of 
size utilized by people. 
Estimates have also been made by F AO of the 
potential yield of larger fishes and other animals 
that have been the subject of major fisheries in 
recent times. The total, aggregated from esti-
mates for different fisheries areas and species 
groups, was 118 Mt (FAO 1970: 281). In another 
study, Fullenbaum (1970) estimated maximum 
sustainable yields (MSY) by species for various 
world fisheries. The aggregate of these estimates 
is an MSY of 120 Mt- remarkably close to the 
F AO estimates. Given 1978 world catch levels of 
65 Mt, this suggests that output from conven-
tional sources could not quite be doubled by 
concerted effort. 
The figures may be misleading in that the MSY 
for many fisheries is not attainable, e.g., because 
part of the stock is too remote or scattered to be 
fished effectively. Also, it may not be possible to 
achieve the MSY for some stocks simultaneously 
because of interspecies relationships. For 
instance, increasing the catch of a species that is 
the food supply. of another species would reduce 
the numbers of the latter. 
In any case, it may be economically infeasible 
to pursue the MSY for many stocks because 
diminishing returns (lower catches per unit 
effort) would make higher exploitation levels 
privately unprofitable and socially unjustifiable. 
Moreover, MSY is generally considered an unde-
sirable goal economically, because marginal 
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costs for the fishery as a whole tend to exceed 
marginal revenue for the fishery at the MSY 
level. Fishing generally should be conducted so 
that stock levels are higher and effort levels are 
lower than those compatible with MSY. How-
ever, in some cases - with dynamic considera-
tions and a positive social discount rate, for 
example - effort levels should be equal or 
greater than those compatible with MSY (Clark 
and Munro 1975). 
Although it may be both impossible and unde-
sirable to achieve a full MSY from convention-
ally utilized fish stocks, it may prove quite feasi-
ble to produce total harvests in excess of the 
MSY output from conventional stocks. The 
reason is that many unutilized or barely utilized 
stocks will probably be attractive enough for 
exploitation in the future. So far, the majority of 
stocks of cephalopods (squids, etc.) and other 
molluscs have not been exploited (Gulland 1971). 
Even greater opportunities are offered by krill, 
consisting of tiny crustaceans. The potential 
annual harvest of krill from the Antarctic has 
been estimated at 50 Mt or more (FAO 1970). 
Other unconventional stocks representing a large 
harvesting potential include red crabs, lantern 
fishes, deep-sea smelts, and sandlances (Carroz 
1973). The output of much of the unconventional 
species would have to go into such products as 
fish paste, fish flour, and fish meal, although this 
might induce the transfer of other catches from 
fish meal to food for human consumption. 
Thus, total annual harvests from the oceans 
may eventually reach 150-200 Mt, three times the 
current level. Undoubtedly, the per-unit value of 
most of the additional output will be far below 
that from conventional species. However, the 
terms of trade for conventional fish supplies have 
improved steadily over the last few decades, as a 
result of increasing demand and an absolutely 
limited natural production capacity. The rise in 
real prices of conventional fish should leave 
increasing economic room for exploitation of 
unconventional stocks. The pace at which har-
vesting of unconventional stocks develops in the 
future will depend on many factors related to 
technology, market conditions, and production 
costs (Kasahara 1972). 
The New Ocean Regime 
A consensus that coastal states should have 
control of fisheries within 200 miles of their 
shores was established in the early plenary 
debates ( 1974) of UN CLOS Ill, but the rules of 
coastal state control had yet to be defined within 
aglobalframework. Early in UN CLOS III, it was 
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agreed that further debate and negotiation 
should be guided by a document containing a 
draft for a comprehensive new convention on the 
law of the sea. Such a document was introduced 
at the conference in 1975 under the title Informal 
Single Negotiating Text (United Nations 1975). 
The document underwent substantial amend-
ment, as UNCLOS III ran on through session 
after session. The document finally emerged in 
1980 as the Draft Convention (United Nations 
1980). The fisheries sections of the negotiating 
document had overwhelming support, and, after 
some slight revisions at an early stage, they took 
permanent shape. 
When countries around the world rushed to 
proclaim their 200-mile limits in 1977, the nego-
tiating document at UNCLOS III (at that stage 
referred to as the Revised Single Negotiating 
Text) provided ready reference to a set of widely 
acceptable rules for fisheries control. Several 
countries, including the United States and 
Canada, explicitly accepted the rules specified in 
this document as the basis of their 200-mile 
claims and agreed to abide by its provisions. 
Other countries implicitly accepted the docu-
ment, by framing their 200-mile legislation in 
conformity with its provisions. Several countries 
claimed more than fishing rights in their 200-mile 
EEZ, and some claimed jurisdiction for a full 
200-mile territorial limit. The most extensive 
claims are unlikely to be recognized by the world 
community - at least not in the foreseeable 
future, but, as a minimum, the 200-mile fishing 
jurisdiction has secured virtually unanimous 
recognition. Also, the fisheries provisions of the 
Draft Convention appear to be so widely 
accepted that they have become de facto interna-
tional law, even though they have not been for-
mally adopted at an international convention. 
Article 56 of the Draft Convention accords to 
each coastal state " ... sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources" in an EEZ 
extending beyond a 12-mile territorial sea to a 
distance of 200 miles from a coastal baseline. 
Article 61 gives the coastal state responsibility for 
conservation of the living resources in its EEZ, 
and Article 62 requires the coastal state to pro-
mote the objective of optimum utilization of 
these resources. 
The coastal state is assigned the task of deter-
mining the total allowable catch for each fish 
stock in its EEZ, but" ... where the coastal State 
does not have the capacity to harvest the entire 
allowable catch, it shall ... give other States 
access to the surplus of the allowable catch." 
Implicitly, this clause infringes on the sovereign 
rights that Article 56 assigns to the coastal state, 
but the rights of the coastal state to set the total 
allowable catch (possibly at zero) and to deter-
mine conditions of access for other states to any 
surplus (possibly at prohibitive fees) mean that 
the actual constraints on the coastal state are of 
little or no consequence. 
Essentially, the rules constitute a moral com-
mandment: "thou shalt not waste fish," with an 
implicit obligation for the coastal state to be 
reasonable in sharing resources in excess of its 
own capacity to utilize. Coastal states are allowed 
to charge management access fees, without limit, 
for any fishing they permit other countries to 
undertake in their zones. Thus, they can capture 
rents from fishing in their EEZ. The moral dic-
tum that a coastal state should be prepared to 
give other states access to surplus fish in its zone 
would, therefore, appear to be generally consist-
ent with the coastal state's self-interest. 
The Draft Convention singles out for special 
treatment five groups of marine species - highly 
migratory species, marine mammals, anadrom-
ous stocks, catadromous species, and sedentary 
species. Article 64 deals with the highly migratory 
species, including, among others, tuna, billfishes, 
oceanic sharks, and whales, which commonly 
migrate widely through the high seas and the 
EEZs of many countries. Sound management of 
these can be achieved only by a cooperative effort 
of all countries fishing in the region over which 
they migrate. Thus, Article 64 enjoins states to 
" ... cooperate directly or through appropriate 
international organizations with a view to ensur-
ing conservation and promoting the objective of 
optimum utilization of such species throughout 
the region, both within and beyond the exclusive 
economic zone." There is, perhaps inevitably, a 
lack of specificity regarding execution of these 
provisions, and individual states may decline to 
become a party to any convention regarding 
highly migratory species. There are, therefore, no 
secure provisions for effective management of 
these species. 
Anadromous stocks consist of species that 
spawn in fresh water but spend much of their life 
at sea. Special provisions for anadromous stocks 
are needed only insofar as they migrate beyond 
the 200-mile zones of coastal states (Copes 1977). 
The only important fish stocks in this category 
are salmon. The bulk of the world's marine 
salmon is in the north Pacific. Much smaller 
stocks inhabit the north Atlantic, and a few 
transplanted stocks are elsewhere. Article 66 of 
the Draft Convention stipulates: "States in whose 
rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the 
primary interest in and responsibility for such 
stocks." This stipulation recognizes that the 
direct costs in maintaining and enhancing the 
freshwater habitats of salmon are considerable. 
Also, river systems that are devoted to salmon 
rearing often cannot be used for important alter-
natives, such as power generation, irrigation, and 
waste disposal. Furthermore, optimal exploita-
tion of salmon stocks requires that harvesting 
take place in coastal waters near the mouths of 
spawning rivers. Here the fish gather when they 
have reached maximum weight, and catches can 
best be monitored and managed to achieve opti-
mum renewal of the stocks. 
Article 66 further provides: " ... fisheries for 
anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in 
waters landwards of the outer limits of exclusive 
economic zones, except in cases where this provi-
sion would result in economic dislocation for a 
state other than the state of origin." This has been 
interpreted to mean that high-seas fisheries can 
continue but that no new high-seas fisheries for 
salmon should be developed. 
Catadromous species, in contrast to salmon, 
spawn in salt water but spend part of their adult 
life in fresh water. Some important eel stocks are 
catadromous. Under Article 67, coastal states in 
whose waters catadromous species spend the 
greater part of their life cycle are assigned 
management responsibility. High-seas fishing for 
these species is not permitted, but as there are no 
notable fisheries for catadromous stocks outside 
200-mile limits, this rule does not appear to have 
significant implications. 
In deference to the many groups that have 
expressed concern about the conservation and 
welfare of marine mammals, Article 65 allows 
coastal states and international organizations 
" ... to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation 
of marine mammals more strictly" than other-
wise provided for in the Draft Convention. This 
evidently sanctions rules that prohibit hunting 
for marine mammals, even where these may be 
contrary to the general purpose implicit in the 
Draft Convention that renewable marine re-
sources should not be wasted through underex-
ploitation. The provision from the 1958 Geneva 
Convention that was concerned with sedentary 
species was carried over into the Draft Conven-
tion. Exploited sedentary species consist largely 
of molluscs and crustaceans. While the rights of 
coastal states to sedentary species have long been 
recognized, nations have disagreed on the appli-
cability of the sedentary classification to some 
species (e.g., certain crabs). 
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The significance of the 200-mile fishing limit is 
that it has brought the bulk of the world's com-
mercial fish stocks under undisputed manage-
ment authority, for most of these stocks occur in 
waters outside the 12-mile territorial seas but 
inside the new limits. The area of the high seas to 
which all nations have free fishing access has been 
greatly reduced. The proportion of the world fish 
catch now available in the high seas is relatively 
small. Katz (1975) quotes sources estimating fish 
harvests outside 200 miles in the early 1970s at 
between 6% and 15% of the world total. Gulland 
(1979) in the late 1970s put the estimat~ as low as 
1%. 
A substantial proportion of unexploited or 
underexploited "unconventional'' stocks occur in 
the remaining high seas. There still is, therefore, a 
significant potential for the expansion of undis-
ciplined fisheries in international waters, with the 
attendant dangers of overexploitation. Many dif-
ficulties also remain to be resolved in bringing 
rational management to the stocks occurring 
within 200-mile limits. 
Boundary Problems 
Although the world's fish resources now are 
largely within waters under the jurisdiction of 
national governments with legal authority to 
manage them, use of these resources is still far 
from optimal. Several forces and circumstances 
militate against rational management (Copes 
1981 b). Some derive from the artificial barriers 
created by the establishment of separate national 
jurisdictions, whereas others result from forces 
within countries, reflecting their institutional or 
sociopolitical character. 
The demarcation of boundaries between the 
200-mile zones of different countries is not sim-
ple. Article 74 of the Draft Convention states: 
"The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone 
between adjacent or opposite States shall be 
effected by agreement in accordance with equita-
ble principles, employing the median or equidis-
tance line, where appropriate, and taking 
account of all the relevant circumstances prevail-
ing in the area concerned." The equidistance line 
is clearly defined by objective criteria that leave 
little room for argument. Between two countries, 
it constitutes the locus of points that are equidis-
tant from the nearest piece of land for the two. 
However, the equidistance principle has been 
eroded by the acknowledgment of special cir-
cumstances that allow for significant deviations 
from it. Special circumstances recognized in 
international jurisprudence may relate, for 
instance, to the presence and location of islands, 
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to the configuration of coastlines, and to physical 
and geological structure (Hodgson and Smith 
1979). 
The criteria defining special circumstances are 
ambiguous, as are the means for establishing 
boundaries with reference to them. Many coun-
tries have formulated arguments for special cir-
cumstances that would enlarge their 200-mile 
zones at the expense of neighbours who rely on 
the equidistance rule. Thus, lingering disputes 
have been a by-product of the extension of 
marine jurisdictions (Buzan 1978) such that a 
recent study observed: " ... the majority of the 
world's putative maritime boundaries remain 
undelimited" (Irwin I 980). The potential 
mischief is well illustrated by the smouldering 
boundary-cum-fishery disputes that now exist 
between Canada and the United States, whose 
relations as neighbours usually have been excep-
tionally cordial. The disputes have been serious 
enough for the Canadian Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, to have 
referred to them as" ... the most serious issue we 
have with any country." 
Fish stocks may be considered in terms of bio-
logi:cal units consisting of individuals of a single 
species utilizing a common habitat and forming a 
common gene pool. Effective management 
requires that exploitation of each biological unit 
be undertaken in a consistent and coordinated 
fashion. It is complicated by the fact that many 
biological units overlap to form stock complexes. 
Also, account needs to be taken of interspecies 
(and interstock) relationships, e.g., predator-
prey interactions and competition for food and. 
habitat. 
Unfortunately, carving the oceans into geo-
graphically defined areas managed by individual 
states has impeded the task of rational stock 
management. Many stocks straddle the new 
boundaries or migrate back and forth across 
them so that they do not come under the unam-
biguous management authority of a single state. 
They are subject to common-property relation-
ships among the nationals of different countries 
exploiting them so that the danger of overexploi-
tation remains. 
The Draft Convention attempts to solve the 
trans boundary stock problem by enjoining states 
concerned in each case to cooperate in establish-
ing joint-management arrangements,. Although 
the guidelines of the Draft Convention in this 
area are weak and enforcement mechanisms 
absent, the prospects for such arrangements are 
often good because a large proportion of the 
cases involve only two neighbouring countries. 
This reduces the complexity of the bargaining 
necessary to achieve mutually advantageous 
management, with an agreed arrangement for 
sharing costs and benefits (Munro 1979). 
A more difficult situation arises when a trans-
boundary stock straddles the line separating a 
country's 200-mile zone from the high seas. Such 
cases are few, but one significant example occurs 
on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland, part of 
which extends beyond Canada's 200-mile zone. 
The stocks here were seriously overexploited 
under the impact of distant-water fishing in the . 
1960s and early 1970s, and, although extended 
jurisdiction has allowed Canada to rebuild the 
stocks to a significant extent, efforts are ham-
pered by lack of jurisdiction when stocks cross 
the outer boundary of the 200-mile zone. 
In accordance with the prescriptions of the 
Draft Convention, Canada has helped to estab-
lish an international body, the Northwest Atlan-
tic Fisheries Organization (N AFO), to manage 
the fish resources on the continental shelf outside 
the 200-mile limit in the Atlantic. In this context, 
Canada has also attempted to gain recognition 
for the proposition that the coastal state should 
be accorded the leading role and decisive influ-
ence in such cases and has offered NAFO 
member states some incentive to agree: modest 
harvesting quotas within the Canadian 
jurisdiction. 
As might be predicted, the N AFO manage-
ment arrangement is proving vulnerable to the 
problems that debilitated international fisheries 
commissions before extended jurisdiction. 
N AFO is operating in an area that is part of the 
high seas where the Draft Convention rules are in 
the nature of a moral prescription only. There are 
no guidelines as to the division of responsibilities, 
costs, and benefits among participating states, 
and there are no enforcement mechanisms. 
Organizations such as NAFO have to rely on 
voluntary membership and voluntary adherence 
to a joint management plan with harvesting quo-
tas for individual countries. It is rare for any 
country to be satisfied with its share so that there 
is a temptation to stay out, or pull out, of the 
organization and to fish without restraint while 
counting on member countries to moderate their 
fishing efforts in accordance with the manage-
ment plan. In the case ofNAFO, Spain has opted 
out and is fishing without restraint. With no solu-
tion in sight for this "free-rider" problem, effec-
tive management of fisheries in the high seas and 
areas straddling the outer boundaries of national 
200-mile zones will probably remain difficult to 
achieve and to maintain. 
The problem can be solved if the management 
organization develops sufficient authority. An 
example is provided by the common fisheries 
policy applied in the collective zones of members 
of the European Economic Community (Koers 
1977). The members together have full fisheries 
jurisdiction in the area concerned and have 
invested their joint governing organization with 
considerable authority to enforce strict quotas on 
catch. A similar setup has been proposed for 
Southeast Asia and may prove a practical means 
of securing more rational management in major 
fishing areas (Valencia 1978). 
The more important highly migratory species 
is tuna, which typically traverse great stretches of 
the high seas as well as the 200-mile zones of 
several countries. Without coordinated man-
agement and restraint on total fishing effort exer-
cised by countries participating in a tuna fishery, 
overexploitation is likely. The Draft Conven-
tion's prescription for management cooperation 
lacks any mechanisms of control and is, there-
fore, of dubious effect. 
The United States, which in most respects is a 
coastal rather than a distant-water fishing state 
(Copes 1972b), has a particularly well-developed 
distant-water tuna fleet, using technically sophis-
ticated equipment and catching methods. A large 
share of its catch has been obtained in waters that 
are now part of the 200-mile zones of other coun-
tries. Over the past few decades, the United States 
has been in conflict with Peru and Ecuador, 
countries that made early claims to 200-mile 
zones and have attempted to collect fees from 
vessels operating within the area. United States' 
tuna vessels refusing to pay fees were placed 
under arrest- an action met by retaliatory mea-
Jures from the United States. Even though the 
200-mile limit achieved general recognition in 
1977, the United States has continued to claim 
the right to fish freely for tuna in the 200-mile 
zones of other countries. Recently, vessels doing 
so have been arrested in Mexican and Canadian 
waters. 
The United States claims that fisheries for 
highly migratory species are exempt from coastal 
state jurisdiction because the Draft Convention 
calls for cooperative management for these 
species. In the absence of an agreement among 
the states sharing the migratory route, the United 
States holds that participants are free to fish for 
tuna outside narrow territorial limits without 
reference to the coastal states' authority. In other 
words, the United States seems to claim what 
might be called a right of pursuit of highly migra-
tory species into the 200-mile zones of other 
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countries. Such a right is hardly consistent with 
the Draft Convention, which places no explicit 
limit on the coastal state's 200-mile jurisdiction in 
respect of any species. The American position has 
attracted little, if any, support. 
Although an international management 
authority seems essential for each highly migra-
tory species, experience suggests that enforcing 
quotas is difficult, especially for species that can 
be intercepted on the high seas. The countries 
that control the waters in which fishing is most 
effectively conducted should have a relative 
advantage depending on the time the stock 
spends in their 200-mile zone, the degree of 
maturity (weight) of the stock at that time, and its 
proclivity to school- and contact-fishing gear. 
It may turn out that where tuna stock spends 
little time on the high seas and is not easily fished 
there, the coastal states concerned jointly will be 
able to achieve reasonably effective management. 
But where there are good opportunities to inter-
cept tuna stocks on the high seas, effective man-
agement may prove not to be attainable within 
the present framework of the law of the sea. 
The special transboundary problems for sal-
mon, which are subject to the anadromous stock 
provisions of the Draft Convention, are note-
worthy. Although the priority rights of states of 
origin to salmon spawned in their waters have 
been generally conceded and the advent of the 
200-mile limit has greatly reduced the area of the 
high seas in which salmon may be found, signifi-
cant stocks still migrate through the high seas of 
the north-central Pacific. At present, the only 
substantial fishing operations in this area are 
undertaken by the Japanese who have agreed to 
limit them. And the Draft Convention disallows 
the development of any new fishing efforts for 
anadromous stocks on the high seas. Neverthe-
less, the principal states of origin (the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and Canada) have 
reason to remain uneasy. No country is obliged 
to accept the provisions of the Draft Convention, 
and any could opt to commence a salmon fishery 
on the high seas of the north-central Pacific. The 
fact that so many distant-water fleets have had 
their access to coastal zones reduced by the new 
200-mile limits is an incentive for them to seek 
new sources on the high seas. Still, one should not 
underestimate the power and influence that the 
United States and the Soviet Union, as interested 
parties, are able to exercise in dissuading such 
activities. 
A more immediate problem in salmon man-
agement is that a large proportion of the salmon 
stocks migrate through the 200-mile zones of 
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countries other than the states of origin, where 
they are liable to interception. The fishery for 
Atlantic salmon of Canadian and European 
origin in Greenland's waters during the 1960s and 
early 1970s posed a grave threat to the already 
seriously depleted stocks of this species (Copes 
1977), and the interception by the United States 
and Canada of Pacific salmon originating in each 
other's waters has bedeviled fisheries relations 
between the two countries (Copes 1980b, 1981 b). 
Article 66 of the Draft Convention provides 
that ". . . where anadromous stocks migrate 
through the waters landwards of the outer limits 
of the exclusive economic zone of a State other 
than the State of origin, such State shall cooper-
ate with the State of origin with regard to the 
conservation and management of such stocks." 
Again, the rule is one of moral admonition -
calling for cooperation but providing no guide-
lines for negotiation or mechanisms for resolu-
tion of disagreement. There is no suggestion in 
the Draft Convention that coastal states must 
abstain from intercepting anadromous fish on 
the way to their home spawning grounds in 
another country, nor is any specific limit 
suggested in respect of such interception. 
Protection against interception, it seems, must 
come from any leverage states of origin may have 
to dissuade potential interceptors. The United 
States government - prodded by an Atlantic 
salmon sport-fishing lobby - persuaded the 
Danish government to curb drastically the 
Greenland salmon fishery. The implied threat 
was that the U.S. would stop importing fish from 
Denmark (MacKenzie 1972). 
In the case of mutual interception of Pacific 
salmon by Canada and the United States, both 
countries have a considerable interest in an 
agreed regulation of interception that recognizes 
the basic entitlement of the state of origin to fish 
produced in its waters. Both countries have 
expansive plaris for salmon "enhancement," to 
augment their stocks greatly by such means as 
habitat improvement, hatcheries, and spawning 
channels. To justify the expenditures, each coun-
try needs to be assured that the benefits will 
accrue to its own nationals. In ongoing negotia-
tions, the two countries appear to be striving for 
an agreement to avoid interception where possi-
ble and otherwise to balance the amounts of fish 
intercepted by the two sides. 
Intranational Management 
The 200-mile limit permits national govern-
ments to manage their fish resources economi-
cally, but it does not compel them to do so. 
Evidence suggests that the new opportunities 
offered to national governments by the 200-mile 
limit often are being used to accommodate social 
and political pressures at the expense of efficient 
resources use (Copes 198lb). Common occur-
rences are the use of fishing operations for wel-
fare "make-work" purposes, assistance to fishing 
operations exploiting submarginal resources, 
and biasing the division of labour between 
foreign and domestic fishing operations in favour 
of the latter. 
In many instances, fishing communities are 
relatively isolated, with few alternative employ-
ment opportunities, low levels of education, and 
reduced labour mobility. In other words, they are 
characterized by low opportunity costs for 
labour. With poor income alternatives and no 
chance to earn resource rents, remote fishing 
communities often have considerable underem-
ployment and incomes so low that they require 
subsidies to meet minimum living standards, 
especially within modern states. The fishing 
communities on Canada's Atlantic coast are a 
good example, and remote coastal areas of Ire-
land, Scotland, and northern Norway have 
similar problems. 
The extra fish made available to coastal states 
by the 200-mile limit could be used to rationalize 
fishing operations in depressed coastal communi-
ties. A relevant strategy would be to freeze entry 
to the fishery at existing levels, allowing the extra 
fish to go to increased catches and incomes for 
existing fishermen (Copes 1979). However, 
where a government has failed to resolve the 
unemployment problem of a depressed fishing 
area, it faces the temptation to use the fishery as 
an employer of last resort and dispenser of social 
welfare. The increased fish supply is then simply 
used to employ additional fishermen at inade-
quate income levels that require continuing 
subsidies to maintain. 
Newfoundland on Canada's east coast (Copes 
l 980a) has long had extraordinarily high levels of 
unemployment, amounting in 1978 to 16.4%- a 
figure that understates the severity because many 
discouraged persons are not counted as unem-
ployed but rather as outside the labour force. 
This is reflected in a very low labour force partic-
ipation rate, which in 1978 stood at only 52% in 
comparison with a Canadian average of 63%. 
Despite very low average catches and incomes 
per fisherman, the number of licenced operators 
in Newfoundland was allowed to rise from 15 351 
in 1976 (the year before extended jurisdiction) to 
32 352, 3 years later. 
Canada's east coast provides one of the most 
spectacular examples of the proclivity of Western 
countries to subsidize economically overex-
panded fishing industries. However, the data 
assembled in a report by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD 1970) demonstrate that the practice has 
been widespread. The Canadian case shows that 
a favourable change in a country's fish resources 
may not be sufficient to break old habits. 
In several instances, the 200-mile limit has 
given coastal states control over more fish than 
they can exploit. The United States, for instance, 
has acquired large stocks of groundfish that it is 
not able to utilize at present. The Draft Conven-
tion requires that surplus stocks be made avail-
able to other countries but coastal states can 
avoid this obligation by increasing their fishing 
industry's capacity to bring the surplus stocks 
under exploitation. Nationalistic sentiment, 
enflamed by the memory of recent overfishing by 
distant-water fleets, creates pressures to do so. 
As one American economist remarked, 
" ... countries which have acquired marine terri-
tory would be tempted to treat their new seafood 
accessions as infant industries requiring produc-
tion subsidies and market protection" (O'Rourke 
1977). Indeed, both these kinds of support are 
now being demanded by elements of the United 
States' fishing industry(Allen 1980). One may see 
in this a kind of Parkinson's law: domestic fisher-
ies tend to expand to utilize all the stocks avail-
able for their exploitation. The history of the 
industry, however, suggests that it already tends 
toward overexpansion - a tendency that can 
only be exacerbated by subsidization. 
The contemplated expansion in the United 
States focuses on stocks, some of which are likely 
to remain economically submarginal for the fore-
seeable future. Probably the largest of these con-
sists of Alaskan pollack - an acceptable food 
fish but one of low value and undoubtedly high 
exploitation cost in the Alaskan circumstances. 
Unfortunately, the new regional fisheries man-
agement councils in the United States are domi-
nated by industry representatives, many of whom 
have contributed to the pressure to overexpand 
into economically marginal or submarginal fish-
ing activities. 
Leaving stocks for distant-water fleets rather 
than expanding into submarginal operations 
would probably constitute an economically more 
rational division of labour (Munro 1977a, b), 
particularly among high-income coastal states 
with high real costs of operation of offshore 
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trawlers. Successful distant-water operations are 
characteristic of countries that are technologi-
cally advanced but that still have modest labour 
costs deriving from moderate income levels 
(Copes l 972b). 
There is evidence, however, that distant-water 
fishing countries have also often engaged in state 
subsidization of uneconomic fishing operations. 
In the case of several western European countries 
(OECD 1970), it has frequently been a matter of 
shoring up the declining fortunes of an estab-
lished industry based on distant-water trawling. 
For the planned economies of Eastern Europe, 
which have acquired an extremely important 
distant-water fishing capacity, it has been differ-
ent. A serious failure of agriculture to come close 
to meeting domestic requirements in these coun-
tries for protein, in combination with a strongly 
autarchic economic structure, has induced the 
countries to rely heavily on an enormous distant-
water fishing effort, with uncertain attention to 
the real economic costs of this effort (Kaczynski 
1977, 1979a). 
The proclivity toward uneconomically high 
levels of fishing effort in both eastern and western 
countries contributes to an understanding of why 
some of the attractive commercial stocks of fish 
were so heavily depleted prior to 1977. The event 
of extended jurisdiction undoubtedly has much 
reduced the extent of overfishing. Coastal states, 
in most instances, have now reduced fishing 
efforts at least to levels compatible with the 
achievement of MSY. 
With the readjustments in overall fishing effort 
that have taken place, there remains the question 
of what is the optimum division of labour 
between distant-water and domestic fleets among 
countries with the technology required for full 
utilization of commercial fish stocks. Given the 
complexity of comparing the production func-
tions of highly diverse systems, involving many 
externalities and distributional considerations, 
one may hazard only a speculative answer with 
respect to any particular case. A general observa-
tion, however, seems in order. In the short run, at 
least, given the enormous investment extant in 
distant-water fleets, it seems sensible that they be 
given opportunities to exploit surplus stocks in 
preference to the premature expansion of the 
domestic fleets of coastal states into currently 
submarginal operations. In view of the nature of 
investment in distant-water fleets, the privilege of 
continuing to fish should be worth a fair amount 
to the operators, and coastal states could demand 
the payment of fees that would make the renting 
of their stocks advantageous. 
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In the long run, it may be a different matter. 
Fishing from a nearby shore, with most process-
ing done ashore, essentially has many cost advan-
tages (Copes 1972b). This comparative advan-
tage of the coastal state eventually may outweigh 
the initial cost advantages held by distant-water 
fleets, particularly when the time comes for these 
fleets to be replaced. Released from the external 
diseconomies of open-access competition with 
the fleets of other nations within its jurisdictional 
limits, the coastal state may structure an econom-
ically efficient resource-use pattern for its domes-
tic fleet. The distant-water fleets, on the other 
hand, will have lost much of their particular 
advantage of being able to move around the 
world's best offshore fishing grounds. In the end, 
even the highest cost coastal states may take over 
substantially all fishing operations in their 200-
mile zones and be justified in doing so on the 
basis of unrestrained comparative advantage. 
New Accommodations 
The sudden advent of extended jurisdiction in 
1977 required an immediate adaptation, particu-
larly by the distant-water fishing countries. They 
not only had large fleet investments that they 
needed to utilize to best advantage but usually 
also had large domestic markets that were criti-
cally dependent on the supply from their fleets. 
By far the largest distant-water operations were 
maintained by Japan and the Soviet Union. 
Moderately important distant-water operations 
were conducted by several countries, of which 
Poland and Spain were prominent examples 
(Kaczynski 1979b). The strongly developed 
operations of South Korea and Taiwan in Asia 
also deserve notice. 
In seeking access to the newly enclosed 200-
mile zones, distant-water nations were dealing, 
basically, with two distinct groups of countries. 
One consisted of developing coastal nations, 
most of which had an inadequate capacity to 
exploit the marine resources of their zones fully, 
and the other consisted of developed coastal 
states with resources surplus to their immediate 
harvesting capacities. Prominent among the 
latter were the United States, Canada, South 
Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. 
Cooperative arrangements are possible under 
which distant-water fleets are allowed to partici-
pate in fishing operations within the zones of 
specific coastal states (Tomlinson and Vertinsky 
1975; Kaczynski 1979b; Tomlinson and Brown 
1979). One possibility is an agreement by which 
distant-water vessels fish under specified condi-
tions in a country's 200-mile zone, providing a fee 
or other consideration for the privilege. Other 
arrangements include requiring distant-water 
vessels to land their catches for processing in the 
coastal state. Conversely, over-the-side sale of 
fish from small coastal state boats to large 
distant-water processing vessels may be 
arranged. Finally,joiht ventures may be entered, 
with various financial, equipment, and personnel 
contributions being made by the two sides. All of 
these arrangements - and some others - have 
occurred, the greater leverage usually being pos-
sessed by the coastal state because of the 200-mile 
jurisdiction. Payments or other considerations 
extracted by coastal states should be sufficient to 
defray costs of management, inspection, and 
enforcement as well as to provide some rent for 
access to stocks. 
The tendency among developed coastal states 
with surplus stocks is to bring these under domes-
tic exploitation. And there are reasons to believe 
that this may be economically rational in the long 
run. For the immediate future, however, the 
distant-water fleets are likely to retain a consid-
erable cost advantage, particularly with respect 
to stocks for which they have a lead in fishing 
experience and technology development (Copes 
1978). Moreover, many distant-water fishing 
countries (particularly those of Eastern Europe) 
exercise strict control over access to their 
markets. As they often have the only significant 
markets for certain species and refuse to expend 
foreign exchange on purchases of such fish, coas-
tal states would not be able to dispose of any 
catches of such species. Several of the agreements 
made by Canada and the United States in recent 
years, giving Eastern European fleets fishing 
access to stocks of (for North America) uncon-
ventional species of groundfish, are an 
illustration. 
Many coastal states are committed to honour, 
in word and spirit, the rule that they should give 
other countries access to their surplus stocks. At 
the same time, several coastal states face political 
pressures to deny all access to foreigners. The 
pressures stem from the fear, suspicion, and re-
sentment held by domestic fishing industries long 
exposed to depletion of their fishing grounds by 
distant-water fleets. Canada is one country 
caught in this dilemma. It has attempted to 
resolve the problem by bargaining judiciously 
with distant-water countries to secure from them 
commensurate benefits that would visibly 
redound to the advantage of Canada's domestic 
fishing industry. These have included, in some 
instances, in addition to standard fees, access for 
Canadian fish products to foreign markets; pro-
cessing in Canadian shore plants of the catch 
taken by foreign vessels; over-the-side sales of 
fish caught by Canadian inshore fishermen to 
foreign factory vessels; increased use of Canadian 
ports, ship repair facilities, and chandlery ser-
vices by foreign vessels; continued abstention 
from high-seas fishing for Canadian salmon; and 
recognition of Canadian leadership in NAFO. 
Some of the arrangements pressed by Canada 
on distant-water partners are difficult to justify in 
terms of optimal resources use because they 
require foreign vessels to be used in a nonoptimal 
fashion (Copes 1981 b). Thus, West German 
trawlers, built for full processing of their catch, 
were allowed to fish for cod off Labrador on 
condition they would land their catches in Can-
ada for processing (Copes 1978). Polish factory 
trawlers were allowed to purchase hake over-the-
side from west coast Canadian fishermen, but not 
to fish directly. The inferior overall economic 
returns resulting from such featherbedding 
arrangements suggest that they are unlikely to 
endure in the long run. 
For the time being, cooperative arrangements 
between developing coastal states and distant-
water fishing countries appear to make good 
sense for both sides, at least where the former are 
not yet in a position, technologically or economi-
cally, to utilize their fish resources fully. The 
developing state may obtain much-needed for-
eign exchange from access fees. It may also 
require a distant-water fleet to supply fish to its 
domestic market at a reasonable cost and to help 
it develop its own fishing industry. Requirements 
may include the construction of port, handling, 
and processing facilities as well as the supply of 
equipment and training oflabour(Copes 1981 b). 
For the developing countries, there are clear 
hazards in these kinds of arrangements, which 
have been borne out by disappointing results in a 
number of cases. Usually the developing state 
does not have an adequate capacity to monitor 
the stocks or to check and control the level and 
pattern of foreign catches. Inadequately con-
trolled activity of distant-water fleets may lead to 
excessive depletion of stocks and fail to provide 
revenue for unobserved excess catches. Develop-
ing countries providing fishing access to distant-
water fleets are well advised to give high priority 
to the buildup of their monitoring capacity. 
As more developing countries acquire the 
capacity to fish the stocks of their 200-mile zones, 
the opportunities for distant-water fleets will 
shrink. Many western European countries, beset 
by falling productivity of their fleets during the 
period of heavy fishing pressure in the early 
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1970s, have phased out much, or most, of their 
distant-water operations. Countries with a 
demand for fish products far in excess of their 
domestic supplies more and more are seeking to 
gain access to adequate supplies by other means. 
Japan offers a good example of this new adapta-
tion (Copes 1981 b). Japanese fishing companies 
are seeking to invest in the fisheries operations of 
countries that have an actual or potential surplus 
of fish products attractive to the Japanese 
market. They have promoted a variety of arrange-
ments, ranging from outright purchase of local 
fishing firms to the extension of commercial 
loans to local fishing firms in return for a privi-
leged trade. Significant Japanese fishing invest-
ments have been made on the Pacific coast of 
both the United States and Canada (Josephs 
1978; Proverbs 1978). Official reservations have 
been expressed by both countries regarding for-
eign investment in their fishing industry (Quadra 
Economic Consultants Ltd and MacDaniels 
Research Ltd 1979). It is ironic, in view of the 
poor profit record of the industry, especially in 
Canada, that there should be more concern about 
keeping foreigners out of fishing than out of more 
profitable industrial sectors. Perhaps, the public 
perceives an implied threat to the new ocean 
frontiers of the 200-mile limit or expects the 
industry to become much more profitable now 
that fishing jurisdiction has been extended. 
Distributional Considerations 
Along with changes in the international pat-
tern of fishing activities, the 200-mile limits have 
meant concomitant changes in the distribution of 
benefits deriving from the use of the world's 
ocean fish resources. Unfortunately, the restric-
tive theoretical analysis of conventional welfare 
economics provides little help for those who wish 
to judge how this redistribution of benefits may 
contribute to optimizing the use of ocean fish 
resources. 
There is good reason to assume that the enclo-
sure of the oceans under the 200-mile regime will 
bring about an overall increase in welfare because 
the establishment of national property rights will 
greatly reduce the external diseconomies that 
previously attached to open-access fishing on a 
global scale. But the incomparability of the 
values of benefits accruing to different persons or 
nations does not allow one to judge whether in 
welfare-theoretic terms the redistribution of fish-
ing benefits among nations per se has brought 
about an improved use of ocean fish resources. 
Nevertheless, such a judgment may be made in 
terms of some widely held notions of equity. 
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What is equitable ultimately is subjective. 
However, there is a widely established disposi-
tion to consider that a redistribution of economic 
benefits is desirable if it favours population 
groups that are recognized to be particularly dis-
advantaged in their living standards. In plain 
terms, one may consider a gain by the developing 
countries relative to the developed countries to be 
beneficial. 
There is strong evidence that the developing 
countries, as a group, have secured an immediate 
net improvement in their fisheries position as a 
result of the 200-mile limits. FAO data show that 
developing countries. were taking only 0.6 Mt 
from waters off the coasts of developed countries, 
whereas the latter were catching as much as 3.6 
Mt off the coasts of the former(Popper 1975). As 
a result of the 200-mile limit, all states are in a 
position to appropriate the benefits of catches off 
their coasts. The developing countries, as a 
group, consequently may appropriate net bene-
fits of 3.0 Mt of fish at the expense of developed 
countries. 4 The benefits could be achieved by 
substitutions of domestic catches for foreign 
catches, where the developing countries acquire 
an economically appropriate capacity to exploit 
their coastal resources. Alternatively, they could 
extract fees or other benefits from foreign coun-
tries who wish to continue fishing in the area. 
Some authors have taken a much less sanguine 
view of the benefits of the 200-mile limit for 
developing countries (Kent 1978). Although it is 
clear that the 200-mile limit is achieving an 
immediate improvement in the position of devel-
oping countries, it should be recognized that this 
improvement is in relation to their current state 
of underdevelopment. One may speculate that 
possibly greater improvements have been fore-
closed by the 200-mile limit than have been 
introduced. 
It might be supposed that, in the longer run, 
developing countries could acquire a distant-
water fishing capacity and that, because of lower 
labour costs, they could then outfish distant-
water fleets from developed countries. There is 
evidence to suggest that a disproportionate share 
of the potential distant-water fishing grnunds has 
now fallen into the hands of developed countries. 
One may assume at least a crude relationship 
between the size of the ocean areas acquired 
under 200-mile zone enclosures and the fisheries 
4ln an alternative calculation, also based on 1972 
FAO data, Gulland (J.979) concluded that the develop-
ing countries' net advantage amounted to 4.1 Mt. 
potential gained thereby. The largest ocean areas 
gained (in order of extent) have gone to the U.S., 
Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Canada, 
USSR, and Japan (Shyam 1976). By this rough 
criterion, only one of the top seven beneficiaries 
is a developing country. 
The 1972 catch in waters off the coasts of devel-
oped countries amounted to 31.3 Mt, whereas 
that in waters off developing countries yielded 
only 24.5 Mt (Pepper 1975). The disproportion 
appears much worse when one considers the 
much larger number of developing countries and, 
particularly, their much larger populations. 
Some caution is warranted in interpreting these 
figures, however, because the fisheries potential 
in the coastal zones of developing countries may 
have been less fully exploited than that of devel-
oped countries. Gulland ( 1971 ), for instance, 
attributes a particularly good potential for addi-
tional fisheries development in the Indian Ocean 
and parts of the western-central Pacific. 
Any consideration of the distribution of bene-
fits between major groups of countries - devel-
oping vs developed, or coastal vs distant water -
masks a great variety of different cases. There are 
many geographically disadvantaged countries, 
both among developing and developed states, 
whose 200-mile zones are small, poor in re-
sources, or both. And, of course, there are land-
locked countries looking on with dismay as the 
acquisitive coastal states carve up the oceans that 
were once considered the common heritage of all. 
Articles 69 and 70 of the Draft Convention speak 
of special consideration that should be given to 
the needs of landlocked and geographically dis-
advantaged states in allowing access to surplus 
stocks of coastal states in the same region. The 
provisions are so vague and weak as to have little 
or no practical import, and there is no evident 
equity in the grossly uneven distribution of 
resource gains brought by the 200-mile limit. 
In the debates on the law of the sea, some 
developed coastal states have pointed out that 
many of their fishing communities are crucially 
dependent on preservation of the local fish 
resource for their continued use. The conditions 
of economic distress in these communities may 
make their needs worthy of equal attention with 
those of developing countries. F AO data show 
that, of the world's total distant-water fishing 
catch, of 15.3 Mt, 11.2 Mt were taken off the 
coasts of developed countries (Popper 1975), so 
that coastal fisheries there have borne the brunt 
of the distant-water fishing impact. 
This argument has been stressed particularly 
by Canada- and with good reason. The Atlantic 
coast fishing communities have long been in a 
notoriously difficult economic position and were 
hard hit by heavy distant-water fishing prior to 
1977. The new 200-mile zone has greatly helped 
these Canadian communities - and those in 
other countries facing similar conditions. If coast-
al communities dependent on local resources are 
considered, on equity grounds, to deserve prior-
ity access to these resources, the 200-mile limit 
may be considered to have unambiguously 
improved resource use. 
It is, perhaps, t.oo readily assumed that the 
200-mile limit will naturally benefit a coastal 
state. Careful consideration reveals many per-
verse effects of the 200-mile limit that may prove 
disadvantageous to particular coastal states 
(Copes 1979, 1980b). Geographically disadvan-
taged coastal states, with negligible fish resources 
of their own, may find themselves cut off from 
accustomed fishing grounds in their neighbours' 
200-mile zones. In fact, this circumstance may 
affect also better-endowed coastal states whose 
fleets have been accustomed to utilizing fishing 
grounds off a neighbour's coast. 
The British Columbia halibut fleet used to take 
more than half of its catch in waters off the 
Alaska coast, from which they have now been 
barred. In turn, American trawlers have lost 
access to their accustomed sources of groundfish 
in British Columbia waters. Both fleets have suf-
fered economically, as a consequence, providing 
examples of a deleterious economic effect of the 
200-mile limit. 
Perverse effects would also result if greater 
efforts were devoted to intercepting Pacific 
salmon stocks when they migrate through the 
high seas and 200-mile zones of countries other 
than their states of origin. Another problem for a 
coastal state could be trade diversion in fish prod-
ucts. Canada's east coast groundfish industry, 
heavily dependent on the United States market, 
could lose much of that market if and when the 
U.S. develops more of the groundfish resources it 
acquired with its 200-mile limit. 
Despite some instances to the contrary, one 
may assume that both developed and developing 
coastal fishing states have gained from extended 
fisheries jurisdiction. Although the distant-water 
fishing states have lost in relative terms, they may 
not have lost in absolute terms. The globally 
improved fisheries utilization that is likely to be 
the result of national jurisdictions, at least in the 
long run, may benefit all. With prospects of more 
rational management, more fish may become 
available in international markets, at lower 
economic cost. 
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Coastal states will make more direct use of the 
stocks that have been brought under their con-
trol; distant-water countries are bound to lose 
many of their accustomed sources in the zones of 
coastal states. They could make up quantitatively 
for the catches lost by switching their effort to 
underutilized stocks that are surplus to coastal 
state requirements or that are still available on 
the high seas. However, such stocks are likely to 
be most often in remote locations or difficult to 
catch and will usually be inferior species, often at 
lower trophicJevels. 
There has been a widespread tendency among 
countries representing different fishing positions 
and different political systems to engage in heav-
ily subsidized fishing operations. The economic 
rationality of this behaviour is open to question. 
If the loss of access to other countries' 200-mile 
zones provides the shock necessary to persuade 
distant-water countries to phase out uneconomic 
fishing operations, they could well gain substan-
tially in the process.The labour and (replace-
ment) capital resources that would be released 
from former fishing pursuits might well be put to 
better use in alternative land-based, protein-
producing enterprises or in other economic activ-
ities that would yield the foreign currency needed 
to buy increased supplies of fish products from 
coastal states. Japanese enterprise, quick to 
adjust to changing opportunities, already has 
moved in this direction. Several western Euro-
pean countries also have reduced their distant-
water operations, although the practice of pro-
viding lingering subsidies to declining industries 
has slowed the adjustment in some cases. There is 
less evidence that Eastern European countries 
will soon make this kind of adjustment, con-
strained as they are by an autarchic political 
framework and relative insensitivity to economic 
profit considerations (Kaczynski 1977). Glob-
ally, the oceans are capable of yielding a much 
larger annual harvest than is now being taken, 
much of it from the remaining high seas. Poten-
tially, there remains room for a substantial 
distant-water fishing effort, with the real ques-
tion being how much expansion can be justified 
in terms of cost-benefit comparisons. 
Conclusion 
The extension of national fishing jurisdictions 
to 200 miles is bringing about an improvement in 
the utilization of the world's ocean fish resources. 
The gains are resulting from the imposition by 
national governments of restrictions on access to 
the fish stocks they have now acquired. Overex-
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ploitation of the commercially desirable stocks, 
which was threatening to spread throughout the 
oceans, has been halted. The distributional 
implications of the changes that are taking place 
also appear, on balance, to be beneficial, at least 
for the near future. 
The establishment ofnationaljurisdictions, by 
itself, gives little assurance that fish resources will 
be used optimally. National governments still 
have far to go in developing and implementing 
fully ratio.nal fisheries management within their 
respective jurisdictions. There still_ are powerful 
social and political forces within many countries 
that deliberately promote the wasteful applica-
tion of excessive amounts oflabour and capital to 
exploitation of the limited fish stocks available. 
The balkanization of the oceans that is the 
consequence of 200-mile jurisdictions also has 
given play to many new dis economies, as a partial 
offset to the efficiency gains flowing from enclo-
sure of the ocean commons. Establishing a vast 
network of new boundaries within the oceans is 
itself costly and disputatious. And, as fallout 
from the new national jurisdictions, a vast 
number of problems in managing trans boundary 
stock have emerged. 
Although economists may have heaved a sigh 
of relief when the irrational conditio~ of open-
access fishing on a worldwide scale came to an 
end, they now find a host of national irrationali-
ties to contend with, within the fisheries policies 
and practices of individual states. Certainly, the 
first task in any further effort to improve utiliza-
tion of the world's fish resources should be to 
develop, at the national level, socioeconomically 
rational and administratively effective fisheries 
management. 
At the international level, important tasks 
need to be carried out to improve world fisheries 
utilization. Most important is the development of 
effective mechanisms for transboundary stock 
management in its many bilateral and multilat-
eral manifestations. Next, there is the need to 
bring an effective discipline to fishing on the 
remaining high seas. An international manage-
ment authority with some powers of sanction is 
needed. For the longer term, there still are the 
scientific, technological, and economic chal-
lenges of exploration on the ocean frontier to 
seek resources that so far have remained beyond 
reach and to bring them under beneficial 
exploitation. 
This paper draws on materials that I developed for a 
research project supported by the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada. Valuable 
research assistance from J. Masson is acknowledged. 
Discussion 
Peter Drysdale: My sole qualification for open-
ing the discussion on these two papers is that I 
know absolutely nothing about forests or fishes 
so that, unconfused by rich detail and deep exper-
tise, I might try to effect some kind of metamor-
phosis between two physically quite different 
products and, in the tradition of my craft, con-
centrate on more universal, if somewhat disso-
ciated, truths. One must confess, at first blush, 
that forests and fishes are, superficially at least, 
very different. But my profession is not one that 
lets the facts get in the way of analysis, so it is in 
this spirit that I am approaching the rather daunt-
ing task of trying to say something useful about 
these two papers together - a presumption for 
which at the outset I must beg the authors' 
indulgence. 
These are two extremely valuable papers. They 
provide not only a wealth of background infor-
mation and expertise on two of the product 
markets that are the subject of this conference but 
also many insights into the analytical issues and 
major themes that must inform discussion over 
the coming few days. 
Scott's paper provides an extremely compre-
hensive survey of factors affecting the utilization 
and management of forest products in interna-
tional markets. It raises every important question 
that has occurred in policy discussion about 
forest exploitation, management, and trade. It is 
a rounded paper full of beautiful literary allu-
sions, and one is confident at the end that one 
knows quite a lot about the optimal development 
of forestlands, however innocently and igno-
rantly one begins. 
Copes provides similar reassurance to those 
previously uninitiated in his fishery world. His 
concise review of the economics of international 
fisheries from Grotius onward makes the unfa-
miliar and complex, familiar and manageable. 
The developments in the jurisdictional system 
governing the exploitation of fisheries resources 
around the law of the sea conferences are particu-
larly deftly handled, and with becoming national 
modesty, especially when one considers how well 
Canada did out of all this. My comments are not 
to imply any disagreement with Copes' main con-
clusions about the virtues of the new regime. But 
the particular circumstances of the Canadian 
fishing industry (whether seen as an infant need-
ing protection or in terms of its disadvantaged 
fishing communities) have had, one suspects, an 
important bearing on how interests in the new 
regime were presented so vigorously and per-
ceived so clearly from this part of the world. 
In reading both these papers, I was struck (and 
perhaps this is the Australian in me coming out) 
by the strong similarities there appear to be 
between minerals and forests and fisheries. 
Indeed, the thrust of the argument in the Scott 
paper revolves around the notion that the inter-
national exploitation of forests consists in forest 
mining roughly according to Ricardian rules. 
The Copes paper also intimates that a good pro-
portion of fisheries exploitation until relatively 
recent times has been really a mining-type opera-
tion. The mining phase in the exploitation of 
both of these renewable resources occurs as 
stocks are taken out without deleterious effects 
on yield. Then there appears to be a distinctly 
foresty or fishy phase(perhaps best described as a 
stable hunting or gathering phase) where the 
focus is on natural harvesting in a way that sus-
tains yield. And finally, there is a closely related 
farming phase where plantation forestry, for 
example, or aquaculture are subject to the same 
principles of husbandry as other farm products 
and can be treated accordingly. 
Obviously all these phases can happily coexist 
in the international marketplace for both prod-
ucts without defying any of the laws of compar-
ative advantage. For example, the relative 
resource endowments and demand structures in 
China and New Zealand encourage efficient 
aquacultural production in the former and fish 
mining in the latter. Or in Japan and Papua New 
Guinea, forest farming is efficient in the former 
and forest mining (with some qualification) sen-
sible in the latter. (Incidentally, I think that Scott 
perhaps underestimates the range and potential 
of agroforestry, which is not confined to exotic 
cases but is being investigated commercially in 
New Zealand and Australia.) 
These simple distinctions may help to clarify 
the nature of the resource allocation and man-
agement problems, as well as the nature of pro-
duction and trade specialization and their 
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dynamics over time in both industries, as one 
traverses the detailed argument in both papers. 
A fundamental question in both papers relates 
to how the authors approach the issue of optimiz-
ation of resource use. Curiously, neither paper 
quite comes to grips with the question of how to 
optimize the use or development of the product 
with which it deals, although this is the subject to 
which attention is ostensibly directed. Scott 
introduces the useful analytic device of the virgin 
island and poses the right questions, but there is 
no analytic island in Copes paper. One is left 
wondering at the end exactly what are the quasi-
market rules that both authors are using or would 
use to ensure efficient (or optimal) exploitation 
of each resource's commodity. 
The crux of the matter is that both papers 
fudge the important stock-in-trade distinction 
between efficiency conditions in resource use and 
distributional and other broader social objec-
tives. In reality, of course, the latter considera-
tions do influence the pattern of resource use. 
Copes provides illustration of the distributional 
interests in the fishing industry in Canada and 
elsewhere, and Scott carries examples in the 
forest area through to an analysis, which more or 
less presumes that distributional and other social 
objectives must directly affect resource alloca-
tion. At least it has to be argued carefully in each 
case that the efficiency objectives cannot be 
handled better separately from the distributional 
and other objectives. This is not done in either 
paper. 
If the optimization objective is addressed in 
this (admittedly) conventional way, the problem 
becomes the familiar one of allocating the rights 
to exploit the resources to the most-efficient 
exploiters (whether they are foreigners or nation-
als), with an appropriate rent-value of the re-
sources being extracted for the community at 
large. There is a further question of how to opti-
mize trade specialization in the utilization of the 
resources and trade in resource-based products. 
Viewed in this way, it is by no means clear, for 
example, that even over time national fisheries 
need be exploited according to what Copes calls 
unrestrained comparative advantage or that 
countries like Australia and New Zealand (not 
the homes of great seafaring people) should not 
continue optimally to auction fishing rights to 
distant-water fleets. 
As for the equity and other social objectives, 
they can be dealt with independently through the 
mobilization of the rents or taxes from resource 
harvesting and their application to equitable and 
social purposes, including broad developmental 
purposes. 
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After observing that the new regime in fisheries 
jurisdiction represents an improvement over the 
previous circumstances in which there was poten-
tial overexploitation of a common-property 
fisheries resource, Copes notes that the new 
regime by itself gives little reassurance that fish 
resources will be used optimally but notes that an 
important problem remaining is the management 
of transboundary stock. Indeed, countries are 
enjoined in the law-of-the-sea conventions to 
cooperate regionally to solve these problems. 
What are the possibilities for such cooperation in 
the Pacific region? What countries might sensibly 
be involved? What regional mechanisms might be 
required to deal with these problems? And would 
it be possible to proceed with Pacific cooperation 
on fisheries management even if the United 
States were reluctant to be involved? I would very 
much welcome some comment on these 
questions. 
Narongchai Akrasanee: The Scott and Copes 
papers set the tone for this meeting on renewable 
resources. The purpose of my comments is to 
assist in setting the tone for the rest of the 
seminar. I consider the subjects to be most impor-
tant to Southeast Asia because the region was 
endowed with considerable quantities of fishes 
and trees. Unfortunately, overexploitation has 
been common to both resources and is the prob-
lem with which Southeast Asia must deal. In this 
respect, neither paper had too much to offer. 
Scott's paper promises to deal with the prob-
lems of forest utilization in Southeast Asia and, 
although it takes examples of the adverse effects 
of deforestation from Southeast Asia, it exam-
ines only general factors contributing to defores-
tation and proposes a strategy to increase forest 
production by advanced management techniques 
that are found only in advanced countries at 
present. The economic analysis in the paper is 
general and is not directly related to the strategy 
to increase production. And, finally, the solution 
proposed is meant for forestry in an isolated 
island! 
The adverse effects of deforestation are well 
known. Perhaps, as a group, we do not need to 
spend too much time on this topic. The circum-
stances in Southeast Asia are evidence of the 
adverse effects of deforestation. Scott has 
touched upon the factors contributing to defores-
tation and has correctly included slash-and-burn 
agriculture. But the factor that has not been made 
explicit is the lack of law enforcement, even 
though this is one of the most important factors 
in the overexploitation of forests in general and is 
the key factor in Southeast Asia. Scott's analysis 
of the economics of forest development does not 
incorporate the costs of enforcement, nor does it 
deal with the political economy of forestry con-
cessions. Thus, his solution has limited applica-
bility and is only suitable to a law-abiding coun-
try such as Canada - or to a small island 
somewhere in the Pacific. The solution is 
obviously not meant for Southeast Asia where 
deforestation started with the export of hard-
woods and was aggravated by rapid population 
growth. The governments gave log concessions to 
a few people, some of whom overexploited their 
concessions. Those without concessions 
poached. A model applicable to Southeast Asia 
must incorporate the costs of control mecha-
nisms and must be based on more than tax and 
incentive measures. 
The mechanisms within an optimization model 
for Southeast Asia would include careful moni-
toring of exports, penalties for log poaching, and 
incentives for the application of intensive farm-
ing techniques. As it is difficult to supervise tree 
cutting, control or even banning of exports may 
be necessary to slow the rate of tree harvesting. 
Log-poaching penalties should be severe enough 
to make log poaching too expensive to continue. 
Finally, intensive farming techniques should be 
encouraged as a much-needed replacement for 
slash-and-burn agriculture. 
On Copes' paper, I only have two short com-
ments. First, I think his analysis should have 
taken into account the fishing ability and fish-
eating habits of both coastal and distant-water 
states. Copes recognizes that countries support-
ing distant-water fishing fleets - South Korea 
and Thailand, for example - will be adversely 
affected by the 200-mile zone. However, he 
stresses only the advantage for the coastal states 
in charging rents to foreign fishing vessels. Coast-
al states whose populations do not eat large 
quantities of marine products can, indeed, begin 
to demand rents from distant-water fleets, but the 
disadvantages for the developing countries with 
such fleets are considerable. Second, this 
approach to analysis fails to recognize the possi-
bility that the imposition of the 200-mile zones 
will lead to international conflict. This possibility 
is real and is enhanced by the difficulty in enforc-
ing regulations over foreign vessels operating in 
the zones. 
John Bene: In his paper, Scott deals with a com-
plex subject on which many people hold strong 
views. It is hard to overstate how important the 
forests are to the economic, social, and cultural 
welfare of the people around the Pacific. He 
points out that few economists have studied the 
contribution of the forest to development. When 
they have, they have concentrated mostly on the 
international trade of forest products, which is no 
more than the tip of the iceberg. In 1974, which is 
the most recent year for which I could find data, 
only 17% of the 2500 x 106 mJ of wood harvested 
found its way into international trade. 
Developing countries produce about 40% of 
the world's timber harvest, and 85% of this wood 
is burned to cook meals. In the monsoonal coun-
tries, branches of tropical trees are the only green 
fodder available during the dry winter months to 
sustain cattle, sheep, and goats. Billions of tonnes 
of topsoil are washed into the sea each year 
because too many trees have been removed. 
None of this is reflected in the statistics from 
which the economists derive their conclusions. 
There is little agreement on how to translate into 
dollars and cents the value of shade for humans 
and beasts under the hot tropical sun, the value of 
a windbreak against the searing winds in the 
Sahel or in Rajastan, or the value of the trees that 
slow runoff after a tropical downpour. Econo-
mists are hard at work on these problems. U nfor-
tunately, so far they have been more successful in 
quantifying the goods contributed from the 
forest than the "bads" from the lack of trees. Next 
to the role of the homemaker in the world econ-
omy, the contribution of the forest is the worst-
documented item in the field of economics. 
This conference is supposed to discuss renew-
able resources, but the forest is a renewable 
resource only as long as it is allowed to renew 
itself or if it is replanted. Most lands will revege-
tate with trees and shrubs if left fallow after the 
trees have been removed. But, under the on-
slaught of a rapidly growing population, the 
forest turns into bare rock, desert, or coarse 
grassland if overused or poorly managed. 
At one time, about one-third of this planet's 
land surface was forested. More than half of this 
forest was in the tropics. In the countries of the 
temperate zone, progress has been equated too 
long with clearing of the forest for agriculture. In 
Europe, the forests were at a minimum about 150 
years ago; since then, they have increased in 
many countries, including France and the Scan-
dinavian countries. Productivity is now increas-
ing almost everywhere in Europe as a result of 
better management and better utilization. 
In the tropics, of 3500 Mha tropical forest, 
1000 Mha have been destroyed during recorded 
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history, and the land has become unproductive 
wasteland. Destruction continues at the rate of 
200 000-400 000 ha annually. The 800 Mha 
humid tropical forests are the source of most of 
the tropical timber trade. If high-grading and 
shifting cultivation continue at the present rate, 
there will be little tropical wood to be harvested 
from the natural forest by the end of this century. 
Scott generalizes about the role of trees in the 
economy, but the role of trees in the tropics, 
where most of the developing countries are, is 
very different from that in the temperate zone, 
where the industrial countries are. Also, he 
focuses mostly on conditions in the humid, tropi-
cal forest of Southeast Asia, but some of his 
assumptions would have to be revised if one 
talked about the coniferous forests of North 
America's west coast, Chile, New Zealand, 
Australia, or Siberia. 
The problem with generalizing is exemplified 
in the term "forestland." There are vast areas in 
the more northerly and southerly regions of the 
globe where the growing of trees is the best use of 
the land. The climate may be too harsh or the 
quality of the land too poor to grow annual food 
crops on these lands economically. In most tropi-
cal countries, the simultaneous or sequential use 
of the land to grow trees, annual food crops, and 
pasture may be the best use of the land. Thus, to 
describe any land in the tropics as forestland is 
somewhat ambiguous. 
The high cost of waiting- the term Scott uses 
to describe interest on the money invested -
requires that some income be derived from thin-
nings or other forms of selective cutting in the 
managed forest. It is just not economic to invest 
in planting and tending and then wait 100 years 
for a return. Another alternative is to harvest by 
clear-cutting and then to wait for the next crop of 
trees from natural regeneration. 
In the tropics, as Scott points out, only inten-
sively managed plantations of fast-growing trees 
make economic sense. The results of natural 
regeneration are unpredictable. Enrichment 
planting of the natural tropical forest looks good 
on paper but has not worked in the field. 
There are many reasons to preserve areas of 
unmanaged tropical forest, but they are not eco-
nomic ones - for example, the preservation of 
gene reservoirs or the protection of steep slopes. 
Until the value of these services can be quantified, 
it is not practical to argue their value based on 
return on investment. 
If tree plantation is the only economically jus-
tifiable method to sustain timber production in 
the tropics, one has to forego forests on land that 
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can sustain annual food crops. Food is in short 
supply and likely will become even scarcer as the 
world population climbs toward the 10 billion 
mark early in the next century. However, only 
10-15% of the tropical land can sustain annual 
food crops even if fertilizer and water are freely 
available. 
One-third of the tropical land mass will not 
sustain any kind of vegetation, because the land is 
too high, too steep,"too rocky, too dry, too salty, 
too alkaline, etc. This leaves about half of the 
tropical land mass for pasture or land on which 
trees can be grown alone or in alternation with 
other crops. Most trees build up the fertility of 
the soil so that it can support food crops. Crops 
can be planted between newly planted trees for 
2-3 years until the canopy closes or for about the 
same amount of time after the trees have been 
harvested. Some trees grow very rapidly in the 
tropics; there are many that can be harvested 
5-15 years after being planted, and many will 
regrow quickly from root shoots after the tree has 
been cut (coppice growth). 
Scott states that 100 Mha plantation forest, 
equivalent to only 4% of the world's forests, 
could supply all the industrial roundwood 
requirements in the year 2000. Technical 
improvements in the use of wood make substitu-
tion with fast-grown, less-dense wood increas-
ingly practical for high-valued, slow-growing 
woods such as mahogany or teak. The average 
rotation age in the tropical forest plantation 
approaches 10 years, and this makes "waiting" 
more economically acceptable even at present 
high interest rates. Shortage of capital and politi-
cal uncertainty are more serious impediments 
than the availability of land or labour or the high 
interest rates. 
Not only economists, but also the general pub-
lic, must gain a better understanding of the con-
tributions that trees make to human welfare. In 
China, South Korea, India, and several other 
countries, programs of social forestry have been 
initiated during the last 10-20 years. Trees are 
grown along roadsides, canals, railway lines, and 
farm boundaries. These trees are planted by 
either the forest services or the farmers and are 
managed by the villagers. The forest service acts 
as an adviser only. Many schools operate tree 
nurseries; the seedlings are bought and distrib-
uted by the forest service. This operation gener-
ates some money for the children to buy books or 
go for school excursions, and it raises interest in 
the forest among young, impressionable people. 
Schoolteachers as well as presidents of the coun-
try preside over tree-planting ceremonies and 
preach the importance of forest management. 
I suggest that the world will see a faster 
increase in the number of planted trees than Scott 
foresees and that these trees will grow in locations 
where they will not compete with any other land 
use; in fact, I think they will assist agriculture and 
improve the amenities of the land. 
Scott's discussion on alternatives for distribut-
ing revenues from the forest and tenures to 
optimize the value of the forest to society should 
be read carefully by anyone who wants to see that 
his or her children and grandchildren live in a 
world where trees continue to provide food, fuel, 
shelter, and beauty. Nowhere is the conflict 
between the perceived interest of the individual 
and that of future generations more acute than in 
the management of the globe's forest cover. Scott 
describes eloquently how different objectives can 
be served if the forest is made a public trust or 
private property. Responsibility for forest man-
agement or enforcement of good managerial 
practices can be allocated to one or another 
group of the society. 
Decisions on how to reinvest the gains from the 
harvest of the forest should not be taken lightly, 
especially if the liquidation of the forest is con-
templated. There are many legitimate objectives 
and quite a few illegitimate ones that can be easily 
disguised to appeal to an unsuspecting public. 
The economist who contributes to decision-
making must be confident that all important fac-
tors are known and have been properly weighed. 
Although it may take longer than a lifetime to 
establish a forest and bring it to maturity, careless 
or irresponsible action may doom reestablish-
ment for all time. 
Wontack Hong: Most of the world's distant-
water fishing catch has been taken off the coasts 
of developed countries (11 Mt of the total 15 Mt), 
such as the U.S. and Canada. The numbers of 
developing countries that have substantial 
resources off their coasts are few. Therefore, 
most of the benefits from the introduction of the 
200-mile fishing zones have accrued to developed 
countries. Although the globally optimal policy 
for fisheries conservation is simply to restrict fish-
ing efforts, these coastal states have taken advan-
tage of their new-found wealth and have begun 
extracting exorbitant entry fees from other 
nations; for instance, the U.S. collects nearly 10% 
of the gross value of fish caught by South 
Koreans in the Alaskan fishing zone. Under the 
pretext of fisheries conservation, what has 
resulted is a fishing colonialism an(j an exploita-
tion of resource-poor countries by the resource-
rich countries. 
Copes contends that the 200-mile limits have 
brought about an overall increase in welfare. I 
believe the opposite: the fact that many devel-
oped states ended up with resources surplus to 
their harvesting capacities implies suboptimal 
fish harvests for the whole world. The expulsion 
of distant-water fleets or the imposition of fees 
means that the coastal developed countries have 
gained at the expense of developing countries 
with distant-water fishing fleets. The 200-mile 
limit has not improved the welfare of disadvan-
taged groups; it has changed the focus of disad-
vantage from one group of developing countries 
to another. To the developing countries that have 
a distant-water fleet, the shift doubles the disad-
vantage because of the waste it entails. 
Copes contends that fishing from a shore base 
nearby, with most processing done ashore, has 
cost advantages that outweigh the initial disad-
vantages in setting up the processing facilities. 
However, the fish can be processed in factory 
vessels of distant-water fleets. Furthermore, off-
shore trawlers do not operate more cost-
effectively than do distant-water fleets. Unless an 
extraordinary, labour-saving device is developed 
in the fishing industry in the near future, fishing 
will continue to be a poor person's pursuit in the 
developed countries. The developing countries 
have comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
activities, such as coastal and distant-water fish-
ing. As a disproportionate share of the potential 
distant-water fishing grounds has now fallen into 
the hands of developed countries, developing 
countries, such as South Korea and Thailand, are 
being deprived of the opportunity to specialize on 
the basis of comparative advantage. Further-
more, the coastal developed countries will end up 
subsidizing and promoting domestic operations 
that are economically marginal or submarginal 
with no comparative advantage. 
What is left now is an international agreement 
on the fishing of the remaining high seas. My 
hope is that the super powers will adhere strictly 
to the objective of fisheries conservation and will 
not stray into the colonialism and exploitation 
that permeate their activities with regard to the 
200-mile fishing zones. 
Francis T. Christy Jr: (My remarks are personal 
comments and should in no way be construed as 
reflecting the position ofFAO.) Copes presents a 
good summary of the development of extended 
fisheries jurisdiction and the evolution of the 
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exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as well as the 
nature of the problems that are emerging. As he 
points out, the new setup provides the opportu-
nity for greatly improved management of marine 
fisheries because of the acquisition of signifi-
cantly extended authority by the coastal states. 
He is also quite correct in noting that there 
remain numerous difficulties for coastal states in 
achieving efficient exercise of their authority and 
numerous problems for bilateral and multilateral 
management of shared stocks. However, I had 
hoped for something more. 
One of the major tasks at FAO is the provision 
of advice to coastal states, at their request, on the 
management of fisheries within their extended 
zones of jurisdiction. In fulfilling this task, my 
colleagues and I need more information, better 
tools, and greater understanding than we pres-
ently possess. We are fully aware of the problems 
of management (which I roughly define as those 
activities designed to increase the flow of net 
benefits from the resources), but we have difficul-
ties in dealing with them effectively. That is, we 
have difficulty in improving the practice of 
management in real life. 
In the hope of stimulating greater inputs from 
academia, I would like to elaborate some of the 
problems identified by Copes and indicate some 
of the areas where we feel the need for greater 
attention. First, however, some background. The 
traditional approach has been to measure global 
production of fisheries by the simple addition of 
the tonnes offish caught, with equal weight being 
given to each species. Thus, a tonne oflobster has 
counted for no more than a tonne of anchoveta, 
even though the former has an average unit value 
roughly 100 times that of the latter. This regret-
table state of affairs is partly a result of the inor-
dinate difficulty of deriving satisfactory price 
information for hundreds of different species of 
fish, many of which have different uses and are 
sold in widely disparate markets. 
At F AO, we have recently attempted to 
remedy this problem by the construction of a 
unit-value weighted output index (FAO, in 
press). This index is based on rough approxi-
mates of the average unit values of major species 
and groups of species in 1969-71 and by the 
application of the La-Speyres formula. The calcu-
lations provide quite a different picture from that 
of the traditional unweighted measure of output. 
Whereas the unweighted measure shows a 
growth rate from 1970 to 1978 of only l % annu-
ally, the unit-value weighted index increases at 
2.9% annually. This figure takes on special signif-
icance when one considers that the new fisheries 
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jurisdiction means that the rights to this increas-
ingly valuable catch have been granted to the 
coastal states. 
Catches of distant-water fleets in 1972 (the last 
year before there were significant extensions of 
jurisdiction) indicate the vast disparities in gains 
among countries {F AO, in press). Two-thirds of 
the value of catches (excluding tunas and sal-
mons) were taken off developed countries and 
only one-third off developing countries. Most of 
these catches were taken by the fleets of devel-
oped countries; therefore, the change in gains to 
developed countries represents mostly a transfer 
from one to another. 
About 40% of the total gains among develop-
ing countries accrue to the states of the east-
central Atlantic, particularly to Morocco, Maur-
itania, and Senegal, and 25% to the states of the 
southeast Atlantic. The developing coastal states 
of the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the 
western coast of Latin America have achieved 
small immediate gains (excluding tunas) by the 
extension of jurisdiction because they have con-
trol over few resources of interest to the distant-
water fleets. This fact reflects the specialized 
interests of the distant-water fleets in a few highly 
valued species that can be taken at relatively low 
costs. In fact, two individual species - Atlantic 
cod and Alaska pollack - accounted for 25% of 
the total value of catch (excluding tunas) by 
distant-water states in foreign zones in 1972. 
It is also noteworthy that two of the distant-
water states accounted for more than half of the 
value of the 1972 catch in foreign zones - 31 % by 
Japan and 25% by the USSR. 
These rough estimates indicate that the effects 
of the extension of jurisdiction have been far 
from uniform, both for the coastal states and the 
distant-water states. Copes is quite right in point-
ing out that the ultimate constraints resulting 
from the Draft Convention's call for coastal 
states to share excess resources are of little or no 
consequence. It is important to emphasize this 
point to correct some of the misconceptions cur-
rently being held by a number of developing coast-
al states. The wording of the negotiating text as 
well as that of the U.S. Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Act (sometimes adopted as a 
model) tends to perpetuate the concept that fish 
are biologic rather than economic resources and 
that the right to dispose of them is constrained by 
some obligations to the international commu-
nity. This concept, to the extent that it is per-
ceived as having weight, is the source of some 
mischief. For example, a few countries have 
rejected offers of help in the assessment of their 
stocks for fear that there may be surpluses that 
they will be obliged to offer to their neighbours. 
And a few states are concerned that they do not 
have the scientific expertise or the knowledge to 
go through the tortuous calculations necessary to 
derive optimum sustainable yield estimates or 
measures of their own fishing capacity. In addi-
tion, this concept tempts states to invest in the 
development of their domestic capacity because 
of the feeling that this is the only way they can 
increase their share of the wealth. 
There are four sets of problems identified in 
Copes' paper that deserve special attention. It 
would be useful to have an analytical framework 
for dealing with these problems, but I am not sure 
that one exists. 
0 ne of the difficulties is how to manage trans-
boundary stocks; it is a problem inherent in 
common property: distribution and efficiency 
seem to be inextricably intertwined. In the 
absence of property rights, the only way one can 
share in the wealth is by investing in the means of 
production or in illegal means (bribery, extor-
tion, collusion, etc.). In fact, I believe that the 
difficulty in distinguishing distribution and effi-
ciency decisions is the heart of the problem of 
adopting and implementing improved manage-
ment practices. Copes rightly states that the reso-
lution of these problems is the most important 
task to be undertaken at the international level. 
However, I cannot agree with his remark that a 
large proportion of the transboundary stock 
involves two neighbouring countries only. Aside 
from the tunas and billfishes, there are sardinellas 
and hakes off the northwest African coast, pil-
chards in the southeast Atlantic, scads and mack-
erels in the South China Sea and the Gulf of 
Thailand, as well as numerous species in Euro-
pean and Mediterranean waters that are each 
shared by several countries. 
For some of these stocks, the problems of joint 
management are not great because use within one 
zone does not affect use in another zone. For 
other stocks - those that are not readily deplet-
able - the management problems are essentially 
economic rather than biologic. The upstream 
users can diminish the supplies available to the 
downstream users without incurring damage to 
their own interests. Bargaining in this case is 
difficult unless side payments or sanctions can be 
used. The shared stocks that are depletable are 
another matter; excessive use by one state will 
diminish its own potential yields as well as those 
of its neighbours. Although this may provide an 
incentive for cooperation, the technical problems 
of managing these stocks are often complicated 
by the fact that use in one zone may be more 
profitable than use in other zones. 
As Copes states, the solution to the trans bound-
ary stock problems is a system of joint manage-
ment. But I think his comment begs the question: 
management for whom and for what purpose. In 
citing the European Economic Community as an 
organization able to enforce a management plan 
with strict quota limitations for its members, 
Copes calls attention to an organization that has 
failed completely to adopt, much less enforce, a 
management plan. 
Management for the purpose of achieving 
increased net economic revenues requires a 
reduction in fishing effort, and this, in tum, 
requires a reduction in-jobs. Ultimately, the item 
of wealth being traded is employment in the ports 
of England, Scotland, France, Germany, etc. 
Making such trades greatly increases the mortal-
ity of politicians because their constituency is 
united by nationalism. Thus, management of 
shared stocks for the purpose of increasing net 
economic revenues is unlikely to occur until the 
mortality of the fishermen has become great 
enough to reduce the mortality of the politicians. 
The intertwining of efficiency and distribution 
decisions is particularly acute and critical for 
shared stocks, but it also plagues management in 
domestic situations - a second set of problems 
requiring attention. It is often thought that the 
proper education of fishery administrators will 
be sufficient to get them to adopt the manage-
ment practices we advisers are fond of suggesting 
- whether these be vessel limits, fishing person-
nel quotas, taxes, price controls, etc. I believe 
that this thinking underestimates the intelligence 
of the administrators. There are still some that 
need to be persuaded of the efficiency of reducing 
effort in an overcapitalized fishery, but I suspect 
there are many more who know full well that 
management to improve net revenues cannot be 
achieved without one group being hurt for the 
benefit of another. 
The problem is that few fishery administrators 
are equipped to make such distribution decisions. 
These decisions are made at a higher level of 
government, either through the political or, as in 
a few cases (e.g., allocations to native Ameri-
cans), the judicial process. In these trade offs, the 
politicians are protected by having a diverse 
rather than a uniform constituency, and they can 
decide on a distribution that meets the majority 
interest. They can respond to the question of 
management: for whom and for what purpose, 
thus greatly facilitating the task of the fishery 
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administration in adopting and imph:menting 
fisheries management practices. · -
Another set of problems emerges after man-
agement objectives have been decided, especially 
if a decision has been made to improve the Jot of 
the small-scale or artisanal fisherman. Copes 
states that where a government has failed to 
resolve the unemployment problem of a 
depressed fishing area, it is tempted to use fishing 
as" ... an employer oflast resort and dispenser of 
social welfare." "Tempted" may not be the word 
to use, when one considers the devastating prob-
lems of unemployment in the rural coastal com-
munities of many countries. 
In these situations, where the opportunity 
costs of Jabour may be at, or close to, zero and 
where fish stocks are fully or overutilized, the 
determination of the optimum utilization of the 
resources becomes difficult. Efficiency may mean 
that the best management technique is to pre-
serve the condition of free and open access to 
maintain opportunities for employment, even 
though they will produce low levels of earnings. If 
this is the case, managers should avoid subsidies 
directed at fishermen, because these will tend to 
encourage the flow of additional labour into the 
fisheries. They should also avoid encouraging 
technological innovations, such as motorization 
of boats, that are Jabour-saving in nature because 
these will tend to concentrate the earnings in the 
hands of a few to the detriment of the many. 
Copes states that there are still powerful social 
and political forces within many countries that 
deliberately promote the wasteful application of 
excessive amounts of labour and capital to 
exploitation of limited fish stocks. The question 
that deserves attention is whether the application 
is wasteful. 
A final set of problems of significant impor-
tance, which is mentioned only in passing by 
Copes, relates to the capacities of coastal states 
for the monitoring, control, and surveillance of 
their economic zones. Optimization implies net 
benefits - the costs of enforcement (and research 
and administration) must be considered along 
with the costs of production. In the U.S., it has 
been estimated that the rents collected from for-
eigners have been about $10 million, whereas the 
costs associated with regulating foreigners have 
been more than $50 million a year. Although fees 
have recently been increased and may match the 
costs, questions can still be raised as to whether 
this is an optimal solution. 
Problems of enforcement are relatively easy to 
solve in the north Pacific. In the central and west 
Pacific, however, the isolated island states set in 
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the vast open seas will have considerable difficul-
ties in the enforcement of their zones. And, in 
Southeast Asia, enforcement of regulations on 
even domestic fishermen is notoriously difficult, 
as noted by some of the other participants in this 
conference. 
The new jurisdiction for marine fisheries pro-
vides a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the optimization of benefits from the sea's 
wealth. A large number of difficult problems 
remain to be solved, several of which have been 
identified by Copes. I have sought to elaborate 
some that appear to be of particular importance 
and difficulty for those of us who have a hand in 
guiding policy and planning decisions. 
Two of these - the management of shared 
stocks and the management of domestic fisheries 
- are greatly complicated by the difficulties of 
separating distribution and efficiency decisions. 
The third is the problem of improving the Jot of 
small-scale fishermen using limited resources. 
And the fourth is the problem of enforcement. 
Although these· problems have not been ignored 
by scholars, they merit greatly increased 
attention. 
Trade and Investment in Fish Products among 
Pacific-Area Countries 
Biing-HwanLin, RebeccaJ. Lent, andRichardS. Johnston 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, USA 
What effects, if any, have the new exclusive economic zones (EEZs), dramatic changes in 
exchange rates, higher fuel costs, and changes in the price of alternative protein sources had on trade 
and investment in fisheries? Although world harvests of seafoods have increased since 1967, fish 
landings among Pacific-area countries, taken in total, have increased even more over the period. 
Furthermore, trading patterns have changed: Japan, the world's leading seafood exporter in 1965, 
has beena net importer since 1972. Canada and the U.S. have experienced declines in their shares of 
world exports, and developing Asian countries have increased theirs. On the investment side, a 
variety of joint-venture arrangements have emerged. Thus, fishing patterns have changed with 
respect to areas and species fished as well as vessel type. Preliminary results from two general 
econometric models suggest that relative prices, while important, account for a small percentage of 
the varieties in export-market shares; that, on the demand side, such shares are relatively inelastic 
with respect to relative prices; that the income (food expenditure) elasticity of demand for shrimp in 
Japan has been decreasing over time (price elasticities of demand are relatively low); and that the 
exchange rate may serve as a separate explanatory variable. Although certain insights can be gained 
if one looks at broad aggregates (countries and species), the more interesting questions should be 
addressed through a detailed investigation of the role that fisheries play in particular countries and of 
the market characteristics for particular species. 
Les nouvelles zones economiques exclusives (ZEE), Jes fluctuations brutales des taux de change, 
Ia hausse du prix du petrole et !'evolution du cout des nouvelles sources de proteines ont-ils influence 
ou non Jes investissements et le commerce des pecheries? Le volume mondial des peches a augmente 
depuis 1967 mais encore plus les captures des pays des cotes du Pacifique. Le commerce lui-meme a 
evolue: le Japon, premier exportateur de produits de la mer en 1965 est devenu un importateur net 
depuis 1972. Les exportations du Canada et des Etats-Unis ont diminue et celles des pays en 
developpement asiatiques ont augmente. Au niveau des investissements, de nombreuses conventions 
ont ete signees. Par consequent, le modele des peches a aussi change, qu'il s'agisse de zones, d'especes 
ou de sortes de chaluts. Les premiers resultats de deux modeles econometriques gt\neraux indiquent: 
que Jes prix relatifs n'influent, malgre leur importance, que sur un faible pourcentage de Ia variation 
dans Ia repartition des marches d'exportation; que du cote de la demande, ces proportions sont 
relativement stables; que I'elasticite du revenu des crevettes a diminue au Japon (l'elasticite des prix a 
Ia demande etant relativement faible); que Jes taux de change peuvent constituer une variable 
explicative separee. L'analyse d'agregats globaux (pays et especes) permet de degager quelques 
indices, mais Jes points Jes plus importants devraient etre etudies au moyen d'une enquete detaillee 
sur le role que Jes peches jouent dans divers pays et Jes caracteristiques du marcht\ de certaines 
especes. 
For the purposes of this paper, Pacific-area 
countries are considered to be those of the 
Middle East, South Asia (bordering on the 
Indian Ocean), Oceania, Asian countries border-
ing on the Pacific Ocean, the United States, and 
Canada. Central and South American countries 
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have been excluded, except for Mexico in the 
case of shrimp, although their role in Pacific-area 
seafood trade may soon increase. 
Country-by-country descriptions of seafood 
trade in 15 Pacific-area countries reveal general 
trends, affected perhaps most significantly by the 
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proclamation of 200-mile exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs). Since the EEZs were widely 
accepted, the fishing activities of many fleets have 
been subjected to controls - joint ventures, spe-
cial quotas, and permits. The new patterns of 
activities are profoundly influencing interna-
tional trade in seafood. For example, countries 
that now allow foreign nations to harvest under-
utilized species within their EEZs may develop 
their own capacities in future. Such shifts in 
access to fish resources are bound to influence the 
flow of seafood between countries. The country 
that eventually takes over the foreign-fishing 
activities will have reduced imports for that spe-
cies; likewise, exports by the foreign nation will 
decline. 
The emergence of 200-mile EEZs has resulted 
in new patterns of fishing activities, in terms of 
areas and species fished as well as vessel types, 
and has affected investment patterns in the fish-
ing and seafood processing industries. Whereas 
fleets currently fishing in foreign EEZs are gener-
ally scaling down their vessel and equipment 
investments, coastal states are attempting to 
expand their domestic industry (both in vessels 
and processing facilities) to begin focusing on 
foreign-harvested or underutilized species within 
their EEZs. Some of this domestic investment 
comes through governmental channels or inter-
national organizations, although investment by 
foreign private enterprises is playing an increas-
ing role. Japanese private investment in various 
countries' shrimp processing facilities and Nor-
wegian private investment in Indonesian tuna 
industries are but two examples of attempts to 
satisfy domestic demand previously met by 
distant-water fishing activities. 
The general trend in the Pacific area during the 
past 10 years has been increased total catches and 
values. Except for the U.S., Japan, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong, all the countries in the Pacific 
were net exporters (by value) of seafood in 1977. 
In fact, in Singapore and Hong Kong, the pres-
ence of imports for resale abroad may mask a 
true, net-exporting status. 
Between 1967 and 1978, total world harvest of 
fish, crustaceans, and molluscs increased from 
60.4 to 72.3 Mt, an increase that pales beside the 
nearly 200% during 1950-67. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAQ) of the United 
Nations has estimated that, in 1967, international 
trade accounted for 42% of the total catch. This 
figure fell to 31 % in 1973 but has been increasing 
since. Among the Pacific-area countries, the role 
of Japan and Israel (the developed market econ-
omies of Asia) as seafood exporters declined in 
relative terms during 1967-79, whereas that of 
Asia's developing-market economies increased 
substantially. The shares of exports from Oceania, 
Canada, and the United States fluctuated. 
As importers, the developed markets of Asia 
and North America showed opposite trends. 
Between 1967 and 1979, the former's share tripled 
for fresh and frozen seafood, whereas the latter's 
fell by one-third. The relative positions of 
Canada, the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand as importers of prepared seafoods -
especially in the canned form - also declined. 
Asia's developed economies increased their com-
bined shares of world imports of. prepared sea-
foods from less than 1.5% to almost 8%. 
Thus, the general picture is that of an 
expanded total world harvest (of both marine 
and freshwater species) with a recent.increase in 
the relative importance of international trade to 
its pre-1973 level (Table l). In addition, the 
developing economies of Asia have increased 
their share of the world's seafood exports, at the 
expense of most of the developed economies for 
products requiring little processing and at the 
expense of Japan for the more processed 
products. 
Between 1967 and 1978, nominal catches for 
Pacific rim regions increased: U.S. and Canada 
33%; Japan 37%; Australia and New Zealand 
37%; USSR 55%; Asia's developing countries 
(including China but not Taiwan) 52%. Harvests 
from all these regions have expanded more 
rapidly than the world totals, an important factor 
underlying some of the international trade pat-
terns. These larger harvests are the result, in large 
part, of expanded investments in fishing effort-
especially vessels - and, to a lesser extent, of 
changes in fishery jurisdictions. 
Increases in population and incomes as well as 
reductions in tariffs have contributed to increases 
in imports. The degree to which seafoods substi-
tute for other protein sources has not been 
explored on a global basis. However, the Asian 
countries' share of world trade in meat, both 
imports and exports, more than doubled between 
1970 and 1979. 
Data for 1973 and 1978 for fresh and frozen 
seafood (UN 1978) indicate the value of Japan's 
exports declined. Japan's exports to the United 
States fell dramatically, whereas, on a percentage 
basis, shares to other markets expanded. Cana-
da's total exports increased, with sales to Europe 
growing at the expense of Japan and the U.S. The 
value of U.S. exports also increased, with Japan's 
share showing a large increase and Europe's 
share a large decrease. (Preliminary data for 1979 
Table I. Shares of Pacific-area countries in world seafood trade, 1967-79. 
Share(% of total world trade) 
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, 
dried, or smoked 
Exports 
Asia, developed economies 8.0 7.9 6.6 6.6 6.2 7.9 8.3 6.9 3.9 4.8 3.4 3.2 2.4 
Asia, developing economies 9.3 9.2 12.0 11.9 12.1 13.6 16.6 16.1 21.4 21.4 24.6 21.4 22.5 
Oceania, developed economies 3.8 4.5 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.4 3.4 3.3 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.5 
Oceania, developing economies 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.7 na• 0.9 0.3 
America, developed economies 20.3 19.9 20.l 18.6 17.6 16.4 18.4 14.5 15.3 16.5 17.9 20.4 17.8 
Imports 
Asia, developed economies 10.3 10.3 12.7 13.6 17.4 18.6 23.6 22.2 24.4 27.6 29.8 32.3 33.3 
Asia, developing economies 5.0 4.7 5.0 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.2 
Oceania, developed economies 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Oceania, developing economies 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 na na na 0.0 
America, developed economies 35.5 39.0 38.5 36.6 34.8 36.6 32.3 30.8 27.6 28.9 28.0 24.7 23.6 
Prepared or preserved 
Exports 
Asia, developed economies 35.3 39.4 37.4 38.9 37.0 34.5 26.3 26.6 26.4 26.7 22.9 20.3 17.5 0 
Asia, developing economies 3.5 2.8 3.3 4.1 4.5 5.4 7.4 7.3 8.3 8.2 10.0 12.7 tT1 na z 
Oceania, developed economies 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.6 1.4 I. I 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.7 tT1 :;>:l 
Oceania, developing economies na 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.0 >-
America, developed economies 17.5 12.9 14.6 12.4 13.5 13.2 16.2 12.3 11.7 11.3 12.0 16.8 19.5 t"""' 
Imports ~ .....j 
Asia, developed economies 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.0 5.0 5.1 6.1 6.7 6.8 6.5 7.6 c:::: 
Asia, developing economies 7.3 7.3 8.0 7.6 8.1 7.0 6.8 7.5 9.4 8.2 8.8 8.9 ti na ; 
Oceania, developed economies 3.6 3.3 4.1 3.3 4.0 4.2 4.6 6.7 3.8 4.7 5.0 4.4 4.1 ~ 
Oceania, developing economies 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 I.I 1.0 1.0 1.8 I.I 1.2 na na 0.1 t"""' 
America, developed economies 22.9 23.1 23.6 25.6 23.6 25.6 19.7 21.1 16.4 19.2 17.3 16.0 15.2 z 
• na = not available. tT1 
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suggest that increasing volumes may be moving 
to Europe.) The values of exports from the other 
Pacific-area countries for which data are readily 
available (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Australia, and South Korea) were all larger in 
1978 than in 1973 (Tables 2 and 3). On a percent-
age basis, Japan is the largest market for these 
countries, although Australian exports to the 
U.S. exceeded those to Japan in 1973. Japan's 
imports from South Korea fell during the period 
and increased for Australia. The U.S. and 
Europe are also major markets for the seafood 
products of these countries. 
In general, the developed countries continue to 
be the primary importers of seafoods, even par-
tially processed forms. Some changes may be 
occurring, however; for example, Japan's share 
of annual exports to "other" countries increased 
by more than 60% over the period. 
For processed products, Japan is the primary 
supplier, suggesting that it imports raw materials 
for processing and subsequent export. Nonethe-
less, Japan continues to be a major market for the 
processed seafoods of South Korea and, begin-
ning in 1978, of Canada. 
Japan 
Between 1950 and 1978, Japan's harvest offish 
and shellfish increased more than threefold, mak-
ing that country the leading fishing nation in the 
world. Indeed, Japan's 1979 harvest exceeded the 
combined catches of the United States, Canada, 
Mexico, and China. In 1965, Japan was the 
world's primary exporter of seafood and ranked 
sixth as an importer. A net exporter of seafood in 
1958, Japan has been a net importer since 1972. 
Japan's fishing industry includes both distant-
water and local fleets, as well as aquaculture 
operations. Despite massive destruction during 
World War II, the fishing fleet and industry 
infrastructure have made remarkable recoveries. 
Much of the increase in harvest came from 
expansions of the catching capacity in both off-
shore and distant waters, particularly for species 
such as Alaska pollack and mackerel. In 1964, 
these two species, together with the tuna species,· 
led all others in terms of volume, whereas the 
tunas had the highest exvessel value followed by 
squid (including cuttlefish). By 1978, sardines 
had replaced tuna in the top three, by volume, 
and Alaska pollack had joined tuna, salmon, and 
squid as a leading income generator. 
The United States is Japan's principal market 
for exports, although six other Pacific-area coun-
tries accounted for 21 % of Japanese exports in 
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Table 3. Distribution of seafoods (prepared):' percentage of exports from selected Pacific-area countries to listed 
world markets, 1973 and 1978. 
Japan Canada USA South Korea 
Importers 1973 1978 1973 1978 1973 1978 1973 1978 
USA 22.6 17.0 17.6 12.3 22.4 39.8 
Japan <O.I 52.2 18.0 8.8 70.9 39.4 
Canada 9.4 6.2 17.5 24.2 I.I 4.0 
Australia 4.6 1.8 2.8 3.9 4.2 9.3 2.0 4.2 
Philippines 7.5 3.9 nae 0.1 0.9 0.4 <O.I na 
Singapore 4.1 3.4 0.1 <O.I 0.8 1.5 0.2 0.8 
Europeb 26.3 13.1 63.6 24.4 51.0 37.0 1.6 6.3 
Other 25.5 54.6 15.9 7.1 7.6 18.8 1.8 5.5 
'Corresponds to SITC 032. 
bFrance, U.K., West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, 
Austria. 
cna = not available. 
Source: Various issues of the UN Yearbook of international trade statistics, New York, USA, UN. 
1978 (up from 17% in 1970). Pacific-area coun-
tries also play a significant role as suppliers of 
seafood to Japan. South Korea supplied between 
11 % and 22% of Japan's imports during the 
1970s, and Taiwan accounted for about 10%. 
Indonesia increased its share of the Japanese 
market substantially during the 1970s, largely 
through exports of shrimp. Japan imports fresh 
and frozen tuna and exports canned, as well as 
fresh.and frozen, tuna. South Korea and Taiwan 
are Japan's major tuna suppliers (aside from its 
domestic fleet), whereas the United States is the 
leading importer of Japanese tuna. 
Among the factors underlying Japan's switch 
from net exporter to net importer are relaxation 
in its trade restrictions, increased domestic 
demand, expanded domestic processing (canned 
sardines and anchovies production alone increas-
ing 50-fold between 1970 and 1978), and changes 
in supply conditions, such as restrictions on fish-
ing operations in foreign fishing grounds, pollu-
tion of domestic fishing grounds, labour shor-
tages, 1 appreciation of the Japanese yen, and, in 
common with other fishing nations, increased 
fuel costs. 
The Japanese government is involved in the 
fishing industry in several ways, from restrictions 
on efforts for certain species, through research 
and development programs, trade policies 
(including import controls on selected fishery 
products), to management of Japan's 200-mile 
economic zone. Japan's large distant-water fleet 
was adversely affected by the introduction of the 
200-mile fishing jurisdictions claimed by other 
IThe International Marketing Fund reports that 
labour costs in Japan rose 28% between 1975 and 1978 
when expressed relative to those of other industrial 
countries. 
nations. The government's response has been 
increased involvement in domestic fisheries, 
including encouragement of aquaculture, water-
purification projects, plans for exploiting new 
fishing grounds, participation in investment 
activities abroad, and the pursuit of other fishing 
resources, such as the Antarctic krill. 
Japan's investments in developing countries 
include the provision of technical expertise arid 
capital to encourage shrimp production, some of 
which it later imports. It also participates in joint 
ventures ranging from tuna, squid, and shrimp 
production in Africa to salmon marketing in 
Chile. A substantial number of joint ventures are 
in Eastern Asia, and major investments have 
been made in American and Canadian fisheries. 
The composition of the domestic fleet has 
changed somewhat, in step with expanded atten-
tion to the coastal areas of Japan. In 1961 there 
were 379 187 fishing boats, of which 1168 were. 
lOOt or larger. In 1974, there were 372151 ves-
sels, of which 3196 were 100 t orlarger. However, 
in 1978, when the total number of vessels had 
increased to 412 423, the figures for 100-t plus 
boats had grown by only 92. 
China 
The People's Republic of China is one of the 
world's greatest producers of fishery items. Its 
output of aquatic animals and plants has consis-
tently ranked among the top four countries of the 
world. Yet the fishing industry in the country 
remains somewhat of a mystery to the rest of the 
world, and only recently has detailed information 
been made available. 
The 1978 marine fish yield in China comprised 
605 900 t from the South China Sea(l9% of total 
62 RENEW ABLE RESOURCES 
marine fish yield) and 2.54 Mt from the East 
China, Yellow, and Pohai seas (81% of total 
yield). The latter fishing region increased in yield 
by 62% during 1970-78, whereas yield from the 
South China Sea increased only 14% for the same 
period. 
Marine and freshwater aquaculture form a 
significant portion of China's annual output of 
aquatic products. In 1978, total output of aquatic 
products reached 5953 Mt, and aquaculture · 
accounted for 41 % of this production (including 
kelp). Moreover, aquaculture yields more than 
doubled during 1970-78, whereas catch increased 
by less than 50%. China's catches have been 
mainly sold at home. Exports in 1970, for exam-
ple, represented only 1.5% of China's nominal 
catch in that year. Total exports averaged 96 000 t 
during 1970-78. 
Although detailed data for China's seafood 
trade are scarce, available information does pro-
vide some insights. A 1966 study cites the USSR 
as one of China's most important fish export 
markets. Britain and Czechoslovakia were 
importing fish meal from China by 1955. An 
effort to expand exports by 50% began in 1956. In 
1962, eels in tomato sauce, spiced hairtail fish, 
croakers in oil, and braised cuttlefish were identi-
fied as important canned export products for 
China. A 1978 study points to Hong Kong and 
Macao as China's primary buyers of fresh and 
frozen fish, whereas Japan and Southeast Asia 
purchase most of China's jellyfish and frozen 
prawn exports. 
Import tariffs for the fishery products as pub-
lished by the International Customs Tariff 
Bureau are high, ranging from 30% to 250% ad 
valorem. A supplement to the customs journal 
for China stated " ... the Embassy of the PRC 
[has advised the International Customs Tariff 
Bureau] that until further notice, no export duty 
is leviable on commodities exported from the 
PRC." 
Thailand 
Thailand's fishery products reached 2.3 Mt in 
1978, an astounding increase of 1055% over the 
volume landed 20 years earlier. Major species for 
Thailand in 1978 included sardinellas, scad, and 
natantian decapods. The country has long been a 
great fish-producing nation of the South China 
Sea countries (second to China), although this 
may change as the result of the establishment of 
EEZs in numerous countries. 
Thailand's 1974 fleet consisted of about 40 000 
vessels, primarily small boats with outboard 
engines for inshore fishing. In the early 1960s, a 
Thai-German bilateral project to introduce trawl 
fishing led to overfishing in nearby waters and 
sent the Thai fleet to distant fishing grounds. 
Fishing operations employed about 64 000 in 
1978. 
Thailand's fishing fleet, already dependent 
upon distant fishing grounds for its trawlers, 
faced considerable problems as various countries 
established 200-mile jurisdictions. In 1978, esti-
mates were that newly established fishing limits 
would cut Thailand's fishing grounds by 780 000 
km2 and reduce catch by 30%. Thailand, thus, 
made special efforts to become involved in joint 
ventures and to obtain foreign fishing permits. 
One joint venture reported in early 1979 involved 
trawling in the waters of Bangladesh. 
Thailand was a net exporter of fishery prod-
ucts during 1963-78; indeed, the value of 1978 
exports was more than 37 times the value of 
imports in 1978. Crustaceans and molluscs -
fresh, frozen, dried, and salted - are Thailand's 
most important fishery export, accounting for 
more than 60% of the total value of exports. 
Primary importers of Thailand's seafood prod-
ucts in 1966 included Japan (crustaceans), the 
United States (crustaceans), and Malaysia (fish). 
Thai 1978 imports were also headed by crusta-
ceans and molluscs, although they were only 2% 
(by value) of the exports. Imports from Malaysia 
were the greatest (in value) of all Thailand's 
fishery imports, but those from Japan and South 
Korea were also important. 
USSR 
Fish and fishery products in the USSR were 
8.93 Mt in 1978, representing a decline for the 
second year in a row. However, the Soviet 
Union's production remains among the top five 
countries of the world in terms of total catch. The 
recent decline is said to be due to the USSR's 
exclusion from various countries' 200-mile limits, 
as well as other factors. 
The species landed in greatest volumes in the 
USSR in 1978 included Alaska pollack, chub 
mackerel, clupeonella, cunene horse mackerel, 
and blue whiting. Japanese pilchard was also an 
important fish for the USSR that year, appar-
ently a previously underutilized species. 
In 1970, the Soviet Union's fishing fleet 
included trawlers (58.8%), drift-net vessels (6%), 
purse seiners (9.2%), and passive-method vessels 
( 10.1 %), and the share of trawlers in the fleet was 
said to be expanding. 
With the imposition of200-mile EEZs around 
the world, the Soviet vessels were excluded from 
important fishing grounds. Thus, the late 1970s 
brought in a new era for Soviet fisheries, with 
joint ventures and international negotiations for 
permits and quotas playing a greater role. The 
Soviets began fishing for hake in a joint venture 
in the late 1970s off the west coast of the U.S. In 
1979, another joint venture began off the coast of 
Alaska, with 136 t harvested in the first year. In 
1978, two Soviet factory ships were purchasing 
and processing more than 2000 t of mackerel a 
month, provided by the U.K. vessels in a joint 
venture off the English southwest coast. The 
Soviet Union has also been allocated quotas of 
unused fishery resources in several countries' 
EEZs, such as those of New Zealand and 
Australia. 
In addition, the .USSR announced in 1978 its 
involvement in a U.S.$12 million venture in 
Singapore. The project was to build a processing 
and storage complex in Jurong that would con-
vert trawler catches into convenience foods. The 
company engaging in the venture was founded in 
1975 by Straits Fisheries and V / 0 S ovrybflot. 
Exports of seafood products from the USSR 
grew from316 400 tin 1970 to 516 230 tin 1978, a 
63 .2% increase. The total value of these exports 
increased by 163% during the same period. The 
share of fresh and frozen fish exports, as well as 
those for fish products and preparations and fish 
meal, all increased during 1966-78. Exports in 
1978 were dominated by fresh and frozen fish and 
fish products and preparations. The country 
exported 5 .8% by volume of its total catch in 1978 
(the comparable figure in Japan was 6.9%). 
As export data by country for the USSR are 
unavailable, we attempted to locate the Soviet 
markets for seafood products from the import 
data for various countries. European Economic 
Community (EEC) imports from the USSR in 
1978 were approximately 4.5% of the volume of 
USSR exports for that year, whereas the value of 
imports reached 21.1 % of the total value of 
USSR exports. The 1966 import figures for the 
EEC showed a lower volume and share of Soviet 
fishery products, although Denmark, the U.K., 
and Ireland were not EEC members at the time. 
Important fishery exports from the Soviet Union 
to the EEC include frozen fish, shrimps, and 
prepared and preserved salmonids. 
Japan, the world's greatest importer of seafood 
products, imported 31 720 t of seafood products 
from the USSR in 1979. Alaska pollack and fish 
fillets were the top Soviet exports to South Korea 
in 1978, whereas fresh and frozen marine fish 
were Singapore's major import from the USSR 
in 1977. India and Malaysia data for 1978 and 
1974, respectively, showed no imports of seafood 
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products from the USSR. Small amounts of 
USSR fishery imports were found for Hong 
Kong, Australia (mostly canned salmon), and 
New Zealand. 
Taiwan 
Taiwan's fishery products reached 675 025 tin 
1976 at a total value of U.S.$383.7 million. Top-
valued landings in 1976 were Spanish mackerel, 
sharks, and squids, together accounting for more 
than 15% of the total value of production in that 
year. Taiwan's output has been rising, with 1976 
landings nearly 250% of those in 1956 (by 
volume). One major factor in the expansion of 
Taiwan's fishing industry has been the availabil-
ity of government and World Bank loans for 
vessel construction. 
Taiwan's fishing fleet included 11 997 powered 
vessels in 1974, almost a fivefold increase over the 
number in 1954. Fishing personnel in 1976 were 
more than 300 000, of whom 63% were full-time 
employees of the fishery. 
In September 1979, the government of Taiwan 
announced the establishment of its 200-mile 
EEZ. The Philippines had earlier declared the 
200-mile limit, excluding Taiwanese vessels from 
the water of the Bashi Channel- fishing grounds 
that had once provided annual catches of50000 t 
for the Taiwan fleet. Taiwan's establishment of 
an EEZ affected fishing activities of the Japanese 
fleet, which had been harvesting about 30 000 t 
annually in Taiwan's waters. 
Taiwan's fishing fleet was adversely affected by 
the emergence of the EEZs as well as the rising 
cost of fuel; in 1976, nearly 300 Taiwanese long 
liners were not able to fish. The government of 
Taiwan began several projects to boost the fish-
ing industry, by providing loans of U.S.$70 mil-
lion to improve port facilities, technology, and 
training. 
In addition to developing underutilized species 
in its own waters, Taiwan has been involved in 
international negotiations to gain access to fish-
ing grounds in other countries' EEZs. In early 
1980, for example, Taiwan had been granted fish-
ing rights in Australia's zone for squid jigging as 
well as trawling and gill netting for certain 
demersal and pelagic finfish and sharks. 
Before efforts were made to expand the fishing 
industry, Taiwan was a net importer of fishery 
products, particularly salt-dried and canned 
products. Exports began rising in 1959 as frozen 
tuna began to be marketed internationally. In 
1963, large volumes of frozen shrimp exports 
further expanded Taiwan's total value of fishery 
exports. In 1976, the total value of Taiwan's 
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fishery exports was U .S.$340 million, more than 
seven times that of imports. 
Fishery exports generating the most revenue 
for Taiwan in I 977 included fresh and frozen 
saury, fresh and frozen eel, and dried and smoked 
stone bream and eel.Japan was clearly the major 
market for Taiwan's seafood exports in 1977, 
although Hong Kong and France were also 
important buyers. 
Major imports for 1977 were salted and dried 
squid and cuttlefish, fresh and frozen squid, and 
salted and dried sea blubber. A large share of the 
imports were from South Korea, Japan, and 
Argentina. 
Taiwan's domestic fish market has been well 
protected by a system of heavy import tariffs on 
fishery products. In 1976, tariffs ranged from 
65% of value (roes, salted herring, dried squid, 
fresh and frozen shrimp, prawns, and lobsters) to 
130% (sharks' fins, bicho de mar). We do not 
know whether these have been reduced since that 
year. Fishery products imported by Taiwan for 
processing and resale are duty free. 
Singapore 
Singapore's role in the international seafood 
market is apparent from the basic data each year. 
For example, in 1978, total landings of fishery 
products were 16 124 t; total exports in that same 
year were 57 271 t and imports were 104 273 t. 
Given that the volume of exports was more than 
3.5 times that of landings, importing for resale 
abroad (perhaps after processing) appears to be 
an important activity for Singapore. 
Although the country's I 978 landings were 
larger than those of the previous year, total land-
ings have been declining gradually since 1973. 
Major species for Singapore in 1978 included 
fusiliers, natantian decapods, and threadfin 
breams. 
In 1968, Sin-gapore's fleet numbered about 
1700 licenced vessels, of which about 85% oper-
ated in coastal waters either without power or 
with outboard engines. The remaining 15% of 
inboard-engine powered boats harvested 75% of 
Singapore's total catch. 
Joint ventures and foreign investment in 
Singapore's fishery include a Soviet investment 
of U.S.$12 million for a processing arid storage 
complex in Jurong. 
Singapore's top-valued export in 1977 was 
freshwater aquarium fish, the bulk of which was 
domestically produced (96%) and destined pri-
maPi!y for the U.S., West Germany, the U.K., 
and Australia. The second-highest export by 
value was fresh and frozen prawns, and 55% of 
the total value was domestically produced.Japan 
was the major purchaser of these prawns, with 
the U.S. apd Australia also being important 
markets. Marine fish exports (excluding tuna) 
went primarily to Japan in I 977, as was the case 
for fresh and frozen molluscs (excluding oysters). 
Singapore's four top-valued imports in 1974 
were: fresh and frozen marine fish (excluding 
tuna), canned horse mackerels, canned sardines, 
and dried and salted sharks' fins. The USSR and 
Malaysia supplied 60% of Singapore's total value 
of imports of marine fish (excluding tuna). 
Japan's share of horse mackerel imports was 94% 
of the total value. Major suppliers of Singapore's 
salted and dried sharks' fins included Japan, 
India, Korea, and Sri Lanka in 1974. Japan was 
also the primary country of origin for Singa-
pore's imports of canned sardines in that year. 
Malaysia 
Total landings of fishery products in Malaysia 
in 1978 were 685 107 t, of which 83% were har-
vested on the Malaysian Peninsula, 6% from 
Sa bah, and 1 I .3% from Sarawak. Major species 
for the country in terms of volume included 
blood cockles, Indian mackerels, and russell's 
scad. Although Malaysia's total production fell 
in 1975, the 1978 landings represented a 194% 
increase over those of 1967. 
In I 974, there were about 29 000 fishing vessels 
in Malaysia, of which 61% were powered with 
inboard engines, I 8% had outboard engines, and 
21% were nonpowered. The fishing industry of 
Malaysia employed some 81000 in that same 
year, about 23% of the country's total labour 
force. 
The country's total value of fishery exports fell 
in 1977 from the previous year's level; however, 
the amount represented a I 56% increase over the 
value of exports in 1970. Exports by species for 
1974 reveal that fresh and frozen prawns were the 
number one export that year in terms of total 
value. Tuna and other marine fish were also lead-
ing exports for Malaysia that year. The major 
markets for these products included Singapore, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. During 
1965, Singapore was clearly the major market for 
Malaysia's fishery exports, whereas Japanese 
and U.K. imports of Malaysian seafood products 
were growing in value. 
Except for 1967, Malaysia has been a net 
exporter of seafood for I 965-77. Japan and Thai-
land accounted for a large share of the total value 
of Malaysian imports during 1965-74, although 
Taiwan's increasing exports to Malaysia 
exceeded those from other countries for 1971-73. 
China began exporting seafood to Malaysia in 
1972, although the total from China is a small 
share of Malaysia's imports. 
The top-valued imports for 1974 were fresh 
and frozen tuna, fresh and frozen marine fish 
(other than tuna and sauries), prepared and pre-
served horse mackerel, and fresh and chilled 
prawns. Taiwan was the source of the largest 
share of tuna, whereas Thailand supplied 90% of 
the total value of fresh and frozen marine fish 
(other than tuna and sauries). Japan's share of 
Malaysia's imports of horse mackerel was more 
than 95% of the total value, and fresh and chilled 
prawns originated primarily in Thailand. 
Malaysia's three top-valued exports were also 
its top-valued imports. This suggests the possibil-
ity that imports are processed for export, 
although no data on resale abroad are available 
to verify this hypothesis. 
Indonesia 
Indonesia's total fish and fishery products were 
1.7 Mt in 1978, having followed an increasing 
trend over the past 10 years. Freshwater species 
from inland waters (including aquaculture) 
accounted for 21 % of this total production. The 
species landed in greatest volume in 1978 
included scads, natantian decapods, Indian 
mackerels, and anchovies. 
The Indonesian fleet consisted of 284 707 ves-
sels in 1972, of which only 2.6% were powered. 
The number of powered vessels has been increas-
ing, however, through various domestic and 
international fishery modernization projects. 
Employment in the fishing fleet was nearly 
900 000 workers in 1971, with an additional 
350 000 persons employed in inland fisheries. 
Indonesia's underutilized fishery resources 
present a significant potential for development, 
thus attracting domestic and foreign public aid, 
as well as private foreign investment. In 1972, 13 
fishing and processing ventures involved private 
foreign companies; 11 of these were backed by 
Japanese firms (total investment, more than 
U.S.$13.5 million). In November 1980, a Norwe-
gian consortium of firms announced plans to 
establish a large Indonesian tuna venture. More 
than U.S.$200 million was invested in Indone-
sia's fishing industry during 1969-75, 48% 
coming from the government, 35% from foreign 
sources, and 17% from private domestic 
enterprises. 
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Indonesian imports increased by 322% in 
volume and 845% in value from 1970 to 1977, and 
exports increased by 300% and 2704% in volume 
and value, respectively. The average price of 
imports was U .S .$0.574 /kg in 1977, whereas the 
average price of exports in that same year was 
U.S.$3.16. 
In 1958-77, crustaceans and molluscs clearly 
took the lead, in both value and quantity terms, 
in Indonesia's exports of fishery products. The 
top-valued exports for 1978 were shrimp and 
prawns, which constituted 88.2% of the total 
value of exports in that year, and were primarily 
shipped to Japan. In contrast, tuna exports, 
second-highest in value, were primarily destined 
for the U.S. and Singapore. U.S. imports of 
fishery products from Indonesia in 1978 were 
more than 36 times the volume imported in 1970. 
Indonesia's imports of fishery products in 1977 
were 15 630 t, valued at U.S.$8.98 million. These 
imports were 32.3% of the volume and 5.9% of 
the value of exports for that same year. Fresh and 
frozen saltwater fish and dried, salted whole fish 
were the seafood products imported at the great-
est volumes in 1978. The major suppliers of these 
products were Singapore, Japan, Thailand, and 
the U.S. 
Hong Kong 
Total production from fisheries for Hong 
Kong reached 162 498tin1978, rising steadily for 
the previous 8 years. The major species landed in 
1978 included threadfin breams, natantian 
decapods, scads, and pike congers. The small 
country's access to distant fishing grounds, par-
ticularly the South China Sea, has been curtailed 
by the imposition of 200-mile EEZs in these 
waters. 
In 1967, its fishing fleet consisted of 6814 ves-
sels, with about 56 000 persons actively engaged 
in fishing. The composition of the vessels in the 
fleet was 865 long liners ( 13% of total fleet), 826 
purse seiners (12%), 1913 trawlers (28%), 2142 
gill netters (31 %), and 1068 miscellaneous fishing 
vessels (16%). 
Hong Kong's 1978 exports of fishery products 
were more than four times those of 1970 by 
volume, and the value increased more than eight-
fold over the same period. The highest-valued 
exports, in 1979, were marine fish, prawns and 
shrimp, cuttlefish, other crustaceans, and aquar-
ium fish. Japan is clearly the major destination 
for Hong Kong's fishery products, although the 
U.S. and Canada also account for large shares of 
exports. 
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Whereas exports represent Hong Kong's sale 
of domestically produced fishery products, 
resales abroad are seafood products that are 
imported, sometimes processed, and then 
exported. The country's total resales abroad of 
fishery products in 1978 were nearly 80% by value 
of total exp arts. Average price/ kg of resales for 
that year was U.S.$5.55, the corresponding figure 
for exports being U.S.$3.75. The difference indi-
cates resales were processed fishery products. 
The four top categories for resales in 1978 in 
terms of total value were prawns and shrimp; 
dried, salted cuttlefish; dried, salted shark fins; 
and dried, salted abalone. Japan and the U.S. 
were major purchasers of Hong Kong's exports 
and resales, although a large share of the salted 
and dried products was sold to Taiwan and 
Singapore. 
A significant portion of imports into Hong 
Kong is destined for processing and export. Of 
the 89 438 t of fishery products imported by Hong 
Kong in 1978, 11 826 t(or 13%) were exported. Its 
imports of seafood products have followed an 
upward trend. However, they are not rising as 
rapidly as exports. The average price/ kg for 
imported fishery products was U.S.$2.85, con-
siderably lower than that for exports. 
Philippines 
The total catch of the Philippines has risen 
steadily since 1955. The 1978 harvest of 1588 t 
represented a 65% increase over the volume of 
production 10 years earlier. Major species landed 
in 1978 included scads, milkfish (aquaculture), 
ponyfishes, anchovies, and freshwater molluscs. 
The Philippines' fishing fleet in 1978 consisted 
of 214 797 vessels, of which 62% were nonpow-
ered. The total number of fishing personnel in 
that year was 365 388. 
The government of the Philippines declared its 
200-mile limit 11June1978, causing considerable 
conflict with its neighbour to the north, Taiwan. 
Several areas and species within the Philippines' 
jurisdiction are believed currently to be under-
exploited, and, thus, with investment, the total 
production may increase. 
The fishing industry in the Philippines has 
been enhanced by domestic and foreign invest-
ment projects, both public and private. In early 
1979, the government announced plans to estab-
lish five additional fishing port and market com-
plexes with a loan from Japan of U.S. $180 
million. A joint project financed with local funds 
as well as Norwegian aid and export credits was 
planned in 1979. The goal of the project was the 
establishment of a processing plant and landing 
jetty in Leyte province. The Asian Development 
Bank lent U.S.$18 million to continue a project 
aimed at developing the small-scale fisheries 
sector in late 1979. 
During 1961-76, the country was a net import-
er of fish. This trend was finally reversed in 1977, 
exports growing by 189% in volume from those in 
1961 and imports falling by 40% in volume. 
Canned seafoods were the most popular 
imported fishery product, accounting for 91 % of 
the total value of imports in 1970. Mackerel is the 
major imported canned seafood, Japan being the 
primary supplier during 1964-70. Fish meal was 
also an important import for the Philippines over 
these years, originating primarily in Peru. 
Shrimp and lobster were the top-valued sea-
food export for the Philippines in 1970, amount-
ing to 62% of the total value of exports in that 
year. Fresh, chilled, and frozen tuna were also 
important. 
Japan's share of shrimp exports from the Phil-
ippines in 1970 was, at 65%, the largest of all 
importing countries. The greatest share of tuna 
exports went to the United States - 70% of the 
total value. 
South Korea 
South Korean landings of Alaska pollack were 
361 871 t in 1978. Other important species 
included Japanese anchovies, threadsail filefish, 
the Pacific cupped oyster, and groundfish. 
Total production of South Korean fisheries 
hovered around 250 000 t, during postwar 
1944-55. Since then, catch has risen steadily, 
enhanced since the early 1960s by efforts to mod-
ernize and expand the industry. South Korea's 
1978 total catch was 2.4 Mt, nearly 3% less than 
that in 1977, yet representing more than 2.5 times 
the catch 10 years ago. 
The South Korean supply of pollack was cur-
tailed when the USSR extended its fishery juris-
diction to 200 miles, ending South Korea's har-
vest along the Kamchatka Peninsula. The 
Korean Marine Industrial Development Corpor-
ation negotiated a joint venture with the U.S. to 
supplement its pollack catch by harvests from the 
Bering Sea. Fishing finally began in 1979, with a 
total processed product of nearly 1.4 million 
kg/year. Other joint ventures have been with 
Ghana and Australia. 
South Korea's fishing fleet varies from small, 
unpowered wooden vessels to large, modern 
distant-water vessels with steel hulls. In 1973, the 
high-seas fleet comprised 552 vessels. These ves-
sels produced 382 800 t of fish in 1973, 31 % oper-
ating in the Atlantic Ocean (primarily off the 
western coast of Africa), 20% in the Indian 
Ocean, and 48% in the Pacific. 
The country's deep-sea catch fell by 18.6% in 
1977, as its fishing grounds were curtailed by the 
newly declared American and Soviet 200-mile 
EEZs. The deep-sea fleet, which in 1978 was 
composed of860 vessels, has been pursuing other 
fishing grounds through joint ventures. 
South Korea was a net exporter of seafood 
products during 1970-78, as the total value of 
exports rose by 1423% over those years. Its top-
valued fishery exports in 1978 were frozen tuna, 
frozen fish fillets, frozen cuttlefish, frozen hard 
clams, and fresh chub mackerel. Japan was the 
greatest buyer of the products other than the 
frozen fillets and, along with the United States, 
has always been a major market for South 
Korean fishery exports. 
The Middle East appears to be a new and 
growing market for South Korea's fishery 
exports. In 1967, Syria and Iran were the only 
significant importers of South Korea's seafood 
products. By 1978, Oman, Bahrein, Kuwait, 
Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, North Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and Iraq 
were also importing large shares of South 
Korea's dried, salted, and in-brine fish, crusta-
ceans, and molluscs. South Korea has also 
expanded its markets in Africa. In 1967, export 
schedules noted South Africa and Ghana as 
importers of South Korean seafoods, but, in 
1978, African buyers included Kenya, Maurita-
nia, Senegal, Central African Republic, and 
Guinea. 
South Korea protects its domestic seafood 
market through tariff and nontariff barriers to 
trade. Non tariff barriers are similar to those in 
Japan, with certain products subject to govern-
ment approval. The government considers 
domestic supply and demand for the seafood 
item, and its import price, before deciding 
whether or not to allow imports. The country 
also uses export barriers designed to stabilize its 
domestic seafood market by restricting exports 
of domestically consumed species. In late 1978, 
the Office of Fisheries relaxed export restrictions 
on IO kinds of fish. 
Australia 
Australian landings of fishery products in 1978 
were 122 947 t, down slightly from the previous 
year's level. Major species included natantian 
decapods, southern bluefin tuna, and Australian 
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spiny lobster. Crustaceans, particularly prawns 
and rock lobsters, are important to Australia's 
fisheries; for the year ending June 1979, crusta-
cean landings accounted for 67% of the total 
exvessel value of landings. 
Australia's 1978 fishing fleet consisted of 
IO 920 vessels (an increase of 23% over the 1970 
level), ofwhich51 % were less than6 mlong, 40% 
between 6 and 15 m, 9% between 15 and 26 m, 
and less than 1 % more than 26 m. The total 
number of fishing personnel reported in 1978 was 
20 272, up 30% over the 1970 level. 
The government of Australia imposed a 200-
mile EEZ on 1November1979, establishing the 
world's largest exclusive fishing zone at that time. 
Numerous foreign licences, joint ventures, and 
foreign stock-assessment projects have been 
allowed in Australian waters. In 1980, Japanese, 
Korean, Taiwanese, Polish, Soviet, and Ameri-
can vessels were involved in squid jigging, trawl-
ing, and tuna purse seining in the Australian 
EEZ. 
During 1970-78, Australia was a net exporter 
of fish in all but 2 years. Total exports in 1978 
reached 25262 t valued at U.S.$165743, an 
increase of 44% in volume and 274% in value over 
exports in 1970. Imports approached 125 t in 
1972, followed by a sudden drop of 50% the next 
year. The 1978 level of imports was the lowest 
volume for 1970-78, but the value was the 
highest. 
Data on imports by species reveal that the 
import of greatest total value in 1978 was fish 
fillets in packages larger than I kg; these were 
primarily from Japan, although New Zealand 
and South Africa were also major suppliers. 
Canned salmon imports represented the second-
highest value in 1978, 88% (by value) of these 
originating in the U.S. and Canada. China sup-
plied nearly 50% of Australia's imports of shrimp 
and prawns. New Zealand is an important sup-
plier of fresh and frozen fish for Australia, and a 
great share of canned and prepared crustaceans 
and molluscs originates in the South China Sea 
countries. 
The top-valued seafood export for Australia in 
1978-79 was rock lobster tails, of which more 
than 97% (by value) were shipped to the U.S. 
Headless prawns and shrimp, another important 
export, were primarily destined for Japan (97% 
by value of total sales), and, in general, Japan is 
Australia's major customer for seafood products. 
A comparison of 1969-70 export data for Aus-
tralia with those for 1978-79 reveals interesting 
trends. The Middle Eastern countries - particu-
larly Saudi Arabia - are increasing their seafood 
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imports from Australia, and the volume of 
imports into Pacific-area countries (excluding 
the U.S. and Japan) from Australia does not 
appear to be declining. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand's total seafood production 
reached 98 000 t in 1978 at a value of nearly 
U.S.$51 million. Rock-lobster landings were up 
7% over the previous year and accounted for 
28.3% of the total exvessel value of New Zealand 
fishery production. Snappers were also impor-
tant species for New Zealand in 1978, with catch 
up 41 % over the 1977 level and exvessel value 
amounting to 19% of total landings. 
The total number of fishing vessels in New 
Zealand's fleet was 5430 in 1978, up 63% since 
1972. The fleet was composed in this year of 88% 
vessels less than 12 m long; 11 %. 12-27 m long; 
and 1 %, greater than 27 m. The number of per-
sonnel rose by 79% from levels in 1972 to 9928. 
The government of New Zealand declared a 
200-mile EEZ on 1 April 1978, establishing 
exclusive fishing rights over an area more than 
3.6 x lQ6 km2. In 1979, New Zealand's domestic 
fleet had the capacity to harvest an estimated 25% 
of the "safe biologic yield" of wet fish in the EEZ. 
The remainder was allocated to joint ventures 
and foreign fleets. By 1979, Korea, the Soviet 
Union, and Japan had signed agreements with 
the government of New Zealand. 
Foreign catch allocations announced 30 
November 1979 covered finfish, squid, and tuna. 
Japan's fleet in New Zealand's EEZ amounted to 
202 vessels in 1979, whereas Korea had 31 and the 
USSR 30. Total quotas were 90900 t for Japan, 
82 800 t for the USSR, and 21 200 t for Korea. 
Twenty-eight cooperative fishing ventures were 
approved by the end of 1979, directed at squid, 
southern bluefin, skipjack tuna, and various fin-
fish species. 
New Zealand was a net exporter of fishery 
products during 1970-79, as exports grew by 
nearly 400% in value and imports grew by 154%, 
with a brief peak in 1974. Rock lobsters 
accounted for 27% (by value) of total seafood 
exports in 1979, down from its 40% share in 1978. 
Most of the increase in export sales in 1979 over 
the previous year reflected the growth in landings 
and value of wet fish. Snappers were the most 
important of these, their sales amounting to 10% 
of total exports. Australia and Japan are the 
primary importers of New Zealand's fresh and 
frozen fish, whereas Japan and the U.S. take a 
large share of New Zealand's molluscs and crus-
taceans. Australia is also an important buyer of 
dried, salted, smoked, and brined fish. 
New Zealand's imports of seafood products 
rose slightly in 1979, with most increases in 
frozen fish, canned salmon, herrings and pil-
chards, and canned and frozen crustaceans and 
molluscs. Fresh, chilled, and frozen fishery 
product imports in 1974 came primarily from 
Australia and the United Kingdom, canned and 
prepared fish originating largely in Canada, 
Japan, and Malaysia. 
Canada 
Canada's fisheries can be divided into the 
Pacific, the Atlantic, and the freshwater areas. In 
both volume and value of catch, the fisheries of 
the Atlantic coast contribute the largest share by 
far. Major species harvested there include cod, 
herring, other groundfish, and pelagic species. 
Lobsters and scallops also generate substantial 
revenues at the exvessel level. 
On the Pacific coast, landings have fluctuated 
in the past 25 years. In value, salmon has been 
dominant, accounting for 48% oflanded value in 
1979 and for more than 60% in 18 of the 25 years 
to 1979. Herring, especially the roe, experienced 
substantial growth during the 1970s. 
Canada is a net exporter of seafoods, with the 
United States being the principal market. Japan's 
share of Canadian exports increased' significantly 
during the 1970s and, in 1978, surpassed that of 
the European community. The role of the Carib-
bean countries has declined on a relative basis. 
Australia and New Zealand are importers of 
Canadian products and, since 1972, so is South 
Korea. 
In 1955, Canada's import-export ratio for sea-
foods, in value terms, was 1 : 10. By 1970, it was 
2: 10, and, in 1975, it was up to 3: 10. Since then, 
it has declined somewhat, but Canada continues 
to import substantial volumes of both finfish and 
shellfish, in canned, fresh, and frozen forms. The 
United States is the major supplier, with Japan in 
second place. In 1978, other Pacific-area suppli-
ers accounted for 8% of Canada's seafood 
imports, in excess of supplies from all of Europe 
and greater than 60% of Japan's share. Shellfish 
is the primary import from these countries. 
The Canadian government has, especially 
since World War II, provided technical and 
financial assistance to both its harvesting and its 
processing sectors to encourage new product 
lines and new species' exploitation. This assist-
ance has ranged from price supports to vessel 
programs. In 1964, there were 4 7 508 fishing ves-
sels in Canada's fleet, of which 157 were 150 tor 
more. By 1978, the total had declined to 37 992, 
but the number of large vessels had increased by 
almost 100%. During the same period, personnel 
(saltwater fishing) increased by about 5%, 
whereas between 1964 and 1977, the number of 
persons working in fish processing plants 
increased by more than 45%. 
The Canadian fleet does not engage in distant-
water fishing, except for tuna. However, Canada 
is involved in fishing projects abroad, including 
at least one joint venture in the South Pacific. 
Fishing by foreign fleets is substantial off both 
Canadian coasts. Since Canada's EEZ took effect 
in 1977, this activity has declined, but the decline 
has been accompanied by increased investment in 
both harvesting (for example, through joint ven-
tures) and processing. In 1978, Japan was the 
source of most foreign investment in the British 
Columbia processing industry, with U.S. com-
panies also having substantial interests. 
The Canadian government has a history of 
involvement in the management of its fisheries. 
The 95% decline in the Pacific herring catch 
between 1965 and 1968, for example, resulted 
from a ban on herring fishing, although, initially, 
the decline was offset by increased catches of 
Atlantic coast herring. Management of Pacific 
salmon has involved agreements with the U.S., 
Japan, and the USSR, programs restricting fish-
ing efforts, and a massive enhancement program. 
In summary, Canada, with active government 
participation in investment and management, 
remains one of the world's leading seafood 
exporters but has also expanded its role as an 
importer. 
USA2 
The U.S. has fish resources along its west 
coast, the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic coast, and 
in fresh water. Tuna is the primary species har-
vested by a distant-water fleet. 
In 1950, the U.S. commercial catch was2.2 Mt. 
In 1975, the figure was also 2.2. During the next 4 
years, it rose to 2.8 but was only 4% of world 
commercial catch, compared with 10% in 1950. 
The 1979 catch was dominated by menhaden 
(41% of total landings, by weight), which is used 
largely for industrial purposes. In terms of value, 
the most important seafood species groups are 
salmon, tuna, shrimp, and crab. Because the 
2The material in this section draws heavily on an 
unpublished manuscript by James R. Wilson. 
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major tuna species are distributed throughout the 
tropical and temperate regions of the Pacific, 
Atlantic, and Indian oceans, most tuna fishing is 
done outside the U.S. EEZ. 
The U.S. is a net importer of seafoods, with 
Canada being the major supplier. South America 
and Europe have increased their roles as suppli-
ers of edible seafoods over the past decade. Asian 
countries accounted for 26% of U.S. imports 
(edible) in 1967 and 23% in 1980, with Japan 
being the major Asian exporter. Import growth 
has occurred most prominently in frozen ground-
fish products, tuna products, and shrimp. 
The U.S. also exports seafood products, espe-
cially high-valued species (salmon, crab, and, 
recently, roe). Japan is the largest buyer of fish 
and shellfish, having recently replaced Canada. 
Asia, excluding Japan, accounted for 3.5% of the 
U.S. seafood exports in 1967; by 1980, this figure 
had risen to 15.6%. 
Although the U.S. does not have any explicit 
seafood quota system for any country, there is a 
general quota on some product forms of fresh, 
chilled, and frozen white fish and some canned 
tuna. With respect to tariffs, the U.S. recognizes 
favoured country status for developing countries, 
as do other parties to the General Agreement on 
Treaties and Tariffs (GATT). 
With respect to investment, the U.S. increased 
its fleet size from 72 000 fishing craft in 1955 to 
almost 104000 in 1979, with substantial growth 
occurring on the Pacific coast. During that 
period, the number of fishing personnel increased 
from 144 359 to 184 000, whereas the average 
number of individuals employed in processing 
facilities declined from 97 825 to 93 100. This 
comparison conceals the upward trend in pro-
cessing plant employment since 1970. 
Several countries participate in joint ventures 
for access to resources within the U.S. EEZ and 
for U.S. access to fish meal in Angola, shrimp 
trawling off Nigeria and Cameroon, tuna off 
Ghana, shrimp in Indonesia, tuna off the Philip-
pines and Korea, tuna ventures off Australia, 
New Zealand, French Polynesia, and Papua New 
Guinea, and tuna and shrimp in South America. 
In short, the U.S. is an active fishing nation, 
involved in international trade. 
Conceptual Issues 
To our knowledge, there is little empirical 
work on international trade in seafoods. On the 
basis of our examination of fishing, investment, 
and trade patterns in Pacific-area countries, we 
developed models appropriate to the testing of 
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hypotheses regarding relationships between 
trade flows and resource availability and compet-
itive relationships among suppliers. 
The first examines factors affecting the shares 
of a country's, or region's, imports coming from 
competing exporters. This market-shares model 
is a modified, distributed lag version of a model 
used by Hickman et al. (1977) and Mikesell and 
Farah (1980); it incorporates relative price vari-
ables and catch ratios. The second model is a 
more standard treatment of supply-and-demand 
relationships in a system of equations. As in the 
shares model, emphasis is on a particular import-
ing country's demand for a specific product or 
group of closely related products. This approach 
uses a somewhat difficult set of data, including 
measures of market conditions in the importing 
country and, on the demand side, does not neces-
sarily differentiate among suppliers. Such a result 
generates estimates of the price elasticities of 
import demand and export supply, substitutional 
relationships among competing commodities, 
and income elasticities of import demand. It also 
permits explicit treatment of exchange rates and 
of other factors believed to influence import and 
export behaviour, including tariffs, nontariff 
trade barriers, and transportation costs. In addi-
tion, estimated relationships lend themselves to 
employment in spatial equilibrium models, 
which permit examination of trade flows among 
particular countries and regions. 
In both models, expenditures for food were 
found to be highly significant - a finding in 
earlier empirical studies (Batie 1974; Doll 1972). 
The models worked satisfactorily, but their use-
fulness can be improved, and we are attempting 
this work. 
Refinements Needed 
Although there may be substantial price com-
petition among seafood-trading nations, our 
econometric analysis suggests that traditional 
methods for testing the existence of price compet-
ition need to be augmented by more in-depth 
investigations of the institutional environments 
within which seafoods are traded. The roles of 
long-term contractual arrangements, the trade 
offs emerging from agreements to permit cooper-
ative investment opportunities, and details on 
product form are among factors needing addi-
tional investigation. It appears that these and 
other factors are more influential in explaining 
trade patterns than are relative prices. 
In the case of shrimp, a test of the hypothesis 
that the exchange rate is an important variable 
accounting for export-supply decisions was 
inconclusive. We are not prepared to reject the 
hypothesis, but, rather, we suggest that multico-
linearity problems disguise causal relationships. 
Furthermore, a test of the hypothesis that 
exchange rates are important on the import-
demand side was not conducted here. 
Trade-Pattern Changes 
Trade-pattern changes are occurring among 
Pacific-area countries. These are intimately 
linked with investment decisions. Batie (1974) 
has argued that foreign investments in natural-
resource development will occur under condi-
tions of relatively price-inelastic domestic supply 
conditions. This seems to be occurring with 
respect to shrimp, where the price elasticity con-
ditions are associated with the conditions of the 
stocks. It also seems to be occurring where such 
conditions result from political constraints on 
availability (e.g., Alaska pollack). Preliminary 
empirical results suggest that changes in harvest-
ing opportunities are affecting trade patterns. 
Pacific-area countries are increasing trade 
among themselves. There is evidence to suggest 
that some specialization is taking place, with 
importation being undertaken for purposes of 
processing and resale abroad. However, the pres-
ent phase seems to be one of transition, as 
adjustments are made to new political arrange-
ments and economic conditions. 
For shrimp, changes in expenditures for food 
(including away-from-home food expenditures) 
appear to be an important factor in the demand 
for imports, at least in Japan. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that, with 
increased leisure time, families tend to dine out 
more and, as a result, increase their purchase of 
seafoods (this tends to confirm a similar finding 
by Paez, 1980, with respect to U.S. markets). 
Competition 
The developed economies of Japan, Europe, 
and North America compete in their demands for 
certain seafoods. A complete model should take 
this into account but should also recognize the 
growing role of the developing countries. Addi-
tional empirical work is crucial to an understand-
ing of the workings of international seafood 
markets. We hope the present paper has provided 
a preliminary - if modest - introduction to the 
subject. Interested readers should contact us for 
additional information on the models. 
GENERAL STUDIES: DISCUSSION 71 
Discussion 
lfak Yong Rhee: I have three brief comments on 
the paper by Biing-Hwan Lin et al. The first 
comment is about the desired direction of the 
study. The authors are trying to explain the 
changes in trade structure in the fishery industry 
in the Pacific basin by estimating price responses 
in a "market-share model" and a demand-and-
supply, simultaneous-equations model. The 
more fundamental issue, however, in my opinion, 
is the identification of distortions and the magni-
tude of their effects in the fishery market. If there 
are market distortions, the identification of the 
factors causing them is more important for poli-
cymakers than trying to come up with informa-
tion on price responses. 
My second comment is a technical one on the 
market-share model used by Lin et al. The model 
uses basically two explanatory variables, namely 
relative price and the so-called catch ratio. The 
first variable indicates the comparative advan-
tage factor mainly from the demand side, where-
as the catch ratio represents the comparative fac-
tor from the supply side. What happened in 
developing countries like South Korea in the late 
1960s and in the early 1970s, however, had little 
to do with either of those variables. The South 
Koreans exploited the profitability that existed in 
the fishery industry because of low wages. As 
soon as the developing countries obtained access 
to world capital for securing fishing vessels and 
fishing technology, they began to move into 
distant-water fishing. Thus, it seems to me, the 
relevant variable from the supply side is the wage 
differentials between the developed countries and 
the developing countries. Wage differentials may 
even be more important in the simultaneous-
equations model than in the market-share model 
because wages are one of the shifting parameters 
of the supply curve. 
My third comment is concerned with the impo-
sition of the 200-mile fishing zones. The authors 
conclude that the new EEZs will have tremen-
dous effects on the trade structure in the Pacific 
basin. In the analytical model, however, the effect 
of the fishing zone is not dealt with at all. 
This fact brings me to the issue of the problems 
related to the 200-mile fishing zones. The restric-
tion of exploitation of fish stocks has a strong 
theoretical base in the literature on the problems 
of externalities. The important issue, however, is 
the efficient allocation of access to restricted 
stocks. The authors point out that, since the 
imposition of the fishing zone, many coastal 
countries have increased investment in fishing 
vessels as well as processing facilities. If these 
investments are taking place with artificial bar-
riers in the industry, the coastal countries are, in 
fact, misallocating resources and will, thus, have 
to face adjustment problems later. Thus, it seems 
to me, an orderly market for allocation of access 
to fishing zones should be developed. The eco-
nomic rent collected from the market should be 
allocated in such a way that the countries 
concerned are properly represented in the alloca-
tion decisions. 
Yoshiaki Matsuda: The country-by-country 
examination by Biing-H wan Lin et al. of trade in 
15 Pacific-area countries is informative and their 
call for more attention to relative prices, 
exchange rates, food expenditures, and resource-
management patterns.in econometric analyses is 
reasonable. However, the theme of their pa per -
trade and investment in fish products among 
Pacific-area countries - is broad and implies 
details about: 
• The economic feasibility of fisheries; 
• The reasons for changes in trade and 
investment patterns of fish products; 
• The reasons for investments in production, 
processing, and marketing in fisheries; 
• The ways that investment has been handled 
and rewarded; 
• The consequences of investments; and 
• The roles of government in fisheries. 
Just using available statistics is certainly not 
sufficient to provide readers with an understand-
ing of these aspects. I believe that most partici-
pants in the UN law of the sea conferences do not 
know these aspects, and most coastal nations 
now believe in economic viability of fisheries 
development. However, reality is different from 
aspiration. In fact, the economic feasibility of 
fisheries production is not vital. Without heavy 
government support, the Japanese fisheries 
would not exist. Even the tuna industry in Japan 
belongs to the welfare sector. 
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As the paper points out, this is a preliminary 
study, and in-depth study is essential, especially 
on the roles of long-term contractual arrange-
ments, the trade offs emerging from agreements 
to permit cooperative investment opportunities, 
and details on product form. 
With respect to the importance of long-term 
contractual arrangements, I would like to bring 
to your attention the Solomon-Taiyo Skipjack 
Fisheries Joint Venture, one successful skipjack 
joint venture in the southwestern Pacific. After 
1.5 years preliminary feasibility study by Taiyo 
Gyogyo, Japan, this joint venture was founded in 
1973. It is said that at least IO years is needed for 
such a joint venture to become profitable. Unlike 
short-term contracts that reflect investors' fear of 
political and economic instability such as nation-
alization or discontinuation, the Solomon-Taiyo 
venture is a 10-year contract. The joint venture is 
long enough to allow its partners to coordinate 
resources effectively. The problem of ensuring a 
supply of bait (one of the most serious problems 
in skipjack pole-and-line fisheries) has been suc-
cessfully solved in the contract by a clause to 
include Okinawa fishermen, and the problem of 
reaching an appropriate market has been solved 
by a clause to use the Taiyo Gyogyo network. 
Two-thirds of the crews are natives, and technol-
ogy transfer problems have been solved by the 
reliance on Okinawa fishermen who are capable 
of working with natives in the tropics. About 20 
of the best local participants a year are given the 
opportunity to visit Japan for a month in winter, 
and people with supervisory potential have been 
encouraged. The second IO-year contract has 
been signed. 
Regarding the trade offs emerging from 
agreements to permit cooperative investment 
opportunities, I would like to introduce a study 
from the East-West Center in Honolulu entitled: 
"A strategic goal analysis of options for tuna 
longline joint-ventures in Southeast Asia: 
Indonesia-Japan case study." With the advent of 
extended maritime jurisdictions, new arrange-
ments have been, and will be, sought between 
fisheries-resource owners and' distant-water fish-
ing fleets. Each party in a joint venture wants to 
exploit the fishery, and each has strengths and 
weaknesses in doing so. The purpose of this study 
was to develop a logical process to identify ar-
rangements that are fair and profitable for both 
parties. As a case study, my colleagues and I 
examined conflicts and agreements between 
Indonesia and Japan for exploiting Indonesia's 
tuna fishery. Forty-eight possible arrangements 
between the two countries were evaluated by a 
multinational, multidisciplinary team employing 
goal analysis, an optimization technique for deal-
ing with multiple objectives. This study found 
many agreements in which the two countries can 
share in efficient and profitable fishing, process-
ing, and marketing operations. 
Finally, with respect to details on product 
form, I would like to point out that the developed 
economies of Japan, Europe, and North America 
are not necessarily competing demanders of cer-
tain seafoods. For example, market differentia-
tion between Japan and other countries is cer-
tainly clear. So-called international items, such 
as tuna, salmon, and shrimp, that are sought by 
consumers in the United States or Europe are 
often irrelevant to Japan. In many cases, fisheries 
trades are complementary rather than competi-
tive. An understanding of tastes and preferences 
among different people, countries, and regions is 
needed as a basis for production planning. The 
impact of changes in exchange rates on trade 
patterns may be clear in a long-term trend study; 
however, I feel that short-term studies may be 
equally or more fruitful. 
I agree with the contention by Lin et al. that 
some specialization is taking place, with imports 
being processed and resold as exports. However, 
I believe that production, processing, and 
marketing should be integrated. If one does not 
consider economic feasibility and income distri-
bution pr<;> blems among these three activities, the 
risk is that inequality will be the result and politi-
cal uncertainties will increase. In the past, income 
distribution in fisheries was favourable for the 
processing and marketing sectors and was unfa-
vourable for the production sector - that is, the 
production sector has less bargaining power than 
the other two sectors at both resource and prod-
uct markets. Fisheries policymakers need more 
studies on structural changes in each sector, 
interactions among these three sectors, and func-
tional changes of participants. 
With regard to the importance of changes in 
expenditure for food on demand, I would say 
that generalizing on correlations in the future is 
difficult, at least for Japan, because the relative 
price for shrimp is high. Before 1979, imports of 
fisheries products to Japan increased yearly, but 
imports of squid, shrimp, and tuna decreased in 
1980 because of the prolonged low domestic 
prices in Japan. Japanese consumers are eating 
meat rather than fish because the prices of 
imported fish are too high and the quality (taste 
and appearance) is not acceptable. 
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that 
fisheries development is vital for coastal nations 
only if it is managed wisely. 
Pacific Trade and Investment in Forest Products 
K.L. Aird and W.A.J. Ca/ow 
Resource Industries Branch, Forest Products Group, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 
Ottawa, Canada 
Trade and investment in forest products among Pacific-area countries have increased more 
slowly in the last IO years than in the preceding decade. However, growth in production and exports 
from many developing countries of the area has been greater since 1969. For Pacific countries as a 
group, four related factors have primarily influenced recent growth in forest-products trade and 
investment. First, world economic conditions in the aftermath of the oil-price increases of I 973 and 
later years have resulted in slower growth in principal end-use markets for forest products, e.g., 
housing construction, industrial packaging, printing and publishing. Second, manufacturing costs 
have risen sharply with the direct inflationary impact of higher oil prices on wood, energy, and 
capital costs and their indirect impact on labour costs. Third, capital costs of minimum economic 
plant size, mainly in the capital-intensive, pulp-and-paper industry, have escalated to the point where 
"greenfield" investments are rare. Finally, the availability of other sources of low-cost timber has 
diminished. For some developing countries of the Pacific, higher growth has resulted from increased 
domestic demand associated with industrialization and from expanded manufacturing capacity to 
process existing mature-timber reserves or fast-growing plantation forests. Further restructuring of 
forest-product trade and investment is implied by these developments and by regulation of raw-
timber exports to recover greater revenues from forest resources and to capture industrial benefits of 
increased domestic processing of indigenous timber resources. 
L'accroissement des investissements et du commerce des produits forestiers entre !es pays de la 
region du Pacifique a ete mo ins rapide au cours de Ia derniere decennie que pendant Ia precedente. 
Cependant, plusieurs pays en developpement de cette region ont accru Ieur production et Ieurs 
exportations depuis 1969. Pour !'ensemble des pays, Jes quatre facteurs suivants ont principalement 
contribue au ralentissement de Ia croissance de ce secteur : premierement, Ia situation economique 
mondiale, a pres !'augmentation du petrole en I 973 et au cours des annees suivantes, a freine Ia 
demande des principaux marches des produits finis tels que Ia construction d'habitations, le 
conditionnement, et !es pates et papier. Deuxiemement, Jes cofits de fabrication ont accuse une 
hausse marquee, cause directe de !'impact inflationniste produit par !'augmentation du petrole sur le 
bois, I'energie et !es cofits du capital qui se sont repercutes sur Jes cofits de la main-d'oeuvre. 
Troisiemement, le cofit en capital de l'etablissement de petites usines, surtout dans I'industrie 
papetiere a forte proportion de capital, a augmente au point de freiner le developpement de ce 
secteur. Enfin, Ia disponibilite des autres sources de bois de construction a bon marche a aussi 
diminue. La croissance enregistree dans certains pays en developpement de Ia region du Pacifique 
provient de !'augmentation de Ia demande domestique associee a I'accroissement de !'industrialisa-
tion ainsi que de !'extension de Ia capacite manufacturiere au traitement des peuplements en reserves 
ou des plantations d'essences a croissance rapide. II s'impose de restructurer le commerce et !es 
investissements dans ce secteur et de reglementer !es exportations de bois brut afin d'augmenter !es 
revenus provenant des richesses forestieres et des nouvelles capacites de traitement industriel. 
The countries of the Pacific area produce and 
consume most of the world output of industrial 
wood and wood products. They also import 
73 
about 44% and export some 52% of all forest 
products traded on world markets. Intraregional 
trade dominates the pattern of world trade in 
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Table I. Value-added ($U.S. million) in forest-













Sa bah 6 
Sarawak 20 
Mexico' 121 
New Zealand• 158 




United States 12190 
'Data are for 1976. 
bData are for 1974. 























Source: Various yearbooks of industrial statistics 
from the UN. 
forest products from these countries.· The capac-
ity to supply major shares of domestic and inter-
national markets has resulted in part from large 
investments in timber-processing plants and 
equipment. For example, 68% of world capacity 
to produce paper and paperboard and 73% of 
world wood-pulp capacity were located in Pacific 
countries in 1978. The combined benefits of 
foreign-exchange earnings from forest-products 
trade and value-added and employment from 
forest-product investments continue to contrib-
ute significantly to meeting the broad economic-
and social-development objectives of many coun-
tries in the region. 
Forest-Product Industries 
Industries in Pacific countries produce 77% of 
the world output for coniferous round wood and 
67% of its nonconiferous wood output for indus-
trial use. They also account for more than half of 
the world production of pulp, paper, lumber, and 
wood-based panels. The potential to maintain or 
increase shares of the world's output of forest 
products depends on the relative cost and avail-
ability of industrial inputs in the respective coun-
tries, e.g., labour, capital, energy, and forest 
resources. 
Most countries of the area actively pursue the 
objective of increased domestic processing of 
their forest resources and primary wood products 
prior to export. A major benefit of domestic pro-
cessing is the value added to the resources origi-
nating in the forest industries. Among Pacific-
area countries, for which comparable data are 
available, value-added in the forest industries has 
varied from 4% of that in all manufacturing in 
Colombia in 1976 to about 49% in Sarawak in 
1974 (Table 1). For most countries, the share 
exceeded 5% in 1976. In all countries other than 
those of Oceania, Indonesia, and Singapore, 
value-added in the paper and allied industries 
was greater than that in the wood industries, 
partly because of the greater degree of processing 
in the former. 
A closely related industrial benefit is the direct 
employment generated by the manufacture of 
forest products. The forest-products industries in 
Table 2. Employment (1000 persons) in forest-





Paper of all 
and employees in 
Wood allied manufacturing 
Australia 50 28 6.7 
Canada 109 123 13.6 
Chile' 13 7 9.1 
Colombia 8 11 4.2 
Ecuador 3 2 7.1 
Indonesia 40 9 6.2 
Japan 
Malaysiab 
451 288 7.3 
Peninsular 38 3 16.1 
Sa bah 2 35.5 
Sarawak 8 53.8 
Mexico 5 27 nad 
New Zealand' 14 10 9.1 
Papua New Guinea 4 1 29.5 
Peru' 5 5 4.7 
Philippines 42 15 8.4 
Singapore 9 4 5.9 
United States 523 627 6.2 
•Data are for 1976. 
bData are for 1974. 
'Data are for 1973. 
dna = not available. 
Source: Various issues of the yearbooks of indus-
trial statistics of the UN. 
the region accounted for a low of 4.2% (Colom-
bia, in 1976) and a high of 53.8% (Sarawak, in 
1974) of all workers involved in manufacturing 
(Table 2). For most countries in the region, the 
proportion is greater than 6%. Furthermore, 
domestic processing creates indirect employment 
in industries supplying services and equipment to 
the forest-products industries and employees. 
Increased export earnings are often ranked as a 
greater priority in the development of trade and 
investment strategies than are value-added and 
employment. Canada and Asia-Pacific countries 
other than Japan, China, and the USSR were the 
principal net forest-product exporting countries 
in 1979 (Table 3). Leading net importers were 
Japan and the United States; outside the Pacific 
area, countries of the European Economic 
Community were major importers. 
Table 3. World forest-products trade (U.S.$ million), 
1979.' 
Exports Imports 
Pacific-area countries 23574 (52) 23746 (44) 
Canada 8151 586 
United States 5702 8293 
South-Central America 958 1468 
Oceania 570 701 
Japan 516 8873 
China 444 520 
Other Asia-Pacific 4675 2703 
USSR 2558 602 
Europe 20935 (46) 27113 (51) 
Other countries 1127 (2) 2603 (5) 
World 45636 (100) 53462 (100) 
'Figures in parentheses are percent of totals. 
Source: Various issues of the FAO Yearbook of 
forest products, Rome, Italy, FAO. 
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Forest Resources and Production1 
The availability of secure supplies of timber at 
low cost has become a principal factor in deter-
mining investments in processing capacity and in 
efforts to restructure the flow of forest-products 
trade. In most countries in the area, the growth in 
industrial wood supplies in the region toward the 
end of the century promises to be much slower 
than that of the last two decades for both conifer-
ous and nonconiferous industrial wood produc-
tion. The exceptions are countries in South-
Central America and the Asia-Pacific region 
(excluding Japan) (Tables 4 and 5). 
In Canada, timber harvests of 162" 1Q6 m3 in 
1979, predominantly softwoods, represented 
about 60% of the estimated annual allowable cut 
from all forestlands. Although harvests are 
expected to increase at reduced rates to about 
88% of the current allowable cut (256" 1Q6 m3) by 
2000, they may not be sustainable for four 
reasons: timberlands may be withdrawn from 
production and reallocated for other uses; 
second-growth forests may produce reduced 
yields; natural regeneration rates may be lower 
than anticipated because of the effects of past 
logging practices; and the reforestation effort 
may be less than required (Aird and Ottens 1980). 
The United States produces and consumes 
more industrial wood than any other country. 
Despite the anticipated shift in importance of 
internal-supply sources - the shift from the fir 
forests of the Pacific northwest to the relatively 
fast-growing pine forests of the South-the U.S. 
is expected to remain a net importer of wood 
products in the next 20 years (United States 
'The data in this section have been taken from F AO 
yearbooks of forest products unless otherwise 
indicated. 
Table 4. World production (106 ml) of coniferous industrial wood, 1959-79. 
Average annual change(%) 
1959 1969 1979 1959-69 1969-79 
Pacific-area countries 601 688 765 1.4 1.1 
Canada 78 Ill 146 3.6 2.8 
United States 211 238 258 1.2 0.8 
South-Central America 15 20 35 2.9 5.8 
Oceania 6 10 12 5.2 1.8 
Japan 34 28 20 -2.0 -3.4 
Other Asia-Pacific 22 28 42 2.4 4.1 
USSR 235 253 252 0.7 0.0 
Other countries 159 191 232 1.8 2.0 
World 760 879 997 1.5 1.3 
Source: Various issues of the FAO Yearbook of forest products, Rome, Italy, FAO. 
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Table 5. World production (106 m3) of nonconiferous industrial wood, 1959-79. 
Average annual change(%) 
1959 1969 1979 1959-69 1969-79 
Pacific-area countries 168 227 283 3.0 2.2 
Canada 5 7 II 3.4 4.6 
United Stat es 60 72 73 1.8 0.1 
South-Central America 20 25 40 2.3 4.8 
Oceania 9 10 13 I.I 2.7 
Japan 9 18 12 7.2 -4.1 
Other Asia-Pacific 30 62 102 7.5 5.1 
USSR 35 33 32 -1.0 -0.3 
Other countries 78 125 140 4.8 I.I 
World 246 352 423 3.6 1.8 
Source: Various issues of FAQ Yearbook of forest products, Rome, Italy, FAO. 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service 1980). 
Declining inventories of mature timber on pri-
vate forestlands, slower expansion of allowable 
harvests from national forests, and withdrawals 
of forestlands for other uses have combined to 
reduce the availability of timber from the 
northwest. 
Whereas Japan is the second-largest consumer 
of forest products in the Pacific, in 1979 it pro-
duced only 36% of its industrial roundwood 
requirements. Although additional supplies are 
expected from domestic forests replanted in the 
post-War period, only 43% of consumption is 
forecast to be supplied domestically by 1996 
(Japan, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
1978). 
The forests of the USSR hold 55% of world 
softwood reserves distributed over an extensive 
area. Western and central southern regions have 
been extensively harvested for internal wood 
requirements and exports, primarily to western 
Europe. Exploitation of northern and remote 
eastern regions has begun and could benefit from 
the infrastructure for hydroelectric and railway 
development in those regions, particularly in 
Siberia, which is a major source of softwood logs 
and lumber for Japan. The future impacts are 
difficult to assess as rugged terrain and a severe 
climate are constraints to extensive forest opera-
tions in the remote and sparsely populated east-
ern regions (North and Solecki 1977). 
The countries of the South Pacific, or Oceania, 
significantly increased their production of indus-
trial wood between 1959 and 1979 from 
6 x 1Q6 mJ to 12 x 1Q6 mJ for coniferous wood and 
from 9 x 1Q6 mJ to 13 x 1Q6 mJ for nonconiferous. 
This trend is expected to continue and will prob-
ably be supported by the large natural forests of 
Papua New Guinea and the fast-growing radiata 
pine plantations of New Zealand and, to a lesser 
extent, some parts of Australia (de Vries 1978). 
The largest increases in industrial wood pro-
duction among the world regions occurred in 
South-Central America (from 15 x 1Q6 mJ and 
20 x 106 mJ in 1959 for coniferous and nonconif-
erous wood, respectively, to 35 x 1Q6 mJ and 
40 x 1Q6 mJ in 1979). Leading producers of conif-
erous industrial wood are Brazil, Chile, and Mex-
ico, whereas most nonconiferous industrial wood 
is produced in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Costa Rica, and Paraguay. Brazil, with the large 
natural hardwood forests of the Amazon Basin 
and the softwood forests of its southeastern 
region, will continue to be the dominant produc-
ing country in this area. The natural forests of 
South America have been heavily depleted and 
reduced in area by shifting cultivation in agricul-
ture and by logging practices that are unfavour-
able to natural forest regeneration. Its large mixed 
hardwood forests have either been exploited for 
their most valuable species or are unused because 
commercial uses, except for relatively few spe-
cies, have been slow to develop. Potentially large 
additional supplies are expected from fast-
growing, industrial plantations of eucalyptus and 
gmelina pine, again, mostly in Brazil but also in 
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay (Lanly and Cle-
ment 1979). 
The countries of the Asia-Pacific area, other 
than Japan, as a group, produced the largest 
quantities of nonconiferous industrial wood in 
1969 (62x 1Q6m3) and 1979 (102x 1Q6m3). 
Moreover, production increases in nonconifer-
ous wood in both decades before 1979 were larger 
than for any other region. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines were the largest producers. 
Supplies have been based on the use of diptero-
carp species with similar commercial characteris-
tics, e.g., merantis and lauans. Past logging prac-
tices, severe depletion, shifting cultivation, and 
fuelwood removals have led to dwindling re-
sources, particularly in the Philippines and 
Peninsular Malaysia. Restrictions have been 
placed on log exports to conserve resources, to 
promote further domestic processing oflogs, and 
to produce greater economic rents from the 
increasingly scarce timber resources. 
Trade: Structure, Changing Patterns, 
and Issues 
World exports of forest products in 1979 were 
valued at U.S.$46 billion. Pacific countries 
accounted for 52%, with the balance being 
exported mostly from western Europe. Among 
Pacific countries, Canada netted the highest 
export earnings from forest products - about 
U.S.$8 billion - followed by the USSR and 
Asia-Pacific countries (other than Japan and 
China) at about U.S.$2 billion each (UN 1977). 
Japan, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, 
South-Central America, Oceania, and China 
were net importers of forest products. As a result 
of the growing interdependency among Pacific 
countries, forest-product trade has been increas-
ing relatively faster than consumption. 
The five principal trade flows of forest prod-
ucts among Pacific countries are: first, exports of 
newsprint, wood pulp, and softwood lumber 
from Canada to the United States and, to a much 
lesser extent, a reverse flow of lumber and paper 
products to Canada; second, exports of logs, 
lumber, wood chips, and wood pulp from the 
United States to Japan; third, exports of soft-
wood lumber and wood pulp from Canada to 
Japan; fourth, exports of lumber and logs from 
Siberian USSR to Japan; and, fifth, exports of 
hardwood logs and, to a lesser extent, hardwood 
lumber and plywood from Southeast Asian 
Pacific countries to Japan and, in smaller quanti-
ties, to the United States and Europe. 
Other significant flows of forest-product trade 
in the region include the export of softwood logs 
and lumber from New Zealand to Australia and 
Japan and from Chile to Japan. 
Outside the region, western Europe, primarily 
the European Economic Community, represents 
an important market for a wide range of prod-
ucts, including newsprint, softwood lumber, and 
plywood from Canada and the United States, 
hardwood lumber and plywood from Southeast 
Asia-Pacific countries. 
Newsprint, wood pulp, and softwood lumber 
account for more than 95% of the value of forest 
products exported to the United States from 
Canada. Of these products, about two-thirds of 
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softwood lumber exports originate from Cana-
da's Pacific coast, i.e., British Columbia, whereas 
most newsprint and a large proportion of wood 
pulp exports are produced in central and eastern 
Canada. 
Some restructuring of trade in these products 
has occurred in the past.20 years. First, the share 
of newsprint imports from Canada in U.S. con-
sumption has been declining since 1960. News-
print from new capacity in the southern U.S., 
based on faster-growing forests and on lower 
transportation costs to major U.S. markets, has 
displaced some imports from Canada. Second, 
the share of softwood lumber imports in U.S. 
lumber consumption has increased. Depreciation 
in the exchange value of the Canadian dollar 
since the mid-1970s has increased the competi-
tiveness of Canadian producers. 
Recurring issues in U .S.-Canada trade of 
forest products involve institutional conditions 
of market access. First, it is sometimes contended 
that the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the so-
called Jones Act, which requires that U.S. inter-
coastal transport of commercial goods be by U.S. 
ships, is favourable to Canadian producers who 
can use lower-cost shipping than can their U.S. 
counterparts (Austin and Darr 1975). The Act 
also provides for a subsidy to U.S. producers who 
use U.S. carriers for shipment to offshore 
markets. 
Much support can be given to the view that 
Canada-U .S. forest-products trade is largely 
determined by the structure of tariffs. Newsprint, 
lumber, and wood pulp are free of tariffs, where-
as further processed products, particularly soft-
wood plywood, are not. As a result of the recently 
concluded Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN), tariffs on softwood plywood have been 
retained by both countries but are to be reduced if 
and when a common plywood standard for 
North America is adopted. Only in particleboard 
and in some grades of printing papers are signifi-
cant increases in trade expected as a result of the 
MTN. 
Other than U.S.-Canada trade, the major 
trade flows in forest products in the Pacific con-
sist of imports to Japan. In the last 20 years, 
Japan has increased and greatly diversified its 
sources of forest-products supply among coun-
tries in the region. Although Japan is expected to 
remain at the centre of this increasing regional 
interdependence, two developments will primar-
ily influence the emerging pattern of trade. First, 
Japan continues to search for new sources of 
primary or relatively unprocessed wood prod-
ucts. Already it has expanded trade in logs from 
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the relatively untapped forests of Papua New 
Guinea. Second, in the face oflog-export restric-
tions from traditional suppliers of hardwood 
logs, Japan could increase its imports of pro-
cessed products from new sources, especially as 
traditional log suppliers develop processing 
capacity and as plywood production in Korea 
and Taiwan is reduced. 
In 1979, Japan accounted for 71% of world 
imports of softwood sawlogs and veneer logs. 
The United States was the source for 64% of 
those, the USSR 28%, and New Zealand 4%. The 
Japan-U.S. log trade had its origins some 20 
years ago when Japan became an outlet for logs 
salvaged from the forests of the Pacific northwest 
after a severe windstorm. Exports increased · 
rapidly until the 1970s when log production in the 
U.S. was increasingly used for domestic demand. 
The Jones Act is said to encourage U.S. log 
exports to Japan by subsidizing use of U.S. ships 
for shipment to offshore markets while giving an 
advantage to Canadian west-coast producers by 
restricting intercoastal U.S. commercial traffic to 
U.S. ships only. Softwood log exports from the 
U.S. are expected to remain stable until about 
1990 and then· to decline primarily because of 
projected reductions in harvests from the U.S. 
west coast as industrial timberlands revert to 
second-growth timber (Darr 1980). 
Japan imported 21 x 1Q6 mJ of hardwood saw-
logs and veneer logs in 1979 - just under 50% of 
world imports. Indonesia supplied 44%, Malay-
sia 50%, and the Philippines 4%. These countries 
have been the primary traditional sources of 
hardwood logs, primarily veneer logs to Japan, 
and growth of industrial roundwood exports 
from each of these countries was extremely high 
in the 1960s. In the following decade, growth 
rates were significantly lower, particularly in the 
Philippines, because of declining timber stocks. 
In 1975, representative trade associations estab-
lished the Southeast Asian Lumber Producers' 
Association to stabilize the hardwood log 
market, to promote further domestic processing, 
to standardize grading, and to promote reforesta-
tion. Restrictions were placed on log exports, and 
the anticipated impact is a reduction in log 
exports and a restructuring of hardwood trade to 
include more processed products, particularly 
plywood from the traditional log-supplying 
countries. 
The industrial impacts of reduced exports of 
hardwood logs from Southeast Asia are several. 
First, the Japanese plywood industry is totally 
dependent on these imports and will probably 
have to undergo some reduction in capacity or 
other rationalization. Second, plywood indus-
tries in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, which 
have also been traditionally dependent on 
imported logs, will also face some contraction in 
output or capacity. However, Japan may not be 
willing to remove the 20% import duty on ply-
wood under the General System of Preferences 
while its industry is undergoing contraction. 
Japan is also a major importer of softwood 
lumber and wood pulp from Canada and the 
United States. A continuing issue in softwood 
lumber trade between North America and Japan 
is the complex and costly grading and inspection 
procedures used in Japan and the tariff on spruce-
pine-fir lumber imports. These restrictions coun-
teract the modest but important recent success 
attained in gaining Japanese acceptance of North 
American platform-frame construction tech-
niques that use lumber sizes produced in the 
United States and Canada. 
In 1979, New Zealand was the source of 5% of 
softwood sawlog imports to Japan, 6% of soft-
wood lumber imports, 4% of pulpwood chip 
imports, and 12% of wood-pulp imports. Lumber 
and log imports were primarily whole logs or 
cants ·of radiata pine for further processing, 
about 70% of which were used in packing and 
only 20% in construction. The underlying issue 
has been the reluctance of Japanese authorities to 
accept radiata pine sawtimber for house building. 
This is viewed as a potentially serious constraint 
to the development of markets for products from 
the fast-growing plantation forests of New Zea-
land, which are predominantly stocked with 
radiata pine. Exports of pulpwood chips have 
doubled since they were started in 1970 to meet 
growing pulp fibre demands in Japan, to allow 
sawmills to recover additional revenues from 
processed logs, and to clear forestland for 
,replanting. About45% of wood-pulp production 
is exported, again, mainly to Japan. Large addi-
tions to capacity, particularly of mechanical 
pulp, are planned, and some involve joint ven-
tures between Japanese and locally owned firms. 
Other forest-products trade occurs primarily 
with.Australia, an established market for a wide 
range of forest products from New Zealand, pro-
tected by conditions of the New Zealand/ Aus-
tralian Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Small 
quantities of lumber and other wood products 
are exported to other Southeast Asian countries, 
the United States, and the Middle East. 
Relatively smaller quantities of forest prod-
ucts, including significant volumes of hardwood 
products, are imported to New Zealand from 
Australia, which is a net importer of softwood 
products, including lumber, from the Pacific 
northwest regions of Canada and the United 
States. Australian demand for softwood prod-
ucts is expected to be met increasingly by domes-
tic timber plantations (de Vries 1978). 
Chile is the largest net forest-product export-
ing country in South-Central America and, 
together with Brazil, accounted for 80% of export 
earnings of forest products from Latin America 
in 1979. Chilean exports of wood pulp, softwood 
lumber, and softwood sawlogs increased signifi-
cantly between 1969 and 1979. Other exports of 
forest products, including paper, paperboard, 
and hardwood lumber were virtually unchanged. 
Principal markets for lumber and pulp were 
other Sau th-Central American countries. 
Although Korea and Japan were major import-
ers of logs from Chile, they imported relatively 
small quantities of its wood pulp and lumber. 
Raw material for the Chilean pulp-and-paper 
industry is mostly supplied from its radiata pine 
plantations while more than 50% of the domestic 
lumber consumption is also produced from plan-
tation timber. 
Forest-product demand has been increasing at 
rates exceeding world increases with the indus-
trialization of major importing countries in the 
region such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Venezuela. Moreover, intraregional trade is pro-
tected by the provisions of the Latin American 
Free Trade area. In addition, most countries in 
this region have placed restrictions or regulations 
on exports of unprocessed logs. These and other 
conditions have resulted in rapid increases in 
regional self-sufficiency in forest products, par-
ticularly in newsprint. 
Investment 
In both major segments of the forest-products 
industries, capital expenditures in most Pacific 
countries increased rapidly between 1959 and 
1969. Much of this growth continued until 1974 
and then declined. In real terms, investment 
growth was probably sharply reduced after 1974, 
as rates of price inflation have been significantly 
higher since then. Even in nominal dollars, fixed-
capital investment in both industry segments fell 
between 1974 and 1977 in Japan and New Zea-
land, whereas expenditures in the wood indus-
tries declined in Canada, the Philippines, and 
Singapore (Table 6). 
The trend to reduced growth in investment in 
the 1970s can be attributed to five related factors. 
First, growth in demand for forest products has 
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been attenuated by the impact of rising energy 
prices on world economic conditions and, in 
turn, on major industrial markets such as hous-
ing construction, industrial packaging, printing 
and publishing. World industrial wood con-
sumption increased at 1.8% annually between 
1970 and 1980 compared with 3.7% a year from 
1960 to 1970. 
Second, forest-product prices have increased 
in real terms during the 1970s compared with 
stable-to-declining prices, as in the case of news-
print delivered to New York. Real-price increases 
have encouraged industrial users of some forest 
products to implement conservation measures or 
to substitute other materials, such as plastic films 
and cases for wrapping papers and paperboard 
boxes, thereby reducing demand. 
Third, rising energy prices have resulted in 
higher manufacturing costs by adding to the deliv-
ered cost of wood, purchased fuels, and capital 
and indirectly by increasing labour costs by their 
inflationary impact on living standards. 
Fourth, costs of maintenance, repair, or 
expansion of plant facilities in the capital-
intensive pulp-and-paper industry have increased 
rapidly in the 1970s. The increase reflected the 
impact of higher price inflation on plant con-
struction and new machinery costs but also the 
expanded minimum economic size of new pulp 
mills, mostly kraft pulp mills to produce pulps for 
relatively stronger paper and paperboard prod-
ucts. As a result, new "greenfield" investments 
have become scarce, and recent expenditures 
have been directed at modernization or expan-
sion of existing facilities. Recent investments in 
new pulp capacity have been concentrated in 
refiner pulping, which produces paper-grade 
pulps requiring less wood input and a smaller 
capital investment per tonne of pulp than the 
kraft process. 
Finally, availability of low-cost sources of 
prime-quality raw material either of temperate or 
tropical timber has diminished in Pacific coun-
tries and in most world regions. Rising wood 
costs will require substantial adjustment in the 
sawmill, plywood, and veneer industries where 
they account for a large share of manufacturing 
costs. Declining timber quality and additional 
costs of processing small timber or mixed wood 
will pose further adjustment problems requiring 
additional investment. In sawmills, recent 
investments have been for the installation of 
equipment systems for processing small-diameter 
timber and for increased automation, process 
control, and wood-chip recovery for sale to pulp 
mills. In wood-based panel industries, new 
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Table 6. Fixed-capital investment (U.S.$ million) in forest-products industries in some Pacific-area countries. 
1959 1964 1969 1974 1977 
Canada 
Paper and allied 199 294 347 562 715 
Wood 55 57 140 293 233 
U.S. 
Paper and allied 686 902 1419 2210 3290 
Wood 301 362 461 1040 1080 
Australia 
Paper and allied 18 26 52 55 78 
Wood 15 22 21 66 71 
New Zealand 
Paper and allied 6 8 28 94 46 
Wood 5 5 10 29 16 
Philippines 
Paper and allied 7 I 3 9 15 
Wood 5 9 12 16 11 
Singapore 
Paper and allied na' na 2 3 4 
Wood na na 4 9 9 
Japan 
Paper and allied 123 223 417 1142 845 
Wood 39 103 172 367 172 
Chile 
Paper and allied na 2 3 2 na 
Wood na I I 2 na 
Colombia 
Paper and allied na 3 3 2 na 
Wood na 2 I I na 
Ecuador 
Paper and allied na 2 na 
Wood na na na 5 na 
Mexico 
Paper and allied 14 18 31 31 na 
Wood 6 I I 5 na 
Peru 
Paper and allied na I 15 3 na 
Wood na 3 3 5 na 
'na = not available. 
Source: Various issues of the yearbooks of industrial statistics of the UN. 
investments have increased rapidly in particle-
board, particularly wafer board, capacity. Wafer-
board produced in Canada and oriented strand-
board produced in the United States from wood 
residues or from relatively abundant but cur-
rently unused timber species have been rapidly 
penetrating traditional markets for the large 
softwood plywood industries of the Pacific 
northwest regions of Canada and the United 
States. Lower production costs of the new panel-
boards based primarily on cheaper raw materials 
favour continuation of this trend. 
The impact on restructuring forest-products 
investment has varied among Pacific-area coun-
tries. For Canada and the United States, rising 
wood and energy costs have favoured increased 
investment in energy conservation and in refiner 
pulping in paper and allied industries, and recon-
stituted panelboard capacity has increased 
significantly. 
In the Asia-Pacific region, Japan had been the 
leading exporter of tropical hardwood plywood, 
primarily to the large and growing U.S. market, 
in most of the post-War period. From the mid-
1960s, Taiwan and Korea, aided by industrial-
development policies of export promotion and 
by the appreciation of the Japanese currency, 
replaced Japan as dominant producers of tropi-
cal hardwood plywood. Until then, exports from 
the Philippines had also increased rapidly, with 
preferential access to the U.S. market provided 
by the Laurel-Langley agreement; these dropped 
because they were unsupported by export-
promoting policies. Outside the region, exports 
to the U.K. and the entire European Economic 
Community expanded steadily under preferen-
tial access afforded to members of the Common-
wealth and as a result of successful market pro-
motion efforts. The traditional role of Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan as intermediate processing 
countries for hardwood log imports from Malay-
sia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and more recently 
Papua New Guinea appears to be threatened by 
the decision of those countries to restrict log 
exports as a means to increase resource rents 
from log sales or to benefit from domestic pro-
cessing. Investment in new or expanded capacity 
in the hardwood plywood industries of the 
former group of countries appears unlikely, and a 
number of problems, including removal of 
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domestic-market price restrictions and improved 
shipping and storage facilities, need to be 
addressed if domestic plywood industries in the 
latter group are to be strengthened to meet devel-
opment objectives (Takeuchi 1981). 
We acknowledge the assistance given by other 
members of the Resource Industries Branch and other 
officials of the Department of Industry, Trade_ and 
Commerce in providing background material for the 
preparation of this paper. However, any errors are our 
own. Moreover, the views presented here are ours and 
do not represent programs or policies of the Depart-
ment or of the Government of Canada. 
Discussion 
Kenji Takeuchi: The paper by Aird and Calow 
reviews the trends and issues in Pacific trade and 
development of forest products. In my view, 
these are less pressing than the issues surrounding 
the overall long-term demand outlook for forest 
products: the long-term supply of wood and the 
most efficient utilization of wood. On the issues 
of long-term supply, there will be a paper by 
Sedjo on plantations and other papers focusing 
on the supply issues to be discussed later in the 
conference. 
However, there is one particular issue in trade 
that is of immediate urgency, especially from the 
viewpoint of tropical hardwood-producing coun-
tries - namely, the issue of local processing of 
timber. The issue is urgent because tropical 
hardwood is a semirenewable resource. The 
exploitation of tropical hardwood today is de-
structive, and, although foresters worry a great 
deal about destruction of tropical forests, I, as a 
development economist, worry more . about 
whether the producing countries are getting the 
maximum possible benefit from the resources. 
Recent developments in the tropical hardwood 
sector in the Asia-Pacific region suggest that a 
wholesale restructuring of tropical hardwood 
trade is under way with global implications. In 
the last few years, three major traditional suppli-
ers, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philip-
pines, which together account for more than 80% 
of world exports of tropical hardwood logs, have 
taken decisive steps to reduce log exports. The 
measures involve export quotas (or outright 
bans) and increased government charges (royal-
ties, export taxes, etc.) on log exports. The objec-
tives of the governments are to conserve the 
semirenewable resources, to collect maximum 
resource rents from their rich forest resources, 
and, most importantly, to secure benefits from 
increased local processing of logs. 
Two important features of mechanical wo.od 
processing tend to favour the location of such 
activities in the hardwood-producing areas. 
These are that the activities are relatively 
unskilled and labour-intensive and that they 
reduce the bulk of the raw material and, hence, 
the transportation costs. 
In terms of current policies, major hardwood-
producing areas in the Asia-Pacific region are 
broadly divided into two groups: states attempt-
ing to increase local processing oflogs and export 
of products (Philippines, Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sabah, and Indonesia) and states with liberal 
log-export policies (Sarawak, Papua New 
Guinea, and other Pacific islands). Increased 
processing increases the export value of the logs 
as well as the local employment opportunities. In 
contrast, policies to encourage log exports reap 
immediate foreign exchange. 
In this context, I would like to stress that a 
distinction must be made between two sets of 
objectives - those for deriving benefits from 
local processing and those for deriving maximum 
resource rents from semirenewable resources. 
The latter set requires careful consideration of 
the long-term price increases and the long-term 
growth of standing trees. 
A government choosing between the two sets 
of objectives has to consider the quality of its 
resources, the level of its technical development, 
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etc. For· instance,_ Peninsular Malaysia and the 
Philippines have chosen a policy to phase out Jog 
exports completely and to take necessary steps to 
improve the cost competitiveness of their pro-
cessing industries. Given their levels of technical 
development and the demand for their resources, 
these governments seem to have made an 
appropriate decision, even though the wood-
processing industries in both places could be 
strengthened ifthe governments introduced more 
aggressive, outward-oriented industrial policies. 
In contrast, Papua New Guinea (PNG) has 
chosen a liberal log-export policy, and this deci-
sion also seems appropriate because the country's 
timber resources are commercially not so attrac-
tive as those of the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia (excluding West Irian). Therefore, this 
country needs to develop a market for its species. 
In Sabah and Indonesia, policy options are 
more open than in Peninsular Malaysia and the 
Philippines or in Papua New Guinea. On the one 
hand, Sabah and Indonesia (excluding West 
Irian) happen to have the richest forest resources 
in terms of commercially attractive species per 
hectare. On the other hand, they have a number 
of short-run problems in realizing increased local 
processing. Attracting the necessary Jabour to 
Sa bah or the outer islands oflndonesia is a prob-
lem. The infrastructure required for large-scale 
growth of the processing industries in these areas 
would be a heavy financial burden. Until pro-
cessed products are exported in large quantities, 
transport costs work against such processing. 
Furthermore, the resource rents that could be 
collected from Jog exports are substantial but 
would have to be foregone if the governments 
opted to establish export-oriented processing 
industries. This could take several years, or pos-
sibly even a decade. Nevertheless, Sabah and 
Indonesia may consider it politically desirable to 
develop some kind of industries in their remote 
regions for the sake of regional development. 
This political objective would be well served by a 
policy to promote timber processing.· Indeed, 
timber processing could be used as the core of a 
regional development strategy, along with 
agriculture. 
The long-run economics are in favour of local 
processing in Sabah and Indonesia, and strong 
measures to protect an infant processing industry 
may be justified, especially in the light of South 
Korean and Taiwanese experience. Adoption of 
an export-promotion strategy like South Korea's 
as the general development strategy should be 
carefully considered. More specific steps are to 
minimize the use of price ceilings and other inter-
ventions of the domestic market, to improve the 
efficiency of domestic transport (especially ship-
ping) and port facilities, and to develop several 
wood-product terminals at strategic locations. 
To ensure an internationally acceptable quality 
of products and to secure market access, joint 
ventures with experienced foreign companies 
should also be considered at this stage of 
development. 
Sarawak is a different case; there seems to be 
room for it to collect higher resource rents on Jog 
exports than it does now. The government of 
Sarawak may be foregoing both the resource 
rents on Jogs exported and the benefits of local 
processing. 
One of the issues in plywood trade has been 
import duties. Industrialized countries have his-
torically levied high import duties on tropical 
hardwood plywood. They have done so to pro-
tect their processing industries. The recent 
changes in the Jog-export policies of major Jog-
producing countries have prompted many indus-
trialized nations to reduce import barriers on 
veneers and sawn wood, which, of course, is a 
welcome trend. However, industrialized coun-
tries should reduce or eliminate import barriers 
on tropical hardwood plywood. The second-best 
solution in terms of maximizing world economic 
efficiency is for Jog-exporting countries to intro-
duce a two-tiered pricing of logs based on higher 
government charges for export Jogs than for Jogs 
processed locally. 
Plywood manufacturing should be the core of 
a development strategy to encourage local pro-
cessing. If the development of a plywood industry 
were promoted successfully, it would automati-
cally have the effect of promoting milling and 
other wood-based paneling, such as particle-
board, because milling and wood-based panels 
are complementary to plywood manufacturing, 
improving the efficiency of raw material use. 
The Northeast-Asian Market Economies' Response 
to Tighter Controls on Fish and Forest Resources 
Sueo Sekiguchi 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Tokyo, Japan 
The Northeast-Asian market economies (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) 
depend heavily on imports from other countries for the raw materials to meet their demands for fish 
and forest pn;iducts. Thus, they have been particularly vulnerable to changes in resource manage-
ment within the exporting countries. Whereas many of the changes have been to promote conserva-
tion of renewable resources - a goal that benefits everyone in the long run - some have been the 
result of protectionist policies that may be viewed as globally counterproductive. Probably the most 
important change in fisheries has been the general acceptance of coastal states' rights of jurisdiction 
over the fish resources within 200 miles of their shores, whereas the most important change in 
forestry has been the greater involvement of resource-owning countries in manufacturing. The 
responses by the Northeast-Asian market economies reflect their differing industrial strategies. For 
example, South Korea's strategy in the fishing industry is to create foreign exchange through 
exports, whereas Japan's is to produce food for a majority of its people. Some of the positive 
side-effects of the tighter control on fish and forest resources are more intensive efforts in fish culture 
and in reforestation, especially in Japan and Southeast Asia. 
L'economie de marche de I' Asiedu Nord-Est - comprenant Hong Kong, le Japon, la Coree du 
Sud et Taiwan -depend largement des importations pour la satisfaction des besoins de Ia region en 
produits forestiers et halieutiques. Ces pays ont par consequent, ete particulierement vulnerables aux 
changements survenus dans Ia gestion des ressources chez Jes pays exportateurs. Plusieurs de ces 
changements ont ete apportes dans le but d'assurer Ia conservation des ressources renouvelables, 
mesures qui a long terme, profitent a tous Jes interesses, mais d'autres changements resultent de 
politiques protectionnistes qui peuvent etre considerees dans !'ensemble comme anti-productives. 
Dans le domaine des peches, le changement le plus important est peut-etre l'etablissement de Ia zone 
de 200 milles dont Ia juridiction releve des etats riverains alors que dans le domaine des produits 
forestiers, Ia principale modification vient de ce que Jes pays proprietaires de forets s'interessent 
davantage au developpement de Ieur industrie. La strategie industrielle de protection mise au point 
par Jes pays de Ia region differe d'une nation a l'autre. La Coree du Sud par exemple, cherche a etablir 
un echange de produits halieutiques avec Jes pays etrangers en developpant !'exportation al ors que le 
J apon essaie d'augmenter Ia production alimentaire pour repondre aux besoins de Ia majorite de sa 
population. Cette situation provoque plusieurs effets secondaires dont Jes plus positifs sont l'exercice 
d'un controle plus serre sur Jes ressources forestieres et halieutiques et de plus grands efforts de 
pisciculture et de reboisement, surtout au Japon et en Asiedu Sud-Est. 
In the last decade, changes in the availability of 
resources in forestry and fisheries have pro-
foundly affected Northeast Asia. The countries in 
the region that are based on market economies -
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan -
are small and resource-poor. To offset their lack 
of natural resources, they have invested in indus-
tries for which the resources have been either 
available to all countries on an equal basis or 
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easily accessible and readily processed for added 
value. They have, therefore, developed their fish-
ing fleets and wood-processing industries. Three 
of the four have distant-water fleets that have, in 
the past, enjoyed equal access to the resources of 
the sea. The introduction of the exclusive eco-
nomic zones has been a major setback to these 
countries, as it has given preferred access to coast-
al nations. The wood-processing industries have 
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also been adversely affected by restrictions on 
access. Many resource-rich countries have 
limited their -exports of logs and have begun 
investing in processing. The response of the 
Northeast-Asian countries deserves study. 
Fish Resources and Trade 
By international standards, people in North-
east Asia eat more fish and other marine products 
than do people elsewhere, although there are 
some differences in diet even within the region. 
Japanese, for example, depend more on fish, 
especially raw fish, for their diet than do 
Koreans. Japan depended on the export of fish 
products in the early stage of its post-War eco-
nomic development, using the revenue to finance 
the import of raw materials for industry. In the 
late 1960s, however, the nation became a net 
importer of fish products as its own industry lost 
comparative advantage while demand for these 
goods continued to grow. Despite the fact that 
Japan has the world's largest fisheries industry, it 
is also the largest importer of these products. In 
contrast, exports of fresh or frozen fish made up 
3.3% of South Korea's total 1978 exports. 
Although South Korea's fishing industry has 
suffered because of higher fuel prices and the 
growing number of established 200-mile eco-
nomic zones, it still is in a more favourable posi-
tion than Japan, for wage costs are lower. In fact, 
South Korean exports of fishery products caught 
up with those of Japan in 1977 (FAO 1977a). 
Japan is a promising market for Korean fishery 
products, bringing in U.S.$443 million in 1980. 
(Taiwan, too, is important to Japan as a source of 
fishery products, but at times trade relations 
between the two countries have been strained. In 
1980, for example, Japan imposed quantitative 
restrictions on imports of eel from Taiwan.) 
For developing countries with poor natural-
resource endowments, fishing is an important 
means to earn foreign exchange, for fishery tech-
nology is, in general, labour intensive. Working 
conditions are severe, and the industry tends to 
hold a comparatively disadvantageous position 
as economic growth advances because wage rates 
rise rapidly. This experience is observed in the 
stagnation of the Japanese fishing industry and in 
the continued growth of the industry in South 
Korea. In the years to come, the ASEAN indus-
try will catch up to that of Northeast Asia (F AO 
1980). 
Northeast-Asian nations attempted to counter 
the movement in 1977 by major countries to 
establish 200-mile economic zones. Up to the 
present, to avoid conflict, the market economies 
in the region have refrained from applying eco-
nomic zoning among themselves. Japan intro-
duced economic zoning to counter the Soviet 
zone, but there are no exclusive zones between 
Japan, South Korea, and China. 
Forestry and Trade! 
No country in the region is self-sufficient in 
wood. Demand for lumber, pulp, and wood prod-
ucts has rapidly increased as residential construc-
tion and consumption of paper have expanded 
with economic growth. Although forests in 
Japan are to some extent cultivated for lumber 
harvest, self-sufficiency has decreased steadily in 
the past 15 years. The index stood at 71 % (for 
lumber) in 1965, 64% in 1975, and 31% in 1978, 
and other countries in the region seem to be 
following similar trends. Production of lumber 
has an extremely long lead time, so it is expected 
that all market economies in the region will have 
large net imports of forestry products. 
Lumber production, planting and forest man-
agement, and wood-manufacturing industries 
such as milling and plywood are all labour inten-
sive and are suitable for a labour-affluent coun-
try. In Japan, the lumber-manufacturing indus-
try developed as an important exporting sector 
selling lumber and plywood to industrial coun-
tries but is at present declining. Exports of ply-
wood are still important in South Korea, 
amounting to 2.7% of total exports in 1978. The 
lumber-manufacturing industry is important in 
earning foreign exchange reserves, and this 
industry can easily be adopted by developing-
country economies, especially those with both 
plentiful forests and an abundant labour supply. 
Time-series data on exports of lumber products 
suggest that ASEAN countries will become more 
important in the export of manufactured wood 
products. Thus, the Northeast-Asian market 
economies will find it necessary to consider tariff 
escalation, technology transfer, and capital 
investment in the industry as well as conservation 
of forests. 
Market Response 
Both the fishing and the forestry (more pre-
cisely the lumber-manufacturing) industries have 
life cycles that are closely related to overall eco-
nomic development, and it will be the ASEAN 
1Statistics have been taken from FAO yearbooks of 
forest products unless otherwise indicated. 
countries that develop these industries in the 
1980s. Japanese distributors (trading houses and 
supermarkets) and fishing companies have 
responded to the trends by establishingjoint ven-
tures with entrepreneurs in almost all countries in 
the ASEAN region. Technical progress in freez-
ing and cold storage in marine transport has 
favoured such undertakings. Some joint ventures 
in cultured fisheries, such as prawn breeding in 
Indonesia, have also begun, and the number of 
joint ventures is growing between Japanese trad-
ing houses or paper-manufacturing enterprises 
and lumber companies abroad. In response to 
regulations on log exports imposed by resource-
owning countries, joint ventures, which may 
replace domestic producers in Japan, also have 
been established in the plywood industry. In fact, 
Japanese plywood manufacturers have occa-
sionally requested protection against foreign 
competition, ultimately shifting to high quality, 
chemically coated plywood production. A few 
joint ventures are in experimental planting and 
reforestation. Japan has imported a growing 
quantity of lumber from Siberia, and this trade 
presents a political factor affecting government 
policy vis-a-vis the USSR. 
Case Study: Japan 
The fishing industry has been important to 
Japan for centuries. For instance, it played a 
major role in the early stages of Japan's post-War 
economic development by providing employ-
ment and earning foreign exchange through 
exports of canned fish and crustaceans. The 
industry originally grew up in response to domes-
tic demand, which is high by Asian and world 
standards. Fish and other marine products are 
the main - and for some Japanese, the only -
source of animal protein. This heavy demand 
combined with changes in the country's eco-
nomic environment has turned Japan into a net 
importer of fishery products, although its fishing 
industry continues to be the largest in the world. 
According to a fisheries census for 1979, 
468 000 persons were engaged in fishing activi-
ties. Of these, 364 000 were small-scale fishing 
families (Norin Tokei Kyokai 1981) much like the 
small farmers in Japan. In 1979, fishing house-
holds owning their own vessels (gyosen gyoka) 
depended for 55% of their income on nonfishery 
Work. As in agriculture, in which some 70% of 
Japanese farmers were classified in 1977 as 
depending for more than 50% of their income on 
nonagricultural work, fishery firms are in general 
GENERAL STUDIES: SEKIGUCHI 85 
small, although some large corporations have 
developed. 
As small farmers have formed a protectionistic 
interest group, so have fishing personnel. Many 
of these small operations are now claiming com-
pensation for the damage caused by pollution of 
inshore fishing grounds, which occurred in the 
1950s and 1960s when environmental protection 
measures were lacking. 
Among the various categories of fisheries, 
pelagic and offshore fisheries expanded the most 
rapidly until the early 1970s. The first oil crisis in 
1973, subsequently higher fuel prices, and the 
spread of 200-mile economic zones, however, 
combined to bring Japanese fisheries to stagna-
tion. New trends include increased efforts in fish 
culture and joint ventures with resource-
managing countries. 
Major Changes on the Supply Side 
Because the Japanese fishing industry was 
based on labour-intensive techniques, it lost its 
comparative advantage in the 1960s and 1970s 
when wages increased in response to improved 
economic conditions. Another factor that drasti-
cally affected Japanese fisheries was the rapid 
increase in fuel costs. Even in coastal fishing, fuel 
costs rose 6.5 times during 1970-78. Although 
inshore fishing consumes a relatively small quan-
tity of oil, the proportion for fuel in the total costs 
rose from 6.5% in 1970 to 9.6% in 1978. Higher 
oil prices damaged the pelagic fishing operations 
even more severely (Norin Tokei Kyokai 1981). 
Labour costs for inshore operations increased 3 .4 
times during the same period, but the percentage 
of total costs contributed by labour dropped 
from 21 to 16. 
Higher fuel and labour costs, reduced fish 
catch due to quotas, and licence fees all combined 
to reduce the supply of fish and raise the price. 
Thus, Japanese production of fish and other 
marine products declined after a peak in 1977-78 
(Norin Tokei Kyokai 1981). Imports expanded 
rapidly, annually increasing 7 .9% during 
1970-75, whereas domestic production grew at 
an annual rate of only 2.4%. 
The most seriously affected sector has been 
pelagic fishing, which is operated by large com-
panies. Their response to the changing environ-
ment was to enlarge their trading departments to 
import fish from resource-owning countries. 
They also established joint ventures in these 
countries, selling technological know-how both 
in management and in fishing. According to 
Norin Tokei Kyokai (1981), sales of the trading 
departments of large fishery companies (with 
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paid-in capital of more than 1.0 billion yen) rose 
from 47% in 1970 to 70% in 1979. The share of 
fisheries itself declined from 34% to 15% during 
the same period. 
Response on the Demand Side 
How sensitive are Japanese consumers to the 
changes in relative prices between fish, crusta-
ceans, and meat? The consumer price index rose 
by 121%between1970 and 1979, whereas that for 
fresh fish, crustaceans, and molluscs increased by 
201% and for meat by only94%. Food consump-
tion per household increased by 141 % in the cor-
responding period, and the figures indicate that 
the Japanese reduced their real consumption of 
fresh marine products and increased that of meat. 
Substitution proved to be fairly responsive to 
changes in relative prices. 
A new feature of the fishing industry is that 
uses of fish for products other than human food 
have rapidly increased. Thus, although demand 
for food use has leveled, total demand still con-
tinues to rise. The total demand for fish, crusta-
ceans, and molluscs increased 2.5% annually in 
1970-79, 2.0% for food use and 3.8% for nonfood 
use (Norin Tokei Kyokai 1981). 
Trade in Fish, Crustaceans, and Molluscs 
The major exporters of marine products to 
Japan are the U.S. (144 billion yen), South Korea 
(133 billion yen), Taiwan, Indonesia, Canada, 
India, Spain, China, and Australia. Develop-
ment of fisheries has been rapid in ASEAN coun-
tries, and trade is promising even among the 
resource-deficient Northeast-Asian market 
economies, as indicated by the large exports of 
Korea and Taiwan to Japan. 
Exports of fish have lost ground in Japan. In 
1979 Japanese exports accounted for only 196 
billion yen, whereas imports were as high as 931 
billion yen. The most important export market is 
the U.S. where Japan sold 36 billion yen worth of 
products. Within the Northeast-Asia region, 
Taiwan (12 billion yen) and Hong Kong (11 bil-
lion yen) were the largest export markets for 
Japan, though still comparatively small. 
Public Policy 
The most important aspect of public policy is 
encouragement of favourable fishery agreements 
for fish catch. Japan has struck agreements with 
the USSR, Canada, and the U.S. in the North 
Pacific. In recent years, fishery agreements have 
been made with nations of the South Pacific, 
such as Australia, and these have increased in 
importance. A common complaint in Japan is 
that smaller fishing quotas and higher licence fees 
in the North Pacific have combined to make the 
pelagic fishery increasingly less attractive (Norin 
T okei K yokai 1981). The Japanese are concerned 
that the fishing quotas in the 200-mile economic 
zones are sometimes used as leverage for other 
trade issues. 
The government has declared that fisheries 
cooperation is one important form of assistance 
to developing countries, and it extended a 6.6 
billion yen grant for fishery cooperation in the 
1980 fiscal year. In addition, it sends Japanese 
experts for consultation and receives trainees 
from developing countries. As most technical 
progress in the industry has been promoted by 
public institutions, just as in agriculture, 
government-to-government cooperation holds 
the promise of technology transfer. Government 
organizations that specialize in these activities 
are Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and the Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation (OFCF). 
On the domestic front, Japanese fishery poli-
cies focus on assistance to small fisheries by 
means of subsidies and preferential financing. 
Fish manufacturing, enlargement of freezing and 
refrigeration equipment, and improved distribu-
tion efficiency are priorities for support. A new 
area of importance has been the protection of 
inshore fishing grounds and promotion of fish-
culture activities. 
Japanese foreign trade policy is a mixture of 
free trade and protectionism. To protect small 
inshore fisheries, it tends to restrict imports of 
competing products. In 1979, there were 27 items 
under residual import restrictions under the 
GATT (4-digit BTN classification), 22 of which 
were agriculture and fish products. Marine prod-
ucts include fresh, frozen, or salted herring, cod, 
yellowtail, mackerel, pike, etc. (BTN 03.01 and 
03.02) and fresh, frozen, salted, or smoked scal-
lops and squid, etc. (BTN 03.03). According to 
the Ministry oflnternational Trade and Industry 
(MITI), the Japanese government has occasion-
ally requested that South Korea voluntarily re-
strain exports (tuna in 1975 and seaweed in 1977) 
(Sekiguchi 1979). 
Similar protectionism is found in the tariff 
structure. For instance, a 10% tariff for fresh fish 
is imposed on sardine and cod imports, which are 
subject to quantity restrictions. Quotas are intro-
duced when domestic prices are higher than 
international prices plus tariffs (and transporta-
tion and other costs). The gap between domestic 
prices and tariffs plus international prices is 
attributed to importers as import premiums. 
Tariffs are also used to protect the fish-
processing sector. Canned herring, for example, 
has a tariff of 15%, although there is no limit on 
quantities imported. Tokyo Round agreements 
will produce a different picture when they have 
been implemented. Tariffs on marine commodi-
ties will decline by about 40% from the levels in 
1979, i.e., 10% to 6%; 5% to 3.5%. Although the 
tariff reduction is substantial, tariffs will remain 
high, as is suggested by the fact that tariffs on 
smoked cuttlefish will decrease from 15% to 7 .5% 
(Tokyo Round Study Group 1980). 
The Japanese public seems convinced that 
price increases are inevitable because of higher oil 
prices and stricter fishing quotas. Debate on freer 
trade in fish products was rare in the 1970s. 
Forestry and Trade in Wood Products 
Japanese residential buildings have tradition-
ally been largely constructed of wood. Rapid 
economic growth in the post-War period was 
followed by expanding housing construction as 
well as increased demand for paper, and demand 
for logs grew rapidly. The forested area of the 
country is limited, although the government 
worked to promote replanting of forests soon 
after the War. Trees planted in the late 1940s, 
however, are still comparatively young. Thus, the 
ever-expanding demand for lumber has largely 
been met by imports. Japan has depended on the 
U.S., the USSR, and New Zealand for coniferous 
lumber and on ASEAN countries for deciduous 
lumber. 
The national forests have supplied an impor-
tant proportion of the total domestic wood pro-
duction and have been critical in environmental 
protection. In fact, national and municipal 
forests supplied 41 % of total domestic log pro-
duction. As the Japanese islands are mountain-
ous with much steep terrain, forests are impor-
tant not only for lumber production but for 
prevention of landslides, flooding, and soil ero-
sion. The latter is especially important because 
rivers are short and steep, and water tends to flow 
quickly to the sea. 
Most private forests are owned and managed 
by wealthy farmers, but, as wage rates rapidly 
increased, the production of logs has expanded 
while forestation has stagnated. Adding to these 
difficulties is the fact that lumber producers have 
seldom been an influential pressure group, for 
lumber users make up a much more numerous 
and stronger interest group. 
Sawing and secondary processing of lumber 
are carried out by small firms. In 1977, 207 000 
persons were engaged in sawmills, 62 000 in ply-
wood manufacturing, and 150000 in furniture 
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making. All firms are small, and, occasionally, 
they demand protectionistic measures. Plywood 
manufacturers, especially, face serious difficul-
ties from foreign competition. Some have shifted 
to high quality, chemically coated plywood, and 
others who stay with the product lines of ordi-
nary plywood have been allowed to form depres-
sion cartels to prevent price decline (Sekiguchi 
1979). 
Domestic production of logs was 51.8 x 106 m3 
in 1967, 34.2 x 106 m3 in 1975, and 33.3 x 106 m3 
in 1979. In recent years, the level has been stable 
at some 33 x 106 m3, 20 x 106 m3 from private 
forests and 13 x 106 m3 from either national or 
municipal forests (Japan Forestry Association 
1981). 
Log imports were 35.7 x lQ6 mJ in 1975 and 
37 .5 x 106 mJ in 1980. The fluctuations in imports 
mostly reflect ups and downs in domestic busi-
nesses in which housing investment plays an 
important role. Japan has been the world's 
largest importer of logs for many years, account-
ing for some 55% of world trade in 1978 (UN 
1978:63). Major source countries for Japan's 
log imports are the U.S. (10.8 x 106 m3 in 1980), 
the USSR (6.2 x 106 m3), ASEAN countries 
(19.1 x lQ6m3), and New Zealand (0.7x lQ6m3) 
(Japan Forestry Association 1981). In 1979, 
Japan's rate of self-sufficiency in lumber was only 
44.6% (Japan Forestry Association 1981). 
Among ASEAN countries, Indonesia and 
Malaysia are the largest exporters of logs to 
Japan, both at 8.9 x 106 mJ in 1980. The Philip-
pines, because of an embargo on the export of 
logs in the mid-1970s, exported only 1.1 x lQ6 mJ 
in 1980. Similar strategies are now followed by 
both Indonesia and Malaysia; the approach may 
have found impetus in the Southeast Asian 
Lumber Producers' Association (SEALP A), 
which was formed to develop, among other 
improvements, better marketing operations. 
In the 1970s, Canada began actively to imple-
ment an export embargo on logs so that it has 
become extremely difficult for Japan to import 
logs. A similar trend has been observed in the 
U.S. where regulations on log· exports are 
increasing at the federal as well as the state 
government levels. The revision of the Export 
Control Act in October 1979 threatens to ban 
exports of American cedar logs completely from 
October 1982. One positive development has 
been the formation of a U.S.-Japan Lumber 
Trade Promotion Committee by private individ-
uals in both countries; the members met for the 
first time in November 1980. 
Because of its enormous domestic demand for 
lumber, Japan has turned to the Soviet Union as 
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an important supplier. During 1975-79, 
17.5 x lQ6 mJ logs and 0.9 x 106 mJ in milled 
lumber were imported from the USSR. The next 
contract, for 1981-86, was delayed by economic 
sanctions against the Soviet Union for its inva-· 
sion of Afghanistan, but it was concluded in 
March 1981. Some other contracts exist for trade 
in pulpwood and wood chips. One problem is 
said to be less-than-punctual delivery, for the 
contract states that 80% of the cargo will be car-
ried by Soviet carriers. In the three prefectures 
where the majority of wood supplies depend on 
the USSR (Fukushima, Niigata, and Toyama), 
wood manufacturers are naturally enthusiastic 
promoters of trade with that country. 
According to F AO statistics, Japan's imports 
of roundwood expanded from 27.8 x lQ6 mJ in 
1967, to 45.9 x 106 mJ in 1970, and to 
53.5 x 106 mJ in 1978. Although Japanese 
demand for lumber continues to rise, the restric-
tions by resource owners on their exports have 
meant that imports into Japan have not kept pace 
with demand. In 1979, Japan's total demand for 
lumber was 109.8 x 106 m3, 55% for milling, 29% 
for pulp production, 13% for plywood manufac-
ture, and 3% for other uses (Japan Forestry 
Association 1981). 
Most of the wood demand, therefore, is for 
construction, especially for residences. By 1980 
housing investment seemed to have reached a 
peak. Nevertheless, the demand for lumber con-
tinues to increase as the size of families becomes 
smaller, and progressive urbanization leads to 
demands for better houses. Demand for pulp-
wood will also expand along with that for paper. 
Another notable feature of Japanese import 
demand for lumber is its drastic fluctuation. 
Because of Japan's large share of worldwide 
lumber trade, its demand fluctuations have had a 
strong impact on international prices. On the 
Japanese domestic front, lumber prices were 
stable in 1977-78 as the yen exchange rates rose. 
In 1979-80, the declining value of the yen accel-
erated the price increase, which was twice that of 
the previous year. 
Because of the serious impact of price fluctua-
tions not only on the importers' but on the export-
ers' economies, a buffer stock scheme was estab-
lished in October 1974. The size is not yet large 
enough, however, and price fluctuations are still 
great. 
The government recognized in.the early post-
W ar economic development that Japan would 
inevitably be dependent on imports for most of 
its raw materials and worked to promote 
resource development projects. Among these was 
the establishment of the Alasca Pulp Co. with 
government support in 1953. 
In the early 1970s, the government more 
actively encouraged private investment in 
resource development. In 1971, it created a 
special fund to redress losses incurred by natural-
res ou rce development investment (Tennen 
Shigen Kaihatsu Sonshitsu Junbikin). It allowed 
firms to deduct a certain percentage of foreign 
investment for exploration and extraction in 
their calculation of taxes. The reserve is to be 
used up equally in 5 years after a 5-year period. 
Lumber was the only renewable natural resource 
covered by this scheme. The system reduced the 
risks firms faced and had an effect of postponing 
the payment of corporate income taxes (Krause 
1976). 
In addition, the government subsidized 
research and development in the utilization of 
South-Pacific woods. These efforts were directly 
addressed to the interests of Japan as an import-
er. The Japanese government was concerned 
about resource conservation, and any strategy 
for securing lumber supplies for Japan naturally 
depended on cooperation with the conservation 
policies of resource-owning countries. 
Among governmental cooperation measures 
in this area are programs for education and train-
ing of persons from abroad and provision of 
Japanese experts abroad as consultants. A non-
profit corporation, called the Kaigai Ringyo 
Konsalutanto Kyokai (Association of Consul-
tants in Forestry Overseas) has been engaged in 
consulting not only in lumber production but in 
reforestation as well. This organization is subsi-
dized by the government, and to date quantita-
tive data have not been published on its activities. 
The Japanese government faces difficulties in 
trade policies for manufactured lumber products. 
If lumber standards for building are accepted 
among all nations, exporters can realign prod-
ucts without risking local demand. Still, many 
small-scale manufacturers operate in this area in 
Japan, and they demand protection from import 
competition. For this reason, tariffs in manufac-
tured lumber products are fairly steep. Since 
implementation of the Tokyo Round agree-
ments, the tariffs will be reduced one-half or two-
thirds. For plywood, the tariff will be reduced less 
than for other products primarily because. there 
are no preferential tariffs for the industry. 
Policy Implications 
Northeast-Asian market economies are all de-
ficient in two important renewable natural 
resources - marine (including crustaceans, mol-
luscs, etc.) and forest products. They, thus, face 
serious difficulties when exporting countries 
decide to impose mechanisms of direct control, 
such as embargoes. Resource-owning countries 
should strengthen conservation policies, but they 
should ensure that new policies do not discrimi-
nate against any particular nation - that is, that 
higher prices of scarce or limited resources 
should be borne by all users, both domestic and 
foreign. 
Increasing fishery licence fees has the effect of 
transferring income from the poor to the wealth-
ier nations because rich countries impose the 
burden on developing countries. This effect 
occurs in fisheries because the industry is growing 
in developing countries and is labour-intensive. 
A constructive way to absorb excess licence fees 
would be to direct the funds toward resource 
studies and regional consultation as well as pub-
lic relations activities on resource management. 
Both fisheries and lumber-manufacturing 
industries in Northeast-Asian market economies 
are in transition. These industries, aided by an 
abundant labour force, have played an important 
role in earning foreign exchange early in eco-
nomic development. Because ASEAN countries 
will be developing these industries in the coming 
decades, it is desirable that the Northeast-Asian 
market economies, especially Japan, reduce 
tariffs in trade in manufactures in this area. If 
these precautions are taken, the export revenues 
of ASEAN countries will increase and price 
increases in importing countries will be moder-
ate. Importing countries' difficulties in making 
these adjustments arise because of the significant 
number of small-scale firms who face adjustment 
problems. In this context, a freer trade policy 
cannot be realized without assistance from 
governments. Increased supply security, too, will 
be essential to removing protectionist measures. 
The growing number of joint ventures in fisheries 
and wood processing will work as a counter-
weight to protectionist pressure in importing 
countries. 
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As new technology, both in fisheries and forest-
ry, has been encouraged and undertaken by many 
governments, the future of government-to-
government technical cooperation is promising. 
Such cooperation should not be limited to fishing 
and wood milling but should include cultured 
fish farming and conservation techniques. Espe-
cially with regard to forestry, all the Northeast-
Asian economies share the benefits of increased 
cooperation. In fisheries, the intraregional 
market is large. For example, Japan is a major 
net importer and South Korea, a large net export-
er. Development of the South Korean economy, 
it appears, will make the industry less competitive 
with Japan, and Korean fishing companies, too, 
will begin to establish joint ventures in ASEAN 
countries. Development of the fishing industry in 
Asia will benefit not only traders in the region but 
each nation by increasing its fish-protein intake. 
Price fluctuation is a matter of serious concern 
for producers and consumers. In the lumber 
trade, private buffer stocks (Beigic and Hager 
1974) with government support will be the prin-
cipal method of improving the situation, 
although the effectiveness largely depends on 
how the cost of storing can be reduced by techni-
cal progress. 
One factor makes trade in lumber dominant at 
a certain stage of processing. Industrial standards 
and building standards vary among countries. 
Thus, producers face increased risks if they 
manufacture lumber for specific uses, as the prod-
ucts will not sell in other markets. Furthermore, 
the further downstream the processing, the more 
important is local taste, as in the case of furniture. 
Downstream industries survive in importing 
countries regardless of tariffs. Information 
exchange and consultation in establishing inter-
national standards will remove some of the risks 
for developing countries moving to higher stages 
of manufacturing. The governments in the 
Pacific basin countries must work together in this 
endeavour, for, although social and cultural fac-
tors do differentiate building standards among 
countries, the potential for cooperation should 
be explored. 
Discussion 
Helen Hughes: Professor Sekiguchi has ana-
lyzed the principal renewable resource issues 
from the resource-poor countries' point of view 
with his usual perspicacity and thoroughness. He 
haE indicated the special characteristics ofrenew-
able resources, the trade and location of process-
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ing questions arising from those characteristics, 
and the ensuing policy options. His analysis 
might have, however, been even more illuminat-
ing if h(! had made a clearer distinction between 
what might be called the "mining" and "farming" 
phases of renewable-resource exploitation. 
When a renewable resource is initially exploit-
ed from the "virgin" state in which it has devel-
oped over many (sometimes hundreds or even 
thousands) of years, it may be said to be in its 
mining phase. During this phase, stocks are 
reduced, and considerable resource rents, akin to 
those accruing to depletable mineral resources, 
are reaped by the public and private owners of 
timber and fisheries. After a time, policy choices 
have to be made about the use of land on which 
the timber stands - whether to continue to plant 
it with timber, to use it for tree crops, grazing, or 
annual agricultural crops. Fish, seaweed, and 
other marine stocks have to be managed to attain 
stable yields, with consequent direct or indirect 
farming costs. The returns accruing in this phase 
are those accruing to land or sea and to comple-
mentary capital and labour (and other factors of 
production). 
During the mining period, the production 
decisions are mainly concerned with rates of 
depletion and the division of resource rents 
among the private and public natural resource 
owners, primary exploiters, traders, and proces-
sors. A tendency to limit production to increase 
the income from rents is common. However, 
once the farming stage is reached and the 
resource rents are depleted, returns are more 
likely to increase as a result of an increase in the 
volume of production. Differences between pri-
vate and social costs and returns generally con-
tinue to be important because of environmental 
and common-property questions. They may, 
however, diminish - for example, in timber 
farming in small competitive woodlots. 
The experience of resource-poor countries 
reflects these phases. Initially, they often bene-
fited from a share in resource and monopoly 
rents by dominating extraction, trading, or pro-
cessing or more than one of these phases. These 
activities were extremely profitable, often per-
mitting the relatively small or inefficient units 
that are typical of the early stages of natural-
resource exploitation, trade, and processing to 
continue in production. But, as the limited 
domestic natural resources became exhausted 
and as developing countries gained political and 
economic strength and reduced the purchasing 
countries' share of natural resource rents, these 
activities became less profitable. Where rates of 
exploitation began to be limited by resource-
owning countries, supplies became or were 
thought to be becoming precarious. 
The long-run outlook, as farming replaces 
mining is, of course, favourable, even for 
resource-poor countries. As tropical hardwoods 
become scarce, it will be profitable to plant (or 
otherwise produce) substitutes. Once fisheries are 
subject to conservation practices and technologi-
cal improvements, their output will rise. 
The transition period, which is occurring, is, 
however, difficult. The formulation and imple-
mentation of appropriate policies is no easier in 
renewable resources than in other sectors, and in 
fisheries it is complicated by common-property 
rights in open seas. In the supplying countries, 
new policies are required to manage the shift to 
farming-type production, with appropriate 
regard for the social as well as private costs and 
benefits. The shift often, though not always, 
means a move to local processing if labour costs 
are low. In the importing countries the loss of 
resource rents, particularly if accompanied by 
rising labour costs, should lead to shifts from the 
affected industries. Unfortunately, usually for 
short-term social reasons, the affected enterprises 
are often permitted to stay in the industry by 
protectionist policies, as Sekiguchi implies in his 
comment that Japanese foreign trade policy is a 
mixture of free trade and protectionism; Taiwan 
and South Korea have been highly protectionist 
until recently. Protection becomes harder to 
remove as the protected industries become less 
competitive. Sekiguchi identifies the problem 
accurately with regard to Japanese protectionism 
in timber processing and in fisheries. He perhaps 
places too much stress on the formal tariff bar-
riers to trade and processing, not giving enough 
emphasis to administrative controls exercised by 
various government agencies to protect small 
producers, and to the intricacies of the Japanese 
distribution system that is inherently highly 
protectionist. 
Resources of the Eastern USSR 1 
Jan J. Solecki 
Department of Slavonic Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
East of the Ural Mountains in Siberia, the Soviet Union has vast resources-85% ofallits fuel 
and energy resources are located in the region. F crests, oil, natural gas, and hydropower are all 
abundant and, with changes in transportation, are increasingly being exploited. At present, Pacific 
markets are easier for Siberia to reach with its products than are major population centres in the 
Soviet Union, and trade flows, especially toward Japan, are expanding. However, plans for 
improved trans-Siberian rail links may have a strong impact on the direction of the flow eastward. 
L'Union sovietique possede des richesses considerables a !'est des monts Oural, en Siberie: c'est 
dans cette region que se trouvent 85 % des combustibles et des ressources energetiques et petroliferes. 
On y trouve en abondance des forets, du gaz nature!, du petrole et de l'eau qui sont de plus en plus 
exploites a mesure que se developpent !es moyens de transport. La Russie atteint aujourd'hui !es 
marches du Pacifique plus facilement que ses grands centres populeux et le commerce prend de 
!'expansion surtout avec le Japon. Le plan d'amelioration du reseau ferroviaire trans-siberien 
pourrait produire un impact considerable sur l'avenir du commerce. 
The part of the Soviet Union that lies east of 
the Ural Mountains is usually divided into three 
economic regions: western Siberia, eastern Sibe-
ria, and the far eastern USSR. These three 
regions cover an area of 11.7 >< 1Q6 km2 (50.9% of 
the Soviet Union) compared with 9.9 >< 1Q6 km2 
for Canada. On 1 January 1980, the population 
of these three regions was 26.6 million and, for 
the entire USSR, 264.5 million compared with 
23.8 million for Canada. 
These three regions account for 85.7% of the 
overall fuel and energy resources of the USSR-
87 .2% of mineral fuel resources and 62.5% of the 
hydro resources (Krushchev 1979: 189). They 
also have 81.8 >< 1Q9 mJ (74.8%) of the USSR's 
timber stands but account for only 33.5% 
(3.88 >< 10s mJ) of the volume of logging and 27% 
( 1.16 >< 10s mJ) of lumber production (Krushchev 
1979: 302). 
The three regions are linked with the Pacific 
basin by trans-Siberian railroad, by air, and by 
the Northern Sea route, which has been function-
'These comments were prepared at the request of the 
conference organizers when the invited participant 
from the Soviet Union was unable to attend. 
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ing for increasing periods through the construc-
tion and use of heavy-duty, nuclear-powered and 
diesel ice breakers. 
Each of the three regions owes its development 
to the availability of fuel and energy resources, 
and each one is endowed with a different 
resource. 
The relationship between the three regions and 
the Pacific basin is primarily determined by 
geographical location. 
Western Siberia lies the furthest from the 
Pacific basin, and, although it is the most impor-
tant of the three regions forthe USSR, it is prob-
ably least important at present for the Pacific-
basin countries. 
The region lies in the basin of the Ob' and its 
tributary the Irtysh. The Ob' is the first of the 
three large rivers east of the Ural Mountains 
flowing from south to north. 
Western Siberia owes its present importance to 
the oil and gas industries, developed during the 
past decade and a half. As late as 1960, no signifi-
cant amount of oil was produced here. In 1965, 
western Siberia still accounted for only 0.4% of 
the national oil output; in 1970 for 8.8%; in 1975 
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for 30.1% (Shniper 1980); in 1980 for 51.74% 
(312Mt) (Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta 198lb). In 
1981, western Siberia is to produce 59.3% of the 
USSR's output of oil. Although the output of oil 
in the country as a whole is to drop in 1981 by 
57.8 Mt, it is to increase in western Siberia by 
11.5 Mt. 
The region experienced similar development of 
the natural gas industry. Its share in the national 
output increased from 0.3% in 1965 to 4.9% in 
1970 when total national output was 1.98 x 1011 
mJ, 13.3% in 1975(Shniper1980), to 35% in 1980 
(national output, 4.35 x 10 11 m3). By 1985, this 
percentage is to reach 55-58 (Ekonomicheskaia 
Gazeta 1981 a). Oil and gas pipelines are currently 
being built to link western Siberian reserves with 
the Ural and the European USSR. Should such 
pipelines be built to the Pacific coast, the new 
supplies may have a considerable effect on the 
availability of oil and gas to the Pacific-rim 
countries. 
The development of the oil and gas industries 
has triggered similar expansion in transporta-
tion, forestry, agriculture, and even fisheries 
through fish breeding in the numerous lakes of 
the region and in coastal waters. However, 
because of the proximity of the region to the 
Urals and to European USSR, western Siberia 
has gravitated westward rather than to the 
Pacific basin. 
Western Siberia has 12.6% of the country's 
timber stand but accounts only for 8.1% of the 
logging operations and 7.2% of the lumber pro-
duced. Although there are possibilities for a sub-
stantial increase in both logging and processing, 
such expansion is not likely to have much effect 
on the Pacific-rim countries' trade in wood-based 
commodities because of the long distances and 
the high costs of transportation. This finding 
applies equally to the fishing industry. 
Of the three regions, western Siberia is the 
smallest (2.4 x 106 km2), but has the largest popu-
lation (13 million). 
To the east of western Siberia lies eastern Sibe-
ria, occupying the basin of the Yenisei and its 
tributary the Angara. The Yenisei is the middle 
one of the three great Siberian rivers. The terri-
tory of the region amounts to 3.7 x 106 km2, and 
the population numbers 8.2 million. 
If western Siberia, with its oil and gas re-
sources, is the region of today, eastern Siberia is a 
region of yesterday and tomorrow. The main 
resource is hydropower, which the Soviet Union 
has been developing since the mid-1950s. There 
are four important hydro projects on the Yenisei 
and four on the Angara, completed, currently 
under construction, or planned. Using this 
hydroelectric power, wood processing and wood 
chemical industries have been developed in the 
region. 
The main industrial centres are in Irkutsk, 
which is an important machine-building centre 
for the mining industry of the region and the far 
east and also an important transportation centre. 
Bratsk is the first giant hydropower station in 
eastern Siberia ( 4.5 MkW installed capacity) and 
is also the site of a large lumber-producing and 
wood-processing plant (Ekonomicheskaia 
Gazeta 1980). Bratsk stands on the ·banks of the 
Angara, which is the only river flowing out of 
Lake Baikal. It is the largest tributary of the 
Yenisei. More than 300 rivers flow into Lake 
Baikal. In other words, Lake Baikal is a huge 
natural reservoir, and a result is that the volume 
of water flowing in the Angara does not vary 
much from season to season. 
Ust Ilimsk hydroelectric-power plant, also on 
the Angara (4.3 MkW installed capacity) is cur-
rently nearing completion. Here is also being 
built a collection of plants to produce wood prod-
ucts. Ust Ilimsk is also a site of a joint project, 
which is being built by the East European coun-
tries and the USSR to produce pulp and paper. 
The last of the three giant power stations on the 
Angara is to be at Boguchany, which is down the 
river from U st Ilimsk. Work is just beginning on 
the construction of the 3-MkW, installed-
capacity power station, which will have attached 
to it another large wood-processing centre (Eko-
nomicheskaia Gazeta 1980). On the Yenisei, are 
Sayano-Shushenskaia hydroelectric-power sta-
tion (6.4 MkW), which is currently under con-
struction, Krasnoiarskaia hydroelectric-power 
station (6.0 MkW), which is already in operation, 
and Sredne-Yeniseiskaia hydroelectric-power 
station (7 .5 MkW), which is yet to be built (Eko-
nomicheskaia Gazeta 1980). 
Besides these three large hydroelectric-power 
stations and the industrial centres attached to 
them, the region has a smaller hydroelectric sta-
tion, as well as nonferrous metallurgy- and 
lumber-processing centres close to the mouth of 
the Yenisei and a scatter of small industrial towns 
around Lake Baikal. 
Wood products from Bratsk and other pro-
cessing plants on the Yenisei and the Angara are 
transported both east and west, either by rail or 
by oceangoing vessels through the port of 
Dudinka on the Yenisei and through the North-
ern S.ea route. 
Located further away from the European 
USSR, eastern Siberia naturally gravitates more 
to the Pacific basin than does western Siberia. 
Nevertheless, distances to the Pacific are still 
great, and transportation costs are a factor in 
determining the commodities that enter Pacific-
basin markets. 
To improve transportation facilities from east-
ern Siberia and the far eastern USSR to the 
Pacific, the Soviet Union is currently building 
Baikalsk-Amurskaia trunkline, which is the con-
tinuation of the existing branch line from Taishet 
on the trans-Siberian railroad to Bratsk and then 
to Ust Kut. From here, the newly planned rail-
road will run to Nizhneangarsk on the northern 
tip of Lake Baikal, then to Tynda - the halfway 
point - where it will intersect the north-south 
railway running from the trans-Siberian railroad 
to Berkakit. From Tynda, the new line will run to 
Komsomolsk on the Amur and then to the 
Pacific coast at Sovetskaia Gavan in Tartar 
Straits between the mainland and the Sakhalin 
Island, or to Vladivostok and Nakhodka in the 
Sea of Japan. 
The construction of the railroad was 
announced without warning in mid-1974. The 
part to be newly constructed is 3145 km. The 
railway will cross seven mountain ranges, will 
require construction of 142 bridges and 25.3 km 
of tunnels, one of which is to be 15 km. Twenty 
thousand comsomol members were directed to 
volunteer for the project. The total labour force 
working on the project is close to half a million. 
The estimated cost is U.S.$10 billion. 
Apart from providing the USSR with an alter-
native rail communication link with the Pacific 
(because the trans-Siberian railroad along this 
sector runs dangerously close to the Chinese 
border), the new railroad will provide access to 
massive resources in the far eastern region (coal 
in south Yakutia, to Udokan copper deposits, 
and to some 5 x 106 m3 of lumber annually). The 
railway was to have been completed by 1982 but 
will probably be ready sometime between 1985 
and 1990. 
The availability in eastern Siberia of the huge 
reserves of hydropower and also of various 
inputs for nonferrous metallurgy, chemical, 
wood-processing, and machine-building indus-
tries promises significant development in the 
future in the region. The main obstacles up to 
now have been the unwillingness on the part of 
the Soviet people to settle here and the lack of 
capital resources, which are currently going 
toward development of the oil industry in west-
ern Siberia. 
The far eastern region is 5.5 x 106 km2 and has 
a population of 5.3 million. It lies directly on the 
Pacific and, consequently, is the most likely of 
the three regions to influence the development 
and trade in the Pacific basin. Because of the 
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remoteness from the population centres of the 
USSR, the natural resources of the region, such 
as coal and wood, have been considered mainly 
as export commodities. Administratively, the 
region was recently increased at the expense of 
eastern Siberia when Yakut ASSR with its rich 
deposits of diamonds and coal and copper was 
incorporated into the far eastern region. 
Except for the southern fringes, the region has 
remained underdeveloped because of the severity 
of the climate. However, local development of 
such valuable resources as gold, mica, and tin has 
been taking place. In the Lena basin are located 
deposits of diamonds as well as extensive depos-
its of coking coal and brown coal. Some oil and 
gas is also thought to be present. The Soviet 
Union expects to be able to export this coal to 
Japan and other countries in the Pacific basin 
once Baikalsk-Amurskaia trunkline has been 
completed. The other major resource is copper 
ore from the Udokan deposits, which are conve-
niently located south of the coal deposits. In the 
more distant future, the Soviet Union plans to 
develop in the region a chemical industry centre 
that will utilize brown coal unsuitable for export. 
In the far eastern region, an important fishing 
industry exists and has important fish landing 
and processing bases, such as Vladivostok, Nak-
hodka, Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka, Okhotsk, 
and others (Solecki 1979). In 1970, the far eastern 
fishing administration was responsible for 33.6% 
of the Soviet fish landings and in 1975 for 34.9%, 
or 3.6 Mt. In 1975 Soviet catch in the north 
Pacific amounted to 3.4 Mt (Sysoev 1977: 317, 
327). In spite of the high domestic demand, the 
USSR was able to export 162 million rubles (not 
freely convertible to U.S.$, fixed arbitrarily; in 
September 1981 U.S.$100 was R.76.30) worth of 
fish in 1975 and 124 million rubles in 1979, of 
which 10.2% went toJapan(Table 1). By volume, 
1979 exports to Japan amounted to 77624 t of 
474471 tor 16.4% (Statistika 1980). 
The far eastern region has 226.3 Mha of the 
637.4 Mha of forestland in the USSR, or 35.5%. 
It has 27.6% of the nation's stand, which indicates 
that the forest-covered areas are poorer than for 
the nation as a whole. Annual increment for the 
area is 2.01 x 10s m3, whereas the volume logged 
in 1977 was only 3.84 x 101 m3. The imbalance 
results from poor accessibility to and poor qual-
ity of the northern forest areas and inadequate 
utilization of stands in the south. But it shows 
that a substantial potential exists here for exports 
to the Pacific-basin countries. 
Also, exports of forest products from the three 
regions east of the Ural Mountains will probably 
depend on the ability of the Soviet forest industry 
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Table I. USSR exports offish and fish products, 1967-79. 
Exports (million rubles) Imports (million rubles) 
Total Fish products Total Fish products 
1967 8687.1 68.4 7683.0 13.4 
1968 9570.9 78.0 8469.0 9.7 
1969 10490.0 80.0 9294.I 13.2 
1970 11520.0 88.3 10565.l 14.9 
1971 12425.0 90.6 11231.9 13.6 
1972 12734.0 84.3 13309.2 14.0 
1973 15802.0 97.5 15540.8 9.6 
1974 20738.0 129.6 18829.2 17.1 
1975 24030.0 162.7 26669.2 18.8 
1976 28022.2 89.0 28730.7 20.3 
1977 33256.3 80.7 30097.0 28.6 
1978 35670.0 90.2 34554.1 29.9 
1979 42426.3 123.8 37864.0 34.1 
Source: Vneshnia Torgovla SSSR (USSR Foreign Trade) statistical yearbooks for the appropriate years, 
Moscow, USSR, Statistika, 1968-79. 
to make use of larch. In all, 258.3 Mha of the 
forests in the USSR are larch. As this species 
appears almost exclusively in the three regions 
(Lesnaia Promyshlennost 1980), it accounts for 
almost exactly half of the forested area in them. 
The stands of larch amount to 2.6 x 1010 mJ or 
45% of the total. Yet, as the Soviet economists 
admit, larch has not been utilized sufficiently. 
An examination of the map of the USSR's 
forests shows that the new major wood process-
ing centres, namely Bratsk, U st Ilimsk, and 
Boguchany (currently under construction) are 
sited on the patches of pine stands. Baikalsk and 
Selenginsk are supplied from spruce and Siberian 
stone pine forests, and Komsomolsk on the 
Amur from spruce forests. As far as is known, no 
major plants have been sited on larch stands. 
Larch is difficult to transport by water and diffi-
cult to process, hence the unwillingness on· the 
part of the Soviet industrial enterprises to use it. 
However, once scientists find a way to overcome 
these difficulties, the availability of larch-based 
forest products may have a significant effect on 
the Pacific-basin markets. 
The allowable cut for the USSR as a whole in 
the accessible areas has been estimated at 
6.8 x lQB mJ of which 61.5% is in the conifer 
stands and 36% in soft-leaf forests. Hard-leaf 
stands account for only 2.5% of the allowable cut. 
Furthermore, 40.8% of the allowable cut is found 
in the European USSR. 
Conclusion 
An increase in the Soviet participation in the 
Pacific-rim markets can be expected with the 
completion of the Baikalsk-Amurskaia trunk-
line. More would be possible ifthere were a scien-
tific breakthrough that would allow wide utiliza-
tion of larch as an input for the production of 
export commodities. Some increase is likely 
simply because of the overall economic develop-
ment of the far eastern region, entailing popula-
tion increase and, with it, an increase in the 
demand for consumer and capital goods, some of 
which it will be more economic to buy from the 
Pacific-rim countries than to bring from the 
European USSR. Overall economic develop-
ment of the three regions will depend to a consid-
erable extent on the growth of the fuel and energy 




Forest Plantations, Production, and Trade in the Pacific Basin 
Roger A. Sedjo 
Forest Economics and Policy Program, Resources for the Future Inc., Washington, D.C., USA 
This paper describes the forest-project flows within the Pacific basin, discusses the transition 
from old-growth to plantation forests, and summarizes the results of another study that examines the 
comparative economic potential of plantations in several locations within the Pacific basin. 
La presente communication decrit la circulation des produits forestiers dans la region en 
bordure du Pacifique, la transformation des anciennes forets en plantations nouvelles et resume !es 
resultats d'une autre etude comparee sur le potentiel economique de ces nouveaux peuplements dans 
divers endroits de la region. 
The Pacific-basin countries are a major source outflow is logs, with modest amounts of lumber 
of the world's industrial wood supply. Nature and wood panels. The major final market is 
endowed the west coast of North America - Japan, with the United States and Europe being 
Alaska, British Columbia, the Pacific northwest lesser, but important, final markets. However, 
region of the United States, and California - much of the processing (particularly of veneers 
with vast inventories of prime conifer timber. and plywood) is done at an intermediate location, 
Across the Pacific, Indonesia, Malaysia, the most commonly Taiwan and South Korea. The 
Philippines, and to a lesser extent Papua New final major flow of trade consists almost exclu-
Guinea have similarly large stocks of high- .. , sively of Siberian logs from the USSR moving to 
quality tropical hardwood stands and have the Japanese market. The USSR supplies about 
become the major world suppliers of these 40% of Japan's substantial imports of softwood 
woods. Also, the Pacific region provides an logs. In addition, relatively small, but substan-
outlet for the vast timber resources of Siberia. tial, flows of forest products, largely softwood 
Certain other countries in the region, such as logs, go from New Zealand and Chile to Japan, 
Chile and New Zealand, are becoming, or have and small flows are from New Zealand to A ustra-
the potential to become, important producers Iia and from Chile to non-Pacific-basin 
and exporters of wood and wood products. countries. 
Trade Flows 
The Pacific coast of North America, particu-
larly British Columbia and the U.S. Pacific 
northwest, is the origin fpr softwood products of 
all types, the most important being logs, lumbety ,, 
and wood chips, newsprint, and pulpwood 
(Sedjo and Radcliffe 1981). Although these prod-
ucts flow to all parts of the globe, a substantial 
portion go to Pacific-basin countries, particu-
larly Japan. The East Indian Archipelago is the 
origin of a massive flow of hardwood forest prod-
ucts (Takeuchi 1974). In this case, the principal 
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The flow of forest products within the Pacific 
basin is profoundly affected by Japan. Histori-
cally, Japan was heavily wooded and relied upon 
wood to provide a variety of its needs, especially 
construction. The post-World War II boom 
found the Japanese forest unable to provide for 
domestic needs. Part of the reason was forest 
overuse and neglect during the War, and part was 
the relatively low productivity of Japanese 
forests compared with the demands of the grow-
ing Japanese economy. However, the plentiful 
forests of Southeast Asia, initially the Philippines 
and Malaysia and later Indonesia, provided 
abundant, accessible forest resources at low 
98 RENEW ABLE RESOURCES 
prices. The early 1950s saw the growth of Japa-
nese imports of Southeast Asian tropical hard-
wood logs. Initially, the logs were processed in 
Japan into lumber and plywood, some of which 
was used for local consumption but much of 
which, especially the plywood, was exported to 
foreign markets, principally the United States. In 
the early 1960s, the Great Columbus Day Storm 
ravaged the forests of the Pacific northwest of the 
United States. The ensuing salvage operations 
generated large volumes oflogs lacking available 
markets. The Japanese market was "discovered" 
as an outlet for the temporary glut. Once the 
benefits of such a trade pattern were recognized, 
U.S.-Japanese log trade continued to expand 
and grow until, by the 1970s, U.S. log-export 
earnings from Japan approached $1 billion. Sub-
sequently, the rapidly expanding domestic 
market has diverted domestic production of 
goods such as plywood from the export market 
into the domestic market. Furthermore, to meet 
domestic demand in Japan, imports of processed 
wood have increased, particularly hardwood 
plywood that is now being processed in countries 
such as South Korea and Taiwan. 
This is not to suggest that Japan is entirely 
dependent upon external suppliers of wood. 
Japan has substantial domestic forests, some 24 
Mha - of which about 10 Mha are artificial. 
However, the enormous wood requirement 
means that domestic production must be sup-
plemented with vast forest-product imports. 
Hence, Japan can be viewed as the hub of the 
great wheel called the Pacific basin, drawing a 
variety of forest products from all parts of the 
rim: softwood logs, wood chips, lumber, and 
some pulp and paper products from North Amer-
ica; hardwood logs and, increasingly, lumber and 
plywood from Southeast Asia; softwood logs 
from Siberia; and the recent modest flows, 
largely of logs, from New Zealand and Chile. 
An interesting feature of Pacific-basin, forest-
product trade is found in the unique set of com-
modities commonly traded. Logs and wood chips 
are not typically heavily traded products in non-
Pacific-rim countries. Within the Pacific basin, 
however, these commodities are traded rather 
than the more highly processed lumber and wood 
pulp that tend to dominate trade flows elsewhere. 
The Forest Transition 
Forestry today is experiencing a transition sim-
ilar to that which occurred in agriculture much 
earlier in human history. Like the transition from 
gathering and hunting to cropping and livestock 
raising, the current transition is from old-growth, 
natural forests to planted, managed, and har-
vested forests. The decisions involved in modern 
agriculture about location, crop type, technolog-
ical inputs, and management mode are similar for 
forestry. 
Much of this transition can be examined in 
terms of a simple stock-adjustment model (Lyon 
1981) that can be applied either to a particular 
forest (given qualifications) or to the global 
forest. In terms of this model, initially the actual 
stock of forest resources is greater than the 
desired stock. Thus, the economically rational 
policy is simply to draw the old growth (actual 
stock). In such a world, the initial price of stump-
age would be very low, approaching zero, and 
there would be no economic incentive to invest in 
tree growing. In fact, the stumpage price was 
often negative, since the timber resources had no 
economic value but were merely an obstacle to 
alternative uses of the land. This situation existed 
until recently, for example, in much of North 
America. Gradually, however, an adjustment 
was occurring. Increases in demand, together 
with a reduction in old-growth stocks, brought 
desired and actual forest stocks into closer rela-
tionship. As this occurred, stumpage prices 
would be expected to exhibit real-price increases 
as has happened (Manthy 1978). 
As increases in the real price of timber re-
sources occur and expectations develop that such 
price increases will continue, the economic incen-
tives are created to induce investments in indus-
trial forest plantations. These increases for some 
types of timber resources, expectations of future 
real-price increases, and technological innova-
tions that reduce the costs of forest plantation 
establishment and reduce the real costs of trans-
portation to major markets all contribute to an 
environment in which the incentives for invest-
ments in plantations are continuously improving. 
In this environment, the role of plantations as a 
supplier of industrial wood could be expected to 
increase gradually. Simultaneously, the old-
growth forests will gradually supply relatively 
lesser amounts as the high-quality accessible 
stands gradually give way to lower-quality, less 
accessible old growth. 
Another important feature of the transition 
should be noted. There is no reason to expect that 
the regions that have large and valuable stands of 
old growth will necessarily be the regions that are 
the most prolific and profitable timber growers. 
The economics of harvesting an inventory of old 
growth that has grown over several hundred 
years are quite different from the economics of 
timber growing. The latter will depend upon such 
features as the establishment costs, the biologic 
rate of growth, the rotation period, alternative 
land use, etc. Thus, it is quite possible, if not 
probable, that some regions with high-value, 
high-quality old growth will not lend themselves 
to economically profitable plantations. Also, 
some regions that never have had extensive high-
quality forests may, because of the introduction 
of exotic species, become dynamic and profitable 
timber-growing regions, e.g., Venezuela. 
Perhaps the principal economic advantage of a 
previously forested region in the process of 
timber growing is the probable existence of an 
infrastructure that was created to facilitate the 
harvest of the old growth. Much of this infra-
structure can probably be used for timber-
growing activities. 
Industrial Forest Plantations 
The transition from natural to plantation 
forests has, thus far, been very gradual. Typi-
cally, plantations have been established to 
replace the harvested natural forest. This is par-
ticularly true in regions such as Europe and much 
of North America, where the process of natural 
regeneration is increasingly being displaced by 
artificial regeneration. 
In the tropics and the southern' hemisphere, the 
introduction of industrial forest plantations pro-
ceeded slowly. Before World War II some local 
plantations were established, but, on a global 
scale, these activities were quite modest. Since 
World War II and particularly beginning in the 
1960s, the tempo of forest plantation develop-
ment has increased dramatically in regions of the 
tropics and the southern hemisphere. The prelim-
inary successes of many of these plantations, the 
rapid biologic growth often achieved, and the 
vast land areas potentially available suggest the 
long-term possibility for meeting much of the 
world's increasing requirement for wood and 
wood fibre with increased production from the 
forest plantations of the tropics and the southern 
hemisphere. 
Plantation Types 
Three major plantation types can be character-
ized as occurring currently across the world. 
First, in temperate regions that traditionally pro-
duced the majority of the world's industrial 
wood- northern Europe and North America -
plantations utilizing indigenous species have 
typically replaced cutover natural forests. 
Second, other temperate regions that have not 
traditionally produced major industrial wood 
supplies are commonly introducing in their plan-
tations exotic temperate-climate species (largely 
North American) that exhibit rapid growth and 
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desired marketability. Third, certain tropical 
regions are introducing exotic species (tropical 
pines, eucalyptus, and gmelina) that exhibit 
desirable growth and marketability from other 
tropical regions. Although experience with 
exotic plantations in thetropics is limited, results 
thus far are so dramatic that some knowledgeable 
observers maintain that tropical regions will 
eventually become dominant wood suppliers. 
Although plantations are a small fraction of 
the world's total forested area, the current land 
areas involved belie their true potential. Indus-
trial potential is the result not only of more land 
being converted into forest plantations but also 
of the volume of output per land unit. These 
volumes are likely to be large for plantations 
because the location is usually determined, at 
least partially, by considerations of high biologic 
growth and also because the management prac-
tices usually increase usable growth. Thus, fast-
growing forest plantations offer the potential of 
meeting a major share of the world's timber 
requirements from relatively small areas. 
Global Trends in Forest Plantations 
Although data on the extent and status of 
forest plantations are extremely sketchy, a recent 
F AO study (F AO 1978 b) provides some perspec-
tive on the global extent of forest plantations. 
Total area regenerated by artificial means was 
about 90 Mha in the mid-1970s. This is roughly 
3% of the area of closed-canopy forest and 
includes all areas regenerated by artificial means 
including conventional afforestation and refores-
tation techniques. These plantations were, for the 
most part, located in the traditional wood-
producing temperate regions of Europe, North 
America, and the USSR. Conifers are generally 
the preferred species, although large areas of 
eucalyptus and gmelina have been established in 
Latin America, particularly in Brazil. 
Although most forest plantations are situated 
in the northern hemisphere temperate regions, 
attention has increased recently in plantation 
activities in the tropics and subtropics and in the 
southern hemisphere temperate regions. Lanly 
and Clement ( 1979) estimated that the tropic and 
subtropic regions of Central and South America, 
Africa, and Asia had about 11.8 Mha of planta-
tion forest in the mid-1970s. Of this, about 6.7 
Mha were industrial forest plantations. By 1980, 
only 5 years later, the industrial forest planta-
tions were projected (F AO 1978) to increase by 
36% to 9 .1 Mha, and projections for the year 2000 
were that the industrial plantations in that region 
would reach over 21 Mha. Although these figures 
include slow-growing specialty woods such as 
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teak, most of the present and projected tropic and 
subtropic industrial plantations consist of fast-
growing conifers and hardwoods designated for 
ordinary solid wood and fibre production. 
Plantation Activity 
Within the Pacific basin, major forest planta-
tion activities have taken place in several regions. 
Historically, the Pacific northwest of North 
America relied upon natural regeneration. 
Recently, beginning in perhaps the mid-1960s, 
however, greater attention has been paid to plan-
tation forestry and to planting, growing, and 
research activities, e.g., to genetic improvement 
of trees. Large areas are now being artificially 
reforested with indigenous species and managed 
for their commercial values. 
Plantations with exotic species have been de-
veloped in Chile since about 1900. Today, about 
700 000 ha of plantation forest exist, much of it 
monterey pine, which originated in North Amer-
ica. In recent years, Chile has increased the rate of 
plantation creation to almost 80 000 ha/ year. 
New Zealand currently has about 1 Mha of exotic 
plantations and is adding about 50 000 ha/ year. 
As in Chile, most of New Zealand's plantations 
are monterey pine. The fertile soils of New Zea-
land and the long growing season result in 
extremely rapid rates of growth. Given the plan-
tation age distribution, New Zealand expects that 
its plantation output will increase severalfold 
between now and the first decade of the 21st 
century. Similar activities are under way in Aus-
tralia, although at a somewhat more modest 
level. 
Within Indonesia, forest plantations of teak 
and other expensive specialty woods have been in 
place for a considerable time. However, planta-
tions with fast-growing exotics are quite new and 
still experimental. Nevertheless, the rapid growth 
and low opportunity costs of some of the land 
suggest good economic potential. 
In China, 30-40 Mha of plantation forest have 
been created since the revolution. However, 
much of this forest is designated for protection 
and fuelwood, and, therefore, the industrial 
potential is limited. Korea, like China, has refor-
ested large areas, about4 Mha. However, as with 
China, much of the reforestation is intended for 
protection and fuelwood purpos!!s. 
In Japan, about IO Mha ofits24 Mha of forest 
are artificial. Predominantly local species were 
used, and the output is directed at the specialized 
local markets. In addition to these countries, 
Costa Rica, Colombia, Fiji, Australia, Malaysia, 
















Fig. 1. Conceptual approach to forest plantations. 
Comparative Economics 
Resources for the Future recently undertook a 
study of the comparative economics of planta-
tion forestry in 12 regions of the world (Sedjo 
1980) using a conceptual approach (Fig. 1). The 
regions chosen either had large-scale plantation 
activities already or were thought to have sub-
stantial economic potential on the basis of 
growth rates, wood quality, and location vis-a-vis 
world markets. In each case, the analysis was 
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Table I. Pacific-basin international plantations: present net values (at 5% discount rate for 1979 constant prices in 
perpetuity and internal rate of return in 1979 US.$/ha). 
Present net values Internal rate of return 
Case/ species Pulpwood Sawtimber• Pulpwood Sawtimber 
North America 
bu .S. south/ lo blolly pine 
bU.S. south/loblolly pine/high site 
Pacific northwest/ douglas-fir 
Pacific northwest/ douglas-fir/ high site 
South America 
Chile/ radiata pine 
Oceania 
Australia/ radiata pine 
New Zealand/radiata pine 
Europe 
bN ordic/ Norway spruce 
Asia 
Borneo/pine 
'Integrated to use residues in pulping. 
bFor comparison purposes. 
based upon the country's ability to export to 
major world markets - Japan, the eastern 
United States, and northern Europe. Of the 12 
regions selected, 5 were in the Pacific basin -
Kalimantan (Indonesia), Australia, New Zea-
land, Chile, and the Pacific northwest region of 
North America. 
The following presents the basic results briefly, 
without indicating the degree to which these 
would be sensitive to changing assumptions or 
conditions. 
The model 
The preliminary findings of the formal model 
are shown as estimates of present net values and 
internal rates of return for the Pacific-basin 
countries. The present net value and internal rate 
of return investment criteria related receipts from 
the wood outputs to the direct costs of forest 
stand establishment and the costs of subsequent 
management. Neither land acquisition costs nor 
development costs enter into these calculations. 
In the absence of development costs and given an 
efficient market, the present net value calculated 
in this manner is an estimate of the per-hectare 
market price of the land (Table 1). 
It should be stressed that, for these quantita-
tive results, no provision is made for political 
risks and uncertainties that may affect an invest-
ment's viability. Also, the quantitative results 
should not be viewed as definitive but rather only 
as preliminary and partial indications of eco-
nomic viability. 
The plantations of New Zealand, Chile, Aus-
tralia, and Borneo performed quite well using 
1748 2474 12.02 12.45 
2830 3742 13.91 14.12 
- 34 336 4.87 5.92 
- 44 1236 4.83 7.51 
3649 4509 23.39 17.50 
2005 2141 10.68 10.06 
2903 4118 11.90 13.11 
- 100 154 4.61 5.57 
1851 2364 12.94 14.73 
either of the quantitative measures. Chile and 
New Zealand did particularly well. The Pacific 
northwest's performance, although the poorest 
within the Pacific basin, was still adequate to 
justify plantation investments; the long rotation 
cycle clearly reduces the economic attractiveness 
of plantations in this region vis-a-vis others 
examined. 
Development costs 
A more complete evaluation requires that 
development costs, risk, and alternative land 
opportunities all be introduced into the analysis. 
These can be introduced qualitatively. Develop-
ment costs are those necessary to provide the 
physical base to undertake forest-plantation 
activities. They would include the provision of 
required infrastructure, both within the planta-
tion boundaries and also of access to the sea. 
These costs are likely to vary considerably across 
regions. These costs are generally likely to be 
small for the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and 
Chile due to the location of the plantations and 
the general level of infrastructure development. 
In the areas examined, one would expect these 
costs to be highest in Borneo and, generally, in 
the area of Southeast Asia that has the vast inven-
tories of old-growth hardwoods. The process of 
logging the old growth, if properly done, could 
provide a basic infrastructure for the establish-
ment of plantation forests. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The Pacific-basin countries are a major source 
of the world's industrial wood supply. Much of 
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the international trade in forest products within 
the basin moves from producing regions along 
the Pacific rim to Japanese markets. 
As the world's old-growth forests have gradu-
ally been used as an industrial wood resource, 
future forest requirements are increasingly being 
met by forest plantations. Rising real prices for 
the wood resource have provided economic 
incentives to undertake investments in industrial 
plantations. The choice oflocation for new forest 
plantations is not confined to regions that have 
traditionally been important producers; it 
includes regions that have particularly favour-
able biologic or locational features. A simulation 
study has indicated that the economics are quite 
favourable for plantation investments in many 
countries in the Pacific basin, including some 
that have not been traditional producers. 
Discussion 
K. Hemmi: The Sedjo paper is excellent, 
although I must confess that the results of the 
analysis are so abbreviated that I could not judge 
the legitimacy of the figures in Table I. For 
example, costs in developing a plantation forest 
may be huge and could change the figures dra-
matically. My impression, however, is that high 
rates of growth, wood quality, and location vis-a-
vis world markets are main determinants of the 
competitiveness of the plantations. I agree with 
Sedjo that the introduction of Pinus radiata into 
New Zealand and Chile opened a new dimension 
for industrial plantation forests. 
This paper complements Darr's because 
regions that Darr examines are in the Pacific 
basin, and the comparative economics among 
them would decide the competitiveness of each 
wood-producing region. Each of these wood-
producing regions is in the forest transition 
detailed by Sedjo. 
Sedjo's projections for the year 2000 that 
industrial plantations in the tropics and subtrop-
ics will be more than 21 Mha suggest that the 
demand for wood will be met by the supply from 
the industrial plantation forests. If my under-
standing is correct, there will be no increase in the 
real price of wood, and competition among var-
ious locations will increase immensely. 
Moreover, there will be increasing competition 
from nonrenewable, inexhaustible natural 
resources, such as iron, aluminum, and cement. 
As Darr states in his paper, management of the 
existing forests will be intensified. In my expe-
rience in managing the university forests of the 
University of Tokyo, selective logging can pro-
duce almost the same amount of wood yearly as 
do plantation forests. 
I believe that the positive environmental effects 
of forests will be more and more appreciated in 
the future and that public funds will be increas-
ingly invested in protection forests. If this think-
ing is correct, selective logging in protection 
forests will be more competitive than the indus-
trial plantation forests, at least in areas where the 
climate is severe. 
In my understanding, the reasons that indus-
trial plantation forests have increased in the past 
are the increasing price of wood and the 
improved technology in plantation techniques, 
including management. If my judgment is correct 
and if there is no technical breakthrough in silvi-
culture in the tropics and subtropics, or in 
extremely cold regions, the industrial plantation 
forest will be limited to temperate zones. In 
regions of severe climate the transition may be 
from the mining phase in forestry to selective 
logging and not to plantations. 
Pacific Northwest Timberlands 
DavidR. Darr 
United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Pacific Northwest, Portland, Oregon, USA 
Because of a large inventory of high-quality, old-growth timber, the Pacific northwest has been 
in a unique position to respond to demand for timber in Japan during the past two decades. 
Competition in the Japanese market has linked the Pacific northwest also to Southeast Asia, Siberia, 
and the rest of the Pacific rim. Withdrawal of land from timber production and uncertainty about 
maintaining current harvest levels cast doubt on the ability of the Pacific-northwest region to meet 
any future growth in demand around the Pacific rim. Shifts in the competitive position of Pacific-
northwest producers of softwood lumber and plywood in the U.S. domestic market may lead to 
increased efforts to sell in Pacific-rim markets. Although demand will continue to grow for pulp and 
paper in Japan, demand for softwood lumber and plywood may not grow as before. Countries in 
Southeast Asia that produce tropical hardwood logs may prohibit log exports, and softwood 
production in Siberia may not increase as in the past. From the standpoint of both demand and 
supply of timber resources around the Pacific rim, the Pacific northwest is at a turning point. Any 
number of scenarios can be drawn, depending upon assumptions about future interactions of 
markets around the Pacific rim. 
Le nord-ouest du Pacifique, comprenant d'anciennes forets composees d'un nombre considera-
ble d'especes de qualite superieure, a pu depuis une vingtaine d'annees repondre it la demande de bois 
du Japon. Mais la concurrence a force Jes producteurs de la region it trouver des debouches sur Jes 
marches de l'Asie du Sud-Est, de la Siberie et des autres pays en bordure du Pacifique. Cependant, 
I' affectation des terrains forestiers it d'autres productions et l'incertitude relative au maintien du taux 
actuel d'exploitation laisse planer un doute quant it la possibilite de cette region de repondre it 
l'accroissement eventuel de la demande des regions de la cote Pacifique. Mais Jes changements 
survenus sur le marche domestique des Etats-Unis dans Jes rangs des concurrents producteurs de bois 
mou et de contre-plaque du nord-ouest du Pacifique peuvent orienter Jes fournisseurs vers Jes 
marches des pays en bordure du Pacifique. Pour cette categorie de produits forestiers, on s'attend it 
un ralentissement de la demande du Japon mais it un accroissement dans le domaine des pates et 
pa pier. Les pays de l'Asie du Sud-Est qui produisent des rondins de bois dur pourraient en interdire 
l'exportation, et la production de resineux de la Siberie pourrait ne pas s'accroitre au meme rythme 
que par le passe. Le nord-ouest du Pacifique est done it un point toumant, au niveau de la demande 
aussi bien que de l'approvisionnement en produits forestiers. On pourrait prevoir divers scenarios 
selon Jes hypotheses fondees sur l'interaction eventuelle des marches de la cote Pacifique. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the industrialized 
countries of Japan, Canada, and the United 
States experienced rapid rates of economic 
growth. The growing economies of these coun-
tries generated demands for increased output of 
timber products: lumber, pulpwood, pulp, and 
paper. The timberlands of the Pacific northwest 
were in a unique position to respond to these 
demands. Development of these timberlands, 
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however, has not been without its problems and 
issues. In many respects, the timberlands of the 
Pacific northwest are at a turning point: attitudes 
about the role of the timber resources in meeting 
the needs of the people are in a state of flux, there 
are concerns about the ability of the timber 
resource to support current harvest levels, and 
markets for timber products are changing. Dur-
ing the 1970s, the potential for economic devel-
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opment of members of ASEAN (the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations) and other countries 
became apparent. Developments in Australia, 
New Zealand, South America, and the rest of the 
Pacific rim, through links in timber markets, also 
have potential effects on the timberlands of the 
Pacific northwest, which, for the purposes of this 
paper, is defined as the states of Alaska, Oregon, 
and Washington and the Province of British 
Columbia. 
Alaska 
Commercial development of the Alaskan 
timber resource has been limited to southeastern 
Alaska. To date, interior Alaska's timber has 
been used by local people primarily for shelter 
and fuel or for rough lumber. Forested land 
covers about one-third of the 146.7 Mha that 
make up the state. Most of the commercial forest-
land is federally owned, but some federal lands 
will be transferred to state and private ownership. 
Of the total forestland (48.2 Mha), 9% is consid-
ered to be commercial (capable of growing 
1.4 mJ /ha annual harvest). Almost 62% of the 
commercial forestland is in southeastern Alaska, 
which has an average timber inventory of 
386 m3/ha compared with 40 m3/ha in the 
interior of the state. Hemlock (67%) and spruce 
(23%) are the most important species in the 
southeastern Alaska softwood inventory of 
I. I x 109 mJ. Spruce makes up the total inventory 
of 6.9 x 107 mJ of softwood timber in the interior 
of the state. The interior has frigid temperatures 
during winter, areas of permafrost, and large 
swamps and bogs. In contrast, southeastern 
Alaska has weather more characteristic of a 
marine climate. The areas contain old-growth 
timber; therefore, annual growth rates are low 
(0.69 mJ /ha in interior Alaska and 0.25 mJ /ha in 
the southeastern portion of the state). 
Interest in the development of the timber 
resource for commercial purposes began in the 
early 1900s. However, the high costs associated 
with the remoteness of the area generally pre-
cluded successful enterprises. After World War 
II, the U.S. Forest Service attempted to encour-
age utilization of the timber resource of south-
eastern Alaska through the development of a 
pulp industry. The primary enticement was the 
availability of long-term (50-year) contracts that 
guaranteed timber. These efforts led to the con-
struction of two pulp mills, one wholly owned by 
Japanese investors and the other owned by U.S. 
investors. The combined capacity of these two 
mills is 395 000 t/ year. All output of the mill 
owned by Japanese investors (capacity of 195 000 
t) is shipped to Japan; the output of the U.S. mill 
is sold around the Pacific rim and other areas 
(Table !). 
Sawmills were constructed in conjunction with 
the two pulp mills; the rationale was that high-
quality logs could be sawed into lumber and 
lower-quality logs used in the pulp mills. Almost 
all the' output of these sawmills is exported to 
Japan in the form of large "cants." The volume 
exported grew during the 1960s, reaching a peak 
of955 000 m3 in 1973 and declining to 657 000 mJ 
in 1979 (Table 2). 
A variety of factors have contributed to the 
orientation toward the Japanese market (Darr et 
al. 1977). Industry personnel generally cite the 
the Jones Act 1 as the major factor limiting the 
shipment of forest products from Alaska to the 
lower 48 states. The Jones Act specifies that any 
cargo shipped between two U.S. ports must be 
transported on a ship constructed in the United 
States and operated by U.S. crews. This legisla-
tion has meant increased shipping costs and has 
made producers in Alaska less competitive in 
U.S. markets than producers in Canada, 
Washington, Oregon, and other states. 
All federal agencies in Alaska have restrictions 
on the export of unprocessed logs from lands 
under their jurisdiction (Lindell 1978). These re-
strictions require processing of raw materials prior 
to export as a means to stimulate employment. 
Until the late 1970s, these restrictions applied to 
almost all commercial forestland within the state: 
private ownership amounts to I 00 000 ha or 2% of 
commercial forestland. 
Before the 1970s, issues revolving around the 
Alaskan timber resource generally centred on 
how to increase the development and the compet-
itive ability of the timber industry in southeastern 
Alaska. The two pulp companies proved to be 
financially secure; in fact, other independent 
firms found it difficult to continue operations 
without eventually becoming involved with one 
of the pulp companies. During the 1970s, the 
issue of development versus preservation of 
resources came to the fore. This issue involved 
not only forestland but other undeveloped areas 
as well. 
Two recent pieces of legislation have major 
consequences for the timber industry of 
Alaska - the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement 
Act (1971) and the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act (1980). The former gave 
to the indigenous people of Alaska the right to 
1Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. 
Destination 
United Kingdom 
Other Common Market 
Other western Europe 
Japan 
Australia-New Zealand 
Other Asian Pacific rim 





Other Common Market 
Other western Europe 
Japan 
Australia-New Zealand 
Other Asian Pacific rim 




'Less than 500 m3• 
bLess than 500 t. 
'Less than 50 000 m2. 
Table I. Foreign shipments of selected timber products, 1980. 
Softwood logs (1000 mJ) Pulp chips (I 000 t) 
Washington Washington 
and British and British 
Alaska Oregon Columbia Alaska Oregon Columbia 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 4 0 0 0 0 
0 II 0 0 0 0 
708 10619 701 137 2824 453 
0 0 0 b 0 
19 1269 0 0 0 
0 I 0 0 0 0 
349 621 
0 4 0 4 
0 12 0 0 0 0 
Softwood plywood (x )06 m2) Wood pulp (1000 t) 
0 5.7 19.6 0 26 205 
0 15.6 29.6 
b 161 1207 
0 0.9 0.4 0 II 131 
0 0.7 2.8 154 119 777 
0 0 22 76 
0 0.1 89 139 249 
0 1.5 0 5 17 
0.7 855 
0 0.6 0 22 
0 0.9 14 71 72 
Sources: Statistics Canada (1981); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1981). 
Softwood lumber (1000 mJ) 
Washington 
and British 
Alaska Oregon Columbia 
0 93 1166 
0 450 1274 
0 62 30 
576 898 2558 
0 212 302 
2 40 5 
0 41 2 
14936 
0 351 
0 203 727 
Paper and board (1000 t) 
0 I 8 
0 13 2 
0 9 0 
0 219 5 'Tl 0 
0 7 121 ::o:i 
0 133 66 tI1 ~ 




0 13 ~ 
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Table 2. Exports (!OJ mJ) of softwood lumber to selected destinations. 
Alaska Washington and Oregon British Columbia 
United United 
Year Japan Other Japan Canada Other States Kingdom Japan Other 
1960 165' 0 257' 30' 409' 6000 1250 0 1000 
1965 373' 0 50 120 627 9152 1760 528 1408 
1970 744 1 71 104 792 10224 1329 1728 1224 
1971 580 4 39 110 640 13032 986 991 1150 
1972 795 8 56 166 737 15552 821 944 961 
1973 953 2 362 209 1316 15159 1159 1456 1087 
1974 854 1 486 299 914 11838 1322 1182 1394 
1975 739 0 491 267 698 10056 550 963 788 
1976 683 1 440 240 970 14641 1267 1496 1261 
1977 579 11 343 180 773 18408 1187 1666 1289 
1978 558 3 385 278 719 19951 961 1838 1442 
1979 646 11 840 269 873 18240 1225 2393 1638 
1980 593 13 855 377 1092 14936 1166 2558 2342 
'Data are for the following year. 
Sources: Ruderman ( 1981 ); Sta tis tics Canada (1981). 
select up to 18.6 Mha ofland. The natives, organ-
ized into corp.orations, opted for forestlands that 
were managed as part of the national forests of 
southeastern Alaska. The intent of most native 
corporations with respect to forestland is to 
export round wood logs, primarily to Japan. 
Because these lands are considered to be privately 
owned, restrictions on log exports do not apply. 
Land selection is still under way, and it is not yet 
clear just how much land and timber will revert to 
native ownership. The volume of logs exported 
may reach 1.8 x 106 mJ /year during the 1980s. 
This volume may eventually threaten the viability 
of the lumber mills that process timber from 
national forestland. This would happen if the 
volume of logs exported from native lands were 
to lower prices for Sitka spruce and hemlock 
cants in Japan to the extent that processing is no 
longer economically feasible in Alaska (Darr 
1978). 
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva-
tion Act (Alaskan Lands Bill) of 1980 was con-
cerned primarily with the allocation of lands 
owned by the federal government in Alaska. The 
issue concerned the potential for development of 
minerals, timber, and other resources on these 
lands versus preservation of the areas. After 
much debate, significant areas of commercial 
forestland were reserved from development. The 
remaining federally owned forestland open to 
timber management in southeastern Alaska is 
believed to be capable of providing at least 
2 x 106 m3 timber annually on a sustained basis. 
This is roughly equivalent to the volume of 
timber necessary to support the existing timber 
industry.in the area. 
The timberlands of Alaska have gone from a 
period when development of any type was 
encouraged to the current debate over preserva-
tion versus development of huge areas of land. 
The outcome of this debate has generally been to 
limit the expansion potential of the existing 
timber industry that is dependent upon federal 
timber in southeastern Alaska. Interactions 
between the existing industry and developments 
on land transferred to native corporations may 
further dampen the role of the timber resource of 
Alaska in Pacific-rim markets for timber 
products. 
Washington and Oregon 
About 55% of the State of Washington (17.2 
Mha) is forested. The commercial forestland (7.3 
Mha) makes up about 78% of all forestland. 
Forestland covers 49% of the State of Oregon 
(24.8 Mha). Commercial forestland accounts for 
9.8 Mha or 81 % of the forested area. As much as 
40% of the economy of the two states is depen-
dent upon timber (Maki and Schweitzer 1973). 
The timber industry is the sole supporter of many 
small, isolated communities. 
Climate and topography have combined to 
make the eastern portions of the two states differ-
ent, in many respects, from the western portions. 
The Cascade Mountain Range is the dividing 
line. To the west, the forest resource consists of 
2. 7 x 109 mJ of timber with an inventory of 49% 
douglas-fir, 22% western hemlock, and 29% 
other species. The volume of timber amounts to 
280 m3 /ha. The forest is dependent upon rainfall 
from a coastal climate. About 51 % of commercial 
forestland and 32% of the timber inventory are 
privately owned. 
The timber resource to the east of the Cascades 
consists of I. I >< J09 mJ of timber. Pine is 45% of 
the timber inventory; douglas-fir, 23%; and other 
species, 32%. The Cascades are a barrier to rain-
fall from the coastal climate, and the area can 
best be described as a high mountain plateau. 
Timber growth is concentrated on the slopes of 
the Cascades and on mountain ranges within the 
area. Timber constitutes an average of 146 m3/ ha 
of commercial forestland. About 31 % of com-
mercial forestland and 22% of the timber inven-
tory are privately owned. 
Washington and Oregon have long been major 
producers of timber: first softwood lumber; then 
lumber and pulp; and, finally, lumber, plywood, 
and pulp. Logging of the timber resource began 
on privately owned lands located near tidewater 
and gradually moved into less accessible land in 
mountainous areas of the Cascade and Coastal 
mountain ranges. National forests and other pub-
lic lands were generally the least accessible and 
the last areas to be actively managed for timber 
production. Total harvest in western Washington 
peaked in 1929 and in western Oregon in 1952 
(Wall 1972). Harvests on private lands in western 
Oregon and western Washington also peaked in 
1952. Overall production was maintained, how-
ever, through increased harvest on public lands 
(Table 3). Although significant inventories of 
old-growth timber still exist on private lands, 
average volumes per hectare on national forest-
lands ( 454 mJ /ha) versus lands that are privately 
owned (l 77 mJ /ha) reflect the historical pattern 
of harvesting. In recent years, national forest-
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lands have accounted for about 28% of the har-
vest in Washington and Oregon; other public 
lands, 19%; and private lands, 53%. Although the 
extent of the increase is difficult to measure, dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, forest management on 
public and private lands generally became more 
intensive. Even with intensification of manage-
ment, however, second-growth stands of timber 
will not produce the heavy volumes per hectare 
that characterize old-growth forests. Current 
inventories on forest industry lands cannot sup-
port current harvest rates. Several studies (Ged-
ney et al. 1975; Beuter et al. 1976; Haynes and 
Adams 1979) have suggested that harvests will 
decline on lands owned by the forest industry. 
The rationale for a decline in harvests on industry 
lands is generally accepted, but there is no con-
sensus as to how severe the decline will be or 
when it will begin. On private lands, timber 
inventories are generally building: growth 
exceeds harvest. This, in part, reflects historical 
harvest patterns: these lands were the first to be 
harvested. As in other parts of the United States, 
there are questions about the timber supply 
potential from privately owned, nonindustrial 
lands (Sedjo and Ostermeier 1977). In general, 
individual holdings are small, and owners may 
have objectives other than timber management. 
There has also been gradual erosion of the pri-
vately owned forestland base as areas are enve-
loped in urban expansion, road construction, 
and other development. 
The possibility of a decline in harvest following 
liquidation of old-growth timber was generally 
recognized for public lands in the late 1960s. The 
response was to institutionalize a policy of"non-
Table 3. Timber harvest (106 mJ), 1950-78. 
British Columbia Washington and Oregon 
National Other 
Year Coast Interior Alaska forest public Private 
1950 16.4 5.6 na' 8.9 4.6 43.9 
1955 18.6 10.7 na 12.2 8.6 45.0 
1960 19.9 14.1 0.3 15.8 7.6 36.0 
1965 24.3 19.1 0.4 24.9 12.7 34.5 
1970 28.8 25.9 2.8 19.1 16.8 35.9 
1971 28.3 28.0 2.6 20.2 12.9 37.0 
1972 24.7 31.8 2.7 24.6 15.2 35.9 
1973 32.7 37.4 3.0 24.7 15.3 37.8 
1974 27.8 32.3 2.8 20.2 I 1.8 37.0 
1975 21.4 28.7 2.0 17.0 8.9 35.5 
1976 32.2 37.3 2.3 19.9 12.5 36.1 
1977 28.6 41.4 2.2 18.5 12.3 34.7 
1978 32.4 42.8 2.0 20.4 na na 
'na = not available. 
Source: Ruderman (1981). 
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declining even flow" timber harvest on lands 
managed by federal agencies. Other public lands, 
generally, also have some policy for sustained 
timber yield. Such a policy places a maximum on 
the level of harvest from national forestlands. It 
also limits the feasibility of departures from cur-
rent harvest levels. Departures are not feasible if 
they would eventually lead to a decline in harvest. 
The National Forest Management Act of 1976 
(16 U.S.C. - United States Congress) directed 
the U.S. Forest Service to update management 
plans for each national forest. In this planning 
process, consideration is to be given to conditions 
that might facilitate departures from the even-
flow policy in individual forests. Planning is to be 
completed by 1985. 
Throughout most of the 1960s, there were few 
open conflicts regarding the management of 
national forestlands in Washington and Oregon, 
and the volume harvested annually increased 
throughout the late 1960s. The Multiple-Use Sus-
tained Yield Act of 1960 (Act of 12 June 1960; 74 
Statute 215, as amended; 16 U.S.C., 528-531) 
institutionalized the concept of management of 
national forestlands for a variety of uses and 
products. Beginning in the late 1960s and extend-
ing throughout the 1970s, conflicts in manage-
ment became more frequent, particularly as 
harvesting began to take place in previously inac-
cessible areas. Interest groups became organized, 
often applying political pressure and appealing to 
the courts to question allocations ofland and the 
pr
0
opriety of management practices such as the 
use of chemicals to control forest pests and 
unwanted vegetation. 
In part, the conflicts led to a review by the U.S. 
Forest Service of all undeveloped land under its 
management. The review process identified land 
to be retained primarily as wilderness. Some of 
the recommendations resulting from this review 
have been challenged and currently await imple-
mentation. The U.S. Congress must approve the 
designation of forestland as wilderness. 
In summary, timber harvests will likely decline 
on industry lands, while public l'ands continue to 
have high volumes of inventory per hectare - a 
setting that will probably mean continued con-
flict among interest groups regarding the man-
agement of public lands within Washington and 
Oregon. 
The capacity to process timber in Washington 
and Oregon has evolved, partly in response to the 
characteristics of the timber resource. Some 
firms are almost independent of open-market 
purchases of timber to meet the requirements of 
their mills, whereas others are completely· 
dependent. Prices for timber have increased 
rapidly in the last IO years, going from 
U.S.$4.8~/m3 in 1960 to U.S.$5.89/m3 in 1970 
and U.S.$58.72/m3in1980(Ruderman1981). A 
side effect of the rise in price has been improved 
utilization: more of the log is being recovered as 
lumber and plywood and as by-products to be 
used in pulp manufacture. Better utilization is 
also a reflection of innovations in logging and 
processing technology, although many firms still 
are operating mills with the technology of the 
1950s and 1960s. These firms are ill-prepared to 
handle the small, second-growth logs that are 
now common; thus, they will have the most trou-
ble competing for timber supplies in the 1980s. 
Nature endowed Washington and Oregon with 
a softwood-timber resource with unique proper-
ties. Douglas-fir has many desirable characteris-
tics as a construction material, and the old-
growth trees yield clear, large timbers. Since the 
1800s, the two states have shipped large timbers 
and specialty items throughout the world. The 
bulk of softwood lumber, however, supplies the 
U.S. domestic market. Since World War II, 
annual production of softwood lumber in 
Washington and Oregon has been reasonably 
stable (Table 4). The distribution of shipments 
within the United States has changed considera-
bly, however, particularly during the 1970s. 
Water-borne shipments from Washington and 
Oregon to the U.S. east coast stopped in the early 
1970s, partly because of competition from pro-
ducers in British Columbia who were not bound 
by the terms of the Jones Act (Austin and Darr 
1975). In the 1970s, rail-freight costs from 
Washington and Oregon to the U.S. mid west and 
northeast increased markedly in the wake of 
escalating energy costs. Also during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, there was a gradual deval-
uation of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. 
dollar, which further enhanced the competitive-
ness of Canadian producers in U.S. markets. 
There was also some increase in competition 
from producers in the southern United States. By 
1980, about 68% of the lumber produced in west-
ern Washington and western Oregon was sold in 
the west, up from 47% in 1972. 
Increased demand in California, Arizona, and 
other western states has eased some of the transi-
tion in markets for the output of softwood 
lumber from Washington and Oregon. The ero-
sion of the competitive position of producers of 
softwood lumber in Washington and Oregon for 
domestic U.S. markets in the 1970s increased the 
interest of these producers in foreign sales, par-
ticularly to Japan and other Pacific-rim markets. 
Table 4. Production of softwood lumber, softwood plywood, pulp, and paper and paperboard, 1950-79. 
Softwood lumber (106 ml) Softwood plywood (106 m2)' Pulp (1000 t) 
Washington British British Washington Washington 
and Columbia Columbia and British and British 
Year Alaska Oregon (coast) (interior) Oregon Columbia Alaska Oregon Columbia 
1950 na 25.5' 5.9 2.4 218 na na 2213b 705 
1955 na 29.0 6.5 5.1 412 72 na 2879b 1237 
1960 0.2b 25.4 6.7 5.8 613 105 242b 3367 1928 
1965 0.4b 26.5 8.6 9.0 937 145 344 4496 2971 
1970 0.8 23.3 8.9 9.4 859 161 318 5494 4101 
1971 0.7 25.7 9.9 11.3 949 173 366 4770 4409 
1972 1.0 27.6 9.4 3.0 1011 186 358 5139 4576 
1973 1.2 27.9 10.4 14.2 999 205 412 5559 5337 
1974 0.9 24.1 8.0 12.7 828 164 372 5573 5268 
1975 0.7 22.3 5.9 11.7 804 162 311 5130 3998 
1976 0.7 26.0 9.4 16.0 911 199 384 5518 5320 
1977 0.6 27.2 10.6 17.8 940 218 360 5964 4831 
1978 0.6 27.3 11.3 18.3 958 237 296 5118 5426 
1979 0.7 26.3 11.0 18.6 897 264 360 5324 
'No production of softwood plywood or paper and paperboard occurred in Alaska during this period. 
bData are for the following year. 
'Data for 1947. 
•Newsprint only. 
Sources: Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (1981); Ruderman (1981). 
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Offshore sales of softwood lumber from 
Washington and Oregon fluctuated between l 
and 2 x IQ6 mJ in the 1970s, and markets were 
worldwide (Table 2). The worldwide sales pattern 
reflected the specialty nature of the products. The 
United States and Canada are the only two indus-
trialized countries that use the so-called 
platform-frame construction technique as the 
standard means of home construction. Also, 
these two countries have yet to convert to metric 
sizes for construction materials; U.S. grades and 
standards for both lumber and plywood differ 
from those in Japan and western Europe, and 
U.S. distribution and sales methods differ from 
those in offshore markets. This lack of familiarity 
with offshore markets, plus tariff and nontariff 
trade barriers, has limited the development of 
offshore sales from both the United States and 
Canada. Promotion efforts in both Japan and 
western Europe on the part of North American 
industry began on a sustained basis in the late 
1970s. North American producers are optimistic 
that sales will improve in the future. In 1979, 
offshore sales of softwood lumber from 
Washington and Oregon amounted to l.7 x IQ6 
m3, up from I.I x 106 m3 in 1978 and 900 000 m3 
in 1970. Much of the increase in sales went to 
Japan, which purchased 840000 mJ in 1979, up 
from 385 000 m3 in 1978 and 71 000 m3 in 1970. 
Other Pacific-rim markets accounted for 293 000 
mJ in 1980. 
In Japan, U.S. producers of softwood lumber 
compete with their counterparts from around the 
world (Table 5). Timber harvest in Japan 
declined from 5.2 x 101 m3 in 1967 to a low of 
3.4 x 101 m3 in 1975. In the late 1970s, imports of 
timber products of all types accounted for about 
two-thirds of Japanese consumption, up from 
one-third in the early 1960s. The decline in har-
vest in Japan occurred at a time of rapid increases 
in Japanese demand, particularly for home 
construction. 
From the United States, the export of soft-
wood logs to Japan was initially an outlet for 
hemlock and other species with limited domestic 
markets and an outlet for logs salvaged after a 
devastating windstorm in the early 1960s. 
Recently, however, the volume of exports has 
grown and has engendered considerable contro-
versy (Darr et al. 1980). The volume of exports 
from Washington and Oregon grew to 
l.2 x IQ7 mJ in 1973, declined in 1974-75, and 
reached a record high of 1.5 x 101 m3 in 1979 
(Table 6). The two states account for about 94% 
of!og exports from the west coast, most of which 
go to Japan. In the late 1970s, log exports 
amounted to about 22% of the total timber har-
vest in western Washington and western Oregon 
and had a total annual value of about U.S.$1.4 
billion. There have been continuing negotiations 
between the Japanese and U.S. governments on 
the feasibility of expanding U.S. exports of soft-
wood lumber to Japan at the expense of soft-
wood logs. The controversy over softwood log 
exports over the years has led to restrictions on 
the export of roundwood logs from lands man-
aged by the State of Oregon and lands managed 
by federal agencies (Lindell 1978). · 
The export of pulpwood chips to Japan from 
the United States began in 1965, from Oregon. 
Subsequently, the volume grew rapidly, 
Washington and Alaska also contributing (Table 
6). The volume from Washington and Oregon 
reached a peak of 3.2 Mt in 1974, declined in 
1975, and rose again to 3.l Mt in 1979. With the 
exception of isolated shipments, chip exports 
Table 5. Japanese imports of selected timber products, 1979. 
Logs ( 106 ml) Lumber (106 ml) Pulp Wood Paper and 
chips Plywood pulp board 
Origin Softwood Hardwood Softwood Hardwood (1000 t) (106 m2) (1000 t) (1000 t) 
United States 12339 81 1139 12 3704 0.5 466 88 
Australia-
New Zealand 963 29 2382 233 4 
Soviet Union 6648 87 134 317 0 9 0 
Other Asian 
Pacific rim 466 22088 485 371 304 12.0 _c 6 
Canada 335 7 1719 6 318 0.7 815 67 
Other Pacific rim 213 213 42 22 82 b 12 _c 
Other 3 208 243 2 249 323 35 
'Less than 500 ml. 
bLess than 50000 m2. 
'Less than 500 t. 
Source: Japan Tariff Association (1980). 
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Table 6. Exports of pulp chips and softwood logs, 1965-80. 
Chips (I 000 t) 
Washington 
and 
Year Alaska Oregon Total 
1965 0 83 50 
1970 0 1673 233 
1971 18 1573 193 
1972 18 2041 298 
1973 0 2768 325 
1974 32 3237 158 
1975 29 2506 131 
1976 98 3029 119 
1977 97 2879 237 
1978 29 2676 308 
1979 76 3149 583 
1980 137 2831 727 
Source: Ruderman (1981). 
from Washington and Oregon went to Japan. In 
the 1970s, Japan developed chip supply sources 
in Australia, South Africa, and other countries 
(Table 5). 
Most of the chips directed toward the pulp 
industry ano export markets consist of by-
products from the manufacture of lumber and 
plywood; to date, chipping of roundwood on a 
sustained basis has not proved economically fea-
sible because supplies of chip by-products have 
generally been in balance with demand. How-
ever, in 1980, a decrease in production oflumber 
and plywood occurred at the same time as an 
increase in pulp production, and the result was a 
doubling of the price of chips in a matter of 
months. The projected decline in timber harvest 
with coincident declines in lumber and plywood 
production may make roundwood chipping 
more viable. 
After increasing rapidly in the 1960s, the 
manufacture of pulp in Washington and Oregon 
was relatively stable in the 1970s (Table 4). 
Expansion at existing sites in the 1970s was offset 
by the closure of obsolete mills in the Puget 
Sound area. The primary offshore markets for 
pulp from Washington and Oregon are Japan, 
other Asian Pacific-rim countries, and the Com-
mon Market (Table 1). The remainder is con-
sumed primarily in the manufacture of paper and 
board within Washington and Oregon and in the 
sale of market pulp to the California area. 
The manufacture of paper and paperboard 
generally parallels the pattern of pulp manufac-
ture in Washington and Oregon(Table4). News-
print and writing paper are major items of export 
to Japan and other Asian Pacific-rim countries 
(Table 1). Most of the remaining production is 
Logs (106 ml) 
Washington 
Alaska and Oregon 
To Japan Total To Japan 
45 4081 3510 
216 10039 9714 
176 8322 7748 
280 11946 10832 
325 11956 11123 
132 9918 8949 
110 10081 9125 
94 12399 11538 
212 11577 10638 
261 12899 11424 
547 14648 13408 
708 11922 10620 
consumed on the U.S. west coast. In Japan, U.S. 
producers of pulp, paper, and paperboard face 
competition from Canadian mills and from 
domestic mills in Japan (Table 5). 
Technological innovations, spurred by the ris-
ing costs of lumber in home construction, led to 
the rapid development of the softwood plywood 
industry in Washington and Oregon (Table 4). 
Production increased from 2.18 x 10s m2 in 1950 
to a high of 1.0 l x 109 m2 in 1972. Output in the 
late 1970s was relatively stable. Technological 
innovations also led to the development of soft-
wood plywood based on the utilization of south-' 
em pines. The manufacture of southern-pine 
plywood began in 1964, and southern mills, with 
an advantage over western producers because of 
lower costs for wood and transportation to 
markets in the east, captured most of the growth 
in U.S. consumption during the 1960s and early 
1970s. In the mid- and late 1970s, annual U.S. 
plywood production was about 1.8 x 109 m2. 
Until the mid- and late 1970s, the U.S. ply-
wood industry was oriented almost entirely 
toward domestic markets. Promotion efforts of 
U.S. industry in the 1970s led to some increase in 
sales to offshore markets, primarily to western 
Europe (Table 7). Producers in Washington and 
Oregon account for about 90% of U.S. sales to 
foreign markets. In western Europe, the main 
competition for U.S. producers comes from 
Canada and from mills within western Europe. In 
Europe, U.S. plywood is used mainly for con-
crete form material and other specialty items. 
Grades, standards, and building codes have 
limited the success of efforts to promote the utili-
zation of U.S. plywood in the home construction 
industry. 
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Table 7. Exports of softwood plywood (106 m2), 
1970-80. 
Washington and 
Year Oregon British Columbia 
1970 8.4 55.6 
1971 6.6 33.7 
1972 11.4 41.6 
1973 26.5 45.l 
1974 26.4 33.5 
1975 37.8 26.1 
1976 49.5 22.0 
1977 21.7 38.1 
1978 22.5 49.2 
1979 30.7 47.2 
1980 26.0 53.1 
Sources: Ruderman (1981); Statistics Canada 
(1981). 
Exports of softwood plywood from Washing-
ton and Oregon to Japan have been minimal. 
Grades, codes, and standards have limited the 
acceptance of softwood plywood from the United 
States and Canada. The rapid growth in Japa-
nese consumption of plywood in the 1960s and 
early 1970s was based on the importation and 
processing of tropical hardwood logs from 
Southeast Asia. Relatively low costs for this ply-
wood plus consumer acceptance of the product 
contributed to the increase in consumption. 
There are many factors operating that will 
affect the softwood plywood industry of 
Washington and Oregon in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In addition to competition from softwood ply-
wood producers in the southern U.S. for domes-
tic markets, technologies for various types of 
fiberboard have been developed. These technol-
ogies are being adopted to process the so-called 
soft hardwoods such as aspen in the northern 
U.S. and the prairie provinces of Canada. These 
fibre products are competitive in price with solid 
plywood and may be used as a substitute for 
softwood plywood in sheathing and other appli-
cations in home construction. Log export restric-
tions in Southeast Asia will affect tropical hard-
wood log exports to Japan and may spur 
development of tra.de in softwood plywood 
between North America and Japan. Even then, 
however, U.S. producers must meet potential 
competition from Canadian producers and from 
the manufacture of plywood from veneer 
imported into Japan from Southeast A.sia and 
other sources. 
In summary, there are many issues and uncer-
tainties at both the resource and end-product 
levels concerning the forestland and timber 
industry of Washington and Oregon. Private 
lands that supported the bulk of timber harvest 
during the earlier decades of this century no 
longer have the timber inventory to support the 
current rates of timber harvest. Major questions 
of land use and timber flow policies on public 
lands add to the uncertainty about future sup-
plies of timber. Competition from Canada and 
the southern U.S. has eroded the Pacific north-
west's markets in the major consuming areas of 
the midwest and northeast U.S. Looming in the 
future is competition for solid-wood products 
from fibre products. Efforts to promote offshore 
sales have met with only limited success. Individ-
ual firms have met some or all of these problems 
with improved technology and responsive mar-
keting efforts. On the whole, however, the timber 
resource and timber industry of Washington and 
Oregon are at a turning point. Log export poli-
cies, timber flow policies on public lands, and 
developments in offshore markets will all play a 
part in their future development. 
British Columbia 
The Province of British Columbia has an area 
of 93.1 Mha, 56% of which is forested (Bowen 
1978). There are48.2 Mha of productive, forested 
land capable of producing a merchantable stand 
within a reasonable period and not withdrawn 
from timber production. There is a total inven-
tory of 7 .6 " I 09 mJ of timber on the productive 
forestland (about twice the volume of Washing-
ton and Oregon). Spruce accounts for23% of the 
timber inventory; hemlock, 23%; and balsam fir, 
19%. 
The coast of British Columbia has a timber 
resource base different, in many respects, from 
the interior of the province. For example, in the 
Vancouver area (southwestern British Columbia 
and Vancouver Island), hemlock ( 40%) and cedar 
(26%) are the most important species; in the 
Kamloops area (southern interior), spruce (28%) 
and lodgepole pine (24%) are the most important 
species. Trees are smaller in diameter in the inte-
rior, and the volume per hectare is smaller, e.g., 
120 m3/ha in the Kamloops area and 243 m3/ha 
in the Vancouver area (Province of British 
Columbia, Ministry of Forests 1980). 
With the exception of about 5% of the total 
area of productive forestland, the Province of 
British Columbia owns and has ultimate respon-
sibility for management of the forestlands of Brit-
ish Columbia. Other lands are mainly privately 
owned and located on Vancouver Island. 
Directly or indirectly, roughly one in four 
people employed in British Columbia depends 
upon the timber resource for a job (British 
Columbia Forest Service 1975). 
Until 1950, development of the sawmill indus-
try was concentrated on the coast and involved 
the manufacture of lumber for foreign markets. 
Through links with other members of the 
Commonwealth, British Columbia has long been 
an exporter of softwood lumber to offshore 
markets. Following World War II, improvement 
of the transportation system in the interior, tech-
nological innovations in processing timber, 
government timber-sale policies, and increased 
demand in the United States all contributed 
toward rapid expansion of lumber production in 
the interior (Table 6). During the 1960s and 
1970s, British Columbia became increasingly 
dependent upon the United States for a market. 
Coastal British Columbia in the 1970s dominated 
water-borne shipments of lumber from the west 
coast of North America to the east coast. 
Total production of softwood lumber in Brit-
ish Columbia increased to 2.46 x 101 mJ in 1973, 
declined in 1974-75, and jumped to a record high 
of2.96 x 101 mJ in 1978. In the late 1970s, ship-
ments of lumber from British Columbia to the 
United States amounted to 20% of U.S. con-
sumption, and the United States accounted for 
80% of total exports from British Columbia. By 
the late 1970s, Japan had displaced the United 
Kingdom as the second most important foreign 
market for British Columbia producers (Table 1). 
In part, the increased sales to Japan reflect the 
efforts of industry and government in British 
Columbia in promoting the sale of softwood 
lumber. Devaluation of the Canadian dollar rela-
tive to Japanese and U.S. currencies has also 
enhanced the competitive position of British 
Columbia producers in both the Japanese and 
U.S. markets. 
The pulp-and-paper industry of British 
Columbia grew gradually on the coast until after 
World War II. Output went mainly to foreign 
markets and products consisted of both pulp and 
newsprint. In 1960, the first pulp mill was estab-
lished in the interior of the province and was 
quickly followed by others. The availability of 
relatively inexpensive hydroelectric power in the 
interior of the province contributed to the growth 
of the pulp industry during the 1960s. Develop-
ment was also facilitated by government timber-
sale policies aimed at matching additional capac-
ity with the availability of by-products from the 
emerging sawmill industry. These policies also 
intended to improve utilization of low-quality 
roundwood timber that was not suitable for the 
manufacture of lumber. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was some 
expansion of capacity at existing sites on the 
coast. By the 1970s, pulp production was about 5 
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Mt. About 68% of the pulp mill capacity is on the 
coast and the remainder in the interior. 
The primary products of the pulp-and-paper 
industry of British Columbia continue to be 
market pulp and newsprint. About 40% of the 
pulp that is produced is processed domestically, 
the remainder going primarily to the United 
States, Japan, and the United Kingdom (Table 
1). In the United States, most of the pulp and 
newsprint from British Columbia goes to the west 
coast. Producers in the United States and Japan 
are the primary sources of competition for British 
Columbia producers in the Japanese market 
(Table 5). 
Technological innovations in the manufacture 
of softwood plywood led to an expansion of pro-
duction in British Columbia in the 1950s and 
1960s, first on the coast and then in the interior 
(Table 4). In the late 1970s, production exceeded 
2.25 x JOS mz. About 80% of the output is con-
sumed within Canada. The remaining 20% is 
shipped primarily to the United Kingdom and 
other countries in the European Economic 
Community (Table 1). There is no pattern of 
sustained shipments of softwood plywood to 
countries around the Pacific rim. In general, off-
shore shipments of softwood plywood from Brit-
ish Columbia have been limited by tariffs, codes, 
standards, and other factors that have also 
limited U.S. sales. 
British Columbia has restrictions on the export 
of roundwood logs dating from 1906. Restric-
tions on chip exports were liberalized in the late 
1970s. The restrictions permitted exceptions but 
practically eliminated British Columbia as a 
source of unprocessed timber in world markets. 
Attitudes toward the forest resources of British 
Columbia have evolved during the past century. 
Prior to 1912, there was little concern over man-
agement and disposition of the timber resource. 
The forest was sometimes viewed as an impedi-
ment to other development, such as agriculture, 
and the forest seemed inexhaustible. In 1910, the 
Fulton Commission concluded that large-scale 
alienation of timber-cutting rights should be 
stopped and remaining reserves of timber should 
be left undeveloped. After 1912, policies were 
implemented that slowed development of the 
timber resource. The Sloan Report, in 1945, 
established the concept of sustained yield har-
vesting and management of forests. This view 
was reinforced by a second Sloan Report in 1956. 
The rapid development of the timber resource in 
the 1960s and early 1970s raised concerns over 
tenure systems, forest management, uses of the 
forest other than timber production, and other 
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matters. These cqncerns led to a review by the 
Pearse Commission in 1976 (Pearse 1976). 
The findings and recommendations of the 
Pearse Commission were responsible, in part, for 
the passage ofa new Forest Act in 1978. Among 
other directives, the act mandates an analysis of 
forest and range resources every 10 years. The 
first of these analyses, published in 1980, found 
that, under existing management, current harvest 
rates cannot be maintained in some areas of the 
province. The response of the British Columbia 
Forest Service was to propose a 5-year program 
with the intent of intensifying forest management 
so as to enhance harvest opportunities (Province 
of British Columbia, Ministry of Forests 1980). 
Pending detailed examination of the province's 
forest resources and harvesting rates, the timber 
harvesting program will be continued at about 
the present level from 1980 through 1985. Thus, 
an effect of the program will be to limit the 
responsiveness of the British Columbia timber 
industry to significant, sustained increases in 
demanCfs for timber products in the 1980s. Shifts 
in shipment patterns between the United States 
and offshore markets are still possible, however. 
There are many parallels between the devel-
opment of the timber resource in British Colum-
bia and that of the public lands in Washington 
and Oregon. In both areas, the forest was viewed 
initially as a resource t'o be exploited and later as 
one to be managed for perpetual yield of timber. 
A key difference between the province and the 
two states is the relative importance of private 
ownership of forestland in Washington and 
Oregon. The structure of the processing industry, 
social infrastructure, and other aspects of the 
economy developed according to the pattern of 
harvest of timber; harvest patterns on private 
land have differed from those on public land. The 
mixture of private and public ownership has 
resulted in the creation of a large number of 
interest groups. The differing objectives of these 
groups have set the stage for continuing debates 
over policies affecting the timber resource. 
Another difference between the Province of 
British Columbia and the states of Washington 
and Oregon is the policy for the sale of the rights 
to the timber resource on public lands. Various 
tenure arrangements in British Columbia have 
long-time horizons, with the purchaser having at 
least some assurance oflong-term timber supply: 
stumpage fees are only one consideration in the 
marketing of timber from public land. In 
Washington and Oregon, stumpage on public 
land is sold to the highest bidder, and harvesting 
rights are limited to specified volumes in specified 
areas. A purchaser may need several sales under 
contract at any time to ensure a stable supply of 
raw materials. The auction method has contrib-
uted to high stumpage prices in Washington and 
Oregon compared with those in British Columbia 
(Haley 1980). Uncertainty about the availability 
of timber from public land probably contributes 
to the instability of operations for individual 
firms in Washington and Oregon. 
Future Prospects 
Japan is the focal point of Pacific-rim trade in 
timber products and provides the links between 
the timberlands of the Pacific northwest and the 
remainder of the Pacific rim. For example, the 
volume of trade between British Columbia and 
Japan affects trade between British Columbia 
and the United States, the United States and 
Japan, the Soviet Union and Japan, New Zea-
land and Japan, etc. Competition among supply 
areas in the Japanese market will likely intensify 
in the future, particularly in the area of solid-
wood products: softwood logs and softwood 
lumber. In contrast with a history of a growing 
market for softwood construction materials tied 
to demand for housing in Japan, future demand 
may be stable or declining(Ueda and Darr 1980). 
Under these conditions, shipments from any one 
supply source can increase only at the expense of 
shipments from ·other sources. 
Demand in Japan is expected to grow for fibre-
based products, such as pulp, newsprint, and 
paperboard (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, Government of Japan 1980). This 
growth in demand will likely be met with 
increased shipments of pulp, chips, and finished 
products from the Pacific northwest, Australia, 
New Zealand, and other areas around the Pacific 
rim (Yasu 1981). 
In addition to the historical pattern of compe-
tition between producers in the Pacific northwest 
and domestic Japanese producers, there may be 
competition from New Zealand, Chile, and the 
countries of Southeast Asia. New Zealand has 
the potential to become a major exporter of pulp 
to world markets (Cavana and O'Dea 1979). As 
log-export restrictions are initiated in Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia and as proposed 
development plans come to fruition, these coun-
tries may become exporters of hardwood lumber, 
veneer, and plywood. 
The People's Republic of China has initiated 
purchases of forest products from the Pacific 
northwest. The future market potential is 
unknown at present, but this country could 
become a major influence in the pattern of trade 
for timber products around the Pacific rim. 
Pulp-and-paper manufacturers in Washington 
and Oregon have limited potential to increase 
production and respond to the expected increases 
in demands around the Pacific rim, given the 
current pattern of reliance upon the by-products 
of lumber and plywood manufacture. Increased 
consumption of roundwood and decreased chip 
exports are two possibilities for expanding wood 
supplies for domestic pulp manufacture. Even 
the potential of these options is dampened, how-
ever, by an expected decli.ne in timber harvest. 
The Alaska Lands Bill mandates for the timber 
industry - dependent upon federal land in 
southeast Alaska - a minimum of 2 x J06 mJ / 
year to maintain its processing capacity. In addi-
tion, lands transferred to native ownership have 
the potential to support, at least for several 
decades, annual exports of as much as 
1.8 x J06 mJ of softwood logs. If intensive man-
agement of national forestlands and improved 
utilization succeed in increasing timber harvest 
potential, the industry will have more than 
2 x J06 mJ available for use. In the 1980s, the 
processing sector of the timber industry in Alaska 
will be constrained in its interactions with 
Pacific-rim markets. 
Recent analysis indicates that the post-World 
War II pattern of rapid expansion of output of 
timber products in British Columbia cannot be 
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maintained. Any future expansion of output will 
be tied more to programs designed to intensify 
forest management than to the availability of 
untapped reserves of timber. Government poli-
cies affecting timber appraisals and timber sales, 
the value of the Canadian dollar relative to other 
currencies, and competition from eastern 
Canada and the southern U.S. for the U.S. east-
ern market will all affect future sales patterns for 
British Columbia producers. The availability of 
timber resources may place a ceiling on produc-
tion in British Columbia. In Pacific-rim markets, 
British Columbia producers will face competi-
tion from U.S. mills, producers in Japan, and, 
possibly, from new developments in New 
Zealand, Southeast Asia, and other areas. 
Uncertainties about the resource situations in 
Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, and 
Oregon; demand in Japan, the People's Republic 
of China, and Southeast Asia; and supply poten-
tials of New Zealand, Chile, and other countries 
suggest that the 1980s and 1990s will be different, 
in many respects, from the 1960s and 1970s. 
Interactions of markets will intensify around the 
Pacific rim. Shifts in markets will present new 
problems and opportunities. The challenge to the 
owners, managers, and processors of timber from 
forestlands in the Pacific northwest is to convert 
into opportunities situations that currently may 
be perceived as problems. 
Discussion 
Wontack Hong: Darr argues that, ifthe volume 
of logs exported from native lands in Alaska 
expands radically, the resultant reduction in the 
price of logs sold to Japan would make timber 
processing in Alaska unviable (economically 
infeasible). However, unless there has been log-
price discrimination between lumber mills in 
Alaska and those in Japan and unless the extent 
of price discrimination is proportional to the 
export price of logs, fluctuations in log price will 
not influence timber processing in Alaska or in 
Japan. The location of processing is not usually 
determined by the price level of the tradable 
intermediate products. 
The question is whether the entire line of wood 
processing - manufacturing of lumber, veneer, 
plywood, fiberboard, chips, pulp, paper, or 
paperboard - should be located at the source of 
raw material or whether there is room for distant 
processors to specialize, using imported· logs or 
imported intermediate inputs. 
In the past, South Korea imported hardwood 
logs from the ASEAN and, on the basis of low-
cost labour, became a major exporter of hard-
wood lumber, veneer, and plywood. The U.S. 
and Japan have been major importers of South 
Korean plywood. However, as log-export restric-
tions are initiated in Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Indonesia, South Korea has either to find 
alternative sources of log supply or to shift its 
processing line into high-quality end-products 
based on imported, semiprocessed wood prod-
ucts, such as veneer. 
Darr says that exports of softwood plywood 
from Washington and Oregon to Japan have 
been minimal and argues that grades, building 
codes, and standards have limited the Japanese 
acceptance of softwood plywood imported from 
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the U.S. and Canada. However, I believe that the 
nonacceptance needs to be explained in terms of 
the labour-intensity of the manufacturing pro-
cess and the labour costs in each country. 
B.C. prohibits export of unprocessed timber. 
The U.S. also restricts exports of softwood logs 
but encourages the export of softwood lumber or 
softwood plywood. One should question whether 
such restrictions reflect comparative advantage 
or protectionism. In other words, do the produc-
tion technology, the capital- or land-intensive 
nature of the processing, and the labour costs 
give these areas a comparative advantage over 
areas elsewhere? If the answer is no, then a self-
respecting economist would condemn the protec-
tionist policy or tolerate it on the basis of political 
excuses. Darr should have examined several 
aspects more systematically. For instance, he 
should have analyzed what determines the ideal 
location of the pulp industry and whl;lt is the 
significance of available processing technology, 
pollution, or labour costs in determining the 
location of each processing activity. 
In analyzing the controversy over softwood log 
exports from the U.S., Darr puts stumpage 
owners on the one hand and processors and con-
sumers of end-products together on the other 
hand. However, he should have separated the 
timber processors from the consumers to exam-
ine the protectionist nature of the problem and 
conflicting interests between these two groups. 
Although the untapped reserves of timber in 
the Pacific northwest have rapidly been reduced, 
forestry management now seems to be reason-
ably optimal, ensuring a perpetual stream of 
nondeclining timber harvests rather than a grad-
ual depletion of timber resources in the region. 
I believe Darr has overemphasized the uncer-
tainties in timber resources deriving from the 
transfer of Alaskan forestland to native corpora-
tions. The uncertainties can hardly be attributed 
to the likelihood that the real price of timber will 
decrease. Timber does not seem to have low 
income elasticities of demand, the world demand 
likely continuing to increase and to raise the real 
price continuously. The only uncertainty in this 
regard is the speed of the price increases. The 
uncertainties to which Darr refers may result 
from possible shifts in markets and trade pat-
terns, reflecting shifts in labour costs in each 
timber-processing country, progress in labour-
saving techniques, technical progress in timber 
processing, lower costs for transportation, or the 
location of mass-consumption areas for final 
wood products. However, whatever the shifts in 
trade patterns, so long as these shifts are not the 
result of protectionist policies but are a reflection 
of the underlying market forces, they are a sign of 
more efficient use of a scarce resource, that is 
timber. 
Essentially, there seems to be nothing 
extremely serious for us, as economists, to worry 
about in the future of timber resources of the 
Pacific northwest. Of course, if we consider the 
problem of management of timber resources in 
other regions (such as Southeast Asia or Latin 
America) or the feasibility of substantially 
increasing the global timber supply in the future, 
we may have a host of worries. Maybe what we 
need is comparative studies on forestry manage-
ment worldwide. 
Development Prospects for Forestry in Indonesia 
A.T. Birowo 
Ministry of Agriculture, Bureau of Planning, Jakarta, Indonesia 
In this paper, I describe the forestry resource base, production pattern, and export economy in 
Indonesia; assess the implications of international trade on forestry development; and discuss 
investment prospects in forestry. 
Ce document porte sur le potentiel des ressources forestieres en lndonesie, !es modeles de 
production et l'economie de !'exportation de ce pays; !'auteur evalue !'impact du marche interna-
tional sur l'amenagement du secteur forestier et expose divers types d'investissements dans ce 
domaine. 
It was estimated that supply of South-Sea logs 
from the Pacific region during the 1980s would 
continuously fall short of the demand in the 
international market. An estimated deficit of 
I. I x I 06 m3 in 1980 would increase to a deficit of 
4.3 x 106 mJ in 1990, corresponding to 3.3% and 
21.7% of the demand. About half of the South-
Sea log supply comes from Indonesia. 
Forestry has contributed substantially to the 
foreign exchange earnings oflndonesia, produc-
ing the largest foreign exchange after oil. For-
estry development has, therefore, been one of the 
major programs in the overall economic devel-
opment policy. The program includes public 
efforts in reforestation, afforestation, and for-
estland rehabilitation, as well as measures to 
stimulate private investments in forest 
exploitation. 
Forestry Resource Base 
Throughout Indonesia, forestland covers 
around 122 Mha or roughly 60% of the land total. 
In 1979, almost 75% was rain forest. The second 
largest forest types - secondary or idle forest 
and swamp forest - occupied less than 15% of 
the total forest area. The remaining four types -
coastal, peat, deciduous, and mangrove - each 
covered around 1 % of the total forestland. The 
predominance of rain forest is not surprising 
because the country is an archipelago within the 
monsoon rainbelt. 
Between 1972 and 1973, forest exploitation 
jumped by nine times to reach 63.l Mha (Table 
l); similarly protection forest increased by 23%; 
and nature conservation forest more than 
doubled. These increases were possible because 
the area of reserved forest was reduced by more 
than 60%. The changing structure of the export 
market, with decreasing supply from the Philip-
pines, produced a tremendous demand, resulting 
in the rapid growth of forest exploitation. In 
terms of geographic distribution (Table 2), more 
than 90% of the total forestland is in Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, and Irian Jaya. However, the forest 
uses differ among the various provinces. 
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In 1978, 7 .8 Mha of land was considered to be 
critical (Table 3) - the soil has been seriously 
degraded. Of this area about 60% is within the 
forest area. Reforestation and afforestation are a 
major concern of the economic development pol-
icy and the areas of reforestation and afforesta-
Table 1. Forest areas (Mha) by function in 1972 and 
1979. 
Forest function 1972 
Protection 11.5 
Production 11.1 
Nature conservation 3.5 
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· Irian Jaya 0.1 
Source: Directorate General of Forestry. 
Table 3. Areas (Mha) of critical land by region, 1978. 
Outside 
forest Inside forest 
Region area area 
Sumatra 1.4 0.5 
Jawa 0.9 0.3 
Bali 0.2 0.1 
West Nusa Tenggara 0.1 0.1 
East Nusa Tenggara 1.0 0.3 
Kalimantan 0.4 0.9 
Sulawesi 0.6 I.I 
Irian Jaya 0.1 0.1 
Source: Directorate General of Forestry. 
tion have generally increased in the last 10 years 
(Table 4). However, it has not yet been possible to 
rehabilitate all the critical lands. 
Production and Exports 
In 1981, Indonesia produced 2.46x 107 m3 of 
timber, in which 2.12 x 101 mJ were logs and 
3.4 x 106 mJ were sawn timber. Both the composi-
tion and total production have changed since 1970 
(Table 5). Log production increased twofold, 
whereas sawn timber production expanded more 
Table 4. Areas ('000 ha) of reforestation and 


































Source: Directorate General of Forestry. 
Forest type 
Nature 
Production conservation Reserved 
18.1 2.2 3.4 
1.8 0.4 0.1 
0.2 0.2 0.4 
32.7 0.8 5.2 
4.2 0.9 1.9 
3.9 0.1 0.1 
2.3 3.3 25.9 
Table 5. Timber production (106 m3) in Indonesia, 
- 1970-79. 
Year Log Conversion/ sawn 
1970 10.4 0.2 
1971 13.7 0.4 
1972 16.9 0.8 
1973 25.8 1.3 
1974 20.9 0.9 
1975 14.6 1.7 
1976 20.8 0:6 
1977 22.4 0.6 
1978 24.8 1.5 
1979 21.2 3.4 
Source: Directorate General of Forestry. 
than 10 times. In general, increasing amounts of 
processed forest commodities were produced 
(Table 6). 
In 1980, forestry exports amounted to U.S. 
$1.8 billion and were more than 10 times that of 
1970 (Table 7). In terms of volume, exports had 
doubled. The general upward trend of export 
prices indicated the increasing gap of demand 
over supply. However, major constraints to the 
development of exports of forest products have 
been inadequate harbour facilities, high shipping 
costs, poor quality control, and lack of trade skill 
and management. 
Between 1969 and 1980, timber exports varied 
between a bout 60% and 85% of total production. 
The period when a high percentage of total pro-
duction was exported, 1975-1977, was followed 
by a decline. Apparently, with increasing 
incomes, the domestic market is able to use more 
of the output, particularly of processed wood 
products. 
International Perspectives 
Because of insignificant replanting of felled 
trees in the supplying countries of Asia and the 
Pacific, log exports in the region are expected to 
Table 6. Production of forest and processed forest 
commodities, 1973 and 1977. 
Increase in 
Commodity 1973 1977 % annually 
Logs (106 m3) 25.8 22.4 -1.0 
Sawn timber (106 mJ) 0.25 0.92 61.7 
Plywood ('000 t) 1.37 9.18 65.l 
Paper ('000 t) 47 83 13.4 
Corrugated 
board ('000 t) 14 31 31.9 
Source: Directorate General of Forestry. 
decrease by about 50% between 1980 and 1990. 
Even with the emergence of fast-growing tropical 
trees, this situation is unlikely to change in this 
century. Equally, the planned local processing of 
logs into manufactured products in Indonesia, 
Sabah, Sarawak, and Papua New Guinea will 
accentuate the decline. 
The historical preference of the Japanese 
market for unprocessed material is likely to con-
tinue as is the depletion of forest resources to 
meet the demand. The exports to Japan mean 
that there is unlikely to be enough resources to 
supply mills in developing countries for worth-
while investment periods. The average price 
movements for dipterocarp hardwood logs in 
1979-80 from Southeast Asia continued to hold 
at about twice the level for 1976-78. There is little 
evidence that this situation will change because 
Japan purchased 60-70% of the total supply 
available. 
Increasing demand for wood products has 
come from China for construction purposes, coal 
mining, railway sleepers, and paper manufacture. 


























































'Average price of export equals the value of export 
divided by the volume of export. 
Source: Directorate General of Forestry. 
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The massive afforestation campaigns of the 1950s 
and 1960s in that country are unlikely to provide 
this raw material in the quantities required. 
Proposals for increased pulp- and paper-
manufacturing plant installations are made at 
frequent intervals in Asian countries. However, 
the viability of such plants depends upon 
government support for the proposals and the 
adequacy of raw-material supplies. At the 
moment, initiatives by public and private sector 
organizations are actively encouraged in various 
ways in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. 
The marked rise in the value of wood as a 
commodity in the Pacific area has occurred 
because of the supply and demand in the 1980s, 
the interest in wood as a renewable energy 
resource, and the emergence of South Korea, 
Taiwan, and China as significant purchasers. 
This may stimulate governments and investors to 
channel their resources of capital, land, and per-
sonnel into a belated, but still necessary, effective 
afforestation effort. 
Investment is needed in permanent forests 
managed for specific needs and uses. However, 
with the relatively long payback period and cur-
rent high interest rates, it is difficult to convince 
investors of the desirability of such investment. 
The impetus must come from governments who 
will either invest in forests themselves or, through 
fiscal and other appropriate measures, encourage 
companies and individuals to do so. 
Investment Prospects 
Today, in Indonesia, there are 525 firms hold-
ing forestry concessions with a total invested cap-
ital of about U.S. $1.5 billion. Of these, 430 firms 
are operating under domestic investment facili-
ties and 95 under foreign investment facilities. 
During the past decade, more and more firms 
have applied for domestic investment facilities 
and fewer foreign investors have entered the 
market. 
The government has encouraged the firms to 
produce more processed wood and fewer logs. In 
1980, a new regulation was issued under which 
firms could export no more than 50% of their logs 
and were required to process 50% locally. A few 
months later, the requirement was increased so 
that an export permit would be issued for one 
unit of logs if the firm could produce evidence 
that it had sold, for local manufacturing, two 
units. 
From an international perspective, it seems 
likely that Indonesia will become a producer of 
plywood and other manufactured goods. The 
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major constraint would be the availability of 
managerial skill. 
Special plans are being considered to encour-
age the establishment of timber manufacturing. 
Under these plans, no new forest concessions will 
be granted to applicants who do not submit plans 
for estabhshing a wood-processing plant. 
Equally, existing forest concession holders are 
advised to merge among themselves to establish a 
viable wood-manufacturing plant. 
The demand for forestry products in the Asia 
and Pacific markets suggests that extended 
investment activity in forestry in Indonesia is 
promising. 
Discussion 
R.N. Byron: Birowo's paper is extremely useful 
as a review of the current resource base on trade 
flows in Indonesia. The change in the area classi-
fied as production forest (from 11.1 Mha in 1972 
to 63. I Mha in 1979) is indicative of both past 
expansion of logging operations and plans for 
future logging operations. The classification of 
7.8 Mha as critical land is also noteworthy. My 
impression is, however, that the paper has too 
many "teasers" - the data are presented, but few 
of the interesting implications are analyzed. For 
example, I would have liked to have known what 
is being done about critical lands and to have 
found much more discussion on the development 
and upsurge in the logging industry. 
Indonesia's policy to encourage local process-
ing through restrictions on the ratio of log 
exports/ logs domestically processed produced 
drama'fic reductions in log exports. The reduc-
tions are a reflection of the lack either of domestic 
processing capacity or of export markets for pro-
cessed wood. The massive reduction in Indone-
sian log exports would probably have led to 
increased log exports from Sarawak - not a 
member of the Southeast Asian Log Producers' 
Association -and Sabah, the major suppliers of 
similar-quality logs, if the three states had not 
agreed in advance to contract log exports. 
(Before the agreement, each country had planned 
to expand log exports over the coming decade.) 
The result of the agreement was increased 
prices for log exports, and, hence, the bonus to 
the log-exporting states, from a policy basically 
deriving from the objectives of increased local 
employment and value-added, was conservation 
or attenuation of the natural resource. 
The constraints on the expansion of domestic 
processing industries are deficiencies in infra-
structure; the foreign exchange costs of new 
machinery; complex bureaucratic procedures; 
low levels of labour productivity that at least 
partially offset low-wage rates; and inexperience 
in producing commodities to international speci-
fications. These constraints, however, should all 
be overcome during this decade. Indonesia could 
become a major supplier of plywood (and, on the 
same basis, of dowel, doors, mouldings, or par-
quet flooring). 
Birowo implies that the Japanese preference 
for hardwood logs somehow could be blamed if 
Indonesia ran short of logs, and this suggestion is 
perplexing. Surely iflndonesia fears future scar-
city of logs, it must slow the harvest of the old-
growth forest stock. Increased log prices, 
increased domestic processing, and increased 
substitution of oil for log exports are all ways to 
collect the same amount of foreign exchange 
from reduced logging operations. 
Indonesia has established a modest pulp-and-
paper industry assisted by high (nominal) tariffs 
and governmental technical and financial aid. 
Production is costly compared with such opera-
tions elsewhere partly because of the mismatch 
between the large-scale plants and the small local 
markets for a wide range of products and partly 
because of technical problems. In 1979, Indone-
sia imported about 116 000 t of pulp - mainly 
long-fibred, for production of, for example, 
cement bags - and 20 000 t of waste paper. The 
Indonesian Pulp and Paper Industry Association 
(APKI) has predicted greatly increased produc-
tion to 88% of projected consumption by 1985, 
but FAO forecasts huge deficits (presumably 
based on an assumption of constant real prices) 
of267 000 tin 1986-90 and 1 Mt in 1996-2000. A 
recent F AO study identified, evaluated, and 
recommended 10 new pulp-and-paper projects 
within the ASEAN region, for 1986-2000. The 
total cost was estimated at U .S .$6718 million, 
and the output would build up to 5.4 Mt/year, 
adding $150 million per year to GNP and saving 
$2200 million in foreign exchange. Some of these 
projects may never materialize, however, because 
of investments in pulp-and-paper production 
elsewhere; a lack of technical assistance in estab-
lishing the proposed plants; or an inability of the 
ASEA to cooperate sufficiently to agree on 
how each country should specialize in particular 
paper types to exploit scale economies. 
Unless the search for an intermediate technol-
ogy in pulping is successful, pulp-and-paper mills 
will be large, capital-intensive, and highly special-
ized; they will , therefore, produce more for 
export markets than for local consumption and, 
so, will be quite probably either joint ventures or 
foreign-owned operations. 
Birowo's assessment of China's potential as an 
importer of forest products is , to say the least, 
highly debatable. In the short run, it may depend 
on a maze of political and macroeconomic fac-
tors, e.g., the priorities for spending fore ign 
exchange. Over the longer term and at a technical 
level , there are equally authoritative, contradic-
tory views on the success of China's afforestat ion 
programs. Of course, even if China were to 
become a major importer of wood products, the 
implications for Indonesia may only be indirect -
many other potential wood exporters are also 
eager to develop such trade links with China. 
As to the important questio n of reforestation 
policy, perhaps there are impediments to invest-
ment in forestry, but I do not believe they are 
intrinsic . Perhaps the removal of certai n 
government disincentives or their replacement by 
incentives would lead to much greater private 
interest in private tree farmi ng. In this regard, 
much of what Chan says, in his paper about 
policies to encourage establishment of tree crops, 
could be applied to afforestation in Indonesia. 
After all, an industrial forest plantation is just 
another tree crop, producing wood as the pri-
mary product rather than fruit, oils, or rubber. 
The increased emphasis in developing cultural 
techniques either for multipurpose trees that 
produce fuel, fodder, and fruit as well as indus-
trial wood or for intercropping cash crops in 
timber-producing plantations provides oppor-
tunities for afforestation while maintaining 
short-term income flows. 
But I also suspect that part of the explanation 
for the "lack of reforestation" lies in the absence 
of property rights for the bulk of forestland under 
discussion and that part is simply economic 
rationality because of competing claims for 
scarce resources . The future extent, type, and 
location of forests are more a function of the 
opportunity costs of land than of either capital or 
labour (because afforestation may be either 
capital- or labour-intensive) and are subject to 
long-run political goals, e.g., increased food self-
sufficiency or, conversely, increased export earn-
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Increasing local processing is the aim of government 
initiatives in Indonesia . 
ings and employment levels in the forestry sector. 
Indonesia faces basically the same investment 
decisions as any other country in this regard, and 
the decisions have to be based on assessments of 
costs, productivity, potential markets, and, con-
sequently, potential profitability. As in Sedjo's 
excess-supply model, it seems at least plausible 
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that interest in replacing forests in Indonesia will 
remain limited as long as there is (or, more 
importantly, is imagined to be) a vast old-growth 
resource still waiting to be depleted. 
My final comment concerns whether the expe-
rience of tremendous expansion in the forestry 
sector in Indonesia coincides with economic 
development. Despite some views to the con-
trary, it seems to me that growth in industrial 
output and increased national income are not 
synonymous with development, which has both 
efficiency and equity elements. Unlike the case in 
some countries where pushing the forestry sector 
has failed on both grounds - i.e., has meant 
misallocation of resources plus inequitable dis-
tributional consequences - Indonesia has at 
least succeeded on the first count. Further, ifthe 
current policies are successfully pursued, one 
should expect development to follow from indus-
trialization and output growth, as the number of, 
and intensity of, backward and forward links 
with the forestry sector increase. 
Tree Crops in Malaysia 
Francis K. Chan 
Department of Economics and Statistics, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, 
National University of Singapore, Singapore 
This paper examines the experience of Malaysia in tree-crop cultivation before and after the 
formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. It focuses on four major issues: the short-term 
export instability of tree crops; the long-term resource immobility of tree crops; the ecological and 
environmental impact of tree crops on the tropical rain forests; and the position of smallholders in 
tree-crop cultivation compared with that of the large estates. The analysis leads to four conclusions. 
First, tree-crop dominance in Malaysia has declined significantly in many respects except in 
percentage of agricultural land use and agricultural employment. Second, the long-term prospects of 
the major tree crops range from hopeful for oil palm and cocoa to bright for natural rubber. Third, 
tree crops are, relative to nontree crops, more profitable and less detrimental to the ecological 
balance in tropical rain-forest environments, although the competition between tree crops and 
forestry in land use may have reached a critical point. Fourth, the competitiveness of smallholders in 
tree crops, as significant new techniques in production and processing become available, will be 
reduced, and, therefore, they may require outside assistance, especially from the state. 
Ce document expose !es experiences d'agrosylviculture que la Malaisie a realisees avant et a pres 
la constitution de la Federation en 1963. Quatre points majeurs ont ete traites : l'instabilite a court 
terme de !'exportation des recoltes forestieres; a long terme, !es ressources immobilisees dans ces 
plantations; !'impact ecologique et environnemental de ces plantations sur !es forets tropicales 
humides; et l'etude comparee de la situation des petites et des grandes plantations. Cette analyse 
debouche sur quatre conclusions. Premierement, !'importance de l'agrosylviculture en Malaisie a 
considerablement diminue a plusieurs egards, sauf en ce qui concerne le pourcentage des terres 
consacrees a !'agriculture et des emplois agricoles. Deuxiemement, !es perspectives a long terme des 
quatre principales especes d'arbres cultives sont encourageantes pour le palmier a huile et le cacaoyer 
et remarquables pour l'arbre a caoutchouc. Troisiemement, !es plantations forestieres sont plus 
profitables et moins nuisibles a l'equilibre ecologique des forets tropicales humides que !es autres 
cultures bien que la concurrence entre !es deux semble avoir atteint un point critique. Quatrieme-
ment, la competitivite des petits agrosylviculteurs ne pouvant que souffrir de l'acces a de nouvelles 
techniques de traitement et de production, ii leur faudra peut-etre recourir a !'aide de l'Etat. 
More than 77% of Malaysia is forested, and, of 
the I 2% devoted to agriculture, about 80% is 
under tree crops - mainly rubber (52%), oil palm 
(I 9%), and coconut (8%) (Table I). In Peninsular 
Malaysia, the total forested area (9.44 Mha) 
includes 4.66 Mha of virgin forest. Of the total 
forested areas (6.16 Mhaand 9.72 Mha) in Sabah 
and Sarawak, virgin forest accounts for 4.66 Mha 
and 8.51 Mha respectively (Malaysia 1976). 
Recent trends in land development show that the 
proportion under tree crops is likely to rise as 
increasing numbers of farms incorporate tree 
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crops such as oil palm and cocoa, especially in 
Sabah and Sarawak. 
Most of the tree crops are grown forthe export 
market - less than 5% of raw natural rubber and 
less than 4% of palm oil were for domestic con-
sumption in 1964-73 (Khera 1976). 
As tree crops are notoriously price inelastic in 
supply as well as in demand, violent price fluctua-
tions have often occurred, resulting in corre-
sponding fluctuations in export earnings. Thus, 
extreme dependence on tree-crop export is 
clearly dangerous - a fact that was pointed out 
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Table I. Agricultural land (Mha) use in Malaysia, 
1976. 
Peninsular 
Land Malaysia Sa bah Sarawak 
Agriculture 3.14 0.38' 0.35b 
Rubber 1.70 0.11 0.20 
Oil palm 0.64 O.D7 0.02 
Coconut 0.24 0.05 0.04 
Cocoa 0.02 0.01 
Rice 0.36 0.05 0.04 
Others 0.18 0.09' 0.05d 
Suitable for 
agriculture 6.32 2.15 5.31 
'Area alienated for agriculture in 1975. 
bThis value would be 3.2 Mha if the area under shift-
ing cultivation were included. 
'This figure was estimated as residual. 
dThis value would be 2.9 Mha if area under shifting 
cultivation were included. 
early in the 1960s by Clifton Wharton (1963a, b) 
for Southeast Asian countries in general and for 
Malaya (present day Peninsular Malaysia) in 
particular. 
In 1960, rubber occupied 68% of total planted 
area, provided about 50% of employment in agri-
culture, and accounted for 63% of total Malayan 
export value and 18% of federal government 
revenue, as well as generating 26% of gross 
domestic product (GDP). This high degree of 
dependence on rubber posed two dangers: short-
term economic instability transmitted from 
export instability and long-term resource immo-
bility, which was especially ominous because of 
the emergent threat from synthetic rubber. 
Many theoretical and empirical studies on the 
links between export instability and economic 
development have since been generated. The 
issues are obviously interesting and relevant to 
many developing countries. 
Cultivation 
Several features in tree-crop cultivation could 
give rise to problems. First is the long period (3-8 
years) before most tree crops in Malaysia begin to 
produce (Wickizer 1951; Seftleben 1978). The 
loss on the investment during this period can be 
offset at times if the seedlings are intercropped 
with some short-term cash crops. 
The long period of negative returns increases 
the cost of production and makes financing a 
problem, especially for smallholders. The Malay-
sian government has recognized this financial 
constraint, providing grants, initially for replant-
ing but subs.equently also for new planting of tree 
crops. The amount was originally fixed at 
M$988 /ha to be paid over a 5-year period for 
rubber. The grant was calculated to help defray 
the costs incurred in felling and destruction (usu-
ally by burning) of old tree trunks, and for plant-
ing material, fertilizers, and other services. The 
grant has been increased several times and is 
M$3705 /ha for holdings equal to or less than 4.1 
ha. 
The second prominent feature is the long eco-
nomic life of tree crops. It depends on such fac-
tors as rate of exploitation, level of upkeep, dis-
count rate, and variety of species. A serious 
problem in this respect is that research on tree 
crops takes a long time, and the results may not 
be applied for many years. For example, in exper-
imental work on breeding and selection of high-
yielding planting material for rubber (Hevea bra-
siliensis), at least 25 years are needed from 
pollination to recommendation for large-scale 
planting. An additional period would usually be 
required to test for other desirable plant charac-
teristics~ For example, the clone RRIM 501 was 
originally bred in 1929 and was recommended for 
large-scale planting in 194 7 but was withdrawn in 
1959 because of high susceptibility to wind dam-
age (Barlow 1978). Equally, a long time is needed 
for new planting materials to be widely dissemi-
nated. At an economic life of 33 years, a stand of 
rubber trees evenly spaced in age would be 
replaced at the rate of 3% a year. Thus it would 
take 33 years for the whole stand to be replanted 
unless the period of modernization is shortened, 
which would raise costs substantially. 
The third important feature of tree crops is the 
short-term, and possibly also long-term, price 
inelasticity of supply. In the short term, this is 
expected for four reasons. First, productive 
capacity, as represented by the existing stand of 
mature trees, cannot be changed. Second, other 
inputs, especially labour, are difficult to vary 
either because of contractual arrangements or 
because of the absence of alternative employment 
opportunities. Third, there are physical or botan-
ical limits to plant exploitation. Fourth, the effec-
tive variable cost is only a small proportion of the 
total cost of production. Some of these factors 
are more likely to be operative under estate con-
ditions than under smallholding production so 
that estates are expected to be less price respon-
sive. In the long term, price elasticity may still be 
low because it is costly to replace an existing 
stand with other crops or to expand productive 
capacity rapidly unless undeveloped land is easily 
available. Empirical studies tend to support these 
expectations (Askari and Cummings 1976). 
Recent Developments 
When Malaya gained political independence 
from the British in 1957, rural development was 
given high priority. The main objectives were to 
provide rural opportunities, to raise per-person 
output, protect living standards against the 
adverse effects of a possible decline in rubber 
prices, and to diversify the agricultural products 
from rubber. The three principal programs were 
replanting overaged rubber trees, improving 
drainage and irrigation to facilitate double-
cropping of rice, and developing new land to 
create new employment and to relieve the pres-
sure on existing agricultural land. 
In the First Malaya Plan, rubber replanting 
was accorded the top priority followed by drain-
age and irrigation. In later plans, however, land 
development became progressively more domi-
nant (Table 2) for several reasons. Rubber 
replanting is obviously limited by the age struc-
ture of the existing rubber area. Equally, the 
number of projects on drainage and irrigation is 
limited. In Peninsular Malaysia, few areas are 
suitable for this purpose, and, in Sabah and 
Sarawak, the constraint is low-population den-
sity and, hence, the low economic feasibility of 
irrigated rice cultivation. 
Land development is the logical solution in 
Malaysia where substantial areas are still undevel-
oped. In Peninsular Malaysia, of the total 13.15 
Mha, 48% (6.32 Mha) is suitable for agriculture; 
60% (3.81 Mha) has been alienated. In Sa bah and 
Sarawak, where the total land areas are 7.19 Mha 
and 12.45 Mharespectively, 30%(2.15 Mha) and 
43% (5.31 Mha) are suitable for agriculture, 18% 
(0.38 Mha) and 51% (2.72 Mha) already having 
been alienated. Agricultural development can be 
used effectively to redress rural poverty, increase 
Table 2. Public-development expenditure allocation, 
Malaysia, 1956-80.' 
1956-60 1966-70 1976-80 
Total economic 
expenditure 759.9 2685.4 13570.8 
(MS million) 
Agriculture and 
rural development 227.5 1114.1 4672.4 
(MS million) 
Rubber replanting (%) 67 15 4 
Drainage and 
irrigation (%) 17 31 19 
Land development (%) 7 33 59 
'Expenditures for 1956-80 are estimated expendi-
tures implemented under plan. 
. Sources: Various development plans of Malaya and 
Malaysia. 
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agricultural production, and create rural 
employment for unskilled labour. Equally, it can 
provide the opportunity to modernize traditional 
communities and agricultural practices. 
The desire for social transformation, especially 
the development of modern farm practices, is 
probably one of the reasons that land develop-
ment in postindependence Malaysia has been in 
the form of publicly controlled land-
development schemes. In this respect, it repre-
sents a dramatic departure from the pre-War 
colonial practice of leaving land development 
strictly to the private sector (Wan 1976). 
The pace of development is reminiscent of the 
early days of rubber planting in Malaya. Between 
1906 and 1930, the area planted to rubber 
increased by almost 1.0 Mha to about 1.3 Mha. 
Total land development in Malaysia between 
1961and1980amounted to 1.3 Mha, ofwhich0.5 
Mha was developed by the Federal Land Devel-
opment Authority (FELDA). The target for 
FELDA in 1981-85 is 0.15 Mha, whereas the 
total for the country is 0.54 Mha. The total public 
expenditure on land development between 1956 
and 1980 amounted to M$4343.3 million or 18% 
of the total public economic development expen-
diture, and another 16% has been allocated to 
land development under the current Fourth 
Malaysia Plan. Besides FELDA, many other 
state and federal land development agencies are 
involved; however, FELDA is clearly the major 
agency. 
Tree crops, especially oil palm and rubber, are 
strongly preferred in land development projects. 
Thus, by the end of 1977, FELDA had allocated 
almost 93% of the 0.4 Mha it developed to oil 
palm (60.5%), rubber (31.7%), cocoa (0.5%), and 
coffee (0.2%). Data are not readily available on 
the choice of crops under the other schemes, but 
tree crops probably represent 75-80% of the 
expenditure. 
Another important aspect of land-use devel-
opment has been the massive effort at rubber 
replanting begun in 1952 and still being vigor-
ously pursued. A total of M$797 million was 
spent between 1956 and 1980 to assist mainly the 
smallholding rubber sector to replant old rubber 
stands either with high-yield rubber or with one 
of the approved crops - coconut, oil palm, cof-
fee, cocoa, citrus fruits, and sago, as well as other 
nontree crops. 
By 1975, about 94% of crops selected were also 
tree crops: rubber (85.4%), coconut (2.4%), oil 
palm (5.4%), and coffee (0.5%). Thus, when it 
was possible to replace existing tree crops, the 
choice made was predominantly another tree 
crop or the same tree crop (generally rubber). 
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Table 3. Main crop areas (Mha) in Peninsular Malaysia, 1950-76." 
Crops 1950 1960 1965 1976 
Rubber 1.42 (67.0) 1.58 (65.9) 1.75 (66.3) I. 70 (54.2) 
Oil palm 0.04 (1.8) 0.04 (1.9) 0.10 (3.7) 0.64 (20.3) 
Coconut 0.20 (9.3) 0.21 (8.8) 0.21 (8.1) 0.24 (7.5) 
Rice 0.31 (14.8) 0.38 (15. 7) 0.38 (14.6) 0.36 (11.4) 
Miscellaneous 0.15 (7.1) 0.18(7.7) 0.19 (7.3) 0.20 (6.5) 
•Figures in parentheses are percent of total agricultural land. 
Source: Selvadurai (1979) and government statistics published in Area of Miscellaneous Crops, 1978 and the 
Statistical Digest, 1976. 
In other words, the commitment to tree crops 
in Malaysia has actually increased. Between 1960 
and 1976, the share in total planted area of just 
three tree crops (rubber, oil palm, and coconut) 
increased from 77% to 82% in Peninsular Malay-
sia (Table 3). The actual share today is probably 
higher, as cocoa is beginning to find popularity 
throughout Malaysia, especially as an intercrop 
with coconut. Trends in Sabah and Sarawak 
have been similar (Table 4). 
If, for Peninsular Malaysia, all potential agri-
cultural land were planted according to the soil-
capability classification scheme, perennial tree 
crops would occupy about 79% of all agricultural 
land compared with the 77% in 1970. However, 
land devoted to agriculture would constitute 
almost 49% of total land area compared with 
about 22% in 1970 (Selvadurai 1979: 10-11). 
Export Instability and Economic 
Development 
Export instability will affect economic devel-
opment adversely if an economy depends heavily 
on the export commodities in such important 
aspects as employment, export earnings, contri-
bution to GDP, and government revenue. 
Rubber was vitally important in Malaya in these 
respects in the early 1960s. Today, the position of 
rubber in these respects is not as critical. For 
example, the planted area of rubber has dropped 
from 68%to 52% but that of tree crops has prob-
ably increased throughout Malaysia due to the 
expansion of oil-palm cultivation. 
About half the population of Peninsular 
Malaysia is employed in agriculture, and that 
statistic has remained fairly constant. However, 
the share of the labour force involved in produc-
tion of rubber has fallen consistently from 1962 
to 1976, whereas it has been an insignificant item 
in Sabah and Sarawak. 
The most important change is in the share of 
tree crops in total export earnings in Peninsular 
Malaysia from a high of 63% for rubber alone to 
only 31% for both rubber and oil palm in 
1976-80. The shares of oil palm and rubber in 
GDP and federal-government revenue have also 
dropped, and for all Malaysia the shares would 
be even smaller because rubber and oil palm are 
much Jess important in the economy of Sabah 
and Sarawak. 
Thus, over two decades, the Malaysian econ-
omy has become much less dependent on tree 
crops in some important aspects. It has achieved 
a substantial degree of diversification both within 
the agricultural sector (away from rubber) and 
sectorally (toward manufacturing, commerce, 
and services as well as toward the exploitation of 
other natural resources such as forest products 
and petroleum). 
These various trends toward a more diversified 
economy are basically healthy. Some are 
responses to changing marginal comparative 
advan,tage; for example, the estate sector 
responded to the challenge of synthetic rubber by 
replacing old rubber areas with oil palm when the 
latter was more suitable and profitable. Although 
total estate area remained almost constant, the 
Table 4. Main crop areas (Mha) in Sabah and Sarawak, 1965-76. 
1965 1970 1976 
Crop Sa bah Sarawak Sa bah Sarawak Sa bah Sarawak 
Rubber 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.19 
Oil palm 0.01 0.04 <0.01 0.07 0.02 
Coconut 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 
Padi 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.13 
Sources: Various issues of the annual bulletins of statistics for Sabah and for Sarawak. 
share of rubber dropped from 87% to 66% and 
that of oil palm increased from 8% to almost 31 %. 
Equally, oil palm constituted about 61 % com-
pared with 32% for rubber in FELDA schemes 
up to 1977. 
The increasing importance of the manufactur-
ing sector is another example of the economy's 
responding to market forces. This can be seen in 
the increasing share in exports of manufactured 
products, which rose from an insignificant 
amount to about 15% of total exports between 
1971and1975 and to 21% in 1980. In fact, it was 
second only to petroleum (25%) in 1980. Thus, 
the desirable degree of diversification has come 
about without sacrifice of economic gain or 
efficiency. 
On this basis, the Malaysian economy has 
apparently overcome export instability, at least 
in the form of overdependence on rubber and tin. 
Export instability will continue to be a threat, 
however, not because of overdependence on a 
few export commodities but because the Malay-
sian economy is still, like that of most developing 
countries, highly susceptible to changes in the 
developed countries. The increased economic 
interdependence of the world and the emergent 
synchronization of business cycles pose serious 
problems to small open economies such as 
Malaysia, almost regardless of what they do. This 
becomes increasingly clear when the developed 
countries seem unable to control inflation and 
unemployment. However, in the absence of 
severe worldwide depression, the Malaysian 
economy will be increasingly less concerned with 
the problem of general export instability, much 
less to export instability from export proceeds of 
tree crops. 
Although export instability adversely affected 
economic development in Malaysia, policy 
options that reduce the share of exports based on 
tree crops are likely to generate much lower, 
though possibly more stable, average return to 
investment in agriculture. In any case, the Malay-
sian economy seems to have experienced several 
episodes of severe export instability without 
apparent ill effects on overall economic devel-
opment. The comprehensive study by Ariff 
( 1972) found that built-in mechanisms in the 
economy helped to insulate it against the worst 
effects of export instability. Such built-in mecha-
nisms are still in place and should cushion the 
impact of future export instability. 
Resource Immobility 
A more fundamental issue than export insta-
bility of tree crops is the potential danger of 
FORESTRY STUDIES: CHAN 127 
resource immobility associated with tree crops. 
Diversification becomes urgent when the long-
term prospects of tree crops are clouded and 
uncertain, as were those of natural rubber from 
the late 1950s. 
The issue of diversification in Malaya has been 
raised on several occasions such as during the 
Great Depression and immediately after World 
War II. In both instances, the solution adopted 
was to encourage the largely subsistent Malay 
peasantry to be self-sufficient in rice while the 
government maintained a stockpile of rice equiva-
lent to a 4-month supply for the so-called "ration 
population" (i.e., population minus the self-
sufficient padi planters). 
Even up to the early 1950s, many remained 
persuaded that natural rubber was still the crop 
for Malaya. They were supported in their belief 
by the rubber boom brought on by the Korean 
War and by the expectation that once the syn-
thetic rubber plants set up by the U.S. govern-
ment during the War were transferred to private 
hands, and hence ceased to receive government 
subsidy, the competitive strength of natural 
rubber would be evident. As it turned out, the 
synthetic industry under private enterprise after 
1956 continued to make rapid progress and came 
up with several improved special types, some 
with technical superiority to natural rubber 
(Allen 1972). Only then did diversification 
become a serious issue. 
The answer to the question of what crops 
should replace rubber is, however, not evident. 
For one thing, it is not clear that natural rubber 
has completely lost its comparative advantage in 
Peninsular Malaysia because of the substantial 
cost reduction through replanting with superior 
high-yield varieties that began to appear from the 
research effort of the Rubber Research Institute 
of Malaya. The increase in yield per unit of 
tapped area can be estimated from the ratio of 
average yield of high-yielding rubber to that of 
unselected rubber in the estate sector. The ratio 
increased from about 2.2: l in 1953 to 3.6: l in 
1976. The ratio continues to increase as higher 
yielding lines are made available to producers_. 
The increase of output with little additional 
increase in cost through the use of these high-
yield varieties keeps natural rubber cost-
competitive against what Allen (1972) called the 
large-tonnage synthetic rubbers such as Stylene/ 
butadiene copolymer (SBR) and polybutadiene 
rubber (BR). Synthetics managed to encroach on 
the share of natural rubber in world consump-
tion, nonetheless, because the demand for all 
rubbers has increased much faster than natural 
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rubber producers have been able to expand their 
output. Thus, synthetics, which require 2-3 years 
to expand capacity compared with the 6-7 years 
for natural rubber, were able to fill the gap and 
thus increased their share of the world market. 
For example, the average rate of growth between 
1951-76 for natural rubber was 3% compared 
with 13% for the synthetics (Chan 1978). 
Second, the alternatives to rubber in Peninsu-
lar Malaysia were not easy to identify in the late 
1950s or even now. The other tree crops were not 
doing well in international markets and might 
not suit the conditions in Peninsular Malaysia. 
The nontree crops seemed to be even less likely 
candidates because of marketing problems and 
considerations of suitability to soil and climate. 
Even the experts invited to examine the prob-
lem of diversification agreed that the intention of 
the Malayan government to press ahead with 
rubber replanting with high-yield material was 
generally wise. For example, the Ford Founda-
tion Survey Team (1963:43) recommended: 
Continue but modify the rubber replanting 
scheme. The diversification team is convinced 
that the government's rubber replanting scheme 
is a wise one. The only safe economic strategy to 
meet the challenge of synthetic rubber is to 
increase efficiency and thereby reduce unit cost 
in the production of natural rubber. 
Elsewhere, the team also observed: 
. . . with the high rainfall, tropical climate, and 
rolling terrain of much of Malaya, potential 
crops for diversification have for the most part 
been perennial crops. Although perennial crops 
take time to become established and have high 
initial costs, they in effect replace the original 
jungle with alternative tree crops and thus con-
tinue to retard erosion, protect the notoriously 
volatile humus content of tropical soils and 
shade out weeds and bush. 
Evidence of the continuing competitiveness of 
natural rubber is that all natural rubber produced 
has been taken up and usually sold at a substan-
tial price premium over comparable synthetic 
rubber for most of the post-War years. For 
example, the price ratio of RSS3 (rubber 
smoked-sheet grade 3) to its comparable substi-
tute (SBR) has been greater than one in most 
years since 1950. 
Furthermore, many significant advances in 
natural rubber production and presentation have 
yet to be widely spread, especially to the small-
holding producers and to producers outside 
Peninsular Malaysia. On the global level, small-
holding rubber accounts for some 63% of total 
world natural rubber and about 75% of all 
planted rubber area. Thus a huge technological 
gap waits to be filled. This is true even in Peninsu-
lar Malaysia where, in spite of huge government 
efforts and assistance, only 63% of planted area 
was high-yielding material in 1971 compared 
with 92% for the estates (Chan 1978). 
More recently, the competitiveness of natural 
rubber compared with the synthetics received a 
most important boost when crude oil prices 
quadrupled in 1973 and continued to rise. In 
addition, a recent World Bank study came up 
with some findings that are "sweet music" to 
rubber producers. In examining the effect of the 
oil crisis on the competitive relation between nat-
ural and synthetic rubbers, the study concluded: 
". . . the relative market position of natural 
rubber (NR) has improved substantially in the 
short term, but has improved even more in the 
longer term" (Grilli et al. 1980:55). 
In the short term, even allowing for the appre-
ciation of the Malaysian currency against the 
U.S. dollar by more than 25% between 1971 and 
1974, Grilli et al. (1980) found" ... the operating 
costs on estates and smallholdings apparently 
increased by about 65% between 1971and1974" 
compared with a 70-80% increase in the average 
direct cost of producing SBR-1500 over the same 
period. Thus the market share of natural rubber 
increased in the world market (excluding the cen-
trally planned economies) . 
In the longer term in which changes in existing 
facilities are allowed, the analysis, based on the 
estimation of "full supply price" of natural 
rubber and SBR-1500, indicates that, at a real 
rate of return of 10%, investing in SBR-1500 
would only be feasible if future expected real 
prices were at least U.S.$0.88/kg ($0.44/lb.). In 
contrast," ... investment in NR in Malaysia, at 
the same real rate of return of l 0 percent, would 
... have been possible in 1977 if a future real price 
of U.S.$0.79/kg ($0.36/lb.) (cif) in Europe had 
been expected" (Grilli et al. 1980:73). 
The authors of the report went on to point out 
that this conclusion probably understates the 
competitive position of natural rubber because 
some assumptions used in the calculation tended 
to overstate the supply price of natural rubber 
and to understate that of SBR-1500. Further-
more, with each increase in the real price of petro-
leum, the competitive position of natural rubber 
is further enhanced. 
Although the future prospects for natural 
rubber thus seem much less uncertain than they 
were in 1973, prospects for other tree crops in 
Malaysia are harder to predict. For oil palm, 
Malaysia may have a strong competitive advan-
tage over other oil-palm producers because pro-
duction is predominantly organized in large-scale 
plantations that encourage central processing of 
the output and are in a good position to innovate 
and improve productivity. Thus, between 1952 
and 1972, output per employee increased from 
about 3 t to 13 t, whereas the average area 
increased from about 3 ha to 7.5 ha (Khera 1976). 
Furthermore, most reported studies on the rela-
tive profitability of oil palm placed oil-palm cul-
tivation above rubber and certainly over padi (Ng 
1971; Wafa 1972; Khera 1976). 
The main advantage of cocoa in Malaysia 
seems to be that it is ideal for intercropping with 
other crops such as coconut. Some evidence for 
this comes from the areas reported under "sole," 
"main," and "mixed" cropping of cocoa between 
I 958 and I 966. The area under "sole" crop stag-
nated at about 510 ha, the area under "main" 
crop dropped from I 1 ha to insignificance, but 
the area under "mixed" crop increased from 106 
ha to 627 ha. Thus, cocoa may have a place in 
Malaysia's future. 
Tree Crops and the Humid Tropics 
The land capability classification scheme pre-
pared during the First Malaysia Plan specifically 
gives priority of land use to mining over agricul-
ture and to agriculture over forestry. This order is 
justified on the basis of higher value-added by 
each use (Lee and Panton 1971). The use ofvalue-
added as the basis is, however, not an absolute 
recommendation because development decisions 
on the land use for a specific area presumably are 
taken only after careful evaluation of the eco-
nomic, social, and ecological factors (Arshad 
I 979). The use of this basis in the case of mining 
versus other uses is not likely to lead to any 
serious consequences because the total area likely 
to be involved is only about 0.6% of total land. 
Past mining land has also been steadily reab-
sorbed by urban zones for housing, industrial, 
and recreational purposes or for market garden-
ing, livestock farming, and fish farming (Lee and 
Panton 1971). 
The application of the same principle to alloca-
tions of land to agriculture and forestry is more 
doubtful especially in Penins.ular Malaysia where 
the past rate of land development is beginning to 
reduce the supply ofland suitable for agriculture. 
There is now the fear that the forest is disappear-
ing too fast and that rapid land development has 
led to wasteful use of forest resources. As revenue 
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from forestry is an important source for the state 
governments and land is a state matter under the 
federal constitution, excessive conversion of 
forestry to agricultural use is clearly a danger. 
According to the estimate of the Environment 
Assistance Mission, provided by the IBRD at the 
request of Malaysia in December 1974, the 
nation's lowland forest area would be consumed 
in the next 30 years at the current rate of forest 
conversion (IBRD I 975). 
The issue of the proper and balanced use of the 
nation's land and forest resources was considered 
explicitly under the Third Malaysia Plan, which 
has just ended. At the urging of the IBRD mis-
sion, a National Environmental Policy has been 
developed and was incorporated into the Third 
Malaysia Plan. Among other things, that policy 
accounts for" ... the critical importance of main-
taining the quality of the environment relative to 
the needs of the population, particularly in 
regard to the productive capacity of the country's 
land resources in agriculture, forestry, fisheries 
and water" (Malaysia 1976:219). 
Such a broad vision of land use in Malaysia is 
clearly needed as a replacement for both the fed-
eral development-oriented view and the state 
revenue-oriented view. It is to be hoped that it has 
not come too late for the forest resources of 
Peninsular Malaysia. 
On the issue of the relative compatibility of tree 
and nontree crops to the humid tropical climate 
of Malaysia, I focus on Peninsular Malaysia, 
although the remarks are often relevant to Sabah 
and Sarawak. 
The climate of Peninsular Malaysia results 
from the state's being in an equatorial region, but 
it is modified by the effects of the northeast and 
southwest monsoons. Annual rainfall is high 
(203-305 cm), as are humidity (85%) and temper-
ature (26-28°C). Lying between 1° and 7°N with 
no point more than I 70 km from the sea, and 
three quarters of the area below 304 m, the state 
never experiences excessively high temperatures, 
and the heavy cloud cover reduces the average 
sunshine to fewer than 7 hours/day. The max-
imal difference between the longest and the short-
est day is only 37 minutes. The absence of sea-
sonal variation in temperature is so marked that 
the daily temperature range is greater than the 
annual range. The main climatic difference 
results from seasonal rainfall distribution, with 
the northeast monsoons bringing rain to the east-
ern and northeastern coastal area and the weaker 
southwest monsoons bringing less rain to the 
western and southwestern plains (Ooi I 959, I 976; 
IBRD 1955). 
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The high annual temperature and precipitation 
have great significance in the problem of main-
taining the fertility of the soil, for the choice of 
crops, and the technique of cultivation, as was 
noted by the Ford Foundation Survey Team 
(1980). 
The high frequency of precipitation in the form 
of thunderstorms encourages rapid runoff and 
soil erosion of inadequately covered land. Heavy 
downpours within a short period increase the 
force of the impact on the ground, and the 
volume of accumulated water exceeds the 
absorptive capacity of the soil. The maximum 
absorptive rate of an average open soil in Penin-
sular Malaysia has been calculated to be 7. 5 cm of 
water per hour. However, slightly more than 25% 
of showers in Kuala Lumpur were of a higher 
intensity - hence, the erosive force of tropical 
downpours (Ooi 1959). 
An example of the serious consequence of the 
failure to account for this was reported by Bauer 
(1948) concerning the practice of clean weeding 
that European-owned rubber estates in Malaya 
used until 1930: the practice not only was expen-
sive but also led to soil erosion and the loss of soil 
fertility. Because the high annual temperature 
works in conjunction with the high annual pre-
cipitation, leaching of uncovered soil, giving rise 
to low soil productivity, is greatly enhanced. The 
combination greatly speeds chemical reactions 
and weathering processes in the soils throughout 
the year. The high precipitation, in excess of the 
soil absorptive rate, leads to a continuous leach-
ing from the surface of the soil downward. 
Organic matter and plant nutrients are washed 
out and are not replaced by compensating 
upward capillary action. 
The high temperature has another significance. 
The higher the temperature, the more difficult it 
is for nitrogen to accumulate (Ooi 1959). In the 
natural equatorial forest, this destructive process 
of the climate is retarded by the heavy canopy of 
leaves that reduces the ground temperature to a 
level at which humus formation exceeds or keeps 
pace with the rate of destruction. It also counter-
balances the rapid rotting of leaves, twigs, flow-
ers, branches, and so on that fall on the ground 
and are quickly reabsorbed by the living plants. 
"A closed cycle is thus set up, in which the plant 
food is circulated from the top soil, taken up by 
the vegetation and then returned to the soil again 
to start the process anew" (Ooi 1959: 80). Because 
of the rapid turnover of the nutrient "capital," the 
tropical forests appear lush and luxuriant, and 
the appearance often gives rise to a false notion of 
the fertility of tropical soils. 
The precarious equilibrium is maintained as 
long as the soil temperature is no higher than 
25° C. Soil temperature under tropical forest fluc-
tuates slightly because of the heavy shade and the 
high humidity of the air. However, if the heavy 
shade is removed, the equilibrium is upset and the 
cycle is broken. The tropical sun then raises the 
soil temperature, causing the rate of humus for-
mation to slow and the rate of breakdown to 
accelerate. At the same time, "reinvestment" of 
the nutrient "capital" in the form of vegetative 
wastes is removed. The removal of the natural 
cover also facilitates the weathering process of 
the heavy downpours. Unless heavy applications 
of fertilizer are used, the result is the conversion 
of an arable land into one infested with obnox-
ious weeds and bushes. 
Thus, tree crops clearly have several clear 
advantages over nontree crops because the tree 
crops better simulate the natural forest. In some 
situations, the higher value of some annual crops, 
such as vegetables cultivated close to urban cen-
tres, may be sufficient to pay for the fertilizers 
needed to maintain soil fertility. In general, non-
tree crops stand at a disadvantage relative to tree 
crops in terms of both protecting or preserving 
land quality and soil fertility and return to 
investment. 
Smallholders 
The stake of the smallholders in Malaysia var-
ies widely among the three major tree crops 
(Table 5). Smallholders are distinguished from 
the estate sector in which holdings are more than 
40 ha. Coconut is practically all on smallhold-
ings, whereas oil palm is practically all on estates. 
Only in rubber is the distribution more balanced 
between estates and traditional smallholdings. 
For rubber smallholders, the Rubber Indus-
tries Smallholder Development Authority 
(RISDA) schemes of replanting and the Federal 
Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Author-
ity (FELCRA) account for 65% of production. 
The FELCRA area consists mainly of rubber 
schemes that had originally been developed by 
state fringe alienation schemes and failed but 
were within commuting distance of existing set-
tlements and were subsequently redeveloped 
under FELCRA. 
The relative performance of the estates and 
smallholdings can be compared with some indi-
cators. Between 1957 and 1971, the share of small-
holdings (plus FELDA) devoted to rubber 
increased from 46% to 63%. In 1971, the average 
size of a farm under smallholding was 2.6 ha 
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compared with 313. 7 ha for estates. Between 1957 
and 1971, the area under high-yield planting 
material increased from 15% to 63% for small-
holdings compared with 48% rising to 92% for 
estates. The percentage of area replanted or 
newly planted was only 15% in 1957 for small-
holdings compared with 33% for estates; this fig-
ure improved to 63%and 83% respectively. Small-
holders were responsible for 42% of total produc-
tion in 1957 and 48% in 1971. The yield of mature 
plantations was 456 kg/ha in 1957 on smallhold-
ings compared with 578 kg/ ha on estates, and 
these yields increased to 702 kg and 1239 kg, 
respectively. 
The two sectors differ significantly (Table 6), 
even though the differences decreased consider-
ably from 1957 to 1971. Along with differences in 
area planted, the smallholdings have higher pro-
portions of overaged trees and larger areas that 
are replanted with unimproved material than do 
the. estates. They also use fewer modern tech-
niques and produce lower grades of rubber than 
do the estates. A great deal of improvement in the 
smallholding sector came as a result of the vigor-
ous state and federal schemes to encourage plant-
ing with high-yield material. In the small-
holdings, the average rates of expansion (newly 
planted areas) were 0.5% between 1937 and 1952 
and 1.2% from 1953 to 1972 and those of 
replacement (replanted areas) were 0.3% and 
2.5% respectively. The corresponding figures for 
estates were 0.9% and 0.4% for expansion and 
Table 6. Some aspects of smallholding and estate rubber-holding, Peninsular Malaysia, 1957 and 1971. 
Smallholding Estate 
1957 1971 1957 1971 
Total planted rubber (1000 ha) 692.3 1086.9 818 631.8 
Percentage of total area 46 63 64 37 
Average size of farm (ha) 2.6 341.4 313.7 
Percentage planted with high-yield 
material 15 63 48 92 
Percentage replanted or newly 
planted since 1946 15 63 33 83 
Average yield for mature area 
(kg/ha) 456 702 578 1239 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, various 
issues. 
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2.0% and 2.3% for replacement (Chan 1978). The 
government schemes for planting contributed 
substantially to the improvement and moderni-
zation of the smallholdings, being responsible for 
almost 100% of the replanted areas and 67% of 
the newly planted areas (Chan 1978). 
Given the important and wide disparities 
between smallholdings and estates, it is relevant 
to examine the relative efficiency of the 
smallholders. 
Historically, that is before World War II, it is 
probably true, as Bauer (1948) maintained, that 
the smallholders could compete successfully 
against the estates. Three factors seem to have 
worked in the smallholders' favour: the negligible 
cost of establishing a smallholding of rubber; the 
practical absence of technological breakthroughs 
in production in the rubber industry; and the lack 
of an effective substitute for natural rubber. 
However, with the release of high-yielding varie-
ties and the development of synthetic rubber dur-
ing and after the War, the picture changed drasti-
cally, and the poor quality of output of the 
smallholders became a severe disadvantage. In 
the meantime, the estate sector had adopted 
many of the improved methods that were devel-
oped by research institutions or by some of the 
big estate groups. 
Under the changed conditions, the small-
holders could not compete unless given some 
outside assistance. This came from the state and 
federal governments with incentives to help the 
smallholders to plant with improved high-yield 
planting varieties. In other functions, assistance 
has come from agencies that carry out specific 
roles for the benefit of the smallholders. 
For example, the Rubber Research Institute of 
Malaya, since independence, has become more 
active in providing advisory services to the var-
ious schemes at project level. The Rubber Indus-
try (Replanting) Board gave assistance in kind 
and cash for replanting. The Malaysian Rubber 
Development Corporation has been basically 
involved in the purchase of latex from the small-
holders for the production of processed Standard 
Malaysian Rubber (SMR) to prescribed specifi-
cations for export. In 1972, RISDA was formed 
to centralize, coordinate, and integrate the var-
ious activities directed at the smallholding sector 
so as to help accelerate the development of the 
smallholders. 
The key lesson from the Malaysian experience 
is that when technological changes, such as 
improved planting material and improved 
methods of processing, become available in tree 
crops, cultivation in traditional smallholdings 
may not be efficient enough to compete with the 
estate-type organization unless supported by a 
strong institutional infrastructure. Support is 
needed especially to offset the estate sector's 
quicker access to and adoption of new techniques 
and innovations (Chan et al. 1973). 
One should ask, however, whether the state 
and federal governments have been wise to have 
taken such active steps to encourage smallholders 
in tree-crop cultivation. The political gains are 
obvious, but there is a danger that the state then 
feels bound to intervene when the industry expe-
riences, for example, a steep drop in commodity 
prices. This danger has proved to be real, for the 
decline in rubber price has led to an appeal by 
smallholders for the government to take steps to 
check the decline (Business Times 1981). 
Similarly, the Malaysian government's active 
interest in pushing for an international-
commodity agreement for natural rubber seems 
to be motivated by the desire to protect the inter-
est and welfare of the rubber smallholders. As an 
efficient rubber producer, Malaysia may stand to 
gain little from such an attempt unless it is one 
aimed purely at price stabilization. Any attempt 
to maintain price upward would not be in the 
long-term interest of Malaysia or of the small-
holders, especially when synthetics are readily 
available. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, three points from the Malaysian 
experience may be stressed. First, of the twin 
problems of short-term export instability and 
long-term resource immobility, the latter poses a 
greater threat to the economic development and 
welfare of a country with a high degree of"peren-
nial monocultural dominance" (Wharton's phrase). 
Second, there is a strong tendency to prefer 
agriculture to forestry in land-use policies 
because of the emphasis on value-added or 
employment creation. This approach fails to give 
. proper weight to the noneconomic, but equally 
fundamental, roles of the tropical forests. These 
roles often complement agriculture. Such neglect 
should be corrected and a more balanced 
approach adopted in land-use planning. 
Third, and finally, the special problems of the 
smallholders in tree-crop cultivation, especially 
when new techniques for improved yield and 
processing of output become available, may 
require some form of state assistance, as the 
market solution to these problems is likely to be 
less than optimal. 
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Discussion 
Mohamed Arif/' Let me, at the outset, compli-
ment Chan for a stimulating, comprehensive, and 
well-written paper on tree crops in Malaysia. He 
addresses himself to four major issues, relating to 
short-term export instability, long-term resource 
rigidities, ecological and environmental implica-
tions, and finally the problems of smallholdings 
competing with estates. He concludes that the 
tree crops' dominance of the Malaysian economy 
is on the decline, that the long-term prospects of 
most tree crops are fairly good, that tree crops are 
ecologically less detrimental than nontree crops, 
and that the smallholders require external assis-
tance to remain viable. 
Although, generally speaking, I agree with 
him, I find that there are some gaps in his analy-
sis. For example, it is well known that tree crops 
are generally price inelastic, especially in the 
short run, mainly because of the long lag between 
establishment and production and the long eco-
nomic life span of most tree crops. However, 
Chan attributes price inelasticity not only to 
these factors but also to the low ratio of variable 
cost to total cost. This last I find difficult to 
digest, because a low ratio of variable to total cost 
would tend to make supply more responsive to 
changes in prices. Besides, labour cost accounts 
for as much as one-half of the total cost because 
rubber production is highly labour-intensive. In 
some estates, tapping charges account for 40% of 
the total expenditure. 
I think the main explanation for short-term 
supply inelasticity lies in the physical or botanic 
limits of rubber. For example, one cannot 
expand rubber output by resorting to frequent 
tapping, as it would cause irreversible damage 
and would shorten the economic life span of the 
tree. Thus, age composition and stand composi-
tion have implications for supply elasticity. 
Rubber growers are more willing to do "slaugh-
ter" tapping on trees that are old and of a low-
yielding variety than on trees that are young and 
of a high-yielding type. The presence of a large 
number of averaged and low-yielding trees on 
smallholdings is one reason that the smallholders 
are generally more responsive to price changes 
than are estates. 
In Malaysia, the evidence of perverse supply 
responses, especially in the smallholding sector, 
is noteworthy. In an attempt to maintain their 
income, smallholders increase output in the face 
of falling prices. This practice, of course, tends to 
further destabilize commodity prices. 
As Chan has correctly observed, land devel-
opment in Malaysia is largely controlled by the 
state. This fact appears inconsistent with the 
country's free-market economy and, to be prop-
erly understood, needs to be assessed in terms of 
the social, economic, and political context of plu-
ral Malaysian society. I, therefore, wish that 
Chan had added an appendix or at least a foot-
note clarifying the context. I also wish that he had 
analyzed the economics of government land-
development schemes such as FELDA. 
Chan has briefly discussed the role of tree 
crops in the diversification of the Malaysian 
economy. It is true that the share of tree crops in 
general, and that of rubber in particular, in total 
export earnings has fallen sharply. In absolute 
terms, however, export earnings from tree crops 
have continued to rise, and, in this sense, diversi-
fication has strengthened the role of tree crops in 
the Malaysian economy. 
In this regard, Chan seems to be endorsing the 
conversion of rubber areas to oil palm. I am 
disappointed that he has not questioned the wis-
dom of this conversion, at least on such a large 
scale as has been witnessed in Malaysia. In retro-
spect, Malaysia may have overreacted to low 
rubber prices. Although recent studies (Thillain-
athan 1976; Chan 1980; Sahathavan 1980) have 
shown that the internal rate of return for oil palm 
is substantially higher than that for natural 
rubber, there are a number of other considera-
tions that favour rubber over oil palm. 
First, natural rubber exhibits greater price sta-
bility than palm oil; during 1970-79, the price 
instability index of 28.5 for natural rubber pales 
in comparison with that of 34.9 for palm oil 
(Chan 1980). India, which is the main market for 
palm oil, dips in and out of the market according 
to the availability of foreign exchange, and tariff 
barriers prevent the penetration of palm oil in the 
U.S. and other advanced countries. It is note-
worthy that the U.S. has withdrawn duty-free 
treatment that had been given to palm oil under 
its GSP scheme in March 1978. Tariff rates under 
the GSP schemes of other advanced countries 
range from 10% in the European Economic 
Community (EEC) to 17. 5% in Canada. In EEC a 
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4% tariff is applied to crude palm-oil imports, 
and a 12% tariff is imposed on refined palm-oil 
imports. 
Second, natural rubber has greater externali-
ties than does oil palm, as shown by the higher 
linkage coefficients. Based on 1970 inputs and 
outputs, Sahathavan (1980) has estimated the 
backward linkage coefficient for rubber to be in 
the order of l.14, which compares favourably 
with the 0.36 for oil palm. Forward linkage 
effects are even stronger for natural rubber 
(4. 78), compared with oil palm (0.85). Total link-
age coefficients for natural rubber and oil palm 
are 2.54 and 0.37, respectively. 
Third, the enormous possibilities for substitu-
tion in oils mean that the cross elasticity of 
demand for palm oil is high. Consequently, the 
prices of palm oil are highly sensitive to changes 
in supply not only of palm oil but also of vegeta-
ble, marine, and other animal oils. In this regard, 
natural rubber seems to be better off, now that 
synthetic rubber has been rendered less competi-
tive by the rising costs in raw materials. 
Fourth, recently a shortage of natural rubber 
has been forecast, with demand expected to out-
strip supply in the 1980s, whereas a glut for palm 
oil has been indicated. 
And fifth, rubber trees have been said to be 
more effective in nutrient cycling partially 
because of lower levels of nutrient removal from 
latex than oil palm in addition to producing a 
more protective canopy for the soil. Rubber 
forests are also possible sources of timber and 
fuel wood for the future (Joseph 1980). 
One gets the impression from Chan's paper 
that smallholdings cannot be viable without 
government assistance. However, several studies 
have suggested that smallholdings are more 
competitive and more efficient than are rubber 
estates. Because economies of scale are not 
important in the production of natural rubber, 
smallholdings are able to operate at relatively low 
cost. Although the problems faced by small-
holders are real, the problem of low productivity 
is associated with the problem of rural poverty 
and is not related to the size of operation. 
Chan speaks of the "danger" of the govern-
ment's stepping in if the industry gets into trou-
ble. This so-called danger is nothing new to the 
rubber industry in Malaysia. Historically, the 
powerful plantations were instrumental in push-
ing through a number of commodity-control 
schemes, especially in the pre-War years. The 
smallholders have always been more adaptable 
than their estate counterparts to volatile rubber 
prices. Therefore, one cannot ascribe the pressure 
for commodity controls entirely to the growing 
political. influence of the smallholders. The past 
experience has been that the benefits of such 
commodity controls have not trickled down to 
the small operators. The smallholders now would 
like to see that they also have an equitable share 
of the benefits of any international rubber 
agreement. And there is nothing undesirable or 
dangerous about that, unless of course prices are 





The Economic Future of Alaska Groundfish under 
Extended Jurisdiction 
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Institute for Marine Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, USA 
The groundfish resources of Alaska make a significant contribution to U.S. and world eco-
nomic well-being. However, they are not likely to be the basis for an economically viable U.S. fishing 
industry, at least in the near or intermediate future. Fortunately, the capture of economic value from 
a natural resource does not necessarily require extensive participation by the owner (national or 
individual) in the extraction. At present, U.S. policymakers have to decide the most effective way of 
ensuring adequate compensation for access to the resource. 
L'abondance des lieux de peche de I' Alaska constitue une ressource susceptible d'apporter une 
contribution importante a la sante economique des Etats-Unis et du monde entier. Cependant, ces 
zones ne peuvent constituer, a court et a moyen terme la base d'une industrie de peche rentable pour 
Jes Americains. Heureusement, la recuperation des profits d'une ressource naturelle donnee ne 
depend pas necessairement de l'etendue de la participation du proprietaire (particulier OU Etat) a 
!'exploitation de cette ressource. Les autorites americaines etudient actuellement Jes moyens de fixer 
une compensation equitable pour la concession de l'acces a ces lieux de peche. 
The groundfish resources of Alaska consist of 
several demersal species that together sustained a 
1980 harvest of 1.558 Mt (Table 1). The term 
groundfish reflects economic rather than biologic 
similarities within the species group. Virtually all 
the harvest is taken by trawlers that process their 
catch on board. Groundfish destined for U.S. or 
European markets are normally filleted and fro-
zen individually or in blocks. Those in blocks are 
subsequently converted into fish sticks and other 
convenience foods. Oriental markets use ground-
fish in a variety of other forms, the quantitatively 
most significant being fish paste. 
Until the extension of U.S. national jurisdic-
tion in 1977, the groundfish resources of the Gulf 
of Alaska and Bering Sea were one of the world's 
largest international common-property fisheries, 
even though the U.S. fishing industry was almost 
totally unrepresented. The major players were 
Japan and the USSR. 
Like those in most other coastal states, U.S. 
fisheries policymakers saw the new control as the 
first step in converting the international fishery 
into local industry. The Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA) set the 
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development of domestic fisheries, particularly 
for Alaska groundfish, as a national policy objec-
tive. However, the extension of jurisdiction, 
alone, does not imply development of a domestic 
groundfish industry. The U.S. industry took no 
interest in Alaska groundfish resources when it 
had equal access to undepleted stocks during the 
1950s and the early 1960s, although the country 
was rapidly becoming the world's largest consum-
er of frozen groundfish. But the extension of 
jurisdiction and other economic signals in 1977 
apparently were interpreted as evidence that 
rapid development of the U.S. groundfish indus-
try was imminent. The first signal was a substan-
tial increase in the real (inflation-adjusted) prices 
of groundfish blocks and fillets on the world 
market, even though an examination of longer-
term price trends would have raised the possibil-
ity that this was just an upswing in one of the 
industry's periodic price cycles. Second, 1977 was 
a boom year for fishing-vessel construction in the 
U.S., particularly the construction of large 
(> 100-t) vessels, capable of groundfish trawling 
but primarily designed to exploit Alaska's king 
and tanner crab resources. Some purchasers of 
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Table I. U.S. and foreign harvest of Alaska groundfish (t round weight). 
Flounder Ocean perch 
Pacific 
cod 
and and Alaska 
pollack 
Other 
species• sole rockfish Sablefish 
. Foreign catchb 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 552.5 15.4 15.1 15.9 5996.3 134.3 
Taiwan 199.7 161.3 27.0 38.4 4973.7 107.9 
Japan 60105.1 147369.2 21898.5 6713.1 870890.0' 61687.2 
Poland 681.8 844.3 93.5 152.2 59230.9 365.l 
South Korea 8070.1 31554.2 1825.2 1241.2 138877.4 28409.2 
USSR 1953.2 1848.8 1255.2 416.0 39157.2 13529.3 
Canada 1177.6 
U.S. catch 
U.S. processed 6213.2 263.5 522.2 1541.3 3298.0 490.7 
Joint-venture processed 8922.0 12627.7 90.9 58.9 11787.7 995.3 
'Includes Atka mackerel, herring, tanner crab, snails, halibut, other finfish, and squid and unclassified. 
bNinety-three percent of total U.S. fisheries allocations to foreigners in 1980 - 1.6 Mt. 
'Excludes tanner crab. 
Sources: Foreign catch, U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service ( 1981); U.S. total catch, North Pacific Fisheries 
Management Council (1981); and joint-venture catch, French et al. (1981). 
vessels did require special features for groundfish 
trawling on the premise that these would be 
expensive to install later. 
An abrupt change occurred in mid-1979. Prices 
of king crab, and eventually of most Pacific-coast 
species, declined sharply. The immediate result 
was a halt in new orders for the large trawlers 
upon which hopes for domestic groundfish 
development had hinged. As early as mid-1977, 
the prices of frozen groundfish fillets and blocks 
had, in real terms, already begun the decline from 
which they have yet to recover. At the same time, 
fuel and investment capital became more expen-
sive. The result has been modest growth in the 
domestic Alaska groundfish industry. Alaskan 
processors tried, with limited success, to fillet 
groundfish when their plants were not being used 
to process higher valued species. Similarly, 
groundfish catches were made by idle U.S. fish-
ing vessels. However, the largest U.S. catches 
were, and continue to be, made as part of joint-
venture arrangements with foreign-fishing inter-
ests. Of the total 1.558 Mt of Alaska groundfish 
harvested in 1980, 1.512 Mt (97%) were taken by 
foreign fishing vessels. Furthermore, 34 000 t of 
the 47 000 t U.S. harvest (72%) was processed on 
foreign factory ships participating in joint 
ventures. 
Although one may regard 3 years as too short a 
time to conclude that early enthusiasm about a 
U.S. groundfish industry was unwarranted, other 
factors support this conclusion. One is the failure 
of several early groundfish processing ventures 
and subsequent withdrawal of their sponsoring 
firms. Also, there has been virtually no new 
investment in groundfish-dedicated plants or 
vessels. The furthest the industry has ventured 
has been to refit existing vessels and processing 
plants with mechanisms for groundfish produc-
tion during the off-seasons for higher valued spe-
cies. Although such an approach makes eco-
nomic sense as a low-risk way of testing economic 
conditions, it cannot be seen as the basis for a 
large-scale industry. 
Thus, the market has spoken at least for the 
near future. But it has only said what will not 
happen. What will happen still requires specula-
tion. In my view, there are four possibilities: two 
of them include development of a domestic 
groundfish industry, whereas the other two 
involve allocation of the resources among pri-
marily foreign participants. 
Market-Induced Development 
The possibility that market forces will eventu-
ally lead to development of a U.S. groundfish 
industry in Alaska cannot be completely dis-
missed. Presumably, world groundfish demand 
will grow at least in proportion to population 
increases in the major consuming regions - the 
U.S., Europe, and Japan. Demand for frozen fish 
blocks will likely grow even faster, as the conve-
nience foods produced from them exhibit a 
greater income elasticity than is typical of other 
fisheries products. 
Supply may or may not keep pace at current 
prices. Most of the world's major groundfish 
resources are already fully exploited, or overex-
ploited, although some opportunities exist for 
new groundfish-resource development, particu-
larly in the economic-resource zones of southern 
hemisphere nations like Argentina and South 
Africa. Also, if and when north Atlantic nations 
restrict their current catches to levels that permit 
the rebuilding of stocks, they will set in motion a 
process that should also lead to long-run supply 
increases. 
If the demand outstrips both these possible 
sources of new supply, then the real price of 
frozen groundfish products could rise on the 
world market and, with it, the financial promise 
of an American groundfish industry in Alaska. 
Another factor that may lead to the same end is 
the recent rise in world petroleum prices. Much 
of the effect of post-1974 fuel-price increases on 
the world groundfish market may still be masked 
by the existence of a distant-water fishing fleet 
built under earlier economic conditions. The 
opportunity cost of deploying the fleet for the 
remainder of its economic life is low compared 
with that for rebuilding and operating subse-
quent generations of distant-water fishing ves-
sels. The fleet can economically exploit world 
groundfish resources at real prices not signifi-
cantly higher than those prevailing during the 
1960s and early 1970s until new capital invest-
ments are required for replacement vessels. The 
world groundfish supply curve will then shift 
upward to reflect more fully the long-term effect 
of higher fuel costs, resulting presumably in 
higher real prices for frozen groundfish products. 
Numerous groundfish feasibility studies (Scott 
1980; Stokes and Offord 1981) have suggested the 
shape the industry would take if it were devel-
oped, beginning as a part-time operation provid-
ing off-season employment for personnel whose 
primary economic motive would be the harvest 
and processing of higher valued species. Eventu-
ally, the industry would shift to year-round oper-
ation to provide continuity of supply and to meet 
quality standards required for competition in 
U.S. and world groundfish markets. 
One sector would comprise shore-based plants 
in Gulf of Alaska communities, processing the 
catch from medium-sized trawlers. Alongside 
this industry one might also find a limited hook-
and-line fishery concentrating on higher valued 
species such as Pacific cod and rockfish; although 
its output would be small, it might become an 
important source of local employment. 
The State of Alaska understandably favours 
development of such a shore-based groundfish 
industry. In fact, the state, and particularly the 
several communities bordering on the central and 
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southeast Gulf, regard groundfish as one of the 
most promising renewable resources in their eco-
nomic base. However, the fact that the majority 
of Alaska groundfish are located well to the west 
of these communities along the Aleutian Islands 
and in the Bering Sea means that much of the 
resource will have to be harvested and processed 
offshore. 
Immediate processing and freezing of products 
at sea offers economic advantages as well as 
independence from shoreside facilities. At pres-
ent, there is one U.S. vessel with processing 
capacity operating in Alaska waters -the Arctic 
Trawler. Formerly, the Arctic Trawler was 
government owned. It was purchased and refitted 
by a Seattle-based group, now harvesting Pacific 
cod and pollack with apparent technical and eco-
nomic success. However, this venture's economic 
performance cannot be easily duplicated, the rea-
son being that no other such vessel is available in 
the U.S.-built fleet and to construct such a vessel 
at current U.S. shipbuilding costs is not now 
considered to be a sound investment. 
Policy-Induced Development 
It is possible that a domestic Alaska ground-
fish industry will develop as a result of policies 
adopted by the U.S. federal government or the 
State of Alaska. Both the federal government and 
the State of Alaska (Scott 1980) currently subsi-
dize fisheries development. However, there have 
not been any significant new federal subsidy pro-
grams instituted since extension of jurisdiction, 
nor in the present fiscal climate are any expected. 
In contrast, the State of Alaska, with consider-
able revenues from the taxation of oil produc-
tion, is able to embark on major economic-
development programs independently of the 
federal government and has elected to use a sig-
nificant share of its coffers to develop renewable-
resource-based industries including a shore-based 
groundfish industry (Scott 1980). 
American international trade policy could 
have a major effect on the rate of Alaska ground-
fish development. Restriction of groundfish 
imports could raise prices; pressure on foreign 
nations to reduce trade barriers could open for-
eign markets; and relaxation of restraints 
imposed by the U.S. on fishing-industry inputs 
could reduce costs. 
On both U.S. coasts, people have long advo-
cated tariff protection for the groundfish indus-
try. The most recent effort was a 1979 petition to 
the International Trade Commission filed on 
behalf of Pacific-coast groundfish trawlers. 
However, the tariffs remain 0-2.Sci:/lb. 
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(0-5.5¢/kg) (U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion 1980), whereas wholesale prices range from 
75¢ to well over $1/lb. ($1.50-$2.20/kg). 
Groundfish imports continue to enter the U.S. 
market free of significant trade restraints, and in 
1980 U.S. groundfish demand was largely met by 
foreign sources (100% of groundfish blocks and 
77% of fillets and steaks). 
At the most recent groundfish-tariff hearings, 
fishing personnel argued that protection from 
foreign imports was essential if they were to pene-
trate the frozen groundfish market and even if 
they were to retain their current share of the U.S. 
fresh groundfish market. The "converters," dis-
tributors, and processors of imported groundfish 
countered that the internal structure of the U.S. 
fishing industry presented the most significant 
impediment to U.S. industry growth. In particu-
lar, they claimed that U.S. suppliers could not 
meet the quality standards of foreign suppliers 
(U.S. International Trade Commission 1980). 
The converters also noted that raising tariffs or 
introducing quotas might be sufficient measures 
to make fishing for species such as cod and flat-
fish economic but would not be enough to tip the 
balance for pollack, the bulk of Alaska's ground-
fish resource. Any stringent trade restrictions 
would have a serious effect on U.S. groundfish 
consumption, the lower priced cuts of beef (ham-
burger) as well as pork and poultry being substi-
tuted for frozen fish sticks, fillets, etc. Casual 
observation, industry experience, and formal 
demand studies all point to strong consumer sub-
stitution relationships between groundfish and 
these other products. If U.S. consumers were to 
shift from imported groundfish toward domesti-
cally produced beef, pork, and poultry, domestic 
groundfish producers would have to recapture 
the market later, a problem perhaps more diffi-
cult than competing with foreign suppliers. 
The U.S. government has pressured foreign 
nations to reduce their trade barriers to ground-
fish imports. Specifically, it has linked Japanese 
access to U.S. groundfish resources with trade 
policy and U.S. access to the large Japanese 
groundfish market. In early 1980 after the USSR 
was expelled from U.S. fishing grounds, U.S. 
fisheries officials embarked on what was termed a 
campaign of "fish-and-chips diplomacy." The 
purpose was to use a portion of the Soviets' 
former allocation as an incentive to other nations 
to relax their trade restraints or to purchase U.S. 
fisheries products. This effect met with some suc-
cess, and nations who responded favourably were 
rewarded with new or increased 1980 allocations. 
This approach has now been introduced into 
U.S. law as part of the 1980 revisions to FCMA. 
Ironically, tariffs and trade restraints imposed 
on inputs used by the U.S. fishing industry are 
one factor that keeps U.S. groundfish above 
world prices. The most significant cost increases 
result from the Jones Act, which prohibits U.S. 
personnel to use foreign-built vessels in U.S. 
fisheries. When FCMA extended fisheries juris-
diction to 200 miles, the Jones Act still applied 
only to fishing within the 12-mile limit. People 
soon discovered they could acquire and use sur-
plus foreign trawlers in Alaskan waters and that 
the prohibition inside 12 miles was not a major 
economic restriction because they could transfer 
their frozen fish to a U.S.-built transport vessel or 
land in a foreign port. American shipbuilders 
immediately sought legislation to close the 
"loophole" that permitted this practice. What is 
surprising is that they were supported by a signif-
icant share of the U.S. fishing industry and 
numerous fishery policymakers. The argument of 
these fisheries people was that people who 
bought foreign boats could compete unfairly 
with those who had already invested large sums 
in a U.S. -built groundfish trawling fleet. Be ca use 
no such fleet has yet appeared or is under con-
struction, one must assume that the vessels being 
referred to were the numerous crabber trawlers 
then being built. 
This apparent misunderstanding illustrates the 
necessity for viewing Alaska groundfish devel-
opment in the context of the rest of Alaska's 
fisheries, particularly the crab fishery. At present, 
well over 200 vessels take the entire king crab 
quota in about 1 month, whereas historically far 
fewer vessels operated nearly year round. 
King crab vessels, particularly the newer and 
larger ones, are the closest thing to a groundfish 
trawl fleet that currently operates in Alaskan 
waters. Many crabbers already harvest ground-
fish for U.S. and foreign joint-venture proces-
sors, and many others indicate an interest in 
doing so when, and if, groundfish harvesting 
becomes economically attractive: that is, when-
ever such an operation represents the most prof-
itable employment of the crab vessel and its crew. 
By one estimate, the existing crab fleet could take 
200 000-300 000 t of Alaska groundfish if all 
available crab vessels operated in the crab off-
season. The adverse side effects when the season 
opens for king crab, and to some degree for 
tanner crab, are that groundfish processors shut 
down, crews are laid off, and deliveries are termi-
nated until the close of the crab season. Then 
processors must rehire and retrain crews and 
work to reestablish markets for their products. 
Meantime, by contrast, their foreign competitors 
who harvest and process groundfish all year 
maintain the skill levels of their workers by pro-
viding continuous employment and the good will 
of their customers by offering reliable supplies. 
Continued Foreign Exploitation 
under Present Allocation Rules 
Unless significant changes occur in economic 
conditions or in public policy, the domestic har-
vests of Alaska groundfish will fall far short of 
the harvestable total. Under FCMA, the U.S. 
commitment to full utilization requires con-
tinued allocations to foreigners. The recent revi-
sions to FCMA have substantially changed the 
rules on how surpluses are allocated among com-
peting foreign nations and how foreign fishing 
fees are assessed. 
Under the original Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 the United States 
adopted a policy of allocating harvestable sur-
pluses primarily on the basis of each nation's 
traditional participation in U.S. waters. A rather 
nominal fee for those allocations was based on 
U.S. government costs that could be attributed to 
foreign-fishing activities. 
Amendments adopted in 1980 de-emphasized 
traditional participation and introduced a new 
criterion for allocation: the recipient nation's will-
ingness to support U.S. fisheries development. 
The amendments also changed the language con-
cerning foreign fishing fees. 
Foreign fishery allocation determinations shall 
be made by the Secretary of State and the Secre-
tary of Commerce on the basis of 
a. whether, and to what extent, such nations 
impose tariff barriers, or non-tariff barriers, 
on importation, or otherwise restrict, the 
market access of United States fish or fisher-
ies products; 
b. whether, and to what extent, such nations are 
cooperating with the United States in the 
advancement of existing and new opportuni-
ties for fishery products from United States 
processors or United States fishermen; ... ; 
e. whether, and to what extent, such nations 
otherwise contribute to, or foster the growth 
of, a sound and economic United States fish-
ing industry, including minimizing gear con-
flicts with fishing operations of United States 
fishermen, and transferring harvesting or 
processing technology which will benefit the 
United States fishing industry. 
Fees imposed ... shall be at least in an amount 
sufficient to return to the United States an 
amount which bears to the total cost of carrying 
out the provisions of this chapter (including but 
not limited to, fishery conservation and man-
agement, fisheries research, administration, and 
enforcement, but excluding costs for observers 
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covered by surcharges ... ) during each fiscal 
year the same ratio as the aggregate quantity of 
fish harvested by foreign fishing vessels within 
the fishery conservation zone during the preced-
ing year bears to the aggregate quantity of fish 
harvested by both foreign and domestic fishing 
vessels within such zone and the territorial 
waters of the United States during such preced-
ing year (U.S. Congress, Public Law 94-265, 94 
stat. 3299). 
Another significant recent development in 
allocation policy has been the growth of joint 
ventures, particularly between U.S. vessels and 
foreign processors. Groundfish in the round are 
delivered to the processor at sea, where they are 
converted to products aboard the foreign-flag 
vessel. Usually, the U.S. fishing vessel simply 
tows its trawl net to the vicinity of the processor 
vessel. There the cod end of the net is detached 
and tied to a buoy until the fish it contains can be 
processed. 
Joint ventures were apparently not foreseen by 
the original drafters of FCMA nor are they 
explicitly dealt with in either the old or the new 
foreign allocation and fee provisions. The only 
reference FCMA makes to joint ventures is the 
so-called processor-preference amendment, 
which restricts them from direct competition 
with U.S. processors. 
Regardless of how joint ventures are legally 
treated, their development is a natural economic 
outcome of U.S. policy concerning fisheries allo-
cation. Given that the demand for foreign alloca-
tions exceeds the supply, one would expect for-
eigners to seek to increase their share of the total. 
FCMA provides no way for an increase in share 
except from American fishing vessels, which have 
not only an automatic preference over all for-
eigners but also the right to take groundfish 
without paying any significant fees. U.S. and for-
eign entrepreneurs have quickly discovered the 
obvious route to a marriage of interests. 
Under current joint-venture arrangements, the 
foreign participants normally provide the labour 
and capital inputs required for processing. For 
these, they hold the advantages of paying lower 
wage rates and of having already acquired capital 
equipment. The U.S. vessels provide the fishing 
effort at a relatively low cost because mostjoint-
venture fisheries operate during the crab off-
season when economic alternatives are limited. 
However, the crucial contribution of the U.S. 
vessels is their access to the resource on a prefer-
ential, no-fee basis. The result, as recent expe-
rience has shown, has been a commercially prof-
itable venture for both partners, accounting in 
19gv for 72% of U.S. landings of Alaska 
groundfish. 
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Foreign Fishing Fees: an Allocation Device 
That monetary fees have been given so little 
consideration as a tool in allocating U.S.fishery 
resources is a little puzzling. The federal govern-
ment relies heavily on fees to allocate federally 
owned timber, petroleum, minerals, and other 
natural resources; and other coastal nations have 
included newly acquired fisheries resources 
among those they sell to foreign interests. Else-
where, I (Stokes 1981) have dealt with the way 
that fees could be used to allocate U.S. fisheries 
resources. 
Briefly, one method would be to set a fee and to 
observe whether the total demand for allocations 
exceeds or falls short of the allocable surplus. The 
response would indicate whether increases or 
reductions in the fee were needed. The fee would 
have to be adjusted as economic conditions 
change. Alternatively, the U.S. could take bids 
on appropriately defined units of fishery re-
sources. Potential buyers would then determine 
the market-clearing fee by offering bids. The 
highest of these would be accepted by the U.S. 
until the available surplus was allocated. 
A variety of factors other than the value of 
allocations to potential buyers would determine 
the actual level of revenues received by the U.S. 
Perhaps the most important of these would be the 
extent of competition among buyers. The eco-
nomic theory of bidding indicates that only under 
competitive conditions will bids approach the net 
profit to be expected from the allocation. 
In trying to sell Alaska groundfish, the U.S. 
would face a far from competitive market struc-
ture. Rather, the market would consist of one 
dominant buyer, Japan (77% of the 1980 alloca-
tion), and a periphery of smaller competitors. 
The Japanese would presumably recognize and 
exploit this market power, and how the U.S. 
would counter in the resulting bilateral bargain-
ing situation is not clear. However, the U.S. posi-
tion would be strengthened by the existence of 
current or potential competition. 
Hence, policies that restrict competition can be 
seen as weakening the U.S. hand when and if 
market allocation is ever adopted. Included 
among these policies would certainly be any 
residual allegiance to the traditional fisheries 
concept, which denies bidding rights to potential 
competitors simply because they have not histori-
cally fished in U.S. waters. The same would be 
true of the ban on fishing by the Soviet Union 
which, until its exclusion, was Japan's principal 
competitor for U.S. fisheries resources. 
Conclusions 
The options for the U.S. in effectively manag-
ing its groundfish resources do not exclude the 
development of a domestic capacity to exploit 
them; however, in the short and medium term, 
there are much more economically rational 
approaches. The first step is a rethinking of the 
policies on allocation of the resources. If policy-
makers were to decide to maintain present alloca-
tion policies, then they would need to give much 
greater attention to joint ventures than they are 
currently. If they decided to change the policies 
on allocation, they could consider several means 
of obtaining fees that are commensurate with the 
value of the resource. 
Discussion 
Yoshiaki Matsuda: In contrast to early expecta-
tions, the domestic Alaska groundfish industry 
has developed little in the 3 years since FCMA 
was enacted. Realizing this fact, Stokes discusses 
possible alternative management schemes for 
resource use, including market-induced devel-
opment, policy-induced development, continued 
foreign exploitation under present allocation 
rules and under a new schedule of fees. Each 
possibility has advantages and disadvantages. 
Market-induced development is favourable from 
the economic point of view but unfavourable 
from the social point of view; policy-induced 
development promotes balanced domestic fisher-
ies development but could be very expensive; 
continued foreign exploitation under present 
allocation rules encourages local development 
through joint ventures with foreigners but re-
duces the U.S. government's share of fee income; 
and foreign fishing fees provide fee income at low 
administrative cost but discourage domestic 
fisheries development. The options require that 
priorities be set and trade offs be made in accor-
dance with the priorities. 
I agree with Stokes' conclusion that the U.S. 
must avoid encouraging groundfish operations 
that could never survive on their own in the open 
market and would require permanent subsidy if 
they were not to engender painful economic 
decline in the communities where they have been 
introduced. 
However, I would like to comment particularly 
on his pessimistic evaluation of current Alaskan 
groundfish development. He notes that U.S. fish-
ing operations harvested 47 400 t (3%) of Alaskan 
groundfish resources in 1981. He feels that this 
accomplishment is minor; however, I feel it is 
only low in comparison with U.S. expectations, 
which may have been too high. 
Unlike development in construction, transpor-
tation, and communication, fisheries develop-
ment is slow because of its complexity. Although 
the United States has discredited itself by using 
strong political pressures on foreign countries in 
its current policy offish-and-chips diplomacy, it 
has a good start in developing the capacity to 
exploit its Alaska groundfish resources. The Unit-
ed States must understand the reality and limita-
tions in developing such a fishery. 
Stokes' paper has not mentioned anything 
about the Blow, Magnuson, and Weicker bills. 
However, the Japanese are concerned about the 
policies in these bills that seek to phase out for-
eign fishing, increase fishing fees, etc. In fact, 
these bills are an indication that U.S. policymak-
ers liave forgotten that foreigners have not 
always been bad for the United States. For 
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example, the Japanese have been willing not only 
to observe conservation measures but also to 
invest in many U.S. fisheries industries, such as 
salmon eggs, roe herring, herring-spawn-on-
kelp, sea urchins, and oysters. In addition, they 
have provided the best market for U.S. fisheries 
products, absorbing more than 50% of the total 
U.S. fisheries exports. 
Frankly speaking, I would like to ask whether 
Alaskan groundfish fisheries development 
(which pertains to dramatically underutilized 
low-valued species) by the U.S. fishing industry is 
advisable when the opportunity costs for this 
development seem to be very high. Now is the 
time to ask why the United States wants to 
develop a domestic industry to exploit Alaska 
groundfish and why it needs fish-purchasing mis-
sions from Japan to guide it in setting up facilities 
to cater to the Japanese market at Japanese 
expense. Normally, when a country wants to sell 
a product to another nation, the producers learn 
the language of the potential consumers and do 
market research at their own expense. In the 
Japanese people's eyes, the policymakers in the 
U.S. are not behaving responsibly. The United 
States should be examining past experiences and 
working toward new means of international 
cooperation that do not exploit others and that 
mutually benefit all the participants. 
Canadian Regulation of Pacific Fisheries 
David G. Moloney 
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
The rich fish stocks on Canada's west coast have been commercially exploited for a century and 
regulated by the Canadian government for many decades. The salmon, halibut, and roe herring 
fisheries are the most important, and the efforts to manage the stocks since the introduction of 
extended fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ) provide insights into the special requirements in managing 
migratory species (salmon) and fisheries, such as roe herring, that are dependent on export markets. 
The impact of EFJ is particularly clear for the halibut fishery. The history of regulation can be 
divided into two phases. Early efforts were based almost entirely on biologic considerations. Starting 
in the 1960s, limited entry programs were used in an attempt to reduce economic inefficiencies and to 
protect the stocks, but these failed because the economic incentives to remaining participants were 
unchanged. Landings taxes and transferable quotas have been proposed as means of rationalizing 
these fisheries, but any scheme that fails to address the crucial links - biologic, economic, and 
international - cannot succeed. 
Le Canada exploite sur une base commerciale ses abondants stocks de poissons de la cote ouest 
depuis un sii:cle et le gouvernement exerce ses droits sur cette zone depuis plusieurs decennies. Les 
peches !es plus importantes comprennent le saumon, le fletan et le hareng. Les efforts de gestion des 
stocks halieutiques depuis !'extension de la juridiction sur !es peches ont mis en relief la necessite de 
fixer des mesures speciales pour la gestion rationnelle des especes migratoires. L'impact de ces 
mesures est particulierement evident dans le cas du fletan. L'histoire juridique de la gestion des 
peches maritimes comprend deux etapes. Les premiers efforts realises s'appuyaient sur des consi-
derations biologiques; Mais des le debut des annees 60, des reglementations furent imposees pour 
!utter contre la surexploitation et proteger !es populations mais ces moyens se sont averes insuffi-
sants, !es rendements repartis entre !es pecheurs n'ayant pas ete rajustes. D'autres formules telles que 
taxe par capture et quota de prise ont ete proposees mais toutetechnique de Jutte est vouee a un echec 
si elle ne comprend pas des parametres fondamentaux a la fois biologiques, economiques et 
internationaux. 
The wild stocks of fish on the northwest coast 
of North America were extraordinarily bountiful 
and productive in their natural state. The Pacific 
salmon especially has long been a highly prized 
fish and, along with the halibut and herring, pro-
vided the economic basis for a wealthy and stable 
coastal Indian culture. With the influx of settlers 
to British Columbia in the late 19th century, 
exploitation of these resources, especially those 
in the Gulf of Georgia, rapidly increased. The 
primary demand has been, and continues to be, 
from export markets. The United States, which 
provided the earliest export market, contin.ues to 
be important, but Japan and the EEC nations 
(especially Great Britain) are importers of sub-
stantial amounts of fisheries products from the 
west coast. 
Salmon occupies a preeminent position in the 
B.C. industry, accounting for up to 60% of total 
landed value (DFO 1980). The salmon fishery has 
always received a large share of public attention, 
particularly regulatory attention, as a result. 
Regulation of west-coast fisheries in Canada is 
carried out exclusively by the federal govern-
ment, as part of its constitutional jurisdiction 
over coastal fish and fisheries. Apart from limited 
jurisdiction over sport fish and shellfish, the pro-
vincial government has control of fish only after 
they have been landed on the dock. This arrange-
ment has allowed the federal government to link 
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management of the stocks both to international 
trade in products and to international efforts at 
cooperation in fisheries stock management. In 
Canada's case, the latter has principally been 
with the United States but also included agree-
ments with Japan. 
Objectives 
Unrestricted, open-access exploitation of fish 
stocks usually leads to several undesirable conse-
quences (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955). One is that, if 
the market conditions are favourable and the 
available technology effective, the fish stock 
could shrink sufficiently to endanger its long-
term survival. A second deleterious result is that 
the level of fishing effort (in the form of capital 
and labour inputs) typically exceeds that 
required to take the catch in an efficient, least-
cost manner. 
Those who have introduced administrative 
regulation of the fisheries off the west coast of 
Canada have not in general viewed the avoidance 
of the second consequence as a primary objective. 
The overriding goal, historically, has been pro-
tection of the fish stocks. For this reason, bio-
logic management has until recently been the 
major organizing principle of the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans. (This agency has under-
gone several name changes over the decades but 
will be referred to here as the DFO.) In particu-
lar, the biologic concept of maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) was the typical expression of the 
goal of fisheries' policy over many decades, 
beginning early in the century. This goal is also 
enshrined in several international treaties relat-
ing to fisheries management to which Canada is a 
signatory (Logan 1974). The major regulatory 
tools applied were total-catch quotas, closed sea-
sons, gear restrictions, and area regulations and 
closures. Effective biologic management does 
require protection of spawning areas and other 
such measures, but because salmon, for example, 
spawn only once, size restrictions have not 
always been used. Related to the biologic empha-
sis was the need to protect the distribution of the 
shrinking catch among traditional gear types and 
fishing groups. 
The principal difficulty with the traditional 
approach to management was that it did not deal 
with the economic implications of the controls it 
instituted. Effort expanded in competition for 
the available catch (Sinclair 1978), returns to 
individuals were threatened, and the number of 
redundant inputs was enormous. As a result, 
open seasons were shortened over time. A 
demand thus existed by the 1960s for a revised 
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management scheme, but the programs that fol-
lowed paid little explicit attention to the ineffi-
ciencies or costs of excessive effort, the one 




There are five major species of salmon on the· 
west coast - sockeye, coho, pink, chinook 
(spring), and chum - all of which are commer-
cially exploited. Salmon are "anadromous" fish; 
mature classes return from the ocean to spawn in 
the coastal rivers and streams in which they were 
spawned. The stocks available for exploitation 
are highly variable because time to maturity 
differs across the five species and because the run 
up a particular river is a mixture of runs from 
different species and genetically distinct subspe-
cies, each making for its particular spawning 
ground. Specific substocks are highly vulnerable 
to overexploitation, owing to their habit of trav-
eling in large schools once they move close to 
shore. They are easily taken by nets if they 
migrate when the fishing is "open." 
The wide-ranging movement of the salmon 
during their early life, together with their high 
market value, makes them a subject for interna-
tional debate. The two largest runs of British 
Columbia salmon are those returning to the 
Fraser and Skeena rivers. Together, these 
account for 50% of salmon caught in B. C. (Mac-
donald 1980), and both pass through U.S. terri-
torial waters. Another significant run, bound for 
the Columbia River. on the U.S. coast, passes 
through Canadian waters off the western coast of 
Vancouver Island. Commonly, one nation's fish-
ing operations intercept the stocks returning to 
another nation's rivers. 
Exploitation of the salmon resource was 
prompted by a strong export demand. The tradi-
tional export form was canned salmon, with the 
United Kingdom being the largest consumer of 
west-coast products. More recently, the canned 
salmon industry has become increasingly 
dependent on the domestic market, which is pro-
tected by a 7. 5% tariff (Macdonald 1980). During 
1966-74, roughly 47% of canned salmon was 
exported. Exports of frozen whole salmon have 
been increasing, largely in response to increasing 
Japanese demand since the mid-1970s. Over the 
same period, 75% of frozen salmon was exported 
(DFO 1979), with some recent years showing 
exports as high as 90% (Macdonald 1980). This 
strong international market has had predictable 
effects on the levels of effort devoted to salmon 
fishing. 
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Exploitation of the Fraser River sockeye 
stocks was well developed by the end of the 19th 
century, and fear for the stocks was expressed 
from the 1880s onward (Fraser 1977). A series of 
slides in the Fraser Canyon limited access to the 
spawning grounds, but Canada was reluctant 
either to invest in improvement to this access or 
to curb its own fleet, believing that the benefits of 
such actions would accrue largely to the Ameri-
can fleet that was fishing the same stocks as they 
moved through the Juan de Fuca Strait and the 
lower Gulf of Georgia. 
Eventually, mutual concern for the stocks led 
to an agreement between the U.S. and Canada, a 
model for international cooperation in fisheries 
management. The Sockeye Salmon Fisheries 
Convention was signed by Canada and the U.S. 
in 1930, although it was not ratified until 1937. It 
created the International Pacific Salmon Fisher-
ies Commission (IPSFC), which was empowered 
to improve the Fraser River sockeye migratory 
route and to regulate the Fraser sockeye catch. In 
1946, it began to regulate exploitation, and the 
Fraser pink salmon stocks were added to its pur-
view in 1956 (Gardner 1980). The Commission 
set total allowable catches, mesh sizes, net 
lengths, area closures by gear type, and weekly 
limits on fishing days. The outstanding aspect of 
this convention, however, is the distributive and 
protective stipulation that the sockeye catch be 
split on a 50 : 50 basis between Canadian and 
U.S. fishing operations and that costs of Fraser 
River fish ladders, spawning-ground improve-
ments, etc., be shared equally by the two coun-
tries. These features remain in force today. The 
Commission invested heavily in clearing the 
river, and the stocks have continued to be com-
mercially exploited. 
A second international agreement of great 
importance to salmon was the tripartite Interna-
tional Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of 
the North Pacific Ocean (N orpac Treaty), which 
was signed by Japan, Canada, and the U.S. in 
1952. J,apan agreed to abstain from fishing sal-
mon (a'iid halibut) east of 175° W (a line more or 
less through the middle of the Bering Sea). Pre-
viously Japan had been free to take salmon 
stocks while they were still in their immature, 
high-seas stage. An important caveat to this prin-
ciple was that the domestic nations fully utilize 
their stocks. It later became a principle of the 
draft law of the sea treaty that anadromous 
stocks should not be intercepted by foreign fleets, 
but this earlier treaty was clearly an important 
preliminary step (Logan 1974). 
Despite these unique attempts at maintaining 
stocks by international cooperation, domestic-
stock management became increasingly difficult. 
The number of days of salmon fishing allowed 
each week declined steadily, and open seasons 
became progressively shorter as the amount of 
effort grew larger and larger. After several years 
of discussion and study (Sinclair 1960), a Licence 
Limitation Program was implemented in 1969 in 
the B.C. salmon fishery. Because this program 
was an important breakthrough in fisheries man-
agement, it is worth stating its objectives in full. 
These were: 
• To reduce the salmon-fishing fleet so that 
the remaining vessels would be more efficiently 
utilized. 
• To reduce capitalization of the salmon-
fishing fleet. 
• To increase the net earnings of the personnel 
involved in salmon fishing. 
• To provide the opportunity for government 
to obtain an economic rent from the salmon 
fishery. 
• To provide the basis for improved conserva-
tion techniques (Sinclair 1978). 
The underlying rationale was that a reduced 
fleet could take the catch at lower costs and have 
less need of new capital investment in gear and 
equipment, so that rents would emerge that could 
be shared by the fishing fleet and the government. 
At the same time, pressures on the stocks could 
be more easily controlled. These objectives would 
not be seriously questioned by most fisheries 
economists, but the program for achieving them 
was doomed to partial success. 
The central features of the program were to be 
attained in four stages, only three of which were 
actually implemented. (Detailed analysis of the 
regulations can be found in Fraser 1977; Pearse 
and Wilen 1979; Sinclair 1979; and Macdonald 
1980.) Under the first phase, the total number of 
vessels was to have been limited to its 1968 level. 
After an appeals process allowed the entry of 
several marginal participants, no new vessel 
licences were issued. All vessels that had engaged 
in salmon fishing in the previous 2 years were 
licenced to continue participation: "A" licences 
for vessels with catches above a certain limit in 
those years and "B" licences for all others. This 
distinction was aimed at restricting fishing to 
full-time participants: only "A" licences were 
transferable to replacement vessels.No gear stip-
ulations were made, however, and only nominal 
fees were charged. 
The second phase attempted a substantial 
decrease in fleet size by limiting the life of "B" 
licences to the period ending in 1981 ( su bse-
quently extended for 5 years) and, more impor-
tantly, by introducing a buy-back program. 
Under the latter initiative, the government 
offered to buy any "A" vessels tendered to it and 
arranged for an attractive price as an incentive, 
i.e., the price was to be that determined by two 
independent evaluations, plus a 15% premium 
(Campbell 1974). These purchases were to be 
funded by licence-fee revenues, and the fees were 
increased.I The buy-back program started in 
1971 but was eliminated in 1973, as a result of 
rising vessel costs and expected resistance to the 
higher licence fees that continuation would have 
required. Another stipulation was that "A" ves-
sels could only be replaced by a vessel of equal or 
less tonnage. This was aimed at curbing the early 
practice of retiring small vessels and replacing 
them with much larger ones of greatly enhanced 
fishing power. 
The third phase was in fact industry-wide and 
was concerned solely with vessel standards that 
affected the quality of fish landed. It started in 
1973. 
The fourth phase, which has yet to be imple-
mented, is to relax the restrictions on time and 
area available for fishing. This phase was planned 
on the expectation that fishing power would 
decline as a result of the three earlier phases, but 
the necessary decline has yet to be observed. 
The vessels that remained in the fishery after 
1969 continued to invest in new equipment and 
even more sophisticated vessels to the extent that 
revenues exceeded costs, because the fish stock 
remained a common-property resource among 
those vested with licences. No legal or property 
limit was imposed on a vessel's potential catch, 
and, in fact, a desire to prosper in the race for fish 
during regulatory openings justified increased 
speed, storage, communications, and capacity. A 
slight decrease in the numbers of vessels (roughly 
10%) was brought about, but real-capital growth 
has been noted in several studies. Pearse and 
Wilen (1979) estimated, for example, that real 
capital employed in the fishery (corrected for the 
value of the licence) grew at an average annual 
rate of 5.7% between 1957 and 1968, and con-
tinued to grow at 3.7% between 1969 and 1977, 
despite roughly constant real-fleet revenue over 
the full period.2 Thus, although the difference in 
rates is statistically significant, implying that the 
program did have a limiting effect on capitaliza-
tion, this success was only partial. 
1This schedule remained in place until the 1981 sea-
son, at which time fees in each category were doubled. 
2Pearse and Wilen do point out that there may have 
been some quasi rents incorporated in their figures, but 
these would not likely have persisted over the fall 
period. 
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The growth in capital occurred in a variety of 
ways. Before the replacement rule on vessel 
weight, 76 vessels were replaced by vessels with a 
combined tonnage three times that of the pre-
viously licenced vessels (Macdonald 1980). A 
second method used after 1971 ("pyramiding") 
replaced several small vessels by a single large 
vessel of the same net tonnage but with a higher 
catch capacity than the smaller ones combined. 
The increment was especially large when a seine 
vessel (which uses a purse-seine net) replaced 
gillnet or troll vessels. Finally, any vessel could 
add another gear type to that already used. As 
Macdonald (1980) points out, however, the fact 
that many seiners became "combination" vessels 
over the 1970s also had much to do with the fact 
that those vessels began to participate in other 
fisheries as well. 
Several subsequent salmon regulations were 
aimed at controlling or limiting this increase in 
fishing capacity. In 1977, seine vessels were 
allowed to replace seine vessels only. In 1978, 
vessels replacing a group of vessels were re-
stricted to be less than 50 feet (15.3 m) long. In 
1979, the tonne-for-tonne replacement rule was 
bolstered by a metre-for-metre rule. Finally, in 
1980, the practice of pyramiding was prohibited 
outright. The DFO, as regulatory authority, had 
been forced to adjust the salmon-vessel limitation 
program to close loopholes in the regulations and 
will likely have to continue to do so. Indeed, it is 
now a standard conclusion in the literature that, 
to the extent that inputs are substitutable one for 
the other, effort cannot be restricted by simple 
input regulation (Pearse 1978). 
In terms of its biologic objectives, the program 
has not been a major success, as is implied by the 
ongoing efforts to limit capacity. Fishery conser-
vation managers, faced with the fleet's rising 
mobility and power, have been forced to intro-
duce stricter area and time closures, with the 
openings reduced to portions of days in many 
areas. Troll vessels have not been subjected to 
such restrictions in their catching. This permis-
siveness exists at least in part for reasons related 
to international negotiation. A possible conse-
quence was the reduced numbers of chinook, a 
traditional target of troll fishing, in 1980. This 
lack of control seems also to have led to the 
imposition of catch-retention limits on trolling 
for sockeye, pink, and chum - traditional net 
fish. (Technological innovation has blurred the 
old rule of thumb that net-fishing operations 
caught sockeye and pinks while trollers caught 
coho and spring.) 
The major response to the threats to the sal-
mon stocks has not been any further economic 
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rationalization of the fleet but rather an attempt 
to increase the stocks directly through the Sal-
mon Enhancement Program. This initiative, 
which has counterparts in the U.S. and else-
where, has as its long-run goal the restoration of 
salmon stocks to their "historic" levels by direct 
investment in spawning grounds and channels, 
hatcheries, rearing ponds, etc. The first phase 
( 1977-84) envisions total expenditures of 
CA$ l 50 million, of which $50 million had been 
spent by 1980 (Fraser and Friedlander 1980). The 
wisdom of such investments may well be appar-
ent, viewed in isolation, but, because of the excess 
capacity that remains in the fishing fleet, reliance 
on this approach to guarantee the health of the 
stocks is questionable. 
The most important developments currently 
facing the salmon fishery, aside from the possibil-
ity of a complete revamping of management and 
rights to access (a major inquiry is currently 
under way), are linked to the 200-mile economic 
zones declared by Canada and the U.S. in 1977. 
Interceptions are being carried out largely within 
formerly high-seas regions now subject to the 
jurisdiction of one country or the other. Other 
species are also involved (especially halibut), but 
the result in the case of salmon has been open 
conflict between Canada and the U.S. The 
IPSFC has been one focus of this debate, with 
Canada demanding a larger share of the Fraser 
sockeye and pink catch and also greater financial 
contributions by the U.S. for spawning-ground 
improvements. Joint management has been 
based on I-year interim agreements, and a con-
vention seems to be taking shape that would at 
least put a ceiling on levels of interception. This 
issue is important not merely on distributional 
grounds, however. The strategic demands of 
international negotiations, based as they often 
are in fisheries matters on past levels of participa-
tion, are having significant effects on Canada's 
domestic management. The relatively lax regula-
tion of Canadian trolling (in comparison with the 
tight time and area restrictions placed on net 
vessels) is a consequence of these demands. The 
trollers have traditionally intercepted chinook 
and coho stocks returning to the Columbia 
River, and such interception is a crucial bargain-
ing point in the ongoing discussions about inter-
ception of the large Fraser and Skeena stocks. 
Domestic difficulties have arisen, however, 
because new lures have allowed trollers to take 
sockeye, pink, and chum salmon so that the tight 
regulations on net fishing are not sufficient to 
protect the stocks. As a result, friction between 
fishing operations using different gear has wors-
ened in recent years. 
Halibut 
The Pacific halibut is a demersal (bottom-
feeding) fish and is the largest of all flat fishes: the 
average halibut at 20 years weighs more than 45 
kg. It is a slow-maturing species, males reaching 
sexual maturity at 7-8 years and females at 12 
years (Crutchfield 1980). Halibut are thus partic-
ularly vulnerable, the stocks being slow to re-
cover from overexploitation. Crutchfield points 
out, however, that these characteristics imply 
that halibut is well suited as the basis for a stable, 
well-managed fishery. The west-coast stocks are 
truly transnational in nature, in contrast with the 
salmon; they are known to spawn at several 
places along the B.C. and Alaska coasts, and the 
various stocks mingle with one another con-
stantly. They typically move into the open ocean 
in winter and return in heavier concentrations to 
coastal waters in the summer. There is also a 
tendency for larvae and immature fish to migrate 
to the north and west and for the mature fish to 
move east and.south. 
Halibut are taken by "longline" fixed gear (due 
·to regulations). Although they could also be 
taken by bottom trawler along with most other 
groundfish, they are said to be far too valuable to 
be subjected to such an indiscriminate and often 
damaging fishing method. "Longlines" are 
lengths of line that lie on the ocean floor; at-
tached at regular intervals along them are shorter 
lines with hooks. Buoys are attached to both ends 
of the lines, and they are typically retrieved by 
power drums. 
The major market for Canadian halibut is the 
U.S. In the first 8 months of 1980, 98% of Cana-
da's exports of fresh halibut went to the U.S., 
along with some two-thirds of frozen halibut 
exports. Another 20% in the latter category went 
to Japan (Statistics Canada 1980). Between 1972 
and 1979, the real price of landed halibut tripled 
(Crutchfield 1980), but the rate of increase trailed 
off in 1978 and 1979. During 1980, the nominal 
price fell to about one-third its 1979 level. 
Halibut fishing has a long history in Canada, 
paralleling that of salmon in that early fears were 
expressed for the long-term survival of the 
stocks. The current lack of effort aimed at exploit-
ation of the south coast stocks may indicate that 
these fears were warranted. Vessels from both 
Canada and the U.S. were involved in the fishery, 
so management could be achieved only by coop-
eration. In 1923, Canada and the U.S. signed the 
Convention for the Preservation of Halibut 
Stocks, the "world's first international attempt at 
high seas conservation" (Logan 1974:43). The 
treaty was revised several times after 1930, with 
the most recent version having been in force from 
1953. The International Pacific Halibut Com-
mission (IPHC) was created in 1924 under the 
convention and given powers, to be exercised 
through the laws of the two countries, to regulate 
the total catch, gear type, and season and area 
openings. The Commission, whose objective has 
always been clearly understood to be the attain-
ment of maximum sustainable yield, is a reason-
ably autonomous international fisheries author-
ity, confining national government services to 
implementation and enforcement. 
Halibut landings declined during the 1920s but 
recovered (as did catch per unit effort - a stan-
dard proxy for stock size) and increased steadily 
to a peak in 1962. (Although the Commission 
claimed success for its regulations, subsequent 
study has attributed this fluctuation in part to 
environmental factors as well.) In the years since 
1962, however, stocks and landings have fallen 
dramatically - average landings during the 
1970s by both countries were less than half those 
of the peak 1958-63 era (Crutchfield 1979a). The 
reasons for the decline are straightforward and 
demonstrate that the Commission has encoun-
tered the same problems employing regulatory 
methods as the salmon managers have. The three 
main reasons are the increased efficiency of the 
fleet, halibut fishing by boats from other fisheries 
(especially salmon and smaller "dayboats"), and 
incidental catches or by-catches by large foreign 
and domestic trawlers, working at some distance 
from shore. 
The increase in the numbers of combination 
vessels can be explained partly by the rapidly 
rising halibut prices and partly by the steadily 
shrinking open seasons in all major west-coast 
fisheries. This trend toward combination vessels 
is certainly a result of traditional management 
methods, but it makes direct linking of fleets with 
stocks in rational management much more diffi-
cult because the fleets exploiting distinct species 
can no longer be treated as separate entities. 
The problem of incidental catches of halibut is 
a quite different one, due to fishing technology, 
but it also imposes links between fisheries. The 
lower valued groundfish species such as hake, 
sablefish, pollack, lemon sole, etc. are taken by 
means of ground trawls, which literally scoop up 
everything on the ocean floor. Some halibut 
catch is inevitable with this method. Regulations 
on gear forced domestic trawlers to throw back 
halibut, with resultant mortality as high as 50% 
(Crutchfield 1979a). But the heavy exploitation, 
in the 1960s, of west-coast groundfish stocks by 
unregulated distant-water fleets of the Soviet 
Union and Japan has been regarded as the most 
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important element in the recent declines of stock 
(Crutchfield 1980). 
With the advent of EFJ, exploitation by 
distant-water fleets has diminished, but other 
problems have arisen. Before 1976, the halibut 
resource on the west coast was managed as one 
entity, with vessels from the U.S. and Canada 
free to compete for all available stocks. The 
thrust ofEFJ, which was toward the exploitation 
of domestic stocks by domestic fleets, made a 
change inevitable. In 1979, a protocol was signed 
between Canada and the U.S., under which fish-
ing operations from one country were excluded 
from the waters of the other. This arrangement 
affects the Canadian fleet more than the Ameri-
can as the latter took only 2.5% of its catch in 
Canadian waters over the period 1969-79, where-
as the former took some two-thirds of its catch 
over the same period from Alaskan waters. A 
special arrangement was eventually made for the 
IPHC's Area 2, which encompasses Alaskan and 
Canadian waters. The IPHC quota for that area 
is to be split, 60% going to the Canadian fleet and 
40% to the American. The system worked poorly 
in 1979, the U.S. fleet taking more than 50% of 
the quota early in the season, but the difference is 
to be made up over several years. 
The IPHC had no authority to initiate eco-
nomic rationalization of the halibut fleet, and by 
1979 the Canadian halibut fleet was far too large 
for the reduced stocks in Canadian waters. The 
DFO response was to initiate a limited-entry 
program for halibut in 1979, with licences to be 
issued only to vessels reporting landings above a 
given minimum in 1977 or 1978. The minimum 
was set so low, however, and the appeals criteria 
were so generous that the result was a reduction 
of only about 20% of fleet capacity. Eighty per-
cent of the vessels are thus left to compete for 
perhaps 50% of the catch previously available to 
the full fleet. The stage is clearly set, therefore, for 
combination vessels within the halibut fishery to 
increase appreciably their levels of effort in 
fisheries other than halibut. Part of this redistri-
bution of effort has been officially encouraged: 
holders of halibut licences were offered, in 
exchange for the halibut licences, gear-
conversion grants and licences for sablefish, 
which have become available as a result of 
reduced foreign groundfishing effort. The advent 
of EF J has thus affected many fisheries through 
this halibut connection and has served to high-
light not only the international links in west-coast 
fisheries but also the links among domestic fisher-
ies. The serious problems currently facing man-
agers of the halibut stocks clearly need to be 
solved by cooperative means, and a thorough 
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understanding of the multiplied impacts of uni-
lateral exclusionary actions is an important 
prerequisite. 
Roe Herring 
In 1971, a market for a new product, herring 
roe, began to open up, and a new phase of the 
herring industry was entered. The Pacific herring 
are shore spawners, and they move into coastal 
spawning grounds in dense schools in the early 
spring. Sixteen major spawning grounds have 
been identified, and the herring generally return 
to their own spawning grounds each spring 
(Wilen 1980). 
The herring must be taken just before spawn-
ing occurs, the roe at this time being in the most 
desirable condition and at maximum weight. 
Once unloaded, the herring are brined or frozen, 
and the eggs are manually removed. The amount 
of roe recovered can vary from 10% to 16% of the 
total round weight of the female (Fraser 1980). 
The female 'carcasses and the males are subse-
quently used for fish meal, because they do not 
meet standards for human consumption. 
The principal market for herring roe is Japan, 
where Kazunoko is a traditional seafood, now 
consumed mainly as part of the Near Year's, 
activities. Roughly 99% of Canadian roe exports 
go to Japan (Statistics Canada), and well over 
90% of the value of the domestic herring catch is 
accounted for by herring-roe exports. Domestic 
Japanese supplies declined steadily over several 
decades (Fraser 1977), but tight import quotas 
were maintained on the product. In 1971, how-
ever, these restrictions were relaxed, and total 
imports to Japan of 8000-14 000 t followed in 
each year between 1972 and 1977. 
The impact of this new market on the B.C. 
herring fishery was explosive. In 1972, 196 seine 
vessels and 58 gillnet vessels took a total of 31 500 
t of round roe herring (fish plus roe), with a 
landed value of CA$2.l million. In 1973, 161 
seiners and 223 gillnetters took 50 400 t with a 
landed value of CA$9. l million (Wilen 1980). 
Although the season extends for 6 weeks at most, 
1973 average vessel returns were $56 400 for seine 
vessels and $5700 for gillnet vessels (Sinclair 
1979). The prospects for additional income for 
salmon seiners, and for anyone willing to invest 
$5000 to bring a new gillnet vessel into the ind us-
try (Fraser 1980), were obvious, and thousands of 
vessels were expected to enter the fishery during 
the 1974 season. Excess capacity and effort had 
yet to develop but were clearly imminent. The 
time was right for a well-conceived management 
scheme that would prevent the problems expe-
rienced with other fish stocks. 
Effective January 1974, a limited-entry licenc-
ing program was instituted for the roe-herring 
fishery. The stated objectives of the program 
were to control the fleet at a level that would not 
endanger the stocks, to guarantee returns above 
fishing costs, and to provide a source of revenue 
for the Crown (Fraser 1980). Because the fishery 
was new and because some new entry was still 
officially encouraged for employment reasons 
(Wilen 1980), the only criterion for gaining a 
licence was payment of a fee ($2000 for seine 
vessels and $200 for gillnet vessels). These fees 
were higher than those levied on salmon vessels 
but were low when measured against the poten-
tial returns. The licences were granted to individ-
uals rather than to vessels and were made non-
transferable (the inevitable result of this provi-
sion was that licences were leased for long peri-
ods). Entry continued to be open until January 
1975, and the number of participants increased 
significantly; 250 seiners were licenced in 1974. A 
much larger jump in the number of gillnetters 
occurred, with 1579 licences issued. A significant 
number of these licences were left inactive, how-
ever, and some ultimately lapsed, so that there 
was clearly some speculative entry. 
A series of shocks over subsequent years made 
the roe-herring industry into the second most 
important fishery on the west coast. The landed 
value of roe herring increased by an astounding 
1000% during 1975-79, despite a 30% decline in 
the harvest (Fraser 1980). Two external devel-
opments initiated this trend. In 1974, the Chinese 
had supplied nearly 50% of Japan's import needs; 
Canada had 35% of the market. In 1975, the 
Chinese supply inexplicably dropped to 15% of 
its former level and, in 1977, dropped further to 
5%. Canada was left in the position of dominant 
supplier, and its market share rose steadily from 
54% in 1975 to 80% in 1979 (Fraser 1980; DFO 
1979). Second, the yen appreciated by 40% 
against the Canadian dollar during 1977 and 
1978. The harvest declined steadily from a peak 
of 78300 tin 1976 to 37000 tin 1979 (Fraser 
1980) and contributed to the upward pull on 
price. 
The result in terms of capital and effort 
devoted to the fishery was easy to predict. The 
two main focuses for new inputs have been 
increased gillnet capacity and enhanced vessel 
mobility among the various spawning grounds. 
These had dramatic effects on the primary 
method of biologic management: area openings 
for specified periods. Although an overall annual 
catch quota is set each year, the actual level of 
effort permitted is determined as a result of 
online management systems (Wilen 1980). In 
brief, the system works as follows: local fisheries 
officers carry out random checks of the stock 
approaching the spawning grounds to determine 
both the size of the stocks (and thus the allowable 
catch) and the optimum time at which to open the 
fishery. When that moment is reached, the fishery 
is opened for the time that these officers estimate 
will be required for the number of vessels on hand 
to take the prescribed catch. The increasing 
capacity is causing severe problems for this sys-
tem, however, in that if all vessels at an opening 
were allowed to participate, the entire stock 
might be taken almost instantaneously. Thus, 
15-minute openings for the seine fleet have 
become rather common (Fraser 1980), this being 
the time required for one "set" of a purse-seine 
net. Openings are occasionally canceled alto-
gether. 
The present outlook for the roe-herring fishery 
is somewhat mixed. In 1980, the trend of declin-
ing catches accelerated, the total harvest amount-
ing to some 18 000 t - one-half of the 1979 level 
and only one-quarter of the 1976 and 1977 
catches. The significance of the 1980 catch is 
unclear.J A large portion of the fleet was on strike 
at the time, and this fact may account for the 
small harvest. N onunionized vessels did continue 
to fish, however, and as many as one-third of the 
usual number of seiners and one-sixth of the 
usual number of gillnetters were involved. This 
reduced fleet may have been sufficient to take the 
larger 1979 catch, but the 1981 catch recovered 
somewhat to about 28 800 t. The overall trend is 
clear, nonetheless, and there is some cause for 
alarm with respect to the health of the stocks. 
A decline in landed price of a bout 50% in 1980 
brought into question capital investments made 
on the expectation of prices' continuing at the 
1979 level of nearly $3000/t. Nevertheless, the 
1980 price remains nearly twice the $700/t paid in 
1978 and four times that paid in 1977. Licence 
fees have remained at their 1974 levels ($2000 and 
$200), and gross returns in 1978 (before the quad-
rupling of price in 1979) were $36 000 for gillnet-
ters and $74 000 for seiners. Thus, participants in 
the roe-herring fishery are continuing to earn 
significant rents, quite possibly at a level signifi-
cantly above that justified by any government 
desire to "improve" their incomes. 
JSome participants argue that recent stock declines 
are a reflection not of overfishing but of the methods of 
exploitation. In particular, they argue that the herring 
are being driven to less-productive spawning grounds 
and that the conditions are leading to reduced survival 
rates. This issue has yet to be adequately analyzed by 
biologists. · 
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A rational approach to management of the 
fishery demands a reduction in effort on a scale 
that can only be achieved by a removal of some of 
the participants in it. In the 1981 season, vessels 
were required to nominate one of three areas to 
which their effort would be exclusively restricted; 
the areas are the Gulf of Georgia, the west coast 
of Vancouver Island, and the mainland coast 
north of Vancouver Island. This is useful only as 
a transitional measure, however, as is a proposed 
"vessel-pooling" scheme under which all vessels 
must pair off and only one vessel from any pair 
can attend a particular "major" opening, 
although both share in the catch. 
In conclusion, the short history of the roe-
herring fishery has demonstrated that inadequate 
control of the level of effort exerted in a fishery 
can lead to serious management and distribu-
tional problems when the industry is subjected to 
drastic shocks. The rapid escalation of effort and 
investment has been based on an assumption that 
the price rise recently observed will not be cyclical 
or temporary. The dominant position of the 
Canadian supplies in the Japanese market may 
well be eroded by external forces, unrelated to 
domestic stock difficulties. Alaska is expected to 
compete more heavily in this market and the 
previously dominant supplier, China, may reen-
ter at any time. Although most of the seine fleet 
participates in the salmon and other fisheries, the 
gillnetters use equipment specially designed for 
roe herring (Fraser 1980) so that redundant 
capacity would represent a significant social 
waste. The fact that these problems have arisen 
from developments in an external market does 
not mean that they are unique to export-led 
resource development, of course. Instead, they 
simply draw attention to the fact that interna-
tional markets can be volatile, especially from the 
point of view of a single player, and that inade-
quate or ad hoc stock, catch, and income man-
agement systems are particularly vulnerable to 
the shocks that external markets can produce. 
Other Fisheries 
Salmon, halibut, and herring roe account for 
nearly two-thirds of the landed value of the total 
catch in west-coast waters, but there are a 
number of smaller, thriving fisheries on the coast 
as well (DFO 1980b). A new approach has been 
taken with respect to the regulation of these 
fisheries over the past 5 years. During this period, 
six new limited-entry programs were initiated, 
and a seventh was begun earlier, in 1975. The 
common characteristic of these is that the licenc-
ing programs seem to have been set up in a 
manner that aimed at encouraging development 
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into major income sources, while maintaining at 
least some control over the pace of that develop-
ment. Employment goals, and particularly dis-
tributional objectives, concerned with spreading 
the potential benefits from these resources 
among participants with limited employment 
opportunities, have been emphasized much more 
heavily in these programs than in others. 
The fact that these programs followed almost 
immediately the introduction of EF Jin 1976 does 
not seem to have been a coincidence. One motiva-
tion was to exploit protected stocks in an orderly 
fashion. Another arose from the displacement of 
Canadian vessels from American waters, which 
was another result of EF J. The principal example 
is the dislocated halibut fleet, and special provi-
sion was made for these vessels to enter the grow-
ing sablefish fishery, as well as others for which 
they had already been licenced or for which no 
licence was required. Significant increases in the 
value of abalone, geoduck, and sablefish, among 
others, attracted new effort in these fisheries, and 
management was necessary for this reason as 
well. 
In terms of landed value, the herring spawn-
on-kelp industry is the most important example. 
This is a traditional native Indian food fishery 
that was viewed as having commercial potential 
in the early 1970s, in light of the growing Japa-
nese roe market. A limited-entry program was 
announced for 1975, with the start of commercial 
exploitation. The concurrence of licencing with 
the beginning of commercial exploitation is abso-
lutely unique among the west-coast fisheries. 
The principal aim of the spawn-on-kelp licence 
distribution system was to provide employment 
and higher incomes for native Indians and those 
living in remote coastal areas. Twenty-eight par-
ticipants were involved in 1981. Each licence has 
an individual quota attached to it as a special 
condition, but the aim of these quotas is to pre-
vent the market from being flooded, rather than 
to achieve optimum economic performance (the 
quotas are not transferable). In fact, the quotas 
are rarely reached, and available stocks have 
provided the true constraint. Production is com-
plex: live herring are caught by seine nets and 
transported to enclosed ponds where they spawn 
and they are then released; high quality kelp is 
transplanted in the pond beforehand, and the 
kelp is subsequently harvested and the roe recov-
ered from the surface of the kelp. The market is 
the same as that for roe herring, so that returns 
are quite high, in excess of $100 000 per licence in 
recent years. The goal of boosting incomes is thus 
clearly.being met. The administrative costs are 
also quite high, however, because supervision of 
quality is maintained throughout the process, 
and observance of catch quotas must be ensured, 
nominally at least. In other words, this may be a 
rather inefficient way of subsidizing isolated 
communities. 
The groundfish fishery in aggregate is the most 
valuable of the smaller fisheries, but each of the 
several species involved (various types of cods, 
soles, etc.) is individually unimportant, and a 
general groundfish trawl licence is issued. This 
fishery has a long history of exploitation, but the 
Canadian fleet has traditionally been only one 
part of a larger fleet fishing the groundfish stocks 
on the west coast. The Canadian catch has been 
gradually increasing since 1977, the year in which 
limited-entry licencing was imposed. The licences 
were distributed on the basis of prior catches, but 
special provision was made for dislocated halibut 
vessels to join the fishery without prior effort. In 
1977, 112 of the 131 vessels reporting trawl land-
ings were multiple-gear vessels, and income from 
their groundfish participation provided just less 
than one-half their total fishing income on aver-
age (Sinclair 1979). This fact highlights an impor-
tant characteristic of several of the smaller fisher-
ies: participants often are involved in the fishery 
mainly to supplement their income, especially in 
bad years for salmon and herring. 
Sablefish is subject to a licence separate from 
that put on exploitation of the rest of the ground-
fish. The sablefish catch hovered between 500 
and 700 t during the 1970s but jumped to 1400 tin 
1979. The sablefish have increased in value rela-
tive to some other fish, and this improvement 
presumably accounts for the recent harvest 
increase. Large specimens are exported to Japan, 
whereas the smaller fish are marketed domesti-
cally. 
Entry was restricted in 1980, and, although a 
historical-catch criterion was used as the basis for 
licence distribution, a series of special conditions 
attached to the program provides a revealing 
example of the conflicting objectives involved in 
managing particular fisheries. The historical-
catch criterion was applied to longline and trap 
vessels, but entry into the fishery was allowed for 
vessels with these types of gear if they invested in 
refrigeration equipment. This provision reflects a 
tolerance of further growth in capacity in the 
interest of an upgraded product. Halibut vessels 
were also granted licences but only if they already 
held "A" salmon licences, or the new halibut 
licences. This condition is a further reflection of 
attempts to accommodate displaced vessels. 
Other halibut vessels were also allowed to retain 
longline sablefish catches if they were engaged in 
the halibut fishery at the time of the catch. This 
provmon is clearly difficult to police. Finally, 
groundfish trawl vessels that had established a 
historical stake in the sablefish catch were 
allowed to retain any sablefish caught on trawl, 
but only so long as the overall quota had not been 
reached. This condition was clearly aimed at 
establishing some sort of equity between the tra-
ditional gear types and those encouraged to 
develop the fishery in a new direction. The result, 
in terms of potential capacity that could be 
brought to bear on the stocks, not only is ineffi-
cient but also portends the kind of biologic man-
agement problems experienced in the more devel-
oped fisheries. 
The other fisheries subject to limited-entry 
licencing - abalone, geoducks, and shrimp -
have each exhibited a pattern of a large jump in 
effort and harvest in I year, in response to a rapid 
price increase, followed by the imposition of 
licencing for the next season. Abalone and geo-
ducks are exploited by divers and so are rather 
separate from the other fisheries. The shrimp 
trawl fishery is basically an extension of the other 
trawl fisheries. 
In summary, the DFO has established a record 
of responding quickly to situations in which 
effort is observed to be rapidly increasing, or in 
which significant potential for new products is 
observed. (Actual exploitation of such potential 
obviously requires some effort on the part of the 
processing sector as well, in terms of identifying 
and entering new markets.) These initiatives are 
certainly laudable in terms of providing for 
orderly market development and exploitation of 
new opportunities for international trade. The 
pitfalls of the regulatory tools employed tend to 
offset the benefits, however. 
Current Management Issues 
One particularly thorny issue that arises in the 
salmon and roe-herring fisheries is that of alloca-
tion of catch by gear type. The DFO is being 
forced to ensure particular divisions of the har-
vest among the gear types, for reasons both of 
equity and of stock management. In the salmon 
fishery, the different gear types have traditionally 
targeted on different species. They also fish in 
separate areas, the trollers tending to be seaward 
of the net fisheries. With the recent development 
of troll gear that can be used to catch sockeye, 
pink, and chum, the share of the gillnet fleet in the 
catch has dropped considerably. The significant 
catch by people who are sport fishing further 
complicates the issue. The DFO must, therefore, 
adjust catch limits, and area and time restric-
tions, to satisfy both biologic and equity objec-
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tives. In the roe-herring fishery, the gillnet fleet is 
usually allowed to begin fishing first, and the 
number of seine vessels on hand at a particular 
spot may be so large that no opening can be 
allowed. Gear-type allocations are highly con-
troversial, and the various participants are jeal-
ous of their stake in the fishery. These facts 
greatly complicate efforts to reduce the fleet to a 
manageable size and to reduce the costs of taking 
harvests. The problem is complicated further by 
efforts to accommodate vessels moved out of 
other fisheries. 
Another issue that applies to all fisheries is that 
of recovering at least a portion of the potential 
rent that these resources could return to the 
Crown, or the general public, as ultimate 
resource owner. A debate is currently under way 
as to the relative merits of profit taxes, catch 
royalties, greatly increased licence fees, and other 
means of garnering a portion of the rent. The 
impact of these levies is difficult to determine. 
Significant rents are being earned, however, the 
most obvious examples being the roe-herring and 
spawn-on-kelp industries in recent years. 
Government policy is unclear as to the extent to 
which rents must be left to the participants alone, 
and resolution of this question is a prerequisite to 
a satisfactory end to the debate. 
A closely related question is whether the fisher-
ies should be completely reorganized or redi-
rected. The limited-entry licencing approach to 
regulation does not work, because it ignores the 
economic incentives to the remaining partici-
pants. Biologic difficulties have developed pre-
cisely because of this inattention to the economic 
aspects of the fishery. Thus, for rational stock 
management and economic efficiency, a com-
plete restructuring of the fishery is warranted. So 
long as any rents at all are allowed to accrue to 
the participants, distortions from the optimal 
levels of effort and stock will result. 
One alternative to methods that attempt to 
force fisheries into economic efficiency by 
extracting all the rents is that of using transfer-
able catch quotas. Quotas would be equal to the 
optimal catch. The incentive to rush and compete 
for the catch would be eliminated, and the fishing 
operations would face incentives to minimize the 
costs of taking their predetermined catch. 
Because the quotas would be transferable, and 
finely divisible, they would shift to the most effi-
cient participants, i.e., those with the lowest 
costs, thus maximizing the rents realized from the 
resource. Government policy could then deter-
mine the distribution of rents. In principle, then, 
the result is the same, in terms of efficiency, as 
that of a landings tax that extracts all the rent. 
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The quota system has the advantage of requiring 
somewhat less information for the regulators, 
and it also allows flexibility in the distribution of 
rent. Such rationalization is clearly required. 
Any scheme that aims at economic rationaliza-
tion on this scale, however, would be difficult to 
implement not only because of its novelty but 
also because of variations in stock levels and 
dispersions of particular substocks. 
Conclusions 
The topic of west-coast fisheries management 
is a large and complicated one. Many details have 
been passed over in this discussion, a notable 
example being the special provisions for native 
Indians included in every regulatory program 
described here. Fluctuations in prices, stocks, 
harvests, and effort have been all but ignored in 
an effort to convey the broad trends around 
which the industry inevitably cycles. The conclu-
sion that must be drawn is that these fisheries are 
truly interdependent-biologically, economi-
cally, and internationally. Recognition of this 
fact in future efforts at fisheries regulation 
around the world would constitute a most valu-
able lesson from experience. 
I wish to thank Professors Anthony Scott, Gordon 
Munro, and Peter Pearse, and Doug Macdonald, 
Sandy Fraser, and Alan Barber for their many useful 
comments, suggestions, and criticisms. This paper 
would not have been possible without their generous 
assistance. 
Discussion 
Yoshiaki Matsuda: Professor Moloney has 
stressed the importance of governments' recog-
nizing the links among fisheries if they are to 
improve management of their fish stocks. These 
links include the biologic interactions among 
species; the interaction embodied in multiple-
gear fleets that exploit quite different stocks over 
large and separated areas; and the interactions 
between domestically owned resources and for-
eign markets and fleets. 
He finds that limited-entry licencing programs 
do not work because they ignore the economic 
incentives to the remaining participants and that 
the difficulties in managing the resources biologi-
cally have developed because of the inattention to 
the economics of the fishery. Thus, Moloney has 
concluded that the fisheries are truly interde-
pendent, biologically, economically, and interna-
tionally. 
In my view, the key to fisheries management is 
good administration based on: 
• Attention to natural and artificial sources of 
fish; 
• An understanding of the objectives, priori-
ties, and limitations of fisheries regulation or 
management among administrators (Moloney 
has not spelled out the priorities of previous or 
future management practices, and yet one cannot 
produce satisfactory results without defining ob-
jectives, setting priorities, detailing the methods, 
ana revising the approach systematically on the 
basis of feedback and results); 
• Appropriate administrative costs; 
• Qualified personnel; and 
• Simple, practical, and flexible regulations 
that respond to needs rather than precede them. 
Canada cannot blame Japan for the inade-
quate management of its resources just because 
Japan has provided a marketfor such products as 
roe herring and spawn-on-kelp herring. Conserv-
ing resources and capturing rents for access to 
them are part of the responsibility of coastal 
nations. The responsibilities are great, as are the 
benefits of ownership. The first responsibility is 
to decide objectives and set priorities among 
them. If the most important objective is employ-
ment, then efforts should not be devoted to 
expanding capital-intensive fishing operations 
but rather to encouraging small-scale, labour-
intensive operations. The impact and efficiency 
of large-scale, capital-intensive fishing opera-
tions is greatest when fish are abundant, whereas 
those of small-scale, labour-intensive fishing 
operations are greatest when fish are scarce. 
Coastal nations should not dismiss the possi-
bility of permitting open access to their newly 
acquired resources. Open access is a valid tool in 
fisheries resources management. Fish are quite 
vital renewable resources with quick turnover 
rates. Natural selection under open access might 
be the best way to achieve maximum social wel-
fare: fishing operations understand that what 
they are doing is at their own risk, and adminis-
trative costs are minimized. I believe that conser-
vation is less important in fisheries than in other 
renewable resources. For one thing, there is no 
single-species fishery, although policymakers 
take a monospecies approach to conservation. 
The disappearance of one species from a fishery 
means neither a decrease in harvest of multi-
species fisheries (or biomass) in the same area nor 
the absolute disappearance of that species from 
the oceans. Unlike pollution problems, overfish-
ing under open-access management is restricted 
by economic feasibility. Fishing efforts for part-
icular species first increase rapidly along with 
increasing profitability, then increase at a dimin-
ishing rate along with diminishing profitability, 
and, finally, decrease, as participants begin to 
lose money. 
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Therefore, fishing operations under open-
access management never wipe out any fish 
stocks, most of which have wide geographical 
distribution. A welfare policy that prevents fish-
ing operations from leaving fisheries has a greater 
impact on depleting species than does a policy of 
open access. The more welfare, the more deple-
tion. Governments' failure to use the open-access 
tool effectively is largely attributable to their too-
high administrative commitments in fisheries. 
Timing is also important. Good timing in the 
introduction of management tools, such as 
limited entry, is essential. Development must be a 
step-by-step process that provides time for gesta-
tion and adjustment. 
TheDevelopingSkipjack Tuna Fishery of the Central and 
Western Pacific Ocean 
David J. Dou/man 
Administrative College of Papua New Guinea, Boroko, Papua New Guinea 
The skip jack tuna fishery is the most valuable fishery in the central and western Pacific and the 
most important fishery of its type in the world. For the small, isolated and largely copra-dependent 
states in the region, its expansion represents a potential means of diversifying their economies, 
providing employment and much-needed foreign exchange. This paper addresses some of the trade 
and development constraints associated with the fishery's orderly and rational expansion, outlines 
the economic importance to the island states in the region, describes the fishery, and analyzes issues 
relating to increasing national participation, marketing, and management, including the role of 
Forum Fisheries Agency. I am generally pessimistic about the benefits that the majority of small 
states in the region will gain from the fishery's development because of their inability to present a 
united front in selling their valuable and sought-after fish. 
La peche de la bonite a ventre raye est la plus rentable des pays du centre et de l'ouest du 
Pacifique et la plus grande industrie du genre au monde. Son developpement represente done, pour 
Jes petits eta ts riverains de la region, isoles et dont l'economie repose principalement sur le commerce 
du copra, un moyen de diversifier leur economie, decreer des emplois et de faire rentrer des devises 
etrangeres. La presente communication porte sur quelques aspects des contraintes commerciales qui 
s'opposent a !'expansion et a la gestion rationnelle de ces peches, en souligne !'importance econo-
mique pour Jes pays insulaires de la region, decrit la peche et analyse !es questions relatives a 
l'accroissement de la participation, de la commercialisation et de la gestion nationale, y compris le 
role de Forum Fisheries Agency. L'auteur envisage avec pessimisme Jes profits eventuels que la 
plupart des petits pays de cette region tireront du developpement de la peche a la bonite, attendu leur 
incapacite de s'unir pour commercialiser cette ressource estimee et recherchee. 
The area in the central and western Pacific 
covered by the South Pacific Commission (SPC 
l 980a) includes 20 island states. Through declar-
ing 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 
they have acquired vast tracts of ocean that, in 
many cases, have become their most valuable and 
abundant resources. Indeed, in no other part of 
the world has the potential impact of extended 
jurisdiction been greater because the EEZs cover 
almost 30 x 106 km2 of the Pacific Ocean (SPC 
1980a:2), stretching in a wide band north of the 
Mariana Islands in Micronesia to Pitcairn Island 
in the east. 
The EEZs provide control over rich fishing 
grounds, significantly increasing the states' 
potential to develop commercial, marine-fishing 
industries. Such development should enable 
more economic self-reliance and lessen the 
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group's dependence on a restricted range of agri-
cultural exports and aid handouts. 
At present, skipjack tuna (Katswuonus pela-
mis) is commercially the most important fishery 
in the region, although still relatively young and 
not yet fully exploited. The potential for its 
expansion is considerable, and many of the states 
look to the exploitation of their skipjack stocks 
as the basis for a sizable industry that would 
provide much employment on fishing vessels and 
on shore and that would generate needed foreign 
exchange. These two benefits and the extraction 
of resource rents are seen by most states in the 
region as equally important policy objectives. 
Skipjack stocks can be successfully exploited 
with relatively uncomplicated and inexpensive 
fishing gear. In addition, skipjack shoals gener-
ally aggregate close to islands and surrounding 
reef masses and are, thus, easily captured in con-
trast to deep-sea tunas, which are currently over-
exploited and unlikely to generate increase of 
yields (Kearney 1976:4). Also, the nature of the 
expensive and sophisticated technology involved 
in deep-sea fishing limits participation by nation-
als of the region. Because the islands are sur-
rounded by deep ocean, trawling opportunities 
are few - the one major exception being Papua 
New Guinea's trawling operations for lobsters 
and prawns. 
Economic Importance 
There are four main factors that make the skip-
jack fishing industry especially important for the 
·socioeconomic development of the island states 
in the central and western Pacific. First, countries 
in this region are relatively small with limited 
areas for agricultural development. Nine SPC 
member countries are smaller than 500 km2, and 
five are less than 50 km2. Of the available land, 
much has a low carrying capacity, is inaccessible, 
or is not arable. Second, the climatic conditions 
throughout the region are not conducive to the 
production of a variety of agricultural crops. 
Many of the island states are dependent on a 
single agricultural export, copra. Third, the 
majority of SPC countries have few land-based, 
nonrenewable resources such as minerals, oil, 
and gas. The potential for development of renew-
able resources - mainly timber- is also limited. 
There are exceptions: Papua New Guinea, New 
Caledonia, Nauru, and to a lesser extent Fiji. 
Papua New Guinea and New Caledonia have 
significant endowments of copper, and the econ-
omy of Nauru revolves around the phosphate 
industry. Papua New Guinea and Fiji also have 
substantial forest resources. 
Finally, industrial development in countries 
with small populations that are isolated from 
large export markets holds little promise, the 
possibilities for benefits and economies of scale in 
production being limited. Poor and expensive 
transportation networks within the region re-
strict trade, even for the two countries, Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji, that have established 
export-oriented light industries. However, dur-
ing 1980and1981, the government of Papua New 
Guinea actively sponsored trade missions to 
northern Australia and the island states of the 
South Pacific in a bid to boost exports. As yet, 
however, the trade missions have only had medi-
ocre success, as many of the goods being pro-
moted, matches for example, are not price com-
petitive with those from traditional sources of 
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supply. Expensive air travel and other costs 
hamper large-scale tourist development. 
Exploitation 
The commercial exploitation of skipjack, 
stocks in the central and western Pacific only 
seriously began in the late 1960s. Before 1965, 
landings of the species were small. Traditionally, 
skipjack and other tunas have been regarded as a 
poor-quality fish. Their flesh is dry and consid-
ered inferior to reef fish that are available in 
plentiful supply. Thus, the development of skip-
jack fishing operations is not competing with a 
traditional food source. Since 1970, the industry 
has expanded rapidly, mainly as a result of inten-
sive fishing activity by vessels from Japan (Kear-
ney l 979a). International demand for tuna, 
which has been doubling about every 10 years, 
coupled with declining longline catches of larger 
tunas in the region, has prompted investment in 
skipjack fishing. Along with Japanese vessels, 
fleets of Korea, Taiwan, the United States, and 
the Soviet Union come to the region for tuna. 
Vessels belonging to joint-venture companies, 
notably in Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, 
and Fiji, engage in skipjack fishing operations as 
well. However, less than 15% of the total catch is 
landed annually by these vessels (Kearney 1976). 
The relative importance of skipjack fishing in 
the region is illustrated by the total catch in 1978: 
363 493 t, 46% of the total for tuna and like 
species in the region (FAO 1980). This amount, 
although including the catch in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, approximates total landings in the 
SPC area and is customarily used to describe 
landings for it. The next most important species 
was yellowfin tuna, which accounted for 15%, or 
120 911 t, of total landings. 
As a proportion of world landings of skipjack, 
catches in the central and western Pacific are 
significant (38% in 1975 rising steadily to 46% in 
1978). Catches in the SPC area rose from 205 387 
t in 1975 to 363 493 t in 1978, an average annual 
increase of 20.8% compared with 10% for world 
landings (540 381 t to 791 786 t). In fact, a large 
share of the increase in world landings each year 
is from the central and western Pacific. Without 
the region's contributions, the annual increase in 
world totals from 1975 to 1978 was only 6.4%. 
Although precise figures for catch per unit 
effort (CPUE)I are not available, the rising pro-
ICPUE is a basic measure of the abundance or 
density of a fish stock in a given area at a particular time 
(Cushing 1968). 
158 RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
portion of catches in the region compared with 
total catches indicates that the fishery is still in a 
developing phase, capable of sustaining even 
more intensive fishing effort. 
The pole-and-line method of capture is used 
exclusively in the region, purse-seining being rel-
atively unimportant at present. The reason, 
according to Kearney ( 1974), is that the water in 
the region is clear and the thermocline is not 
suitable for purse-seining. However, Bour and 
Galenon (1979) have recently refuted this argu-
ment, maintaining that purse-seining operations 
can be developed. The advantage of this form of 
capture is that live baitfish are not required, 
although highly sophisticated and expensive 
technology is used. 
A major constraint on the development of any 
pole-and-line fishing is the availability of suitable 
baitfish (good survival even after repeated han-
dling, attractive to skipjack, quick, etc. - Wil-
kinson 1977). For this reason, the development of 
the skipjack fishery and baitfish resources should 
be considered together. In some island states, the· 
availability of bait does not pose problems, 
although in Western Samoa, Tonga, and Kir-
ibati, bait cultivation is necessary if skipjack fish-
ing activities are to be expanded. As bait cultiva-
tion is ex pensive, it gives those states with natural 
populations of baitfish a cost advantage in pro-
duction. However, the cultivation or the collec-
tion and "hardening" of bait from natural popu-
lations presents an additional avenue for 
economic involvement by local fishing personnel. 
In places without shore-based processing facil-
ities, benefits to the local people of the skipjack 
fishing industry are not significant. Employment 
opportunities are usually temporary and for 
unskilled labour- catching of bait, carrying bait 
during fishing operations, storing skipjack after 
they have been caught and moving them to 
mother ships or shore facilities, scrubbing decks, 
cooking meals for crew members, and simple 
general maintenance tasks such as painting. Skip-
jack vessels, whether they are locally registered or 
not, operate only about 9-10 months each year 
and then return to their ports of origin. Local 
employees on these vessels are paid at this time, 
and there is no certainty that they will be reen-
gaged if and when the vessel returns. 
Where shore-based processing facilities have 
been installed, the benefits are substantially 
greater. There are already many processing facili-
ties in the region. American Samoa has two can-
neries in Pago Pago employing about 1200 
workers and providing approximately 20% of all 
tuna consumed in the United States. Fiji has one 
cannery at Levuka. Since the establishment of 
this plant, processed tuna has become a major 
foreign-exchange earner, after sugar and timber. 
The Solomons has one cannery in Honiara where 
all the skipjack landed there are canned (Kent 
1980). Vanuatu also has a processing plant at 
Pallicola, and there is a similar establishment in 
New Caledonia. Tonga has large cold-storage 
facilities at Nuku'alofa for skipjack taken in its 
waters (Wilkinson 1978b). Papua New Guinea, 
after negotiations lasting almost a decade, 
expects to have a cannery operating in Kavieng 
by 1983. It is projected that this facility will 
employ up to 300 PapuaNewGuineans and have 
an output of about 20 t/ day. 
Skipjack exports from the region between 1975 
and 1978 rose steadily, whereas price per tonne 
rose from U.S.$402 to a high of$912in1974 and 
declined in 1978 to $674. These dollar figures are 
based on the mean annual FOB prices for skip-
jack at Papua New Guinea and have been con-
verted from Kina to U.S. currency at the average 
exchange rate for the year. In using Papua New 
Guinea export prices, I have assumed that the 
trends in Papua New Guinea's FOB prices reflect 
world price trends and that prices realized by 
Papua New Guinea's exporters are not signifi-
cantly different from those realized in neighbour-
ing island states. 
The estimated export value of production (i.e., 
if all skipjack were exported fresh or frozen) rose 
from $83 million in 1975 to $245 million in 1978. 
The estimated value of exports in canned form is 
250% higher (Fairbairn 1977; Kearney 1976), 
$207 million in 1975 and $613 million in 1978. 
These estimates are in minimum and maximum 
valuations, and the real valuation of exports for 
the region lies somewhere within these broad 
limits. 
National Participation 
In striving to develop the skipjack resources 
within their EEZs and to derive maximal benefit, 
the states of the region must come to terms with 
several problems. Perhaps the most imperative of 
these is to increase national participation in the 
industry. Local inhabitants are strongly national-
istic and will not tolerate indefinitely the fact that 
foreigners are exploiting the resources. Prudent 
distant-water nations (DWN) already have prob-
ably recognized that their future in the EEZs will 
be determined largely by their attitude to, and 
success in encouraging, participation in the 
industry by nationals (Doulman 1980). 
Local participation needs to be increased at 
three levels: in skilled positions on both foreign 
and locally registered vessels, in entrepreneurial 
fishing, and in processing. At present, most of the 
skilled positions are filled by recruits from Korea 
or Taiwan, as remuneration is now generally 
insufficient to attract the Japanese. Thus, there is 
an incentive to hire and train personnel for the 
island states. Although the pole-and-line method 
of fishing requires stamina, the necessary skills 
can largely be acquired fairly quickly. Wilkinson 
( 1977) believes that staffing vessels with local 
people would not act as a constraint on the 
fishery's expansion. Initially, the key positions on 
each vessel - fishing master, chummers, and 
perhaps captain - that require experience and 
skill in locating skipjack schools should be 
staffed by foreigners. According to industry offi-
cials in Papua New Guinea, often the difference 
between a profitable and unprofitable vessel is 
determined by the skills of the fishing master in 
locating skipjack and being able to direct the 
vessel to a suitable position ahead of the school so 
that fishing can begin. Skipjack fishing could be 
made more attractive for nationals from the 
island states if conditions of service were 
improved. It should be seen as a permanent 
occupation with the rights and benefits taken for 
granted in other occupations. 
Second, attention should focus on introducing 
nationals into the industry as entrepreneurs. 
Initially boats smaller than 10 m, powered by 
15-40 hp diesel engines and employing standard 
pole-and-line fishing techniques, could be used 
effectively. The initial capital investment could 
be reasonably financed under local development 
bank arrangements or perhaps by Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB) loans. Maintenance costs of 
these boats are also within manageable limits. 
When their skills and capital permit, nationals 
can move to larger vessels of the type currently 
used by DWN. Governments of the island states 
that want to become directly involved in fishing 
operations have a variety of options for the pur-
chase or lease of conventional, skipjack-fishing 
vessels. 
The third level of involvement revolves around 
the development of shore-based processing (can-
ning or freezing) and the related infrastructure. 
Wherever the catch is sufficient ( 6 t/ year) to jus-
tify processing facilities, they should be estab-
lished. Employment opportunities created by 
such facilities are vital to every state in the region. 
The heavy migration from rural to urban areas 
and high rates of population growth give rise to 
unemployment and social unrest. Also, process-
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ing facilities increase the value of exports and, 
thus, the foreign exchange. 
Marketing 
Almost the entire catch of skipjack landed in 
the central and western Pacific is destined for 
markets in the United States, western Europe, 
and Japan. The major market is the United States 
where, as in western Europe, the fish is marketed 
in either brine or oil packs. A significant propor-
tion of the skipjack marketed in Japan is 
exported frozen, whole from the Pacific region. It 
is subsequently processed into a dried form such 
as katsuobushi.2 Generally, skipjack frozen in 
brine is unsuitable for the lucrative sashime 
market, as it discolours after thawing and has a 
high degree of salt penetration. 
Although the island states import significant 
quantities of canned fish each year, the potential 
for import replacement by locally canned skip-
jack and other tuna is not greatJ because, in 
canned form, it is not competitive with cheaper 
canned imports. In Port Moresby, for example, a 
180-gcan of tuna retails for about $1.30, whereas 
a 365-g can of mackerel imported from Japan 
sells for $0.55. Part of the nutritionally good dark 
meat, which is unsuitable for A-grade tuna packs 
and which is currently canned as a pet food, could 
be packed for sale on local markets. This is the 
only way locally canned tuna could realistically 
substitute for imported canned fish. Thus, it 
seems likely that for some time skipjack landed in 
the region will be destined for markets in high-
income countries. 
A major problem in marketing for resource 
owners is the control of transfer pricing, which is 
especially a problem when vertically integrated 
companies operate in an industry. When the price 
is below world market values, not only is the 
value of the resource reduced but so is the inter-
nal revenue from the taxes paid by the exporter. 
Papua New Guinea has experienced blatant 
abuses because of transfer pricing, mainly in its 
2u ntil 1979, Papua New Guinea had a katsuobushi 
processing plant with a throughput of about 3000 t of 
fresh skipjack each year. The plant employed approxi-
mately 50 Papua New Guineans. The entire output was 
exported to Japan, realizing about U .S.$800 000 
annually. 
JAccording to ADB figures, imports of canned fish 
and other fish preparations by seven member countries 
of the SPC (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Western Samoa) 
amounted to U .S .$21.4 million in 1977 (Lawson 1981 ). 
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prawn fishery. The Fisheries Division of the 
Department of Primary Industry estimated 
losses to be U.S.$2.3 million-4.3 million. These 
abuses prompted the government in 1980 to 
introduce two policies to check prices of all 
marine exports. The first of these policies was to 
establish a government-owned corporation, the 
PNG Fish Marketing Corp. Pty. Ltd. This cor-
poration is legally empowered to purchase 25% 
of all fish products exported annually at the 
exporter's declared market price. This means that 
·it can take advantage of low prices and resell 
products at their true market value. If fish are 
being sold at what is considered to be a fair 
export price, the corporation does not intervene. 
The second policy on pricing requires companies 
to seek export price approval from the Secretary, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for all 
fish exports. To date, these new policies have 
operated effectively and could serve as a model 
for other island states in the region. 
Management 
Following the introduction of extended juris-
diction, island states have focused most of their 
attention on how best to develop their skipjack 
stocks. Management issues have been largely 
ignored, although these issues will become more 
important as the level of fishing effort increases. 
Historically, however, fisheries management has 
not been seen necessary until problems of over-
exploitation and overcapitalization have clearly 
manifested themselves. To minimize the effects of 
these problems, governments should introduce 
popular, regionally based management early. 
The effective management of the skipjack 
stocks in the central and western Pacific is com-
plicated because skipjack migrate over wide areas 
in the region in unpredictable patterns that vary 
year to year (Kearney 1976). Because of this 
erratic migratory behaviour, biologists believe 
that it will probably be impossible to exploit 
these stocks to their maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY). This means that policies should be 
geared primarily to economic management of the 
fishery rather than to questions of resource 
conservation. 
The case for effective regional management of 
skipjack stocks has been clearly stated by Kear-
ney (1976) and Lawson (1979). Both writers 
argue for common licencing arrangements for all 
foreign and locally registered fleets, as well as 
coordinated and harmonized policies. Essentially 
these would permit a licenced vessel to move 
unimpeded from one EEZ in the region to 
another in pursuit of skipjack. Such policies are 
necessary for reasons of economic efficiency 
because vessels must be permitted to pursue the 
fishable concentrations of skipjack along their 
migration paths. Without common licencing 
arrangements, interzone pursuit offish is unlaw-
ful (unless the vessel is registered in adjoining 
zones), although the chances of detecting 
poachers are remote. Poached skipjack are con-
sidered part of the catch taken in the EEZ of the 
state where the vessel is licenced, and that state 
derives the financial benefits. 
Common licencing arrangements would be 
advantageous to all states, even smaller ones that 
do not wish to, or are unable to, become directly 
involved in exploiting skipjack stocks. Under 
these arrangements all states would reap part of 
the resource rent. Kearney (l979b) recommends 
that a fee of 6% of the value of the catch be 
charged. In the absence of uniform policies and 
regional cooperation, the states are forced to 
compete with each other for resource develop-
ment - a situation that dissipates the resource 
rent and fosters irrational resource use. 
The major arguments for implementing a 
regional management policy for the exploitation 
of skipjack stocks in the central and western 
Pacific are: 
• Because of their highly migratory nature, 
skipjack stocks are a shared resource among the 
various island states and, as such, should be 
regarded as a single fishery for management pur-
poses. It is, therefore, in the interests of all states 
to follow policies that do not adversely impinge 
upon fishing operations. A common manage-
ment policy should minimize conflicts between 
neighbouring states and promote regional, polit-
ical cohesiveness. 
• Uniform management policies will protect 
the interests of all states in the region, especially 
the smaller, economically disadvantaged ones, 
and help ensure that an equitable share of the 
resource rent is retained by them in return for 
access by fleets of the DWNs. It is on this point 
that strong arguments can be made against states' 
entering into bilateral arrangements with DWN s: 
resource owners tend to be weak bargainers and 
sellers, and such arrangements inhibit political 
unity in the region (Lawson 1979). 
• Regional management better serves the 
interests of economy and efficiency. Effective 
regional planning should prevent problems of 
overcapitalization in the industry. Standard 
region-wide data collection and central analysis 
would provide basic biologic and socioeconomic 
information necessary for good management 
decisions and intraregional comparisons. The 
costs of surveillance and enforcement of fishing 
agreements could be shared - an important con-
sideration as surveillance costs for individual 
states' waters may at present offset financial 
benefits and discourage them from participating 
in the skipjack industry. 
• Regional cooperation could include train-
ing of nationals from states in the region - a vital 
step if part of the industry is to pass into national 
hands. Regional training institutions would 
obviate duplication and mean reduced cost per 
unit output. Small states that' cannot economi-
cally justify the establishment of their own insti-
tutions could derive significant benefits. The 
University of the South Pacific in Fiji has created 
a precedent in this regard. Fisheries training 
could also be undertaken at an institution like 
Papua New Guinea's Fisheries Training College 
in Kavieng. 
• International legal provisions relating to 
extended jurisdiction require that resources of 
individual states within EEZs be conserved and 
that optimal use be made of them. For the island 
states in the region, these obligations could be 
best met through a regional management agency. 
From an administrative point of view, the 
obvious organization to be assigned the respon-
sibility of coordinating the management of skip-
jack stocks, including the control of fishing 
effort, resource exploitation, and distribution of 
revenue from the common licencing fund is the 
recently formed Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) 
whose member states are Cook Islands, Fiji, Kir-
ibati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solo-
mons, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western 
Samoa (Australia, New Zealand, Palau, Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, and the Marshalls have 
observer status). The 1979 Convention establish-
ing the agency has as a goal to promote conserva-
tion and rational use of fish stocks and to coordi-
nate management policies throughout the region. 
In this task, the most controversial policy area 
that the agency would have to grapple with, given 
that it will be responsible for levying and collect-
ing access fees, is determining the split in resource 
rent between the resource owners and harvesters 
exploiting the resource. Similarly, controversy 
also may surround the adoption of an acceptable 
formula for sharing the rent among the various 
resource-owning states. 
Since its inception, the FF A has paid only 
lip-service to its role of coordinating a regional 
management policy for skipjack stocks. If the 
FF A is to do this task effectively in future, its 
composition should be expanded to include 
others besides the resource owners. At present, 
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there is no provision for representation from 
DWNs or countries that process or consume 
skipjack. An expansion of the agency's member-
ship to include representatives from these groups 
would place it in a better position to devise and 
implement management programs. But, given 
the states' current suspicion about the motives of 
the resource harvesters, processors, and consum-
ers, such a recommendation will be interpreted as 
politically naive by many observers. The United 
States' intransigent stand on highly migratory spe-
cies has been a major stumbling block for widen-
ing membership of the agency. At the South 
Pacific forum meeting in Niue in 1978, the 
Solomons, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Tonga, 
and Kiribati staunchly opposed United States' 
membership in the FFA. Australia, New Zea-
land, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, and 
Niue took the opposite view (Kent 1980). 
One justification for widening the composition 
of the FF A is funding. The 1981 budget for the 
agency was projected to be about U .S.$350 000, 
two-thirds of which would be contributed by the 
governments of Australia and New Zealand 
(FF A 1979). Apart from the total budget's being 
small in comparison with the task at hand, the 
disproportionate share coming from two sources 
(both formerly colonial powers in the region) 
could mean that these governments have undue 
influence on the agency's operation. Also, if they 
chose to withdraw their financial support, the 
FF A's collapse would be virtually assured. If the 
agency's membership were widened, the total 
budget could be raised anci the potential influ-
ence of one country would be diminished. 
Politics of Management 
Despite many socioeconomic similarities 
between the developing island states of the cen-
tral and western Pacific, they exhibit a striking 
propensity to disagree, even when the common 
good is at stake. This lack of cohesion has infil-
trated the operation of the FF A and hinders 
rational economic management of the fishing 
industry on a regional basis. 
The reasons underlying the seemingly petty 
rivalry of the states in this region are numerous. 
They can probably be traced to colonial expe-
riences and are reflected in differences of geo-
graphical location and size. There is a definite 
feeling in most regional organizations in the· 
South Pacific that the large, affluent, and better-
developed states dominate organizations to the 
detriment of the smaller ones. Issues such as the 
location of regional meetings and, more recently, 
the appointment of staff to the FFA have been 
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divisive. In fact, at least one of the agency's larg-
est member states is lending orily nominal sup-
port to its functioning because the nominee of 
that state for a particular position in the agency's 
secretariat was not appointed. 
The attitude of states to regional management 
of the skipjack stocks also varies. At least three 
states, Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, and 
Fiji, have already entered into bilateral agree-
ments with Japanese and American corporations 
for the exploitation of part of their skipjack 
resources. If an all-encompassing regional man-
agement policy is to be implemented, these joint-
venture arrangements will have to be accommo-
dated by special provision or be discontinued. 
Other members of the FFA would press for the 
latter course of action, because these three coun-
tries are the "big three" in the agency. There is 
also genuine skepticism on the part of some states 
in the region as to the ability of the FF A to 
coordinate and manage the skipjack stocks. 
Logistically, this will be an awesome task. 
What must be recognized by the island states in 
the region is that failure to present a united front 
to the DWNs will invariably mean that benefits, 
resource rent, and other potential gains will be 
less than they otherwise might be. The expe-
rienced DWNs find it relatively easy to deal with 
small countries on an individual basis and to play 
one against the other. With a regional manage-
ment policy for access to the resource, the scope 
for such bargaining tactics will be reduced. 
Future Prospects 
Whether regional management is implemented 
or not, the large, more-developed states in the 
region that have already actively encouraged 
exploitation of their skipjack stocks and states 
having substantial shore-based facilities will real-
ize financial benefits from the expansion of skip-
jack fishing activities. These states have a strong 
negotiating position in dealing with DWNs or 
their own joint-venture companies. In the 
absence of regional management, the losers will 
be the majority of small states that lack a strong 
negotiating stance but that are most in need of 
economic diversification because of their relative 
disadvantage in their economies. The resource 
rent will be distributed according to the rules of 
the jungle, and the resource owners will be ex-
ploited by the DWNs (usually represented by 
multinational corporations) so that their share of 
the rent will be little more than a token. Enforce-
ment of such arrangements by the small island 
states is difficult. The only option under these 
circumstances is to accept the situation as it is or 
prohibit fishing within their EEZs. This latter 
option is impossible to enforce without effective 
and continual surveillance, which is very expen-
sive and beyond the financial means of most 
states. 
When viewed from an international stand-
point, the potential value of skipjack is great. 
Almost without exception, larger tunas around 
the world are currently being exploited at MSY 
levels. The only tuna fisheries where there is con-
siderable scope for further development are skip-
jack, the largest of which is located in the central 
and western Pacific. Despite steeply rising pro-
duction costs (mainly labour and oil prices), this 
industry remains economically attractive because 
international demand for tuna continues to 
increase, whereas international production is 
leveling off. In the United States, where approx-
imately 50% of world production is consumed 
annually, per-person consumption is rising in 
spite of real increases in price. This situation is 
expected to continue. Like any primary commod-
ity, skipjack prices fluctuate widely from year to 
year, but over the past decade these fluctuations 
have moved upward. Production costs for tuna 
substitutes - primarily beef and poultry - have 
also risen sharply, with the result that tuna has 
probably maintained its relative price position. 
Thus, the future prospects are bright. 
Conclusions 
Skipjack tuna of the central and western 
Pacific is the region's most valuable fish resource 
and the most important fishery of its type in the 
world. Although it is already being exploited to a 
significant degree, further exploitation is possi-
ble. The industry is particularly important to the 
small and isolated states of the region as a means 
of broadening their narrow economic bases and 
increasing their potential for development. Its 
development should generate much-needed for-
eign exchange and, where processing facilities are 
established, have a considerable impact on 
employment and the balance of trade. 
At present, most skipjack are harvested by 
DWN s, with only a small proportion of total 
landings being taken by locally registered vessels. 
For the continued orderly exploitation, efforts 
should be made to redress this situation, as it will 
become increasingly difficult to justify in political 
terms. 
Being highly migratory fish, skipjack move 
through the EEZs of many island states. Thus, 
effective regional management might be imple-
mented under the auspices of the FFA. The man-
agement agency should have representation not 
only from the resource owners but also from the 
harvesters, processors, and consumers. However, 
the politics associated with implementing this 
type of management arrangement poses enor-
mous practical problems mainly as a result of the 
lack of political unity among states in the region. 
Evidence already suggests that attempts to intro-
duce common licencing arrangements will be 
futile, as several of the member states have opted 
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to follow independent management policies. 
Despite the problems in implementing a 
regional management program for skipjack, the 
future of the fishery seems bright. With the 
exception of isolated mineral developments in 
the region, the skipjack stocks belonging to the 
island states of the central and western Pacific are 
without doubt their most valuable and important 
natural resource. 
Discussion 
Theodore Panayotou: Doulman's description 
and analysis of the skipjack tuna fishery of the 
central and western Pacific Ocean is both infor-
mative and thought provoking. He addresses 
four issues - the importance of the skipjack 
fishery to the island states in the region; the new 
opportunities produced by the 200-mile EEZs; 
the objectives of, and constraints to, the devel-
opment of the skipjack tuna fishery; and advan-
tages and difficulties of regional management. 
Doulman states that the skipjack tuna fishery 
in the central and western Pacific countries 
potentially offers opportunities for employment, 
foreign exchange, and resource rents. The only 
way that the fishery could produce these benefits 
simultaneously would be if one were to shadow 
price labour and foreign exchange below or 
above their market value. Such adjustments, 
often appropriate for developing countries 
(many of which have considerable unemploy-
ment and balance-of-trade deficits), should be 
incorporated in the calculation of resource rents, 
which are likely to be social rents rather than 
private profits. 
To say that demand has been doubling every 
year without indicating at what prices is not 
meaningful because it does not indicate whether 
one is moving along the demand curve in 
response to changing prices or shifting to a new 
demand curve as a result of population growth, 
income rises, or taste changes. 
Doulman does not show clearly the relative 
importance of the skipjack fishery in Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomons, and the other countries 
because he does not give rough estimates of the 
fishery's contribution to gross domestic product 
(GDP), employment, foreign exchange, or 
government revenues. Similarly, the difference 
between the value of fresh and canned tuna in 
Papua New Guinea does not accurately reflect 
the potential contribution of canning to those 
who do not have the facilities yet. Not only the 
cost of processing and the economies of scale 
should be considered but also the possibility that 
the spread between the price of fresh and canned 
food would not remain unchanged if all the coun-
tries in the region were engaging in processing. 
Doulman does not distinguish between nomi-
nal and effective control of the resources, 
although, no doubt, he is aware of the difference. 
The simple declaration ofEEZ does not establish 
control of the resource unless effective enforce-
ment can be exercised. Moreover, from the view-
point of the coastal state, a resource is not a 
resource if, in the foreseeable future, the country 
has no capability to extract a resource rent 
(directly or indirectly). It is a resource for the 
poachers and the distant-water fleet, but it is no 
more than a potential resource for the coastal 
state. Only when these distinctions are clearly 
made, can one fully appreciate the investments 
necessary to convert a potential resource to an 
actual one. 
I don't share Doulman's opinion that the rising 
proportion of catches indicates that the fishery is 
capable of sustaining even more intensive fishing 
effort. Economic and biologic overfishing has 
rarely been preceded by falling total catch, much 
less by a falling proportion of catch from a given 
location relative to the world catch as he states. 
Increases in effort (either through more vessels or 
through technological progress) can increase 
total catch far beyond the MSY. The effects of 
overfishing will be experienced much later. An 
example is the demersal fishing of the Gulf of 
Thailand, which is currently undergoing a decline 
partly as a result of overfishing. 
Doulman gives ample evidence of the prob-
lems that fisheries development in the region is 
facing, and he is justifiably concerned about the 
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low retained value. He recommends localization 
of the skilled crew positions while retaining the 
services of some skilled foreigners; promotion of 
locally owned and operated pole-and-line fishing 
boats; and more government investment and 
development of onshore processing. Correctly, 
he also perceives a number of constraints -
inadequate and unreliable sources of baitfish; 
temporary and uncertain nature of employment; 
and control transfer pricing in marketing. On the 
positive side, the capture of skipjack is compara-
tively easy even with relatively uncomplicated 
fishing gear of low capital and operating cost; 
funds can be found and fishing skills can be 
acquired fairly quickly. The problem appears to 
be more in management than in development. 
Doulman argues that the unpredictable migra-
tory patterns of skipjack call for a regional man-
agement policy geared to economic management 
rather than to resource conservation. First, the 
difference between these two types of manage-
ment is not obvious to me. Second, and more 
importantly, he underestimates the obstacles to 
an operational management agreement. 
Although the benefits from a regional policy may 
be large, it is unlikely that the 20 or so island 
states in the region can agree on a policy. The 
large number of states, their difference in size and 
level of development, as well as their history -
"petty rivalry and propensity to disagree even 
when the common good is at stake" - operate 
against such an agreement. Even if they could 
reach agreement, there would be an incentive to 
chisel and a tendency to break away under for-
eign encouragement. Doulman advocates 
enlarged membership for the Forum Fisheries 
Agency, but experience suggests that the larger 
the membership, the less cohesive the group and 
(hence) the more difficult the enforcement. 
These comments notwithstanding, Doulman's 
paper adds considerably to the knowledge and 
understanding of the refractory problems of 
development and management of the skipjack 
tuna resources of the central and western Pacific. 
Fisheries Development in the South China Sea 
Teruji S akiyama 
Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan 
This paper is a critical review of the South China Sea fisheries from a statistical point of view. 
The focus is marine fisheries, although inland fisheries and aquaculture also have a significant role in 
the countries exploiting the South China Sea. Because of the lack of statistics for the nonmarket 
economies, these have been little explored in this paper, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia receiving most of the attention. Expansion of fishery production in this region over the last 
few decades has mainly resulted from the introduction of trawl boats, large and small, which have 
also been responsible for the recent emphasis on the by-catch, a particularly noteworthy example 
being found in Thailand. All the countries in the region were seriously affected by the oil shortage in 
recent years, and those for which distant-water vessels dominated fishing activities have lost 
considerable ground. 
La presente communication est un examen critique des peches du sud de la mer de Chine, en 
terme de statistiques. L'etude porte principalement sur Jes peches marines, bien que Jes pays de cette 
region pratiquent egalement !es peches continentales et !'aquaculture. L'absence de statistiques dans 
certains pays a limite !'exploration a cet egard, le document portant surtout sur la Thallande, 
l'Indonesie, !es Philippines et la Malaisie. L'extension de la production halieutique de cette region 
depuis quelques decennies resulte principalement de !'adoption de chaluts de petite et de grande 
taille, qui a donne lieu a !'exploitation des peches auxiliaires, nouveau debouche bien illustre par la 
Thallande. Tous !es pays de la region ont ete serieusement affectes par la penurie de petrole des 
recentes annees et ceux qui exploitaient Jes lieux de peche Jes plus eloignes ont vu leur industrie 
s'affaiblir considerablement. 
The volume of world fish catch has increased 
from 20.3 Mt to 71.3 Mt over the last 40 years 
( 1938-79). Figures for the Southeast Asian coun-
tries during the period rose from 1.3 Mt to 7.3 
Mt. The other major fishing countries of Asia 
(Japan, North and South Korea) increased catch 
to 2.5 times their pre-War figures (Japan from 
3.60 Mt to 9.97 Mt, although a high of 10.2 Mt 
was recorded in 1978). The United States and 
Canada experienced a modest increase, the USA 
from 1.9 Mt to 3.5 Mt and Canadafrom0.8 Mt to 
1.3 Mt; the USSR had the greatest increase in 
catch (1.5 Mt to 9.1 Mt), some six times its 1938 
level. The greatest single catch (12.61 Mt) was 
recorded by Peru in 1970. The upward trends of 
catch recorded by developing countries during 
the 1960s and 1970s should be seen as a catching-
u p process. 
Among the three major developing regions of 
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the world, Latin America grew most signifi-
cantly, followed by Africa, and Asia (31, 10, and 
3 times respectively). In Latin America, fish was a 
secondary source of food until the end of World 
War II, and overall catch was low in 1938 (0.26 
Mt). Peru and Chile found anchovy to be the 
basis of a lucrative industry and greatly devel-
oped the anchovy-meal industry after World War 
II. With the development of a large-scale process-
ing system, this region's catch reached 10 Mt. 
Thus, total output rose to 14.45 Mt by 1970, 
accounting for 21 % of world catch. 
In Africa, the pre-War method of fishing was 
traditional and small scale; inhabitants caught 
fish from the lakes and seas strictly for their own 
use. With the introduction of modern technology 
and the input of capital, the supply and demand 
for fish expanded. 
In Asia, historical and social conditions were 
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different from those in other developing regions. 
Fish were, and still are, an inseparable partner of 
rice in the daily diet, particularly in East and 
Southeast Asia. In Japan, as well, fish and other 
marine products have been a major source of 
protein, although the rice-fish diet is now chang-
ing, with meat, bread, and noodles gradually 
replacing fish and rice. 
Trends 
The use of resources in the South China Sea is 
primarily a concern of the Southeast Asian coun-
tries - particularly the ASEAN, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong. China, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and 
Brunei .are also concerned in the overall fish 
resources of the South China Sea, but data from 
these countries are not available. Brunei's annual 
catch is fewer than 30 000 t, and this volume does 
not affect the total picture of the South China Sea 
fisheries. 
In all the ASEAN except Singapore, fish pro-
duction has expanded sharply since World War 
II. The increase was marked after 1960 and con-
tinued until 1977 when the oil crisis seriously 
hampered Thailand and the Philippines. Interest-
ingly, the fish industry in Indonesia and Malaysia 
appeared to be little affected by the oil crisis, with 
a continued expansion of the trawler fleets. The 
main reason is that diesel fuel is available and 
cheap. Thailand was most directly affected by the 
increase in oil prices, with drops in catch in 1974 
and from 1978 to the present (FAO yearbooks on 
fishery statistics, 1954-55 to present). The impli-
cation is that the Thai economy is vulnerable to 
the oil shortage and its fishing industry is not 
protected by government measures or industrial 
control. The fishing personnel are not equipped 
to cope with this international crisis. 
Since 1978, the supply of diesel oil has often 
been disrupted - a fact that prevents the off-
shore fishing fleet from acquiring a minimum oil 
supply. During 1979 alone, the number of 
powered boats, large or small, that failed to set 
sail reached some 6000 (unofficial estimate). The 
result has been increasing pressure on the coun-
try's balance of payments, with exports (mainly 
to Japan) of shrimp being drastically reduced 
since 1980. 
In the ASEAN, the annual growth rates in fish 
catch for 1961-65 and 1966-70 were 10.2% and 
9.9% respectively. For 1971-74 and 1975-79, the 
figures were 3.4% and 4.0%. These two distinct 
movements are clearly demonstrated by Thai-
land. Thailand, which held the record for greatest 
catch since 1969, relinquished its position to 
Indonesia in 1979, its total catch falling from 21.9 
Mt to 17.2 Mt in 1977; Indonesia rose from 15.7 
Mt to 17.3 Mt in the same period. The fishing 
industry in the Philippines survived the initial oil 
crisis of 1974 but has been adversely affected by 
subsequent shortages. Thus, the 1976-79 esti-
mates of average annual catch denote an increase 
of only 2.1 %. 
China, Burma, and Indonesia traditionally 
have been inland fishery countries, recording a 
high of 50% of total catch from inland waters. 
Statistics show that Indonesia recorded the high-
est inland catch among Southeast Asian coun-
tries during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1955, it still 
maintained a high of 60% of total catch. Thailand 
also depended heavily on inland fishing, with 
some 30% of the total catch coming from inland 
waters. Today the share of inland catch has been 
reduced considerably, as the marine fishing 
industry has rapidly expanded. Inland fishing 
should not, however, be ignored. The majority of 
inland consumers in all Southeast Asian coun-
tries (including Thailand) still depend heavily on 
fish from fresh water. 
SEAFDEC (1976, 1978) and FAO data on 
marine fish for 1970 and 1978 show that marine 
production in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore increased markedly as a percentage of 
total catch, whereas in Taiwan, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, the percentage 
declined. Whether or not this trend in marine 
fishing is temporary is difficult to evaluate. 
In contrast, aquaculture is showing signs of 
increased production in the major Southeast 
Asian countries (515 000 t, 640 000 t, and 687 000 
tin 1974, 1976, and 1978 respectively). 
The future of the fishing industry of the 
ASEAN, and Southeast Asian countries, will be 
determined by the maintenance of fish stock, 
both economically and politically. The growth of 
the demand for fish in both domestic and foreign 
markets hinges on the government's ability to 
manage its fishing resources and to deal with 
increasing conflicts of interest between tradi-
tional fishing personnel and the large-scale mod-
ern industries. 
Inland Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Inland fisheries in the Southeast Asian coun-
tries were a source of 18% of total catch in 1978, 
natural sources and aquaculture operations 
accounting for 9.5% and 8.5% respectively. The 
quantities are not high, but the real value is con-
siderable because the species (shrimps, sea bass, 
groupers, etc.) are highly desired by both import-
ers and local consumers. By-catch from prawn 
trawling costs U.S.$0.05-0.10/ kg, whereas good-
quality prawn costs $6.00/kg. This comparison 
indicates the importance of price-conscious 
assessments of subsectors of the fishing industry. 
Although the proportion of marine catch for 
human consumption is declining, the proportion 
of fish from inland waters and aquaculture has 
remained at 100%. In the case of Thailand, with a 
tremendous increase in fish caught for fish-meal 
processing, the percentage of fish caught for 
human consumption declined from 70-80% in 
the mid-1960s to 30% by the mid-1970s. This 
change has meant drastically reduced prices for 
the total catch and, thus, lower incomes for those 
who derive their livelihood from marine fishing. 
The ratio of marine to inland catch is 84: 16 in 
terms of quantity, but in real values it is 69:31 in 
the four major fishing countries of the ASE AN. 
The percentage of fish used in fish-meal plants 
is increasing for each country of the region. The 
marine/ inland fish ratio in value terms is also 
changing and, in the foreseeable future, may be 
50:50 with perhaps a bias toward the inland 
industry because of the increase in quantity and 
value of aquaculture and the overexploitation of 
high-valued fish and shrimp in marine waters. If, 
as the trend indicates, some (or all) of these fish 
disappear from the South China Sea, the total 
value of marine fish catch would further decline 
both in absolute and in relative terms, although 
the demand for feed in the livestock and aquacul-
ture industries raises the market price of poor-
quality fish. 
Structure of Marine Fisheries 
Comprehensive figures on the number of fish-
ing personnel by working status are available 
in SEAFDEC's 1978 report. Given that fishing is 
an occupation where the majority have small-
scale operations and a considerable number are 
part-timers, a comprehensive assessment of 
the employment status in these countries is 
complicated. 
The total number of fishing personnel aged 14 
and older in Southeast Asia is 1.55 million, of 
whom 0.97 million (63%) are fully employed in 
the industry. If Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Tai-
wan figures are included (about 0.6 million), then 
the number reaches 2.2 million. Because another 
2.5 times as many people are supposedly engaged 
in fishing-related occupations, then a total of 
some 7. 7 million people are supported by the 
fishing industry. If the households of these people 
and those of southern coastal fishing personnel 
are included in the calculation, one could say the 
South China Sea and its adjacent waters are the 
primary source of food, employment, and 
income for about 50 million people. 
Because the fishing operations are affected by 
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weather and the availability of stock, many fish-
ing personnel are unemployed for days and even 
months every year. It is probable that the oil 
shortage has been especially damaging for the 
temporary labourers. In Indonesia, for example, 
it is reported that to catch the number offish in a 
powered boat originally operated by two, at least 
three and as many as seven are currently being 
employed. It is safe to say, then, that the coastal 
small- and medium-scale fisheries are one of the 
important cushions for the unemployed in South-
east Asia. 
SEAFDEC (1978) reported small- and large-
scale fishing contributions to total catch. In 10 
countries of the region, a total of 7.16 Mt was 
caught in the sea and inland in 1978, 27.3% by 
small-scale operations and 52.5% by large-scale. 
Large-scale operations in Thailand accounted for 
the greatest proportion (77.3%), followed by that 
in Malaysia (68.6%) and the Philippines (32.0%). 
The increase in fishing activity during the 
1960s and 1970s coincides with an increase in 
powered boats in the region, both in number and 
size. This change is predominant in Thailand, 
which exhibited an impressive increase in 
trawlers (more than 5 t) (201 boats in 1961, 2395 
in 1965, 3114 in 1970, and 6041 in 1978). In 
Indonesia, where motorized fishing boats are the 
least common, the proportion of motor boats in 
the total fleet was only 1.3% in 1966. By 1978 this 
had reached 10.5%, of which 5468 were 5 t or 
more. 
As of 1978, no fewer than 132 000 powered 
fishing boats were operating in the South China 
Sea and adjacent waters, with many more under 
construction. If the boats belonging to Vietnam, 
Burma, Taiwan, and China that also fish these 
waters are added, at least 200 000 motor boats are 
engaged in marine fishing. 
In Thailand and Malaysia, trawling produces 
the largest catch, whereas in the Philippines, gill 
and seine nets share the largest catch. Data are 
not available for Indonesia (SEAFDEC 1978); 
however, it is known that the emergence, in 
Indonesia, of a modern fishing subsector oflarge-
scale shrimp trawling is hindering the traditional 
small-scale operations in the same waters. 
Statistics on catch by species (about 20) show 
by-catch from shrimp trawling and sardines as 
the largest contributors to total catch. The 
remaining species are evenly spread in availabil-
ity. By-catch is by far the greatest in Thailand 
(0.85 Mt of total 1.02 Mt). However, statistics on 
by-catch are unreliable and in most cases under-
estimated because the fish are landed at the dis-
cretion of the ship's captain and usually when a 
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monetary gain is expected. Some determining 
factors for landing by-catch are the distance from 
the fishing ground to the harbour; oil consump-
tion for the transportation; prevailing market 
price; and the contract between boat owner and 
fish-meal plants. 
In the domestic market, demands differ by 
country. In Thailand by-catch fish are an essen-
tial raw material for livestock feed.Now that they 
command 70% of the total market in Thailand, 
fishing can be seen as part of the fish-meal indus-
try. The practices in Thailand contrast dramati-
cally with those in Sabah and Sarawak where 
there is no domestic market for by-catch and the 
fish caught incidentally by shrimp trawlers are 
returned to the sea. The mortality for fish 
handled in this manner is extremely high, some-
times 100%. 
By-catch fish are the predominant catch in the 
South China Sea, and comparing them and mis-
cellaneous fish with the other major species is 
quite informative when assessing stocks and 
looking at the economy of the sea (SEAFDEC 
1978). In value terms, expanded in dollars, 
penaeid prawns rank first, albeit seventh in quan-
tity, and account for 15.7% of the total marine 
fish catch. They are followed by sardines (5.6%) 
and anchovies (5.0%). In value terms, by-catch 
fish rank 14th (2.2%). Due to the export market, 
penaeid prawns are particularly important for 
Malaysia and Thailand, with values to the coun-
try of $264.3 million and $132.8 million respec-
tively. Sardines are important to the Philippines 
($133.7 million), and, in Thailand, by-catch fish 
are the second largest source of income, $62.6 
million. Penaeid prawns will continue to be eco-
nomically valuable only if effective fishery man-
agement is introduced. At present, prawns are 
endangered and are the target of trawling fleets. 
Fisheries in Coastal Ecosystems 
of the Humid Tropics 
The coastal areas of the humid tropics are 
among the world's most productive and scientifi-
cally interesting regions. Some 60% of the popu-
lation'lives near the coast, and, at present, almost 
90% of marine protein is derived from coastal 
fishing areas. It is estimated that more than half 
the world's recoverable hydrocarbon resources 
are located beneath these waters. Moreover, 
these regions provide prime sites for urban devel-
opment, industry, agriculture, and, above all, 
fisheries. 
Coastal areas comprise highly complex and 
productive ecological systems that, because of 
the interaction between land and water, are 
among the least understood. They are also 
vulnerable to environmental abuse. Some of the 
world's most densely populated areas are found 
in the deltas and coastal plains of Southeast Asia, 
whereas similar regions in South America (for 
example, the Orinoco Delta of Venezuela) are 
among the least-populated regions on earth. 
These regions, with large areas of alluvia result-
ing in tropical soils with above-average fertility, 
are highly productive breadbaskets in Southeast 
Asia. In tropical South America, however, they 
are regarded largely as marginal areas (Ruddle 
and Manshard 1981). 
As the global population expands, the pressure 
on forested and tropical humid areas is bound to 
increase dramatically. Although, to increase 
productivity, most nations emphasize policies 
that intensify the use of resources that are already 
being exploited, governments are either promot-
ing or at least not restricting local-level develop-
ment of agriculture and other resources of forest-
ed areas. Many of the schemes are poorly 
conceived and will undoubtedly have an adverse 
and widespread effect. Yet, such areas are allur-
ing to decision-makers who, when faced with the 
demographic situation of Java, for example, see a 
future in the 8.5 Mha of Indonesian lagoon and 
estuaries for at least partial development of 
aquaculture, especially in the mangrove and 
freshwater swamp forest of Sumatra. 
The importance of mangroves to the popula-
tions of many tropical- countries is gradually 
being acknowledged. The peoples of Southeast 
Asia perceive that the plant is not only useful as a 
raw material (firewood, charcoal, timber, etc.), 
but also essential for nursery-hatched shrimp (or 
other aquatic renewable resources). As the 
exploitation of coastal aquatic resources intensi-
fies, the development of these mangrove areas 
appears more attractive to the villagers. 
Fish production from the mangrove forests is 
difficult to estimate, as it is currently a subsis-
tence activity. However, the mangrove forest is a 
reliable food source for many aquatic animals. 
The young of many kinds of prawns live in a 
mangrove area for at least 2 months and leave 
when they mature.No data on production from a 
mangrove forest have been recorded, although it 
is clear that the mangrove forest has potential for 
the development of the fishing industry. 
The potential productivity and the "value" of 
the humid areas are not widely appreciated by the 
communities that traditionally use their renew-
able natural resources. For example, estuaries 
have been used as garbage dumps and seen as 
wastelands, which they may, in fact, become if 
not reclaimed and upgraded in the near future. 
The hidden costs of the destruction are only now 
being realized. 
A major part of the mangrove forests is located 
in Asia and the Far East. In this region alone, 
roughly 6-8 Mha of forest have been identified 
(Christensen 1979). As these areas are rapidly 
being deforested, the identified areas have been 
considerably reduced. 
Policymakers foresee a specialized use for 
reclaimed tropical wetlands, including large-
scale agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture, and 
have, unfortunately, lost sight of the need to pre-
serve the natural functions of the forest. 
Mangrove areas are lush in nutrients for coast-
al aquaculture. The National Research Council 
of Thailand reported in 1977 that an area of 
approximately 19 000 ha has been used for this 
purpose. The total annual yield is about 37 355 t 
(Sanit et al. 1980). According to the Department 
of Fisheries, the area of mangrove forest suitable 
for shrimp culture is about 62 800 ha. This figure 
is based on soil properties, water salinity, tidal 
periods, and the availability of commercial 
shrimp. 
A hazard to mangrove areas is mining, espe-
cially in the southern Thai coastal zone where tin 
is a major resource. Mining concessions may 
cover both mangrove and nonmangrove areas, 
and the defining of mangrove limits is difficult. In 
spite of government regulations aimed at min-
imizing pollution in the areas concerned, igno-
rance of these regulations is common. 
Over the last decade, Thailand has witnessed 
an appalling increase in pollution in all land and 
water areas. The use of chemicals in the rice fields 
is widespread. Coastal waters and rivers are pol-
luted by the indiscriminate dumping of wastes. 
Consequently, the fish catch has been greatly 
reduced, and many fishing personnel are finding 
other employment more lucrative. 
Multiple and complex factors influence the 
overall ecosystems in mangrove areas, and it is 
still difficult to assess the economic implications 
of their interaction. One thing is certain: arbi-
trary use of the coastal waters of the South China 
Sea will have a deleterious impact on the aquatic 
resources. 
Recognition of the real and strategic value of 
the coastal zones is forcing scientists and admin-
istrators to treat seriously the long-term implica-
tions of human-nature relationships. Fishery 
economists must also be cognizant of these impli-
cations, which will profoundly affect the income, 
health, and nutrition of the region's people. At a 
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time of increasing socioeconomic difficulties, the 
careful use of economics and ecology in the man-
agement of this fragile and fertile area of the 
South China Sea could guarantee the Sea's last-
ing fertility in aquatic resources. 
Two Problems 
Infrastructure and Marketing 
In all the countries of the region except Tai-
wan, the infrastructure supporting the fishing 
industry is inadequate. Above all, the develop-
ment of fishing ports, most basic to marine fish-
ing, lags behind the economic and infrastructural 
requirements. Most of the major fishing ports of 
this region have grossly inadequate facilities. 
As fishing activity expands, the standard of 
port facilities becomes more important to the net 
value and net income of fishing personnel. All the 
postcatch facilities are weak in the countries of 
the region - a fact that reduces the quality fish to 
the level of by-catch fish. In my observations in 
various ports of Thailand, I found that signifi-
cant numbers of quality fish are being shipped to 
fish-meal plants along with the poor quality fish 
from the by-catch. 
Fishing villages scattered along the coastal 
areas have even worse infrastructural facilities. 
There are generally no moorage facilities for local 
fishboats, powered or not, and these boats are 
usually beached. Even when relatively large 
wooden piers are available, trawlers over IO t 
often have to wait until peak tide to dock. 
Medium- and large-scale boats are totally 
dependent upon the tides. Not only is this ineffi-
cient, but it reduces the value of the fish. 
Inefficient ice-making machines and the lack 
of freezers also cause many problems. Although 
it is unrealistic to expect the degree of moderniza-
tion of port facilities in developed countries, 
improvement of present conditions is crucial to 
the growth of the industry. A conservative esti-
mate of food products not reaching the market is 
from 22% to 35%. This is almost totally caused by 
spoilage. This is a loss both to the people who 
need more nutrition and to the economy of the 
country. 
The problems among the rural, traditional 
fishing personnel differ considerably from those 
facing people living in large, urban areas. The size 
of boats, the limited means of transportation, 
and the distance from village to the markets 
result in fish being preserved by salting, drying, 
or smoking methods. The fish preserved in this 
traditional way are sold at a low price to interme-
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diaries and meet the demands of the majority of 
consumers. 
I have frequently visited rural fishing villages 
of the southern and eastern regions of Thailand. 
Ice is usually unavailable to rural operations, and 
the slow process of salting is frustrating. The 
people are deeply aware of the problems for 
which there is no immediate economic or techni-
cal solution. 
In my view, a large portion of the technologies 
originating in the developed countries can be eas-
ily adapted to the existing large-scale industries 
of the South China Sea, but, for the remote and 
small villages, special attention must be given to 
the cultural needs of the villagers before modern 
development techniques can be applied. 
To some extent, fishing personnel can partici-
pate in the construction of ports, which should be 
initiated by public institutions and governments 
with international support in terms of capital and 
money. The Japanese experience is noteworthy: 
many of the major issues and problems have been 
solved by fishing cooperatives. 
From the economic point of view, the small 
quantity of fish handled and inefficient means of 
transporting fish to the market are major prob-
lems in rural areas. Government assistance is 
essential, and technical assistance is needed to 
promote effective and economic methods offish 
processing. The ultimate objective is to upgrade 
the fishing industries, both rural and urban, and 
to ensure economic prosperity. 
Thailand's By-Catch 
A worldwide tendency of fishing industries 
currently is to use a high percentage of the marine 
catch for purposes other than human consump-
tion. This is especially true of incidental catches 
by shrimp trawlers that scoop up everything 
along the ocean floor in their search for shrimp. 
In Thailand, the trawlers use mesh sizes that are 
extremely small; inevitably, this practice means 
young, undersized quality fish are caught and 
that the availability of adult quality fish will be 
drastically reduced in the future. The use of the 
fish for fish meal devalues the total catch and 
allows an inferior industry to flourish. This 
industry is profitable only to owners of large 
trawler fleets or fish-meal plants. Eventually the 
misuse of the industry will affect everyone. The 
diminishing supply of quality fresh fish available 
to the people will be at too high a price. 
The misuse is exemplified in the fishing statis-
tics from the North Sea. Fish caught here were 
directed in alarmingly large quantities to fish-
meal plants. During 1966-75, the percentage rose 
from 27 to 75. This figure will rise to more than 
80% ifthe trend continues. Although the quantity 
of fish caught during this period did not alter, 
there was a dramatic change in the varieties of 
fish caught; such quality fish as cod decreased 
from 0.8 Mt to 0.3 Mt; horse mackerel from 1.0 
Mt to 0.25 Mt; and sprat of less than 15 cm 
increased from 0.11 Mt to 0.64 Mt. 
In the northern seas, monophyletic fish are 
caught, and resource management is easier than 
for multispecies. In these areas, the small fish can 
be used for human consumption. In contrast, 
regulations in countries like the U.S. forbid the 
use of mixed species in processed foods; there-
fore, catches of multispecies have no value other 
than for fish-meal production. In many areas in 
the tropical seas, personnel pick only shrimp and 
relatively large fish from the catch and, after 
sorting, dump the remainder. 
Serious attention must be given to the impor-
tance of the by-catch fish and fish-meal industry 
to Thailand. Once a subsidiary market (in this 
case fish meal) is established, it is extremely diffi-
cult to reestablish an industry geared toward 
products for human consumption. 
Peru's experience in anchovy use is note-
worthy. Peru is the world's largest fish producer 
and recorded a 12.5 Mt catch in 1970, almost all 
of which was anchovy. When the fish-meal indus-
try began to base its operations on anchovy, the 
Peruvian people changed from treating the fish as 
a delicacy to believing the fish suitable only for 
animal feed. Thus, the landing and processing of 
anchovy is a mechanized chain of mass produc-
tion for feed purposes; the freshness and quality 
of fish have become unimportant. Also, most 
vessels contract with plant owners for direct 
delivery of all anchovy caught. So, a market was 
created. Given the efficiency of the meal industry, 
where one labourer can process 60 t of anchovy 
daily (compared with 2-3 t for human consump-
tion), the economic gains made from maintaining 
the fish-meal industry are quite dramatic. 
The basic principles of economics underlying 
the Peruvian fish-meal industry are applicable to 
Thailand. The existence of such efficient and 
modern fish-meal industries presupposes the 
future availability of an unlimited supply of raw 
material. A lesson can be learned from Peru 
where anchovy has become scarce. The invest-
ment in a highly mechanized fish-meal industry 
and the alternative, high-priced, quality fish 
market have been lost. 
The fish-meal industry has an advantage over 
the fresh or frozen fish trade in that the interna-
tional demand for fish meal is potentially unlim-
ited. In fact, fish meal is a commodity having high 
elasticity in the market and can maintain a 
demand by a minimal reduction in price. 
Hirasawa (1980) refers in his recent book, 
Fisheries of Japan and the World, to proper feed 
mixing rates in relation to fish meal. The mixing 
rate of fish meal in livestock feed is generally set 
at 2-6%. Below this rate, animal growth is re-
stricted, and, above it, the animals acquire a fishy 
smell. In the past, fish meal was thought to con-
tain some "unknown factor" that accelerated 
animal growth. As biochemistry developed, it 
was discovered that meal contains a specific 
amino acid that today can be artificially manu-
factured. Unfortunately, the synthetic product is 
still too expensive for practical use, and livestock 
enterprises continue to use fish meal. If the per-
centage offish meal in animal feed is raised 2-3%, 
the demand will increase by 50% - an increase 
that shows the great elasticity of demand. 
Prawn and shrimp continue to be the highest 
value export of Thailand, and the country's 
trawler fleet will continue to fish the South China 
Sea and its surrounding waters, even though the 
margin of profit is falling in proportion to rising 
oil prices. These facts indicate the need for better 
management of the fishing industry and the 
implementation of government regulations to 
protect it. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have not touched upon the 
subject of stock assessment, leaving this to partic-
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ipants with a greater knowledge of the subject. 
This paper deals more with the fish catch aspect 
and its economic and physical facets. In the 
course of my research for this paper, I found 
many similarities and differences among the 
countries exploiting the South China Sea. 
By far the most common characteristic in these 
fishing countries is that a dual economy exists in 
the fishing sector. I also found that fishing 
achievements (catch, farm production, etc.) can-
not be discussed in terms of the "national aver-
age." This sector is distinctly divided in half: the 
small-scale, coastal fisheries and the large-scale, 
modern offshore fisheries. It is clear that the gap 
between these two sectors is getting wider, and 
this trend is reflected in all major fishing cpun-
tries surrounding the South China Sea. 
The most common problems are historical and 
cultural in nature; for some fishing communities 
the problems are ethnic. It is a time when all 
coastal and island countries must recognize that 
many international agreements and regulations 
oppose domestic ones, in particular with regard 
to resource management. Conflicts and disputes 
occur in many fishing grounds and, generally, 
concern fishing limits. To minimize losses stem-
ming from these disputes, the governments and 
educational institutions must educate the fishing 
personnel (and their children) about the impor-
tance of conserving the precious renewable 
resources. 
Discussion 
Aida R. Librero: Sakiyama classifies the fishing 
industry in Southeast Asia according to eco-
nomic structure, i.e., small scale or traditional, 
industrial or commercial, and artificial ( aquacul-
ture operations). His is the first paper at this 
conference to distinguish the contributions of 
these three sectors, and I believe his recognition 
of the special contributions and needs of the 
small-scale sector is essential for adequate fishery 
management and stock control. 
In general, for Southeast Asia, the small-scale 
fisheries sector provides income, employment, 
and protein to the local people. In the Philip-
pines, of total fish production, 60% comes from 
small-scale fisheries, 30% from the commercial 
sector, and 10% from aquaculture. 
Although small-scale operations contribute a 
large proportion to production, they pose devel-
opment problems. They constitute a large pro-
portion of the rural population; they have low 
incomes; the reasons include inadequate vessels 
and gear, lack of alternative employment oppor-
tunities, and inflation. 
Sakiyama noted that fishery production 
expanded rapidly until 1977 when the oil crisis 
seriously affected countries dependent upon 
imported oil, specifically Thailand and the Phil-
ippines. The series of fuel-price increases in the 
Philippines has seriously taxed industries since 
1973 when the price (U .S.$0.03 / L) increased by 
77%. The price has continued to rise and is now 
more than 20 times that in 1972. 
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The effects of the oil crisis on the fishing indus-
try vary with the degree of oil dependency of a 
country. As fuel costs account for about 38% of 
the total costs in small-scale fisheries production, 
this sector is seriously threatened. The amount of 
fuel consumed is also dependent upon the type of 
fishing gear used. Hook-and-line users spend 
50% of their total operating expenditures on oil, 
whereas lift-net users spend only 16%. 
In the South China region, the component of 
the marine catch that is destined for human con-
sumption is declining. Apparently, the tremen-
dous by-catch landings from Thailand have dom-
inated the picture. Clearly, however, this varies 
among the countries in the region. In the Philip-
pines, virtually all fish catch goes for human con-
sumption, and demand for fish is increasing. By-
catch fish serve as feed for livestock and for fish 
cultured in ponds, and this use is an indirect 
increment to food for humans. 
The coexistence of traditional and commercial 
fishing operations has given rise to conflicts over 
the resource base and the markets - both factor 
and product (Smith 1979). Surveys show that, 
despite legislation designating fishing grounds 
for small-scale and commercial fishing opera-
tions, commercial fishing has continually 
encroached on the fishing grounds set aside for 
small-scale fishing (Librero et al. 1981). 
Competition in the factor and product markets 
is less obvious but probably has an equally 
serious long-term effect on small-scale opera-
tions. Economic theory is that, under competitive 
conditions, factors of production are used in 
activities that provide the highest marginal 
return. Competition leads to capital-labour 
ratios that reflect the contribution to output of 
these factors. However, small-scale and commer-
cial fisheries operate in two separate labour and 
capital markets. For example, in small-scale fish-
ing communities, where the source of capital is 
the private moneylender, the price of capital may 
be as high as 100% a year. In contrast, develop-
ment loans available to commercial fisheries have 
been highly subsidized, both by international 
lending agencies and by domestic development 
bankers (Librero et al. 1981). 
Competition in fish marketing may also work 
to the disadvantage of small-scale fisheries. As 
commercial fisheries expand, the relative level of 
living of those dependent on small-scale fishing 
declines. However, there may be advantages 
accruing to the traditional sector from the devel-
opment of the commercial sector. Infrastructure 
improvement, for instance, is mutually benefi-
cial, and the two sectors do not necessarily catch 
the same species nor do they supply the same 
markets. 
Sakiyama also pointed out the inadequacy of 
vessels and gear that are used in small-scale oper-
ations and that contribute to low productivity. 
Steps must be taken to develop management 
schemes to help solve such problems. 
The economically optimum catch is lower than 
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) because, 
at MSY, the marginal cost is greater than margin-
al return. In agriculture, there is an analogy: 
biologists generate technology in crop produc-
tion with the objective of maximizing total out-
put. This is not a wrong objective, of course. 
However, to entice producers to adopt new tech-
nology requires that the net benefit be maxi-
mized. Attitudes to risk are closely related to the 
social and economic environment of the produc-
ers. A low-gain/ low-risk strategy that generates a 
market for the product and, more importantly, 
guarantees survival of the family may be more 
attractive than a high-gain/ high-risk technology. 
Whether in agriculture or in fisheries or in 
forestry, policymakers must work toward com-
plementarity among the biologic, technological, 
and socioeconomic aspects. Often, biologists, 
technologists, and economists have worked 
independently of each other. Mutual cooperation 
among these disciplines in technology generation 
could bring about technology that is feasible, 
economically viable, and socially acceptable. 
The other fisheries sector that I would like to 
comment on is aquaculture. Sakiyama reports 
that aquaculture in Southeast Asia is showing 
signs of increased production. An earlier paper 
stated that efforts in conserving renewable natu-
ral resources have invited desirable reactions in 
the market, e.g., fish culture. I would like to say 
that there are both desirable and undesirable 
reactions. 
Fish culture is increasingly becoming an 
important component of fisheries production in 
Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, aquaculture 
development has received particular attention. 
However, the industry has been faced by a short-
age of fry and has been marked by low productiv-
ity. Two-thirds of the fish ponds in the country 
apply fertilizer, a large proportion compared 
with many agricultural crops. Despite this, pro-
ductivity has remained at about 700 kg/ ha, only 
about one-third the yield obtained by Taiwan fish 
farmers. 
Increases in aquaculture production are 
brought about by an increase either in yield or in 
area or in both. Pond areas per farm range from 
less than one hectare to hundreds of hectares, 
although not all the area is necessarily cultivated. 
Yet, increasing pressure has been brought to bear 
on policymakers to open new lands for fish 
ponds, particularly from mangrove swamps. 
Competition among sectors who wish to main-
tain mangrove swamps and those who wish to 
open them for fish development makes manage-
ment of mangrove areas difficult (Librero 1980). 
Mangrove forests are a fast-dwindling resource 
in the Philippines, although they may be classi-
fied academically as a renewable resource. The 
current practices of exploitation and utilization 
make them nonrenewable. Mangrove areas in the 
country have been declining at the rate of24 592 ha 
annually, having been cleared for culture or 
simply as fuelwood and timber. 
The importance of mangrove areas cannot be 
overemphasized. From the ecological viewpoint, 
mangroves serve as an effective buffer to the 
upland environment during storms by preventing 
soil erosion and minimizing seawater pollution. 
They also act as shelter for wildlife. 
The significance of mangrove from a forestry 
point of view in the Philippines lies in the timber 
and nontimber products it provides such as fire-
wood and charcoal, nipa shingles, palm sap, etc. 
For fisheries, mangrove areas serve as breed-
ing, spawning, and nursery grounds for numer-
ous species of fish, molluscs, and crustaceans. 
The tidal characteristics of the mangrove swamps 
lead to the suitability of this ecosystem for aqua-
culture purposes. 
The suitability of mangrove areas for fish pro-
duction has encouraged the tapping of these 
areas for fish-pond development. In the early 
1950s fish-pond area in the Philippines was only 
about 88 681 ha, but it rose to 100 000 ha in 1954 
and further increased to 129 000 ha in 1962, 
176 000 ha in the 1970s. In 1981, there are 3300 
applicants for developing new mangroves, the 
area constituting about one-third of the remain-
ing mangrove areas in the country. 
The magnitude of the conversion of mangrove 
areas into aquacultural production, human set-
tlements, industrial development, and other uses 
is not documented. However, observations indi-
cate the wide areas that have been utilized for 
such purposes. 
The multiplicity of uses of the mangrove areas 
and their environmental impact demand sound 
management and disposition. Optimization 
models for the use of these resources should 
incorporate ecological, economic, and social 
parameters in a language that policymakers and 
program implementers can understand. 
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Explicitly or implicitly, several papers in this 
conference point out the "fishiness" of fishery 
statistics. To a large extent, the ability to do 
policy-related research depends upon the avail-
ability of reliable and accurate statistics. Thus, a 
great deal of improvement in data collection and 
reporting is essential. 
Norman J. Wilimovsky: Sakiyama's paper cov-
ers a broad area and invites comments and dis-
cussion on several fronts. In one respect, the wide 
scope has the consequence that details are some-
times insufficient to be judged adequately. 
In analyzing the trends within fisheries, 
Sakiyama does not distinguish between catches 
and landings, and, in the regions discussed by 
him, these factors vary widely. Some countries 
land most, if not all, of what they catch, and 
others keep only a proportion of the catch. Also, 
as Sakiyama and, earlier, Christy pointed out, 
economic analyses based on the value of landings 
frequently show patterns significantly different 
from those based on weight. Likewise - although 
not mentioned by Sakiyama - attention must be 
given to the problem of natural fluctuations in 
abundance, as they influence interpretation of 
fishery catches and landings. Many investigators 
feel that the way in which the statistics are 
reported varies widely and depends on, among 
other things, politics. There are statistical arti-
facts for the South China Sea area. They are 
difficult to document and adjust for but are 
worthy of mention. For example, significant por-
tions of the Thai catch apparently are taken in 
areas other than indicated, and many catches 
within China's coastal waters are landed else-
where. These inconsistencies are accommodated 
under local ad hoc sharing arrangements, and 
often all parties who are involved in submerging 
the details of the catches benefit. The recognition 
of EEZs has not materially changed practices in 
the reporting of fish catches. 
Sakiyama recognizes the dual nature of the 
fishery within the region, but his analysis would 
have benefited from a detailed consideration of 
the different institutional arrangements within 
the industrial fishery as opposed to the artisanal 
fishery. The need to upgrade the latter without 
superimposition of the former is critical in this 
region. The management problems imposed by 
the dual nature of the fishery are significant and 
have not been treated in depth by Sakiyama. For 
example, the effects of"growth" overfishing and 
"recruitment" overfishing by both large- and 
small-scale operations are distinct and need to be 
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spelled out. Sakiyama recognizes that the solu-
tions to the problems lie in the provision of 
infrastructure such as transportation, port facili-
ties, and ice plants. However, he does not expand 
enough on this point and expresses only limited 
hope for the near term. He suggests the use of 
cooperatives as a mechanism appropriate to the 
area, but this is a particularly sensitive national 
question and regional attitudes vary widely. 
The position of those who derive their liveli-
hood from fishing in the area is central to solu-
tion of the problem. Even within this cultural 
group, there is little tendency to induce younger 
members of the community to consider continu-
ing in the fishery tradition. To my knowledge, 
only in the Philippine islands is a serious attempt 
to change this attitude taking place. It is a signifi-
cant sociological problem requiring attention 
and has direct management implications. 
A strong case is made regarding by-catch. 
Sakiyama recognizes the multispecies catch/ 
price problem but limits his analysis of driving 
forces to price elasticity. There are deboning 
machines and other chemical utilization tech-
niques amenable to at least part of the solution of 
direct use of less profitable fishes that have had 
dramatic effects where introduced. 
Considerable attention is given in the review to 
the mangrove conservation problem. Recent 
studies have indicated that the actual impact 
between forestry and fisheries can be substan-
tially mitigated. The solution lies in a central 
responsibility, authority, and communication 
between the institutional units involved. At the 
field level, the problem usually can be readily 
solved. Moving the solution through the bureau-
cratic hierarchy poses some serious political 
questions in almost all countries. 
In summary, I am sure Sakiyama would agree 
that there is an overall need at the policy level for 
recognition of the fundamentally differing prob-
lems between the industrial fishery and the arti-
sanal fishery that the advent of the EEZs has not 
materially changed. Sakiyama stresses the need 
for fishery management and stock control but the 
options available to the two groups grossly differ. 
To cope with this problem, policymakers must 
carry rational planning beyond the confines of 
fisheries and its infrastructure. The time frame to 
implement change is limited and growing shorter 
as the EEZ-induced institutional changes become 
fixed. Any long-term solutions require upgrading 
of the artisanal fishery, involving training and 
not just superimposition of a modern industrial 
fishery that can replace the small-scale sector but 
not solve the basic problem of their needs. The 
ultimate problem lies in an area of declining pop-
ularity, i.e., the control of population growth. 
Fishery planning on a long-range scale cannot 
take place in the vacuum of single-resource anal-
ysis. Sakiyama's review raises many of the central 
points for a discussion. 
Theodore Panayotou: The Sakiyama paper 
provides an informative account of the long-term 
trends and problems of the South China Sea 
fisheries. My comments focus on what I consider 
to be his main findings: 
• The fishing industries of the countries bor-
dering the South China Sea are characterized by 
ever-widening dualism manifested in the persist-
ing coexistence of a large-scale mechanized fish-
ing sector, accounting for most of the catch and 
exports, side-by-side with a traditional small-
scale sector accounting for most of the employ-
ment and local fish consumption. 
• The fishery makes a substantial contribu-
tion to employment, income, and food consump-
tion of the Southeast Asian population; more 
significantly perhaps the fishery is seen as "one of 
the important cushions for the unemployed in 
Southeast Asia." 
• Rising fuel prices and fuel shortages are the 
major factors responsible for the decline of the 
fishing industry in several Southeast Asian coun-
tries, particularly in Thailand and the Philip-
pines, which import oil. 
• By-catch predominates the catch from the 
South China Sea and its share is increasing over 
time. The use of the by-catch for fish meal rather 
than for human consumption is an inferior indus-
try and in the long run erodes the demand and 
availability of edible fish. 
• The development of a supportive infrastruc-
ture, such as landing ports, transport systems, 
and ice plants, has been lagging behind fisheries 
development, and it is at present grossly inade-
quate for large-scale fisheries and almost nonex-
istent for traditional fisheries. This means that 
the value of fish caught is lower than it need be 
because of delays, spoilage, and inappropriate 
processing; edible fish, thus, become suitable 
only for fish meal - a fact that reduces further 
fish-protein availability. 
• Trawling operators must be educated to see 
the importance of conserving renewable re-
sources and traditional operations should be 
assisted through more economic methods of fish 
processing. 
• For the long-term sustained growth of the 
fishing industry, conservation of the mangrove 
forests and the coastal ecosystem (presumably 
the spawning and feeding grounds offish) should 
also be part of fisheries management. Moreover, 
conflicts and disputes between international 
agreements and domestic regulations (or prac-
tices) must be recognized and dealt with if renew-
able resources are to be properly managed. 
There can be no dispute that a dualistic struc-
ture exists in Southeast Asian fisheries, but this is 
neither uniform in all countries nor unique to 
Southeast Asia. Although dualism is found in the 
fisheries (and other sectors) of virtually all devel-
oping (and some developed) countries, it is quan-
titatively and qualitatively different in Thailand 
from the dualism in Malaysia or the Philippines. 
In Thailand, it is a dualism between coastal oper-
ations and long-distance trawlers and has been 
fostered by an immaculate laissez-faire policy 
and an expediently distorted capital market. 
Before the early 1960s, the Thai marine fisheries 
were all coastal and employed traditional gear 
such as traps and cast-nets. Following the suc-
cessful demonstration of trawlers with German 
assistance in 1960, fish traders and investors 
acquired the new technology. 
As the coastal fishing personnel were expected 
either to obtain employment on the rapidly 
expanding trawl fleet or to switch to other occu-
pations, they attracted little government atten-
tion until very recently when it was realized that 
their numbers, far from declining, have been ris-
ing. Apparently, distorted relative factor prices 
and increasing unemployment elsewhere resulted 
in a capital-intensive trawl fishery and a reverse 
flow of labour from farming to coastal fishing, 
which perpetuate dualism. 
The situation is clearly different in other 
ASEAN countries (Malaysia, the Philippines) 
where the governments took a leading role in 
fisheries development with an explicit objective 
to protect and upgrade the small-scale fisheries. 
Through a series of credit and subsidy schemes 
for small-scale or municipal fishing operations 
and the regulation of large vessels, these coun-
tries managed to contain dualism within smaller 
limits than was the case in Thailand where the 
problems of small-scale operations are still 
regarded more as social than economic. 
In a comparative study of a number of coun-
tries over a number of years, one can learn much 
about key variables. If dualism is common, but 
neither uniform nor constant, what accounts for 
the differences and changes? Such an attempt to 
analyze and explain would help policymakers 
identify instruments that will reduce dualism if 
dualism is considered undesirable. Sakiyama 
stops short of such analysis. 
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One may take issue with the way Sakiyama 
estimates the contribution of fisheries to 
employment and income, but even the casual 
observer finds that fish and fishing play a promi-
nent role in the economy and life of Southeast 
Asia, a role that is perhaps reflected more in the 
culture than in the statistics. Also, as Sakiyama 
aptly points out, the fishery is one of the impor-
tant cushions for the unemployed in Southeast 
Asia. This is, however, at best, a mixed blessing. 
In the short run, open access to resources can 
serve well the role of a cushion or a safety valve 
for a "marginalized" section (landless and unem-
ployed) of the population who, in the absence of 
any better option, take up fishing, mangrove 
forest felling, or illicit offshore mining. 
In the long run, however, free entry and 
increasing numbers of people of a nearly zero 
opportunity cost lead to depletion, if not destruc-
tion, of the resource. The increasing use of 
dynamite, poison, and fine-mesh nets by coastal 
fishing personnel in Thailand exemplifies the 
problems. A decline in catch per unit effort when 
neither expansion into new fishing grounds nor 
alternative employment is possible leads inescap-
ably to the adoption of fishing methods that only 
a few years earlier were considered unacceptable. 
Although it may be fashionable to blame the 
large trawlers for the destruction of much of the 
coastal fishery in Southeast Asia, the small coast-
al operations are as much to blame. The differ-
ence is that trawlers have options (other fishing 
grounds and other investments), whereas the 
small-scale operators ~o not. 
One cannot rely on the fishery to serve forever 
as a cushion for the unemployed. Most coastal 
fisheries in Southeast Asia are already overex-
ploited, and, if complete destruction is to be 
avoided, the direction of migration should be 
reversed soon through alternative employment 
opportunities in the interior as well as in coastal 
aquaculture. This will also meet Sakiyama's 
requirement that the mangroves and the coastal 
ecology be preserved for the long-term viability 
of the fishery. 
The impact of the rising oil prices on South 
China Sea fisheries depends not only on whether 
a country is an oil producer or an oil importer but 
also on whether a country is a distant-water fish-
ing nation or not, as well as on the degree of 
capitalization of the industry and on the effec-
tiveness with which EEZs are implemented. The 
oil crisis has changed the relative costs between 
near- and distant-water fishing. To the extent 
that the declared EEZs are enforced, a distant-
water fishing nation such as Thailand faces a 
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dilemma between retreating into its overfished 
waters or venturing further away, beyond its 
neighbours' EEZs, an option increasingly dis-
couraged by rising fuel prices. 
For most Southeast Asian countries, expen-
sive fuel may help save their fisheries; after all, 
whatever is bad for fishing operations is good for 
the fish. It is not so with Thailand: as distant-
water fishing becomes more and more costly, as a 
result of both higher fuel prices and higher prob-
ability of being caught in foreign waters, increas-
ingly larger numbers of vessels are shifting their 
operations to the Gulf of Thailand with detri-
mental effects on coastal operations and fish. 
Yet, higher fuel subsidies would not save the 
resource, for they will attract more entrants into 
the coastal fishery from other sectors of the econ-
omy, further exacerbating the misallocation that 
already exists as a result of the open-access status 
of the resource and the chronic undervaluation of 
capital and energy. 
Joint-fishing ventures between capital-surplus 
fisheries, such as Thailand, Taiwan, South 
Korea, and Japan, and resource-surplus coun-
tries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and Indochina, are a promising option not 
discussed by Sakiyama. Nor does one find much 
reference to the problems of encroachment and 
jurisdictional conflicts that afflict the South 
China Sea fisheries. 
I agree with Sakiyama's assessment that by-
catch fish predominate the South China Sea 
catch and that the share of by-catch has been 
rising, but I find his argument on the causes and 
implications of this trend somewhat dubious. 
Although trawling for shrimp in a multispecies 
environment results in a certain amount of by-
catch, I believe the source of the problem is more 
institutional and economic than technical or 
environmental. Most of the by-catch is not 
obtained as a by-product of shrimping but as a 
target catch. That fishing operations prefer a low-
valued catch today to a high-valued catch tomor-
row (more than half the by-catch is juveniles of 
high-value species and much of the remainder is 
food for these species) could be the result of lack 
of property rights over the resource or of too-
heavy discounting of the future. Probably both 
factors are in operation, and open access explains 
the observed behaviour. 
Of course, the demand for by-catch fish by the 
fish-meal plants is also a necessary condition for 
the continued survival of the practice, but it can-
not be offered as the sole cause of the problem. 
Nor can it be meaningfully charged that, as a 
result of the high and rising by-catch production, 
an inferior (but efficient) industry is established 
and that consumers lose their "taste" for fish used 
in fish meal. 
Instead, I see four distinct social costs in the 
increasing trend toward by-catch use: 
• As a result of the open-access status of the 
resource, the demand for by-catch will encourage 
investment in more capital and labour than is 
socially optimal for the harvesting of by-catch, 
i.e., any of the rents from the exercise will be 
dissipated; 
• The opportunity cost of immature capture -
that is, the future revenues foregone because the 
fish are not allowed to reach marketable size - is 
substantial; 
• The future benefits will be lost if the fishery 
collapses as a result of the reduction of the adult 
fish population below a critical minimum; and 
• There will be overinvestment in by-catch 
processing (at present, fish meal) on the false 
assumption of "future availability of an unlim-
ited supply of raw materials," as Sakiyama aptly 
points out. 
The research and policy issue is whether the 
total net benefits from leaving the fish to reach 
maturity and harvesting the "right" amount 
exceed the cost of regulation and enforcement to 
achieve this result. For at least some countries in 
the South China Sea (Thailand is a good exam-
ple), enforcement costs are often prohibitively 
high. 
Sakiyama has identified one of the most potent 
constraints to fisheries development in Southeast 
Asia: lack of infrastructure. Except for a few 
urban landing centres and the general transporta-
tion network, postharvest infrastructure is min-
imal. More landing facilities in remote areas, 
marketing outlets, ice plants, and cold storages 
are needed, but they are not provided by the 
private sector because of stringent government 
regulations or market failures (economies of 
scale, public goods, externalities). The govern-
ment that is supposed to provide such infrastruc-
ture is often unable to do so because of inability 
to tax the fishing operations and unwillingness to 
effect a net transfer of funds from other sectors of 
the economy to the fishery. 
Unlike agriculture and industry, which are 
often heavily taxed, fishing operations resist tax-
ation on the grounds that, being sea-oriented, 
they do not benefit much from public services. 
Every time the Thai government attempts to 
impose a tax or a landing fee, the Thai trawlers 
start landing their catch in Singapore or Malay-
sia. This leaves the coastal fishing operations 
"with the bill," which they are unable to foot even 
if the government had the resources to collect 
taxes from thousands of dispersed operators. 
This situation, coupled with the fact that income 
taxes outside the urban areas of developing coun-
tries are inoperative, means that the fishery, its 
natural-resource base notwithstanding, yields lit-
tle or no government revenue. As already too 
much capital and labour are occupied in the 
fishery (and too little elsewhere), the government 
would be misallocating general revenues if it were 
to build fishery-supportive infrastructure that 
would attract new entrants into an already 
crowded sector. 
Of course, foreign development assistance, 
some fishery-specific, may be used for infrastruc-
ture, but, in the absence of restrictions on entry 
into the fishery, the long-term effects of such 
investment are not economic. Inadequate infra-
structure may well be a substitute (however 
imperfect) for taxation and fisheries manage-
ment that governments are unable to enforce. 
Fisheries management is understood to mean 
different things to different people. Here, it is 
defined as a move from an existing situation to 
one in which net social benefits are enhanced. 
Management comprises the move, the means of 
moving, and the means of maintaining the new 
position. For the calculation of the net benefits of 
the move, one presumes knowledge of the distri-
butional weights and intertemporal trade offs 
and ability to quantify all relevant costs and 
benefits. 
Sakiyama has outlined a number of factors 
that should be part of such a move: 
• Trawlers should be educated to see (or 
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rather made to behave as if they see) the impor-
tance of conserving renewable resources; 
• Small-scale fishing operations should be 
assisted through more infrastructure; and 
• Future availability offish should be ensured 
through preservation of coastal ecology. 
These recommendations clearly outline a move 
and an implicit set of distributional and inter-
temporal weights, but they remain silent about 
the means of effecting such a move and maintain-
ing the new position. How can trawlers, without 
property rights over the resource, be made to 
abstain from landing by-catch? How can small-
scale operations enjoy long-term benefits from 
more infrastructure in the absence of restrictions 
on entry? How can the felling of mangrove forests 
and the destruction from coastal mining be regu-
lated when unemployment and landlessness are 
rising and other sources of income are hard to 
find? Even if answers to these questions are 
found, there remains the question of whether the 
benefits from such a move are large enough to 
justify the enforcement and other costs involved. 
These difficulties are not offered as reasons for 
despair and inaction but as grounds for more 
in-depth analysis to identify moves that are feasi-
ble within the economic, institutional, and admin-
istrative constraints of the countries concerned. 
Sakiyama has provided us with solid background 
and high-quality food for thought. I hope his 
contribution will be used as a seed for further 
research and analysis rather than as raw material 
for an inferior policy. Sakiyama's contribution, 
however, goes beyond the figures and their inter-
pretation to the approach of!ooking at the South 
China fisheries as a whole, an interdependence 
underlined by fish migration, overlapping EEZs, 
and a host of common geoclimatic and cultural 
features. 
The Squid Fishery in New Zealand· 
the Role of Joint Ventures and Foreign Fleets 
C. C. W a/lace 
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand 
The catching capacity of the New Zealand fishing industry has grown rapidly since the 
mid-l 960s. New Zealand's declaration of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in J 978 forced resource 
managers in the country to parcel out the fisheries resources among competing claimants: the 
domestic, joint-venture, and foreign fleets. The squid fishery is one in which there is no domestic 
capacity; therefore, at present, joint ventures and licenced foreign squid jiggers are operating in New 
Zealand's waters. The total contributions of each to the balance of payments of New Zealand have 
been similar and relatively small, but individual companies have differed dramatically. Export 
incentives applied by the New Zealand government to the operations of the joint-venture companies 
dominated their performance results and were highly discriminatory. The policy changes to the basis 
of the application of these incentives altered results significantly and were well directed. The licenced 
foreign fleet's operations contribute more in direct benefits than do joint ventures, but the compari-
son is exceedingly sensitive to the institutional framework that governs the operations of the joint 
ventures. The research is still in progress. 
Le volume des peches de la Nouvelle-ZeJande s'est rapidement accru depuis le milieu des annees 
60. Cependant, en J 978, a pres que le gouvernement eut delimite sa zone economique exclusive, Jes 
administrateurs ont ete obliges de repartir Jes ressources halieutiques entre Jes concurrents interesses, 
soit !es flottes domestiques, etrangi:res ou conjointes. Dans le cas de la peche au calmar, qui n'est pas 
pratiquee par !es Neo-Zelandais, des permis d'exploitation ont ete accordes a des proprietaires de 
cotres, etrangers ou conjoints. Leur contribution totale a la balance des paiements est relativement 
modeste et a peu pres egale alors que celle des entreprises privees accuse des differences considera-
bles. Les stimulants a !'exportation fixes par le gouvernement, qui influent directement sur le 
rendement, devenaient discriminatoires pour Jes flottes conjointes. La reorientation de cette poli-
tique a contribue a faire evoluer !es resultats. Aujourd'hui, !es flottes etrangi:res operant sous permis, 
rapportent plus de profits directs que Jes autres mais la comparaison est etablie en fonction du cadre 
institutionnel qui gouverne !es operations des flottes conjointes. Cette recherche est encore en cours. 
Optimism prevailed on 1April1978 when New domestic fleet and the foreign fleet. The domestic 
Zealand resource managers assumed responsibil- fleet has virtually no deep-sea capacity, and few 
ity for what was then the fourth largest exclusive of the vessels have fast-freezing facilities. In con-
economic zone (EEZ) in the world. True, much of trast, the foreign fleet was well equipped. It con-
the zone was inhospitable, or the sea floor too sisted of Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and 
rough or deep for bottom fishing methods, but Soviets who had, over the preceding 7 or 8 years, 
the acquisition of the EEZ did seem to offer a fished in the area during their home off-seasons. 
stimulus to the development of new fisheries for The compromise arrangement of the joint ven-
New Zealanders, especially the deep-sea, migra- ture, with equity and, possibly, activities being 
tory pelagic and squid resources. shared between New Zealanders and foreign 
The resource managers had first to estimate the partners was also an option, both a compromise 
total resource; though the estimate is now being and, possibly, a tool of development. 
revised downward, they guessed then at 400 000- High fish prices in 1978, caused by the efforts 
600 000 t. Their next task was to allocate the of distant-water nations to stockpile fish supplies 
resources between competing claimants - the against uncertain future access in EEZs, contrib-
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uted to New Zealanders' optimism. Some saw the 
joint ventures as a shortcut to development of the 
domestic industry, foreign partners supplying 
skills, technology, capital, equipment, knowl-
edge of the resource, and markets in exchange for 
access to the resources. 
Another view of the joint-venture arrange-
ments was that they could be a method of obtain-
ing for the New Zealand partner and nation quick 
access to extra income in much-needed foreign 
exchange. Others thought the joint ventures 
would have a neutral impact on the industry's 
development, simply reserving the resource for 
the domestic fleet to "grow into." 
A fourth and less enthusiastic view often held 
by domestic operators was that the joint ventures 
were simply a back-door method used by for-
eigners to avoid licence fees and that, worse still, 
they could be expected to preempt the New Zea-
land catch on foreign markets or even local 
markets. By overfishing, the joint ventures could 
actually inhibit the development of the domestic 
fishing industry. 
It was further asserted - although without 
substantiation - that the taxation and incentive 
system was such that New Zealand was actually 
"paying the foreigners to take the fish away." 
For me, the debate generated a whole series of 
questions: 
• Why, with its long coastline, early history of 
sea-mammal hunting, and pre-European Maori 
economy in which fish was important, had New 
Zealand's fishing industry been so slow to 
develop? 
• If there were development blocks, what were 
they? Had they disappeared? Would either joint 
ventures or the licenced fleet option remove those 
that remained? 
• Would the presence of joint ventures inhibit 
the development of the domestic fleet? 
• Could the domestic fleet be expected to 
"grow into" the resource? 
• Were the joint ventures helping or damaging 
the balance of payments? 
I found a consumer's choice of explanations 
for retarded development although none has 
been rigorously tested: restrictive measures 
imposed by successive New Zealand govern-
ments to protect the resource or those exploiting 
it; capital-market imperfections; inefficiencies 
caused by oligopsonies; cultural inadequacies; 
and lack of knowledge of the resource. 
There are too many questions, and too many 
competing answers, for one paper: they will be 
examined later in the research program. In this 
paper, I examine in the context of the squid 
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resources the scope for domestic expansion into 
squid fishing, and I compare the immediate 
impacts of the joint venture and licenced fleets on 
national income and the balance of payments. 
The New Zealand Fishing Industry 
The New Zealand fishing industry encom-
passes coastal pelagic and demersal resources; 
rock lobster; shellfish such as oysters, scallops, 
paua (abalone), and mussels; freshwater re-
sources are mainly managed for recreation and 
tourism, although the export of live eels is 
important. 
The fishing fleet has many part-timers; vessels 
operating full time in 1980 probably numbered 
around 1500, employing some 2900 crew (New 
Zealand Fishing Industry Board estimate). Few 
of the vessels are longer than 27 m, and most lack 
deep-freezing capacity. 
Owner operators concentrate in the high-value 
fisheries, such as rock lobster and whole, chilled 
snapper for export. The larger companies tend to 
dominate the large-volume, low-value fisheries. 
In 1980, about 87 000 t of finfish, 4000 t ofrock 
lobster, and 18 000 t of shellfish (including small 
quantities of squid) were caught by the domestic 
fleet. Finfish accounted for 59% oflanded value, 
rock lobster 29%. 
The industry had stagnated at 20 000-25 000 t 
of finfish during the 1950s, but there was a take-
off in the mid-1960s. Growth during the 1970s 
was rapid, although greatly exaggerated in later 
years by the original statistics that frequently 
included figures relating to joint ventures.Japan 
and Australia are major markets; the USA 
absorbs high-volume shellfish and rock lobster. 
Squid 
New Zealand's interest in developing the squid 
fishery was stimulated by the appearance of Jap-
anese vessels - some of them converted tuna 
boats - fishing for squid off the New Zealand 
coast. In the 1970-71 season, eightJapanese ves-
sels were observed squid fishing, and the Japa-
nese Fishery Agency research vessel was recorded 
as having returned for a second catch. 
Records are incomplete, but, in a report to the 
government (unpublished 1975), a New Zealand 
fishing firm recorded that in the 1972-73 season, 
69 Japanese vessels landed squid at an average of 
3.9 t/fishing day (rather high by recent stan-
dards). Successive New Zealand Fishing Industry 
Board reports have recorded increasing total 
squid catches by the Japanese from New Zealand 
waters. 
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By 1977, both the Soviets and the Japanese had 
increased their fleets, landing a total squid catch 
from New Zealand waters of about 83 500 t. New 
Zealanders caught only about 500 t. Of the for-
eign total, just over two-thirds was taken by trawl-
ing (28 500 t by the Soviets, 20 000 t by Japan, and 
8500 t by Korea). Japan took a further 24 500 t by 
jigging and Taiwan about 1800 t.1 
Since the introduction of the EEZ and of 
foreign-fleet licencing arrangements, the Japan 
Squid Anglers' Association has acted as an 
intermediary for Japanese vessels. Owners send 
vessels to New Zealand under the auspices of 
matchmaking companies. 
The affairs of the vessels are usually looked 
after in New Zealand by a port agent who, for a 
fee, handles the arrangements necessary to secure 
customs' clearances and formalities, harbour 
board services, medical and dental treatment for 
the crew, repatriations, repairs, surveys, and 
sundry other services. Such agents also handle 
onshore arrangements for some joint-venture 
vessels. 
The Nature of the Resource 
At least 70 species of squid have been identified 
in New Zealand waters, but arrow squid (Noto-
darus sloani) is by far the most important com-
mercial species, well-liked by Japanese consum-
ers. Squid are cephalopods, part of the mollusc 
family. 
Most of New Zealand's knowledge of its squid 
resource has come from foreign fishing and 
research activity, especially that of the Japanese. 
New Zealand scientists have only recently begun 
to research the squid resource. They still lack an 
understanding of its distribution, migratory pat-
terns, life cycle, position in the food chain, and 
population size and dynamics. 
Squid occur in areas rich in species upon which 
they feed: saury, fingerling fish, krill (small crus-
taceans), and small squid. These areas tend to be 
where ocean currents converge and bring nutri-
ents from the ocean floor into the zone where 
light penetrates and allows photoplankton to 
grow. 
Squid are thought to migrate in swarms from 
around New Zealand to warmer waters for 
spawning. Evidence suggests that a series of 
swarms, more-or-less independent of each other, 
move at different times, at intervals, along several 
migration paths. Scientists believe that the squid 
live for about 12 months, growing rapidly during 
I Unless otherwise specified, the information in this 
section comes from successive annual reports of the 
New Zealand Fishing Industry Board, Government 
Printer, Wellington. 
migration. When the mantle - or body - is 
20-35 cm long, the squid are mature. They spawn 
and apparently die soon afterward, although no 
large concentrations of dead squid have been 
found. An enormous loss through natural mor-
tality has been recorded. In one major New Zea-
land fishing ground, Korean squid-trawling fig-
ures for 1978 suggest natural death and migration 
accounted for a loss by August of83% of the July 
stock (Roberts 1978). 
Squid occupy an important position in the 
food chain. As well as being predators of many 
species, they are preyed on by sea mammals, 
tuna, and other fish. Squid stocks can be 
expected to fluctuate considerably from year to 
year (according to environmental conditions). 
Stocks are thought to recover quickly because the 
squid are short lived. 
The jig fishery is concentrated in 40-250 m 
deep water. Early estimates, based on random 
samples of foreign-trawling catches with allow-
ances for escape, placed total standing stock of 
squid at 300 000 t (Roberts 1978), but scientists 
now consider this estimate to have been too high. 
Squid fits the vent-for-surplus model. The 
domestic market is limited to a small demand for 
food and anglers' bait. The main limitation on the 
domestic market apart from the size of the popu-
lation is consumer preference. 
How far squid is a surplus that can be vented is 
also a biologic question. If this year's crop of 
squid is not used, is it wasted? Where in the rest of 
the food chain does it go? Uncaught squid serve 
an economic function if they eat the predators of 
commercial species or are a food source for 
commercial species. 
Problems of Domestic Industry Development 
So far, squid fishing is seasonal, with foreign 
vessels moving into New Zealand's waters during 
their own off-season. Since 1972-73, the Japa-
nese (and for a while the Taiwanese) jig fleets 
have arrived in mid-December and left in early to 
mid-April, although the New Zealand season is 
now thought to extend from at least November to 
June-July. New Zealand trawling data suggest 
year-round presence, but, until a year-round 
fishery is identified, the New Zealand squid-
fishing industry would need off-season employ-
ment of crew and capital to be viable. For the 
foreigners and joint ventures, this complementar-
ity is provided by their domestic season for squid. 
Possible options for a New Zealand fleet 
include: 
• Specialized jig boats that pursue squid year 
round, either in New Zealand waters or in foreign 
waters under reciprocal agreement; and 
• Dual or multipurpose boats that can fish for 
squid and other species with a complementary 
season. 
Unless the fishery is close to onshore facilities 
for freezing the catch to an unvarying -50° C 
within a short time, a primary requirement for 
squid boats would be this freezing capacity. Sta-
bility - and, hence, trawl boats - is also neces-
sary for inclement weather, although boats fish-
ing only in summer and close to shore would be 
relatively free from this constraint. 
Complementary-Season Fisheries 
If the New Zealand squid season is about 
November-June, then the seasons for bluefin 
tuna, oyster, and snapper complement it. The 
oyster season is 1 March-31 August, but entry to 
this fishery is already limited. Squid jigging with 
finfish longlining in the off-season has been tried 
by a Korean-New Zealand joint venture, but so 
far results are not encouraging. The bluefin tuna 
season is May-October (at least that is when the 
Japanese operate in New Zealand waters). Both 
squid and bluefin tuna require quick freezing 
and, in that sense, are technically suited to com-
bination. Tuna boats, however, are usually slim, 
with a cutaway side for brining the big fish. Lack 
of stability is thus a problem for their use in squid 
fishing. 
Jigging is a line-poling technique that became 
mechanized in the early 1970s so that one person 
can operate several lines. The machines are 
mounted along each side of the deck, with lines 
being paid out and then reeled in over elliptical 
drums. Bright lights are usually used to attract 
the squid to lures, although off-season trials by 
New Zealanders working close to shore have 
given good results in daylight. 
Trawling is the major alternative to jigging and 
is so far the only technology that is suitable to 
rough seas where the motion of the boat and the 
tangling of the lines preclude jigging. The draw-
back of trawling is damage to the squid. Purse-
seining or other forms of aimed net fishing have 
not been shown to be viable, because the New 
Zealand arrow squid probably does not concen-
trate for spawning as densely as other species of 
squid. 
Net fishing, including trawling, has the disad-
vantage of being nonspecific so that mesh sizes 
fine enough to catch squid tend to be ruled out by 
the requirement of protecting the young of other 
commercial species. Most of the current squid-
trawling operations (mainly Soviet and Japa-
nese) are restricted to the rough southern waters 
for this reason. 
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With the introduction of the exclusive eco-
nomic zones around the world, many distant-
water fleets have considerable excess capacity, 
and vessels may be available for the market - a 
source for increasing New Zealand's fleet 
capacity. 
Squid Joint Ventures 
The 1978-79 squid season was the first after the 
declaration ofN ew Zealand's EEZ took effect. In 
that year, 12joint-venture companies were given 
approval to operate, a total 71 squid-jigging ves-
sels (of which 59 actually arrived and operated in 
the zone). The vessels came from Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan. 
The 1979-80 season saw approvals given for 
108 vessels under charter to 18 companies to be 
operated in the EEZ, but only 82 actually oper-
ated. Together, they caught a total 15381 t, 
according to company records. 
Joint-venture companies were set up between 
New Zealanders and foreigners by means of a 
shared equity company and a charter arrange-
ment whereby partners assumed various respon-
sibilities; a charter fee was paid to the foreign 
partner (or, where a matchmaking company par-
ticipated, to a third party), which supplied vessels 
and crew. Arrangements for the provision of 
supplies, fuel, onshore and marketing services 
varied. Risk-taking by the local partner ranged 
from full catching and marketing risk, with ves-
sels being hired on a contract basis, to a fee that 
depended on catch volume or on the eventual 
sale-value of the catch. 
The New Zealand government vetted arrange-
ments, insisting on copies of charter and other 
documents and financial accounts of operations 
at the close of each season, as a condition of 
approval. These data were the basis for my study 
of the joint-ventures' contributions to the 
national economy and the balance of payments, 
in particular. The cooperation of the companies 
is greatly valued. 
The study is still in progress; at this time, the 
results are preliminary and do not deal with mul-
tiplied effects or opportunity costs. The flows 
treated are current flows: capital has been left 
aside. The development issues of the transfer of 
skills and technology, market pioneering, or the 
generation of backward and forward links have 
not been addressed. Thus, the features of joint-
venture arrangements that make for good or bad 
performance from a national-interest point of 
view have not been identified, although the rela-
tive effects of the existing export-incentive 
schemes are clear. 
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Method and Terms of Assessment 
A host country (such as New Zealand) consid-
ering the immediate effects of private direct for-
eign investment, such as a joint fishing venture, 
would chiefly be concerned with what it gets from 
the operation. National income, rather than 
domestic income, is the key to my analysis. 
Whereas gross domestic product, or income 
(GDP or GDY), is the sum of value added by 
each industry in the economy, gross national 
product or income (GNP or GNY) is GDP minus 
the net remittances to foreign factors of produc-
tion abroad. 
Gross national income is the sum of all 
incomes accruing to domestic nationals. This 
includes wages and salaries; rents to resources 
and facilities; net income to government; profits, 
interest charges, and other payments to capital. 
Transfer payments between New Zealand 
nationals are excluded and net payments to for-
eign factors of production are deducted. 
I have calculated the balance-of-payments 
impact, or returned value to New Zealand, in two 
stages. First, I found the net effect on foreign 
exchange earned (revenue less all direct outgo-
ings of foreign exchange); then I adjusted this 
figure for leaks abroad in the form of the import 
content of the goods and services purchased 
locally. (Details of methods and assigned import 
contents could not be included here for reasons of 
space, but I will be pleased to provide them on 
request.) 
For the joint-venture approach to be worth-
while to the host country, it should compare 
favourably with a total New Zealand enterprise 
on one hand and the flows generated by licenced 
foreign vessels on the other. Although returned-
value and value-added generated by joint ven-
tures and the licenced foreign fleet are considered 
here, the domestic industry does not yet exist, so 
no consideration is given to this alternative. 
A balance-of-payments approach, rather than 
an overseas-exchange transaction (OET) ap-
proach, is used. In other words, all profits to 
which a foreign partner has claim have been 
subtracted from New Zealand's foreign 
exchange, and, similarly, all funds to which New 
Zealand has claim have been added. 
Export incentives 
One of the policy objectives of government has 
been to promote exports, one method being tax-
payer subsidies for exports. During the period 
studied, two sets of rules on incentives applied, 
referred to here as the old rules and the new rules. 
The latter were phased in during 1980. The old 
rules provided a tax credit or payment on the 
basis ofa percentage of FOB export receipts. The 
new rules provide rewards for the domestic value-
added of exports. For the 1979-80 season, I made 
calculations of the export incentive for each 
company based both on the old and on the new 
rules so that the impact of the two export incen-
tive schemes could be compared. Probably all 
ventures were in fact rewarded for exports 
according to the "old rules." 
Implicit foreign-exchange premia 
The returned-value (adjusted for leaks abroad) 
to New Zealand of a venture's operations, when 
related to the size of the export incentive, pro-
vides an indication of.how much taxpayers paid 
for foreign exchange, or how much taxpayers 
paid to the joint venture to secure export dollars. 
In the study, I looked at two measures of tax-
payer subsidy - net (export incentive less tax) 
and gross (export incentive alone). The latter, 
divided by returned-value, is probably the best 
measure of the implicit premium on foreign 
exchange because it measures what the taxpayer 
pays out to secure national income in foreign 
exchange rather than in New Zealand dollars. 
This is not an exchange transaction but a direct 
subsidy from the taxpayer to the joint-venture 
company. For example, the gross figure may be 
0.70. This indicates that New Zealand taxpayers 
paid $0. 70 to the joint-venture partners for every 
$1 of returned-value. The net figure is sometimes 
negative. This is caused either because the 
returned-value was negative (foreign exchange 
drained away) or because taxation exceeded 
export-incentive payments. 
I added wages, rents, return to capital and 
entrepreneurship, and net payments to get 
incomes to factors of production directly 
employed by the venture. Returned-value is this 
amount plus the local content of locally pur-
chased goods and services in the venture. Viewed 
another way, it represents that part of the export 
receipts that ends up in New Zealand after all 
foreign-exchange leaks have been accounted for. 
The measure of value added directly by the firm 
can be viewed as the direct gain to New Zealand 
national income if the domestic factors employed 
by the company would otherwise have been idle, 
that is, if there were no opportunity costs. 
Comparison between values added by individ-
ual ventures is difficult because of the consider-
able differences in the way in which joint-venture 
companies arranged and reported their affairs in 
their accounts. For example, some joint-venture 
companies hired New Zealand companies to per-
form various services for them. Sometimes, the 
company hired was one of the New Zealand 
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Table!. Aggregate squid-fishing joint-venture performance, 1978-80. 
Exports ($1000) 
Net returned value ($ 1000) 
Value added nationally ($1000) 
Net taxpayer subsidy ($1000) 
Export incentive ($1000) 
Catch (t) 
Returned value per tonne caught($) 
Value added nationally per tonne caught($) 
Export incentive per tonne caught ($) 
partners in the joint venture. Thus, comparisons 
of interfirm performance are made on the basis of 
returned-value, corrected for foreign exchange 
leaks, rather than on the basis of value-added. 
The study material 
The study covers the accounts for the opera-
tions of 10 joint-venture companies operating in 
the 1978-79 squid-jigging season and 13 com-
panies in the 1979-80 season. The majority of 
vessels were Japanese, but some were Korean and 
Taiwanese. 
The 1978-79 figures exclude the results of one 
company that went out of operation early. The 
results of another company that operated in the 
1978-79 season but not the following season have 
been included in the aggregate results but 
excluded from the presentation of the individual 
results because of the need to maintain 
confidentiality. 
Caveats 
The figures on costs, charter fees, and prices 
have all been taken at face value and have not 
been independently checked, although queries to 
companies sometimes elicited revised figures that 
were adopted for the study. Some caution should 
be exercised in accepting the final figures. The 
existence of export-incentive payouts provides a 
clear reason for companies to inflate export 
revenue or, in the case of the new rules, to boost 
local spending. Various controls and levies on 
imports to markets also provided incentives to 
manipulate figures. 
One company, D, noted on its 1978-79 return 
that the price it received was U.S.$1550/t CIF 
"But. .. the letter of credit was established at 
$1050/tonne." There is an obvious local corol-
lary to this kind of practice. 
The Results 
The aggregated performance results (Table 1) 
of all the squid-jig joint ventures in 1978-79 and 
1979-80 1979-80 
1978-79 old rules new rules 
12221 20868 20868 
1623 2883 3279 
416 991 1386 
1081 1501 237 
1279 2311 532 
7445 15423 15423 
218 187 213 
56 64 90 
172 150 35 
in 1979-80 disguise a wide difference between 
individual companies. 
In 1978-79, the gross value of joint-venture 
squid exports stood at $12.2 million, of which the 
returned value to New Zealand was $1.6 million 
($0.4 million of value being added directly by the 
companies), and the export incentive was $1.3 
million. The New Zealand taxpayer, thus, paid a 
subsidy of $0.79 on average for every $1 of for-
eign exchange. Thirteen percent of the value of 
exports returned to New Zealand. For every 
tonne of squid caught, $218 returned to New 
Zealand but $172 in export incentive was paid to 
the joint-venture company. The companies paid 
out, as direct income to factors of production 
that they hired themselves, 3% of their total 
export receipts. Among individual companies, 
returned-value ranged from -$1173 / t to a high of 
$356/t (but both of these results are somewhat 
suspect). The next two extremes were $34/ t and 
$306/t. 
Value added nationally also varied signifi-
cantly and was negative in 4 of 10 cases. The 
highest figure for value added nationally was 
$169 / t. The range in implicit foreign exchange 
premia was very wide. One company was paid 
$0.13 for every dollar of foreign exchange that it 
drained away. Another company received $3.75 
for every dollar of foreign exchange it brought in, 
and three other companies received payments in 
the $0.40-0.50/$1 range. 
Export incentives per tonne caught varied but 
less dramatically and were within $100-200/t. 
The average was $172 / t. The export incentives 
made a difference to the profitability of the joint 
ventures, 4 of 10 ventures recording losses before 
taxes and 2 reporting profit levels at 0-5% of 
export receipts. 
In 1979-80, a gross $20.9 million in export 
receipts was recorded from a squid catch of 
15 424 t. U oder the old export-incentive rules, 
about $2.9 million would have been returned to 
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New Zealand, compared with $3.3 million under 
the new rules (Tables 2 and 3). The former, based 
on total export receipts, averaged $150 / t, where-
as the latter, paid out on the basis of domestic 
value-added, averaged $35/t. The difference in 
payout per dollar of foreign exchange earned was 
dramatic - under the old rules $0. 76 was paid on 
average, whereas under the new rules, the subsidy 
would have been only $0.16/$1. In 1979-80, no 
returned-value was negative, although value 
added nationally was negative in 5 of 12 cases. 
Under the new rules, returned-value and value-
added would both have been generally higher, the 
latter being negative in only two cases. Under the 
old rules, the implicit foreign exchange premia, 
or export-incentive payments, ranged from $0.18 
to $2.98/$1 of foreign exchange earned. 
The overvaluation of the New Zealand dollar 
(20% commonly regarded as being a realistic 
estimate of the implicit shadow exchange rate 
premium) indicates that New Zealand would be 
behaving rationally in providing a subsidy of up 
to $0.20/$1 of foreign exchange ifthe balance of 
payments were the criterion. 
Under the new rules, the payout to all but 1 of 
the 13 companies was within this "rational" 
range, but, under the old rules, only 1 company 
was paid at a rational level, and 10 were paid at 
more than three times this amount. 
Licenced Foreign Vessels 
In the 1979-80 season, 102 vessels were 
licenced to jig squid, 98 of them Japanese, the 
others Korean. The licence fees were $14 250 / 
vessel plus $95 / t for every tonne over 150 caught. 
Licence fees totaled $2.5 million. Accounts for 29 
of the vessels (all Japanese and operating during 
1979-80) were available, and I used these to 
derive figures for returned-value for both 
seasons. 
The accounts covered all port calls and 
recorded provisions, cash advances, mainte-
nance, air fares, and hotels for crew leaving the 
vessel, medical fees, and other charges such as 
harbour board, port agency fees, and sundries. 
Purchases listed in the accounts as provisions 
were separated into categories and calculated as a 
Table 2. Performances by individual joint-venture companies under old rules for export incentives, 1979-80. 
Profit or loss as % of X 
Net profit 
Net profit Net profit to NZ 
to venture to venture partner Value added Export 
Net returned Value added before tax after tax after tax nationally incentive 
value as nationally and and and per tonne per tonne 
Company %ofX as% ofX incentives incentives incentives caught($) caught($) 
A 14 -5 -11 -1 -0.5 -63 120 
B II -I I 12 7 -12 113 
c 14 6 3.5 12 6 7 117 
D 63 6 -213 -203 23 134 134 
E 15 8 9 17 13 82 113 
F 12 7 6 14 14 IOI 172 
G 4 -I 6 14 7 -19 159 
H 17 7 5 14 13 86 145 
r 27 -6 -5 6 I -62 Ill 
J II -I 3 12 9 7 122 
Kb 12 6 9 16 12 120 212 
L 21 -I 3 12 6 -11 100 
M 16 7 5 14 9 75 129 
'The results of company I, which in 1978-79 showed the highest figure of returned value per tonne of squid 
caught should not be taken at face value. The company did not supply figures for its accounts in the standard form 
requested and instead presented the figures for both squid seasons and other fishing operations in consolidated 
form. The figures have been untangled as far as possible but staff changes in the company and uncertainty over the 
eventual size of the catch has left unsolved problems. Lack of certainty that surrounds both the accounts and the 
catch makes the distribution of returned-value, value-added, and tonnage between seasons suspect. 
bThe results of company Kin 1979-80 were suspect for several reasons: its average price per tonne was, at $1881, 
much higher than that of any other company in the season; the charter arrangement it had with the foreign owner of 
the vessels gave Ka fixed fee that did not vary with the catch or its value; and, like other companies, it stood to gain 
a great deal through export-incentive payments. 
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Table 3. Individual performances by joint-venture companies if new rules on incentives had applied, 1979-80. 
Profit or loss as % of X 
Net profit 
to venture 
Net returned Value added before tax 
value as nationally and 
Company %ofX as% ofX' incentives 
A 18 -1 -11 
B 15 3 I 
c 16 3 3.5 
D 63 6 -213 
E 17 II 9 
F 12 7 6 
G 9 3 6 
H 18 7 5 
I 30 -3 5 
J 14 3 3 
K 14 9 9 
L 25 4 3 
M 19 9 5 
percentage of the aggregate budget. The import 
content of the categories was then estimated. 
The procedure carries the implicit assumption 
that the 29 vessels whose records were available 
were representative of the rest of the fleet. There 
is no check on this, but the size of the group -
about one-third of the fleet - makes it unlikely 
to be highly inaccurate. 
For the 1979-80 season, I arrived at a figure of 
$4.4 million for value returned by the 102 vessels. 
The Japanese had caught 25 150 t, the Koreans 
403 t. Licence fees averaged $24 141 /vessel, or 
$94.36/t of squid. The average returned-value 
stood at $43 43 7 /vessel or $251 / t. 
The accounts for the 1978-79 season were not 
available so the 1979-80 figures were used, with 
adjustments for changes. 
In 1978-79, 117 vessels from Japan and Korea 
were approved, and those that came caught a 
total of 18 471 t of squid. Allocations were made 
on a quota basis, and in this year fees were levied 
on the basis of a flat fee, $80 / t allocated. Japan's 
quota was 29 000 t, Korea's 1000 t. Actual catch 
(18 4 71 t) was well short of the total 30 000 t 
allocated. The full amount of $2.4 million of 
licence fees was collected. The net result of the 
calculations was a figure of $4.l million in 
returned-value. This gives an average returned-
value per vessel of $35 043 or $222/ t. The licence 
fee averaged $130/t caught. 
Comparison 
New Zealand government officials allow vessel 
entry on the basis of an expected season's catch of 
Net profit 
Net profit to NZ 
to venture partner Value added Export 
after tax after tax nationally incentive 
and and per tonne per tonne 
incentives incentives caught($) caught($) 
-9 -5 -16 22 
3 2 29 23 
8 4 30 71 
-203 21 134 Ill 
7 5 106 18 
5 5 IOI 25 
5 2 48 22 
5 5 97 33 
-I -3 -31 44 
2 2 36 6 
7 5 161 41 
4 2 28 21 
5 4 107 33 
220 t/vessel. In the 1978-79 season, 71 joint-
venture vessels were approved, reflecting an 
implicit allocation of 15 620 t. Fifty-nine joint-
venture vessels actually operated, and company 
records give a total catch of7352 t. In the 1979-80 
season, only 82 of the 108 joint-venture vessels 
approved actually operated, catching a total of 
15 381 t. The allocation to joint ventures was 
23 760 t. The foreign fleet in 1979-80 was allo-
cated 115 vessels, or a total allocation of23 760 t. 
The shortfall in joint-venture vessels reflects 
the fact that some partners were either unwilling 
or unable to complete the charter of foreign ves-
sels. The inability of a few joint-venture compa-
nies to secure all the vessels for which they had 
approval heavily influenced the joint-venture 
record on the basis of allocation. 
Comparative Catch Rates 
Analyses by Roberts of the squid catch rates of 
foreign and joint-venture vessels fishing in the 
New Zealand EEZ during 1978-79 (Roberts 
unpublished) revealed that, at 161 t, the average 
catch per vessel of the licenced Japanese fleet was 
considerably higher than the joint-venture vessel 
average of 125 t. 
Roberts' work also revealed that the Japanese 
vessels of all sizes consistently outfished Korean 
and Taiwanese counterparts on the basis of catch 
per vessel-day. He attributed this difference 
mainly to greater length of fishing experience of 
the Japanese in the waters around New Zealand. 
The difference in average catch by the foreign 
and joint-venture fleets has been attributed by 
New Zealand officials to the presence of Korean 
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and Taiwanese vessels in the joint-venture fleet; 
to the most experienced crew and skippers being 
attracted to the licenced fleet; and to the licenced 
fleet vessels being on the whole newer and better 
equipped than those of the joint ventures. 
Roberts reported that foreign vessels and joint-
venture vessels stayed in the EEZ for about the 
same length of time and fished for about the same 
proportion of that time. 
Returned-Value 
The returned-value per tonne caught and per 
tonne allocated of the joint ventures was virtually 
the same as that of the licenced foreign fleet in 
1978-79 on the basis ofactual catch, although the 
foreign fleet returned about 30% more on the 
basis of allocation (Table 4). 
The 59 joint-venture vessels that fished for 
squid returned $1.6 million in foreign exchange 
to New Zealand in 1978-79, 13% of the total 
export receipts earned by the squid joint ven-
tures. The figure for 82 vessels in 1979-80 was 
$2.9 million (or $3.3 million if the new rules on 
export incentives were applied). This constituted 
14-16% of export receipts. 
In contrast, the licenced foreign fleet of 117 
vessels approved in 1978-79 contributed $4.1 mil-
lion. In 1979-80, 102 foreign vessels returned $4.4 
million in foreign exchange to New Zealand. In 
1978-79, there was little difference between 
results from the foreign and joint-venture fleets. 
In 1979-80, the change in the export-incentive 
rules improved the returns to New Zealand of the 
joint-venture fleet, but a change in the licencing 
fees improved the returns from the licenced fleet 
and gave relatively better results than the change 
for joint ventures. 
The range of performance by individualjoint-
venture companies, both in terms of their profit-
ability and their contribution to national econ-
omy, was wide, conforming to the pattern noted 
by Lall and Streeten (1977) in their studies of 
private direct foreign investment in manufactur-
ing. 
Table 4. Comparison of returned values from joint 
ventures and the licenced foreign fleets. 
Per tonne caught 
Joint venture 
Foreign 




1978-79 old rules new rules 
221 198 213 
222 251 251 
104 128 130 
137 197 197 
The influence that overwhelmed that of the 
institutional arrangement was the highly discrim-
inatory export-incentive payments and the 
manner of levy of the licence fees on the foreign 
fleet. The export-incentive payments arrange-
ments under the "old rules" were irrational and 
inequitable as they rewarded earners of foreign 
exchange very differently for their contributions 
to the balance of payments and even paid for the 
draining away of foreign exchange. 
Changes to the incentive scheme have been 
made and have improved returns to New Zea-
land. The payments under the new rules can be 
regarded as generally sensible, so that govern-
ment policy has moved appropriately. Even with 
the new rules, however, rewards are unevenly 
bestowed. 
Shadow prices and opportunity costs have not 
been built into the study, but the major distor-
tions to prices and returns caused by inappro-
priate institutional arrangements that stem from 
government policy are particularly clear. In this 
context, calculation of the real social cost-benefit 
of alternative options is extremely difficult. The 
role of different institutional arrangements in 
overcoming possible development blocks - if 
these can be identified - and the identification of 
any tendencies toward systematic development 
inhibitors are subjects for continuing research. 
Particular thanks are owed Dr Geoffrey Bertram of 
Victoria University of Wellington, on whose method-
ology this study is based, and Dr Peter Bushnell, head 
of the Research Section of the Economics Division of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, New Zea-
land. Both have given much advice and help. Thanks 
are also due the numerous individuals in the Fisheries 
Management, Fisheries Research and Economics Divi-
sion of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, New 
Zealand. Dr Peter Roberts and Peter Riley have been 
especially helpful. Any errors are mine and the views 
represented here do not constitute official New Zealand 
government policies. The work is in progress as part of 
a PhD thesis with Victoria University of Wellington 
and this section was completed under contract for the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, New Zealand, 
whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Most of 
the aggregate figures concerning the fishing industry as 
a whole were compiled by the New Zealand Fishing 
Industry Board; the information supplied concerning 
squid came from Dr Peter Roberts of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, whereas I obtained the 
information on the companies and the foreign fleet 
while working under contract with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. The cooperation of the 
companies is also gratefully acknowledged. 
The raw data for the study are confidential, and the 
results of this study have been presented in a form that 
does not disclose the identity of the firms. Individual 
results are interesting for their range, so these have been 
written up as ratios, percentages, and rankings. Abso-
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lute figures have been avoided, except as aggregates, so 
that the results cannot be reconstructed to identify in-
dividual firms. 
Export Potential of Coastal Shrimp Cultured in Thailand 
K amphol A dulavidhaya and Thanwa Jitsanguan 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, 
Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand 
Thailand is searching for a new marine resource to meet its future demand for fishery products 
and to maintain the contribution of fisheries to the national economy. The cultivation of marine 
shrimp appears particularly advantageous as a means to expand production for export. To obtain 
one unit of foreign exchange from this export would require only 0.55-0.77 units of domestic 
resources. In other words, the cost in bahts to realize U .S.$1 from export would be only 12.97-18.14 
baht at the shadow exchange rate. Therefore, the promotion of coastal shrimp farming is highly 
recommended, and government policies that encourage its growth should be formulated. 
La Thailande s'engage dans !'exploitation d'une nouvelle richesse marine afin, d'une part, de 
repondre a la demande toujours croissante de produits de poisson et d'autre part, de maintenir la 
contribution de ce secteur a l'economie du pays. L'elevage de la crevette marine est particulii:rement 
indique, etant donne Jes possibilites d'exportation de cette espi:ce. II n'en cofiterait a la Thallande que 
de 0,55 a 0, 77 unite monetaire locale par unite de devise etrangi:re; par exemple, au taux de change 
fictif, cette production rapporterait 1 $ US pour de 12,97 a 18,14 bahts. L'elevage intensif de la 
crevette dans Jes eaux cotii:res est done hautement recommande et le gouvemement doit elaborer une 
politique qui favorisera la mise en oeuvre de cette nouvelle industrie. 
With a long and fertile coastline of 1900 km 
along the Gulf of Thailand and another 700 km 
along the Andaman Sea, Thailand has long sup-
ported a thriving fishing industry. Of its total 72 
provinces, 22 are located in such areas. However, 
only after 1960, did fishing operations become 
more than subsistence activities with stationary 
gear such as bamboo traps, fence traps, block 
nets, and winged set bags, etc. The contribution 
of fishing to the Thai economy was minor - a 
source of village employment and domestic food 
supply. 
The rapid development of the fishing industry 
began when Thailand, with the technical cooper-
ation of the German government, succeeded in 
using a movable gear - trawl nets - in the Gulf 
of Thailand. The otter-board trawl proved most 
effective among the various types of trawl net and 
became increasingly popular. Trawl nets have 
gradually replaced all other equipment, including 
the Chinese purse seine. During 1960-70, the 
number of fishing boats increased from about 
188 
700 to more than 5000. Thus, the Thai fishing 
industry has become one of the most vigorous 
sectors of the economy. 
Thailand now has the most developed fishing 
industry in Southeast Asia and, in terms of pro-
duction, is one of the top 10 countries in the 
world (Table 1). The industry is not only a source 
of employment but also a source of foreign 
exchange. In 1979, it comprised about 25000 
fishing boats, earning 7326 million baht 
(U.S.$358.24 million) from exports of only 
15-20% of the total catch. In Thailand, the per-
person consumption of fish is about 20 kg annu-
ally. About 300 000 people are now directly 
involved in the industry, and not fewer than 
100 000 are involved in related activities such as 
cold storage, processing, and ice industries. 
Current Problems 
Thailand's fishery production increased grad-
ually from about 170000 tin 1957 to 762188 t 
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Table !. Fishery production and exports, Thailand, 1970-78. 
Production 
Marine Freshwater Exports 
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Year (103 t) (million baht) (103 t) (million baht) (103 t) (million baht) 
1970 1335 4096 112 906 44 369 
1971 1470 4554 116 973 55 497 
1972 1548 4936 131 1371 82 807 
1973 1538 6562 140 1646 104 1649 
1974 1351 4093 158 1646 88 1548 
1975 1394 5102 106 2092 98 2106 
1976 1551 5968 147 2152 133 3097 
1977 2067 8622 122 2038 180 3590 
1978 1957 11458 141 2369 235 5086 
Source: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Record of Thailand, Bangkok, Ministry of Agriculture and Coop-
eratives, various issues. 
and 1.47 Mt in 1967 and 1971 respectively. In 
1977, the total catch of marine fish was 2.07 Mt; 
this was the highest production ever achieved by 
the Thai fishery. The growth in production 
reflected two key factors: the efficiency in man-
agement as well as technology and the fertility of 
the natural marine resource in the Gulf of 
Thailand. 
In a survey conducted in the Gulf of Thailand, 
the Department of Fisheries found that an hour 
of trawling in 1965 produced 300 kg; by 1973 this 
number had dwindled to 57 kg (Manasawet 
1976); and, in 1978, a survey conducted by Kaset-
sart University revealed that the fish captured in 
an hour of trawling in some areas around the 
Gulf of Thailand had dropped to 30 kg. These 
figures indicate that the fish resource is inade-
quate to support current trawling efforts. As a 
consequence, the amount of fish captured per 
unit of fishing effort must be decreasing. The 
maximum sustainable yields of demersal fish 
from the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea 
have been, respectively, estimated to be not 
greater than 500 000 and 200 000 t annually; the 
figures for pelagic fish are about 380 000 and 
100 000 t. The reason that fishery production has 
continued to increase (average annual produc-
tion for the last decade was 1.75 Mt) is that a 
considerable number of fish have been taken 
from waters outside the Thai boundaries - the 
Indian Ocean and South China Sea and joint-
venture projects with neighbouring countries like 
Bangladesh. The ratio offish by-catch(Thailand, 
Government of 1979) to the total catch increased 
from 33% in 1970 to 48% and 65% in 1973 and 
1976, respectively, whereas it accounted for only 
about 10% of the total-catch value. Moreover, 
only 46% of the by-catch is species that would be 
unsuitable for domestic consumption or export if 
given time to mature. Therefore, the increase in 
by-catch production incurs a long-run economic 
loss to the Thai economy. 
Other factors that have had negative effects on 
the Thai fishery industry are the expansion of 
exclusive economic zones and the oil crisis. 
Almost half of the total fish production in recent 
years has come from waters now under coastal 
states' jurisdiction, and the input cost of oil has 
accounted for 30-50% of the total costs in operat-
ing a common trawler. 
The spectacular development of the fishing 
industry has benefited only the large-scale opera-
tions (Panayotou 1979); small-scale operators, 
who are the majority (70%) of the fishing-
dependent population, account for only 30% of 
the total catch. Using traditional fishing gear, 
such as bamboo traps, hooks, winged set bags, 
etc., they must compete with modern trawlers for 
a portion of the fishing grounds and inshore 
resources. Thus, they not only have not partici-
pated in the recent boom of the Thai fishery 
industry but also have lost ground in their 
occupation. 
One solution to the problems facing the Thai 
fishery is to enlarge the source of fish production 
through cultivation, in particular, cultivation of 
marine shrimp along the fertile coastlines of the 
country. 
Although 85% of shrimp production is at pres-
ent consumed domestically, shrimp is the most 
important marine export. The commercial 
shrimp species in Thailand can be categorized as 
white (Penaeus merguiensis), flower (Penaeus 
semisulcatus), black tiger (Penaeus monodon), 
and pink (Metapenaeus monoceros) (Koyama 
1976). 
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Thailand started trading shrimp in the 1950s 
and accelerated its export in 1962 when Japan 
began to import the products at a relatively high 
price. Because of the export demand, the Thai 
shrimp industry has emphasized quality control 
and standardization of products. This emphasis 
encouraged the growth of the cold-storage indus-
try, which gradually increased from 3 units in 
1963 to 24 and 32 units in 1973 and 1977, respec-
tively. During 1962-72, annual exports of shrimp 
were about 6000 t, rising to about 14 000 t after 
1973. In 1980, Thailand exported 18 000 t of 
shrimp to the world market, with Japan import-
ing about 56.21 % of this amount (Table 2). 
Most of the shrimp traded internationally are 
beheaded and frozen in a block or beheaded, 
peeled, deveined, and frozen individually. 
The export market for shrimp is still consider-
able. Although Thai shrimp account for only 
6-10% and 1-2% of the shrimp imported respec-
tively by Japan and the United States, they 
represent 60% and 15% of Thailand's total 
exports in marine products. The annual increase 
in export price between 1967-78 was 11.68%, 
whereas the increase in amount exported was 
only 7.71%. 
Shrimp Cultivation 
There is no record of when shrimp cultivation 
began in Thailand, but local shrimp farmers say it 
was practiced before 1930. Historically, farmers 
reclaimed estuaries around their rice fields, 
allowing the brackish water to flow in and out of 
the fields after the paddy had been harvested. 
Thus, the fields became sanctuaries for shrimp 
and other species. Eventually, the profit from 
selling the shrimp Jed some farmers to full-time 
shrimp cultivation. The industry received 
renewed interest about 1950 when prices for salt 
dropped, and many salt farmers switched to 
shrimp-pond operation. 
Conditions in Thailand are favourable for 
shrimp farming: the temperature is lower than 
34° C along the coastline, and there are rich natu-
ral food areas (about 72 720 ha coastline). 
Although the area under shrimp cultivation 
almost trebled between 1970 and 1979, it is still 
less than half the potential. 
Cultivated shrimp totaled 664 tin 1979, of the 
total 63 652 t harvested. In 1972, the Thai 
government initiated a shrimp culture develop-
ment program in the Third Development Plan 
(1972-76). Three marine fishery stations were 
established to conduct research and to produce 
shrimp seeds for shrimp farmers. 
Increases in cultivated shrimp, however, have 
mainly been reflections of the response by private 
shrimp farmers to higher market prices. To date, 
most shrimp farming in the country is still done 
with traditional techniques. Hence, the produc-
tion has remained far below the target in the 
development plan. 
To test the hypothesis that shrimp farming in 
Thailand is economic, we have evaluated the 
endeavour's social costs and returns; we have also 
attempted to determine whether or not Thailand 
would have a comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of cultivated shrimp and how much for-
eign exchange the country could earn ·from 
exports of cultivated shrimp. 
The data derive from traditional operations in 
1980 at Samutsakorn, a province at the mouth of 
Chao Phraya River and the Gulf of Thailand. 
Table 2. Marine shrimp production and exports, Thailand, 1970-79. 
Production Export 
Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Year (103t) (million baht) (103 t) (million baht) 
1970 63653 1527 6421 224 
1971 67614 1758 5593 247 
1972 66887 1872 6726 340 
1973 77525 2635 14875 803 
1974 80093 1141 10251 602 
1975 87039 1498 13541 891 
1976 88672 1987 15218 1347 
1977 118953 2844 13663 1171 
1978 127414 4247 15378 1500 
1979 na' na 18626 2371 
'na = not available 
Source: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Record of Thailand, Bangkok, Ministry of Agriculture and Coop-
eratives, various issues. 
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Table 3. Cost structure of shrimp cultivation in Thai-
land, 1980. 
Costs (baht/ rai) 
Item 30-rai farm 50-rai farm 
Investment 3099 1860 
Water pump 833 500 
Water gate 1333 800 
Drain 533 320 
Warehouse 333 200 
Other 67 40 
Annual operating costs 2733 2020 
Fuel 833 700 
Pond maintenance 700 600 
Labour 1200 720 
Yields per rai (0.16 ha) were 60 kg/ year, with an 
average farm-gate price of 70 baht/ kg 
(U.S.$1=20.45 baht) (Table 3). 
Methods 
We assumed that Thailand would have a com-
parative advantage in shrimp cultivation for 
export ifthe domestic resource cost in producing 
one unit of foreign exchange were less than the 
shadow price of foreign exchange (Bruno 1972). 
To such a model, the two numerator terms are the 
direct domestic factors including land, labour, 
and capital evaluated at their opportunity costs 
and the indirect nontraded domestic commodity 
inputs, whereas the denominator is the net for-
eign exchange earned. To make the model more 
applicable to Thailand where the inputs and out-
puts for the agricultural sector are not available, 
we used a modified version of the model (Pearson 
et al. 1976) such that the domestic inputs were 
divided into tradable (if they were fully traded) 
and nontradable (if they were not fully traded). 
The nontradable inputs were subdivided again 
into tradable components and primary domestic 
factors. 
We calculated opportunity costs of land, 
labour, and capital. In general, the land would be 
used for mangrove-tree growing, the net benefits 
of which, according to Department of Forestry 
data, would be 123 baht/rai annually. We multi-
plied the number of person-days (both hired and 
family labourers) by the market wage rate. Funds 
invested in the fixed assets were assumed to be 
15%, and 10% depreciation was assumed. 
Indirect costs of production were the interme-
diate input costs incurred in shrimp cultivation: 
costs for fuel, shrimp seed, pond maintenance, 
transportation, marketing, and processing (con-
version ratio from raw to frozen shrimp was 
1 :0.65). Cost of input at the farm-gate price was 
calculated as the sum of the foreign content of the 
input, the value of the input generated in the 
country, and overall taxes levied by the Thai 
government. Because our study concentrated on 
traditional cultivation, in which shrimp seeds are 
obtained from natural seawater, the opportunity 
cost for the use of shrimp seeds was zero. 
The price of foreign exchange or the social 
value of production is the FOB price of one unit 
of output, whereas the private value of produc-
tion is the FOB price less all direct and indirect 
taxes at the border. These taxes are export duty, 
business tax, municipal tax (and other equivalent 
tax in terms of premium or quota for some com-
modities such as rice). In this study, the social 
value of the final output was the FOB price/ kg of 
frozen shrimp, which is 130 baht, the private 
value being 127.14 baht. 
The shadow price of foreign exchange, which is 
the rate of exchange that would apply if there 
were no trade barriers such as tariffs, taxes, sub-
sidies, etc. (McCleary 1976), is the product 
obtained from multiplying the official exchange 
rate by the sum of the foreign exchange premium 
(weighted average of import barriers and export 
subsidies) plus 1. The official exchange rate for 
1980 was 20.45 baht/U.S.$1 and the foreign 
exchange premium 0.15; hence, the shadow 
exchange rate 23.52 baht/U.S.$1. 
Findings and Implications 
The domestic resource cost would be 
0.55-0. 77 / unit of foreign exchange; that is, Thai-
land would spend 11.28-15.77 baht/ U.S.$1 at the 
official exchange rate or 12.97-18.14 baht/ U.S.$1 
at the shadow exchange rate. The social benefits 
from investment would be more than 2000 baht/ 
rai, and society would receive a net benefit of 
between about 1000 and 2000 baht, depending on 
the scale of operation with increasing returns to 
scale (Tables 4 and 5). 
The activity is highly labour intensive, with 
labour costs accounting for 63% of the total 
domestic cost and capital costs accounting for 
only 32%. Shrimp farming, therefore, could be a 
means of decreasing unemployment in the coun-
try. Jobs would be created both directly in the 
farm and indirectly in activities such as process-
ing, cold storage, transportation, and marketing. 
To determine the relationship between factor 
costs and the comparative advantage in shrimp 
production, we estimated the domestic resource 
cost sensitivity and found again that labour costs 
were more significant than any other factors. An 
increase in cost of 1.56% (30-rai operation) or 
1.58% (50-rai farm) would result in an increase of 
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Table 4. Applied cost structure of shrimp cultivation, Thailand, 1980. 
Annual costs (baht/ rai) 
30-rai farm 50-rai farm 
Item Direct 




Opportunity cost 464 
Depreciation (on non traded only) 226 
Foreign input costs 
Capital 83 
Fuel 517 
Transportation, marketing 116 
Processing 124 
Tax, tariff 264 
I% in domestic resource cost. The elasticities 
with respect to capital and foreign-input costs for 
30- and 50-raifarms were 3.09, 3.15 and4.93, 5.95 
respectively; land exhibited the highest value 
(20.00, 26.66), the effect of this elasticity being 
relatively insignificant compared with the other 
factors. The elasticity with respect to yield was 
negative, indicating that increasing yield per rai 
by 0.93%, 0.96% would decrease cost by I%. 
Policy Recommendations 
The potential of shrimp cultivation indicates 
that government should implement policies that 
promote increased shrimp production along the 
coast. Improvements in cultivation technology 
Table 5. Social costs and benefits of shrimp cultiva-
tion, Thailand, 1980. 
Indicator 
Domestic factor costs 
(other than capital) 
Domestic capital cost 
Social value of product 
(foreign exchange earned) 
Foreign input costs 
Social profitability (net foreign 
exchange minus domestic 
factor costs) 
Baht of domestic cost to earn 
U .S.$1 at official rate 
Baht of domestic cost to earn 












Indirect Direct Indirect 
123 









such as shrimp pond management, use of fertil-
izer and feed, and removal of predator fish 
should be a priority, and training programs in 
shrimp farming should be provided by the 
government. Moreover, effective credit and mar-
keting systems are needed for this industry to 
grow. One direct way to increase shrimp produc-
tion is to increase the shrimp-seed supply; thus, 
government should aim for increases in its 
shrimp-seed producing units (usually within the 
fishery station) as well as those within the private 
sector by providing both financial and technical 
support. 
Mangrove Preservation 
Expansion of the area devoted to shrimp pro-
duction should be directed in such a manner that 
mangrove forests are preserved. Because the 
forests are essentially natural sources of shrimp 
seed and feed, destroying the mangrove trees 
should be avoided and the boundaries of the 
forest reserve should be clarified. 
Environment Controls 
Environmental pollution from the industrial 
sector, especially from factories located near the 
river estuary, must be carefully controlled 
because contaminated water would be a hazard 
to the shrimp seeds. Also, control of overfishing 
is important in the promotion of shrimp cultiva-
tion. Particularly, enforcing the prohibition of 
trawling inshore would mitigate shrimp-seed 
scarcity and encourage a biologic equilibrium. 
Overfishing in Thailand is the core of all fisheries 
problems in the country and must be controlled. 
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Discussion 
Hugh Patrick: The Kamphol and Thanwa paper 
has considerable merit. It is a specific case study 
analyzing the social cost-benefit ratios for coast-
al shrimp cultivation by Thailand. The paper 
makes standard introductory bows to the general 
state of fishing in Thailand, with statements 
about new trawler technologies, increases in out-
put, recent inclines in productivity, dire warnings 
of overfishing, higher fuel costs, etc. that we, as 
participants, have heard in discussions these past 
several days and have learned to accept in part, 
qualify or reject in part, and remain less than fully 
informed about in other respects. Then, the paper 
gets down to the main business: shrimp, their 
rapid growth in production, domestic consump-
tion, and exports, in volume and value terms. Put 
simply, between 1970 and 1978, total production 
doubled and total value almost trebled, whereas 
exports (1970-78) trebled in quantity and rose 
some 10 times in value. Thais have had their 
shrimp and eaten it too! That is to say, about 85% 
of production is consumed domestically, with 
only a modest rise in prices, whereas exports have 
done extremely well in both volume and prices. It 
would be interesting to know why the gap 
between domestic and foreign prices has widened 
so much. Does the trend reflect normal market 
forces, lack of infrastructure, government policy, 
or what? Maybe the high-quality, high-priced 
shrimp are being exported to Japan, and it is Thai 
rather than only the Hong Kong cooks who are 
so excellent! 
The main purpose of the paper is to estimate 
quantitatively Thailand's comparative advantage 
in shrimp cultivation. The authors use the stan-
dard technique of domestic resource cost per unit 
of foreign exchange earned, with shadow prices in 
principle (assuming those close to factor-market 
prices in practice). They derive data from a sample 
of unspecified (but I suspect very limited) size and 
range in one shrimp-cultivating region, compar-
ing two scales of operation, 30- and 50-rai farms. 
They assume the traditional type of cultivation, 
with shrimp seed coming from the natural flood-
ing of coastal ponds. Their results are impressive. 
Thailand has a strong locational advantage -
comparative advantage - in shrimp cultivation. 
There are substantial differences in economies of 
scale, in both capital and other input uses, 
between 30- and 50-rai production units. In addi-
tion, the production process is quite labour inten-
sive in terms of share in value-added. Shrimp 
farming, on this evidence, makes a great deal of 
sense for Thailand. Moreover, the possibilities 
seem excellent for substantial expansion in pro-
duction and export sales at least. Only about 5% 
of shrimp production is from cultivated rather 
than natural sources. Only about two-fifths of the 
suitable coastal area is actually under cultivation. 
The major constraint is in obtaining adequate 
supplies of shrimp seeds, as industrial pollution, 
trawler small-mesh nets, and other uses of man-
grove swamps cut into natural sources of supply. 
Whether this is a serious constraint is not clear. At 
any rate, fishery research institutes are at present 
attempting to develop supplies of shrimp seeds. 
Moreover, the demand in foreign markets 
appears excellent. Shrimp apparently have high-
income elasticity of demand in Japan and the 
United States, and the Thai share of those 
markets is small enough that price elasticity of 
demand must also be high. This paper bears out 
earlier qualitative statements in this conference 
that shrimp cultivation, essentially a private oper-
ation with some governmental technical assis-
tance and perhaps help on infrastructure, is profit-
able for domestic and especially for foreign 
markets. It well combines trade and develop-
ment. As one who loves shrimp, I hope the Thais 
rapidly take full advantage of their comparative 
advantage and expand production significantly. 
There are always questions one has about such 
a study, usually those about further information. 
How representative is the sample? How good are 
the input-price assumptions? My guess is that the 
results are so strong that more expensive capital 
and cheaper labour shadow prices would not sub-
stantially alter the conclusions. Is the long-run 
supply schedule highly elastic for large expansion 
in production, i.e., what about the facts of the 
extensive margin? And how about the intensive 
margin? It is suggested that Thai shrimp cultiva-
tors do not bother with fisheries institute shrimp 
seeds. Are there serious problems of adoption of 
new technologies? How good are those technolo-
gies? Are the requisite infrastructure - storing, 
transporting, marketing - readily forthcoming 
without great need of government subsidy? How 
important - and distorting - are government 
export-subsidy programs in the estimates? 
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Finally, it would be useful to look at the income-
distribution effects of the expansion of shrimp 
cultivation and of economics of scale in that 
production. 
The Kamphol and Thanwa paper is concerned 
with the economics of production. Rents play no 
essential role in the authors' analysis. In this 
respect, this paper is different from most in this 
conference, which focus on issues for renewable 
resources of how to generate rents, how to collect 
them, how to distribute them, and how to ensure 
that resources are allocated efficiently. I have 
come away with the impression that, in fisheries in 
particular, resources are far from allocated effi-
ciently and that rents go predominantly to groups 
outside government. The problems of distribution 
seem to be deeply intertwined in this process -
bargaining and other power games within nations 
as well as among them. 
Renewable 
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Substitution of N onexhaustible R esourcesf or Fossil Fuel Energy 
and Industrial Raw Material Resources 
Ben Smith and Hugh Saddler 
Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia 
We examine the substitution of nonexhaustible resources for fossil fuels to indicate the factors 
important in determining the rate and pattern of use of these resources. The characteristics of 
nonexhaustible substitutes and resource requirements suggest important distinctions between con-
centrated and diffuse energy forms, between tradable and nontradable energy products, and between 
energy forms of limited use and those more widely useful. We have used taxonomy based on these 
distinctions to examine possible implications for trade and investment flows of substitution toward 
nonexhaustible resource use, although the conclusions depend heavily on assumptions about future 
nuclear fusion technology. The uncertainties, and the possible significant adjustments required, call 
for governments to become involved and to encourage cooperation so that adjustments are efficient, 
and inefficient pursuit of energy security by individual countries will be avoided. 
Le present expose porte sur la recherche des facteurs determinant le niveau et le mode 
d'exploitation des ressources renouvelables en vue de la substitution des combustibles fossiles. Les 
caracteristiques de ces energies de remplacement impliquent l'etablissement des distinctions existant 
entre Jes formes d'energie - diffuse ou concentree, d'un emploi limite ou non -et entre Jes produits 
energetiques - commercialisables ou non. La taxonomie a ete fondee sur ces distinctions afin 
d'examiner Jes incidences possibles de la substitution sur la circulation des investissements et du 
commerce, bien que Jes conclusions dependent fortement des hypotheses relatives a la technologie de 
fusion nucleaire. La difficulte d'etablir des previsions et !'importance des ajustements exigent 
!'intervention et la cooperation des gouvernements afin que Jes mesures retenues soient fonction-
nelles et que Jes pays ne se lancent dans une vaine poursuite de la securite energetique. 
Heavy dependence on exhaustible mineral and 
energy resources can continue only for a finite 
period. For most of the minerals on which pres-
ent production patterns are based, the time is 
sufficiently long for there to be little present 
incentive to alter the rates at which they are con-
sumed. In the case of energy, however, the size of 
exhaustible fossil fuels and uranium reserves, rel-
ative to demand, is small. Thus, within a rela-
tively short period, production and consumption 
patterns must shift so that they are more consis-
tent with the availability of energy supplies from 
nonexhaustible sources. 
In the intermediate phase, there will be a strong 
substitution of the more readily available fossil-
fuel resource, coal, for the shorter-lived oil and 
gas resources, and .the stimulus to this is now 
leading to major developments in the countries 
with relatively abundant coal supplies. Progres-
sively, however, coal reserves will also be 
depleted and nonexhaustible energy resources 
will increasingly have to be substituted for fossil 
fuels.I 
Aside from their use in direct energy supply, 
fossil-fuel resources are also used as sources of 
industrial raw materials for several purposes. The 
most important of these are synthetic fibres and 
rubber, plastics and other petrochemicals, and 
the fixation of nitrogen in fertilizer production. 
To a considerable extent, this use has been a 
'We do not discuss prospects for nuclear energy 
development. We note that all existing nuclear technol-
ogies are based on exhaustible resources, including 
experimental nuclearfusion technology, which requires 
lithium. Although an inexhaustible supply of electric 
power may ultimately be available from nuclear fusion 
based on the use of deuterium, we have not c.ounted this 
as one of our nonexhaustible alternatives. 
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process of substitution, first of coal and later oil 
and gas, for earlier "natural" sources of supply of 
these materials - a progression that must ulti-
mately be reversed in some way. 
Although the transition from dependence on 
fossil fuels is sometimes characterized as moving 
from a high-energy demand pattern, in which 
stored supplies of energy are progressively run 
down, to a "steady-state" energy demand pattern 
where demand adjusts to the rate at which addi-
tional energy resources become available, that 
physical rate is not the real limiting factor. The 
amount of nonexhaustible energy supply avail-
able to be tapped from geothermal, gravitational, 
and solar sources is, to all intents and purposes, 
infinite. It is not, however, free. To convert the 
natural forms of energy supply into forms useful 
to people, it is necessary to employ other factors 
of production (land, labour, and capital) and the 
opportunity costs of doing this are the chief limit 
on the extent to which it is desirable to use 
energy.2 In addition to this, however, the forms of 
usable energy that are technically obtainable, or 
that are likely to be economic to obtain, from the 
various natural sources differ in some important 
ways. It is useful to distinguish between concen-
trated and diffuse energy resources, between 
tradable and nontradable energy resources, and 
between those forms that can be used in many 
different ways and those that cannot. Clearly, 
these factors influence the rate and pattern of 
substitution away from use of fossil fuels, as well 
as the emerging patterns of trade specialization in 
energy products and energy-using products. 
Substitutes for Exhaustible Resources 
Throughout this paper, we use the term "non-
exhaustible" rather than "renewable" to describe 
the resources that may be substituted for exhaust-
ible fossil fuels. Given the general focus of this 
volume on renewable resources, this terminology 
requires some clarification. 
The standard economics literature (Plourde 
1970; Brown 1974; Long 1976) defines a renew-
able resource as one that is depleted by use but 
that has a natural capacity to regenerate. 
Although the resource is capable of being 
depleted to the point of exhaustion, it is also 
capable of providing a sustained yield where the 
2The use of energy could, in principle, also be con-
strained by the possibility of "overheating" the earth. 
How ever, the only serious prospect of this lies in the 
effects of increasing t_he carbon dioxide concentration 
of the atmosphere, an issue that arises only in the con-
text of use of fossil fuels. 
rates of depletion and regeneration are matched. 
Although biologists tend to suggest management 
strategies providing the maximum sustainable 
yield - at which the marginal rate of regeneration 
is zero - this will be optimal only if the net price 
of the product is rising at the required rate of 
interest. If the net price of the product is expected 
to remain constant, the optimal strategy is to 
deplete beyond the point of maximum sustainable 
yield, settling ultimately on a sustainable yield at 
which the marginal rate of regeneration is equal to 
the interest rate. 
Although these issues are relevant to the 
exploitation of biological alternatives to fossil 
fuels, other potentially important substitutes in 
the energy area are clearly not appropriately clas-
sified as "renewable" resources. Some of these are 
inexhaustible resources, whose future availabil-
ity is entirely unaffected by current levels of 
exploitation, whereas others are exhaustible 
within a time scale irrelevant to human 
consideration. 
We distinguish between resources that are 
exhaustible over a relevant period (fossil fuels) and 
those that either are not exhaustible in such a time 
frame or can be managed to provide a continuous, 
nonreducing level of supply. The latter category we 
refer to as "nonexhaustible" resources. 
Simple Substitution Model 
We have constructed a simple substitution 
model in which a single, homogeneous resource 
product "energy" may be derived either from an 
exhaustible source (E) or from a nonexhaustible 
source(N). We have assumed extraction costs are 
zero for the exhaustible resource so that the cost 
of exploiting this source of supply would be 
simply the lost future opportunity to do so. In 
contrast, we have supposed that extraction from 
the nonexhaustible source would involve a pres-
ent cost, as factors of production need to be 
diverted from other uses to obtain energy from 
that source. 
Fig. I shows the demand for energy and the 
supply curve relating to the nonexhaustible 
source, both of which are assumed for simplicity 
to be constant over time. The upward slope of SN 
reflects the increasing opportunity cost of divert-
ing resources from alternative uses to the extrac-
tion of energy from N. In the absence of the 
exhaustible resource, a "steady-state" level of 
consumption, Q*, and price, P*, will be main-
tained. However, this steady state results from 
the assumed stability of demand and nonenergy 
resource costs, not from any ultimate limit on 
energy availability. 
Although the exhaustible resource has zero 









Fig. I. Energy demand and supply from nonexhaustible 
sources. 
extraction costs, energy will not be supplied at 
zero price from this source (with Q consumed in 
each period) until E is exhausted, unless property 
rights in the exhaustible resource are undefined 
and nobody can make investments in conserving 
the resource. As a reasonable approximation, 
conservation decisions may follow the Hotelling 
rule (Hotelling 1931), with the price of energy 
rising over time at a rate equal to the rate of 
interest. The position of that price path (Fig. 2), 
and hence the current price of energy, is deter-
mined by the condition that total demand for E 
over the period until price reaches P* (the "ceil-
ing" price) must be equal to the total available 
stock of E.J Other things being equal, the price 
JThis condition ensures that the resource is 
exhausted when demand for it ceases. Total exhaustion 
of the resource arises from our assumption of zero 
extraction costs. In reality, the exhaustible resource will 
cease being exploited when extraction costs reach the 
price P*, and we think of this as equivalent to exhaus-
tion ( oflower cost reserves). Otherwise, the assumption 





Fig. 2. Energy price path. 
path will be lower and the life of the exhaustible 
resource longer, the lower the price (Po in Fig. 1) 
at which it is economic to start production from 
the nonexhaustible source because such produc-
tion reduces the demand for E in all periods in 
which it takes place. Equally, the smaller the total 
stock of E, the higher the price path will lie and 
the sooner the nonexhaustible substitute will be 
brought into production. 
This simple model indicates the essential ele-
ments in the interrelationship between exhaust-
ible resource depletion and the availability and 
rate of development of ftonexhaustible substi-
tutes. Although the existence of a nonexhaustible 
alternative (whether currently economic to 
exploit or not) reduces the price of energy in all 
periods, we cannot say a priori whether the life of 
the exhaustible resource is actually extended or 
shortened by this. 4 
Non homogeneity of Product and Resources 
We now complicate the model slightly by sup-
posing there to be two different energy forms (A 
and B) that are not closely substitutable in their 
uses but can both be produced equally readily 
from the exhaustible source E. However, produc-
tion of A and B from nonexhaustible sources 
requires the exploitation of two different resources 
(NA and Ne) where NA is available at a lower cost 
than Ne (Fig. 3). For convenience, the price at 
which NA meets all A demand (PA*) coincides with 
the price at which exploitation of Ne becomes 
worthwhile (Pea). The ceiling price for the 
exhaustible resource is Pe*, at which all B demand 
is met by Ne, and the price of E will again rise at the 
rate of interest to reach Pe* at the date when 
cumulative production (to meet A and B demands) 
is equal to the size of the resource stock (Fig. 4). 
Below a price of PAo, only the exhaustible 
resource will be used to provide both energy 
forms. Above this price, NA will progressively be 
substituted for E in meeting demand for energy 
form A until, at PA*, the exhaustible resource will 
no longer be used to produce A and will provide 
only Qe of energy form B. The price of energy 
form A will remain constant at PA* (and con-
sumption at QA*) from time TA onward, whereas 
Ne will progressively be substituted for E in meet-
ing B demand until Eis exhausted at time T. 
4That is, the availability of nonexhaustible substitutes 
cannot necessarily be regarded as having the effect of 
"conserving" the exhaustible resource. Obviously, if a 
perfect substitute for oil were available in unlimited 
quantity at the current oil price, the (present) price of oil 
would fall sharply and the rate of depletion would 
accelerate. 
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0 QA* 
Quantity of energy A 
0 Qe* Qe 
Quantity of energy B 
Fig. 3. Energy demands and supplies from different nonexhaustible sources. 
The existence of the relatively low-cost alterna-
tive source of energy form A - and the conse-
quent early substitution of NA for E in meeting A 
demand - has the effect of conserving the 
exhaustible resource for use in the area with the 
less cheaply available substitute source of supply 
and, therefore, delays the date at which higher 
prices need to be paid for energy form B. 
An alternative modification of the basic model 
is to suppose that the two forms of energy 
demand match the products of two different 
exhaustible resources (EA and Ee) but can equally 
well be met by a single nonexhaustible resource. 
In this case, if one supposes that reserves of EA 
are significantly smaller relative to demand over 
time than those of Ee, in the absence of the 
resource N, prices 12_f both forms of energy would 
ultimately rise to P where their demand would 
fall to zero (Fig. 5), although this would occur 
sooner for energy form A than for energy form B. 
Given the nonexhaustible alternative, however, 
Pe* - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~--Pe 





Fig. 4. Price paths of different energy forms. 
0 Qe* 
Quantity 
Fig. 5. Energy demands and supply from different non-
exhaustible sources. 
the ultimate steady state involves a price for both 
energy forms of PN*, with consumption QA* of A 
and Qe *-QA* of B. 
0 T' T" T* 
Time 
Fig. 6. Price paths of different energy forms and 
exhaustible resources. 
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Once the price of either A or B rises above Po, 
N will provide a substitute source of that energy 
form. Given the greater scarcity of EA, this occurs 
sooner for A (Fig. 6) and N is used exclusively as 
a substitute for EA until the price of A reaches PA 
and EA is exhausted. From that time (T') until T", 
the price of A will remain constant and consump-
tion will remain at QA. Only when the price of 
energy from the initially more abundant Ea rises 
above PA will the nonexhaustible resource also be 
used to provide a substitute source of energy 
form B. From T" until T*, the prices of the two 
forms of energy will be the same, rising toward 
the final steady-state equilibrium price PN*. 
In this example, the nonexhaustible source of 
supply is concentrated wholly on meeting 
demand in the area where the exhaustible source 
is less abundant, until such time as the initially 
more abundant exhaustible resource also 
becomes critically scarce. This has the effect of 
conserving the scarcer exhaustible resource and 
maintaining lower prices for the energy form 
produced from it. 
One could go on to consider more complex 
problems using models, but the simple cases out-
lined indicate the essential issues and principles. 
Judgments about the probable real world rate 
and pattern of substitution between exhaustible 
and nonexhaustible resources require investiga-
tion of the actual mixtures of the sorts of situa-
tions described in the simple examples. In addi-
tion, however, judgments will also be necessary 
about possibilities of substitution between prod-
ucts, either as inputs into particular production 
processes or in final demand. 
Product Substitution 
In the preceding analysis, we assumed that the 
cross-price elasticity of demand between the dif-
ferent energy forms was zero. In reality, there is 
likely to be a high degree of direct or indirect 
substitution between energy forms. 
A positive cross-price elasticity of demand 
between energy forms A and B would result in a 
greater expansion of supply from the lower cost 
nonexhaustible resource NA and a reduced 
supply from Na. The ultimate steady-state prices 
for the two energy forms, PA* and Pa*, would lie 
closer together, the price path PE would be lower, 
and the life of the exhaustible resource would be 
extended. 
Likewise, a positive cross-price elasticity of 
demand would lead to a substitution of the more-
abundant exhaustible resource, Es, for the less-
abundant resource, EA, lowering the price path of 
the latter and raising that of the former. The 
result of this is that EA is exhausted later and Es 
sooner and that the nonexhaustible resource 
begins to be substituted for EA later. 
In practice, the extents to which different 
energy forms can be substituted in consumption 
will clearly be major determinants both of the 
relative rates at which different fossil fuels are 
depleted and of the rate and nature of the devel-
opment of nonexhaustible substitutes for fossil 
fuels. 
A more indirect form of product substitution 
may affect the ways in which nonexhaustible 
resources are substituted for exhaustible resources. 
In the context of the above models, the product of 
the nonexhaustible resource may not actually be 
energy but a product capable of substituting for 
energy use. The natural fibres wool and cotton are, 
through their use in clothing, substitutes for the 
use of energy in space heating, and timber may 
provide a substitute for other structural materials 
(bricks, cement, steel, and aluminum) whose pro-
duction is relatively energy intensive. In both cases, 
there is a more obvious direct substitution possibil-
ity- natural fibres for fossil-fuel-based synthetics 
and timber for direct energy production as a fuel. 
The dual substitution possibilities make it difficult 
to relate substitution incentives to energy prices 
from exhaustible sources: For example, if wool 
and cotton had the same thermal qualities as syn-
thetics (and were otherwise also the same), one 
would expect their prices to reflect closely the cost 
of synthetics, which in turn reflects the price of 
exhaustible fossil fuels. However, given that the 
natural fibres have a superior thermal quality, it 
seems likely that their prices will rise more rapidly 
than those of synthetics as energy prices generally 
increase. 
Substitution Possibilities 
Alternatives to fossil-fuel sources of energy are 
(with the exception of the exhaustible resource 
uranium) derived directly or indirectly from solar 
radiation, from the heat contained in the earth's 
core, or from gravity. These primary sources are 
inexhaustibly large, both over time and at any 
time, but they are only to a very limited extent 
directly useful to people. We now consider briefly 
the various ways in which they can be harnessed 
to provide useful energy forms and the limita-
tions and constraints that apply. 
Direct solar radiation may be converted into 
useful heat or electrical energy, but conversion 
capacity is limited by the flux of solar radiation 
and by the capabilities of the extraction technol-
ogy. The radiation flux varies with latitude, being 
greatest in the tropics and least at the poles. 
Cloudiness is also an important limitation for 
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collection systems dependent on focused radia-
tion. Ordinary solar collectors supply heat at low 
temperatures (below I 00° C), which may be used 
directly as hot water or, for example, to drive 
refrigeration or air conditioning equipment. 
Evacuated tube collectors and focusing systems 
supply heat at higher temperatures, which may be 
used as steam for a multitude of industrial heat-
ing purposes or to drive turbines to generate elec-
tricity. Direct conversion of solar radiation to 
electricity occurs in photovoltaic cells, which are 
a form of semiconductor. The technology for 
making them is closely related to that used in the 
production of silicon chips and is undergoing 
development only slightly Jess rapid. 
These technologies all produce energy at rela-
tively low concentrations and are useful for 
domestic and commercial purposes. The land 
area over which solar radiation would need to be 
collected for industries may be a serious con-
straint. Indeed, even for domestic and commer-
cial uses, the land area on which solar radiation 
impinges limits the usefulness of direct solar con-
version in densely populated areas. Considerable 
research is currently being devoted to schemes to 
produce large quantities of energy at a single site 
so that a solar power station can be fitted into an 
existing distribution infrastructure. The technol-
ogy available to do this is extremely costly and 
the extensive use of land for the necessary collec-
tion systems would seriously limit the range of 
possible sites. It seems unlikely that such concen-
trated solar energy will prove a viable alternative 
in other than the long term and then only in 
locations where land has an extremely low value 
in alternative uses. 
Much of the solar radiation impinging on the 
earth is converted into the energy of winds, 
waves, and ocean currents. Technology for 
extracting useful energy from these sources is still 
being developed, but it is possible to obtain elec-
tric power in concentrated form from them. As 
with solar radiation, however, the energy flux 
varies from place to place. In general, wind and 
wave energy intensity is relatively low in tropical 
latitudes, although local topography has an 
important influence on wind energy - coastal 
and hilltop sites being the best. For the tropics, 
there is more potential in ocean thermal energy 
conversion (OTEC), which uses the difference in 
temperature between seawater at the surface and 
at depth (off the edge of the continental shelf). 
The applicability of this form of energy conver-
sion is clearly site dependent and is of greatest 
relevance to islands. 
Hydroelectric power generation is also an indi-
rect form of solar energy and has a well-established 
technology. The hydropower resources of any 
country are limited by topographical and hydro-
logical characteristics, and total world capacity has 
been estimated as 34.9 x 101s J /year (Armstrong 
1978), which is 12% of the current annual world 
use of commercial energy (British Petroleum 
1980). In 1978, the output of installed capacity was 
about 20% of total electricity generated (UN 1979) 
and represented about one-seventh of the total 
potential annual hydropower output. In theory, 
hydroelectricity is an inexhaustible resource 
although in the Jong term the size of the resource is 
affected by climatic change. In practice, some 
hydro schemes have a relatively short life (mea-
sured in decades rather than centuries) because of 
siltation of the storage dam. Once the basin is filled 
with silt, it is unlikely to be economic to empty it, 
and the hydropower resource of the site is thus Jost. 
The direct and indirect solar energy alternatives 
described so far are all extremely capital intensive, 
producing energy from the application of capital 
to land or site-specific natural resources with 
minimal employment of Jabour. 
The final means of converting solar energy to 
usable forms is through extraction of the chemi-
cal energy stored by living plants as wood, cellu-
lose, starch, or sugar (i.e., biomass). In most 
developing countries, biomass already provides 
an important share of the total energy used. For 
example, the traditional fuels (fuelwood, crop 
wastes, and dung) have been estimated to supply 
more than 50% of total (traditional plus commer-
cial) energy use in Burma, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, and Thailand (Brown and Smith 
1980), and China has made extensive use of bio-
gas derived from waste materials. In general, 
these are important sources of limited quantities 
of low-concentration energy mainly useful for 
domestic purposes, although wastes from 
centralized-agricultural or forestry-processing 
activities can sometimes provide sufficient energy 
for those production processes. In broad terms, 
the category of use of these resources (diffuse, 
low concentration) is similar to that of direct 
solar conversion, although substantially less 
capital intensive. 
Concentrated-energy forms obtainable from 
biomass involve the conversion of wood to char-
coal, pyrolytic oil, producer gas, or methanol or 
the fermentation of starch and sugar to produce 
ethanol. These energy forms have a wide range of 
potential uses and could, in principle, be 
employed to replace fossil fuels in any energy use. 
Production of the raw materials is an agricultural 
or forestry activity and, thus, has the same 
FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSTITUTES: SMITH AND SADDLER 203 
resource-input requirements as those activities 
generally and the same possible range of capital 
and labour-intensive technologies (Binswagner et 
al. 1978). The processing of these materials, how-
ever, is necessarily relatively capital intensive. 
Like solar energy, tidal energy is an inexhaust-
ible resource of large magnitude. However, the 
nature of the resource is such that large-scale, 
capital-intensive technology producing concen-
trated electric power must be employed, and this 
can only be done where the tidal amplitude is 
large and the coastal topography is suitable. Sig-
nificant exploitation of tidal energy is likely to be 
a viable alternative at relatively few sites. 
The exploitation of geothermal energy is also 
constrained by the technical problems of extract-
ing more than a small proportion of the total 
resource. Energy can only be extracted where 
particularly hot areas in the earth's crust are close 
to the surface. As it is not clear how quickly this 
energy would be replaced from greater depth, i.e., 
how renewable it is, it is usual to describe geo-
thermal energy in terms of the total accessible 
resource base in situ, as is the case with fossil 
fuels. Even in these terms, the resource is large 
and has been estimated as 2.9 x 1024 J /year (Auer 
et al. 1978) or roughly 10 times the fossil-fuel 
resource. Technological difficulties and capital 
requirements for the extraction and conversion 
to concentrated electric power of that energy pre-
sumably vary widely across sites, so that the costs 
of extraction may rise sharply as the level of use 
of the resource is expanded. 
Raw-Material Substitutes 
The combustion of petroleum, natural gas, and 
coal to provide useful energy is the major use for 
these exhaustible resources. However, they are 
also used as raw materials for the production of 
nitrogen fertilizers, plastics, rubber, synthetic 
fibres, and a great many other chemical products. 
Renewable alternatives, derived from plants or 
animals, are available either as alternative raw 
materials for essentially the same production 
processes or as alternative products to meet the 
same consumer uses (natural rubber, natural 
fibres, and paper). The use of these alternatives 
would in most cases merely constitute a reversal 
of the process by which synthetic chemical prod-
ucts have replaced natural ones during the past 30 
years. For example, before World War II, 
ethanol made by fermentation of crop-derived 
starch or sugar was an important raw material for 
the production of organic chemicals. After the 
War, it was rapidly replaced by naphtha(a petro-
leum product) and natural gas. The War itself 
provided the stimulus for the synthetic-rubber 
industry. More recently, the natural fibre jute has 
been largely replaced by polypropylene. Some of 
these substitutions occurred because the syn-
thetic alternative was a better product, but rela-
tive cost was frequently the more important 
consideration. 
Other important nonenergy uses of petroleum 
products include bitumen, lubricating oils, and 
petroleum coke (used, for example, to make car-
bon anodes for aluminum smelting). Some plant 
products are a potential substitute for lubricating 
oils. For bitumen, however, mineral products 
such as cement are a more likely substitute. 
As with biomass-energy resources, the raw-
material substitutes for fossil fuels are agriculture-
and forest-based and require the same inputs as 
these activities generally. In the case of fibres, 
rubber, and paper, production and trade patterns 
for the "natural" materials and intermediate 
products are well established. Substitutes for other 
raw materials are largely the same products, or 
types of products, able to provide concentrated 
energy from biomass and will require the same 
sorts of capital inputs in the processing of the raw 
materials. 
The most important point about all nonenergy 
uses for fossil fuels is that they are a relatively 
small fraction of total use of those resources. In 
1978, nonenergy petroleum products accounted 
for only 9% of total petroleum-product output 
from refineries throughout the world (UN 1979). 
Corresponding figures for the nonenergy uses of 
natural gas and coal are not available, but they 
are unlikely to be larger. Thus, although there are 
some raw-material uses of fossil fuels for which 
nonexhaustible substitutes are not readily avail-
able, this is unlikely to influence significantly the 
rate at which substitution away from fossil fuels 
occurs in aggregate. 
Trade Possibilities 
Heavy dependence on the use of oil, on a global 
scale, has been facilitated by the ease with which 
oil and petroleum products can be transported 
internationally, given that oil deposits occur in 
only a few areas of the world. The substitution of 
coal for oil involves transportation problems, 
providing some incentive for highly energy inten-
sive activities to be located close to coal resources 
(Anderson and Smith 1981). But coal is still rela-
tively easy to transport between countries, and an 
international trade in this energy commodity is 
developing rapidly. 
In contrast, an important characteristic of 
most of the nonexhaustible energy alternatives is 
that their energy products (heat or electric power) 
are not tradable except in limited and unusual 
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circumstances. As these resources are substituted 
for fossil fuels, energy consumption will increas-
ingly need to match the availability of nonex-
haustible alternatives, not only in form and quan-
tity but also in location. 
The exception to this is concentrated energy 
derived from biomass. Products such as ethanol 
can readily be transported in much the same way 
as petroleum products, but it is unlikely that the 
agricultural raw materials for producing these 
energy forms would be tradable except at high 
cost. Thus, development of these sorts of trad-
able, concentrated energy sources will require 
that processing facilities be established in coun-
tries with the resource endowments suited to 
production. 
In general, the nonexhaustible raw-material 
substitutes for fossil fuels either are the same prod-
ucts as the concentrated-energy forms from bio-
mass or are agricultural, pastoral, or forest prod-
ucts that have well-established, international-trade 
patterns at various levels of processing. Thus, these 
substitutes are not significantly distinguished from 
the fossil fuels for which they provide alternatives 
by their degree of tradability. 
Comparative Advantage, Trade, 
and Investment Issues 
The review of substitution possibilities sug-
gests a simple classification of three alternatives 
for fossil fuels: (1) agricultural - liquid (and 
other) fuels and industrial raw materials that are 
technically capable of substituting for fossil fuels 
across the whole range of uses and are tradable 
internationally; (2) direct-solar and traditional 
biomass - electricity or heat at low concentra-
tion that can be substituted for fossil fuels in 
low-energy intensive and domestic uses but is not 
tradable; and (3) indirect-solar, gravitational, 
and geothermal - electricity or heat at high con-
centration that can be substituted for fossil-fuel 
energy in any nontransport use and in electrified 
transport systems but is not tradable. Stretching 
the facts a little, we could regard agricultural 
sources of energy and materials as perfect substi-
tutes for .fossil fuels. If all demands could be met 
from these sources at prices lower than from the 
other alternatives (Fig. I and 2), agricultural 
energy and material resources would progres-
sively be substituted for fossil fuels, meeting all 
demands at the price reached when fossil fuels 
were exhausted. 
By introducing a spatial element into the 
model, we could predict that comparative advan-
tage in the production of agricultural substitutes 
for fossil fuels would approximate the pattern of 
comparative advantage in agricultural, pastoral, 
or forest products generally. That is, it would lie 
with countries with relatively large endowments 
of land suited to these purposes. Anderson and 
Smith (1981, Table I) give details of the relative 
endowments of these resources of countries in the 
Asian-Pacific region. Because of the increased 
demand for land, the terms of trade of land-
abundant countries would improve (through an 
increase in export prices of all land-intensive 
goods) relative to countries in which land is rela-
tively scarce. 
However, the extensive use of agricultural 
resources to provide substitutes for fossil fuels 
would be subject to opportunity costs that would 
increase sharply with increasing competition for 
land, particularly for the production of food-
stuffs. The pressure may be reduced substantially 
by development of the other energy sources. 
Focusing on the third set of alternatives and 
treating them as relatively low cost(Fig. 3 and4), 
we could say that early development of the non-
exhaustible resource NA as a substitute source of 
energy form A would effectively conserve the 
exhaustible resource for use in the area with the 
higher-cost substitute and, therefore, would 
postpone the need to develop that substitute. 
The introduction of trade considerations com-
plicates the issue more significantly in this case, 
because the energy products of these alternatives 
are not themselves tradable goods. Thus, the 
extent to which they are capable of substituting 
for fossil fuels (or, ultimately, agricultural energy 
resources) depends on the level and composition 
of energy demands in the countries with a com-
parative advantage in their production. We 
should expect a shift in comparative advantage in 
production of energy-intensive goods toward the 
countries with relatively abundant resources. 
The variations in the characteristics of land 
areas are such that there is not a high correlation 
between land-abundance and availability of 
indirect-solar, gravitational, and geothermal 
energy resources. A clear example is Australia, a 
country with abundant land but with little poten-
tial energy resources of this sort. In general, pre-
diction of comparative advantage in producing 
energy from these sources requires an inspection 
of the specific resource endowments of countries 
and assessment of the costs of exploiting the 
resources in each particular situation. 
The characteristics of the second set of alterna-
tives are such that their substitution for fossil 
fuels cannot be enhanced either by trade in the 
energy products themselves or to any significant 
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extent by the relocation of energy-using activities 
in countries with particularly favourable oppor-
tunities for exploiting these energy sources. Some 
production processes of medium-energy intensity 
could operate on the basis of direct-solar conver-
sion (food processing, for example), and the 
availability of this energy form might influence 
location decisions for those activities where com-
parative disadvantage assessed independently of 
energy costs was not great. As a broad generaliza-
tion, one might expect a higher level of process-
ing of agricultural and forest products in the 
countries in which the raw materials are pro-
duced. In general, however, the main areas for 
substitution of these alternatives for other energy 
forms lie in diffuse domestic and commercial 
uses, that is, in essentially nontradable activities. 
The availability of direct-solar energy depends 
on the intensity of solar radiation in the particu-
lar location and on the area of land on which it 
impinges relative to population and. energy 
demands, whereas the availability of "tradi-
tional" biomass energy in general correlates 
closely with relative land abundance. For domes-
tic and commercial uses, scarcity of land only 
really constrains the possibilities of substituting 
solar energy for fossil fuels in very densely popu-
lated areas. The potential availability of diffuse, 
low-concentration energy in some countries sig-
nificantly exceeds energy demands in activities 
capable of employing these energy forms, where-
as the reverse is likely to apply in other countries. 
Such mismatching of supply and demand reduces 
the possibilities of using these energy forms to 
increase the relative availability of tradable 
energy products or of energy products suited to 
use in production of energy-intensive tradable 
goods. 
Capital and Technology 
So far, we have focused principally on the 
nature of the nonexhaustible substitutes for fossil 
fuels and their resource-input requirements and 
paid little attention to the supply of technology 
and capital required for the exploitation of these 
resources. 
In the exploitation of fossil fuels, capital and 
technological expertise are highly mobile inter-
nationally through the operations of large inter-
national companies, which also play an impor-
tant part in establishing and maintaining trade 
links and matching supplies and demands (Smith 
1978; Smith and Drysdale 1980; Anderson and 
Smith 1981). Thus, comparative advantage in the 
production of energy from these naturally occur-
ring resources is almost wholly determined by 
their physical availability. 
The development of agricultural-based substi-
tutes for fossil-fuel energy, and the establishment 
of significant international trade in the resulting 
energy products, would increase capital demands 
in the producing countries and would require a 
significant degree of coordination between the 
structures of energy demands of importing coun-
tries and supplies of exporting countries. Interna-
tional companies can be envisaged as ultimately 
engaging in processing facilities in land-abundant 
countries and undertaking the required marketing 
and trading operations in much the same way as 
with fossil fuels. However, this route is uncertain, 
especially in the early stages of the development of 
agricultural-energy substitutes, when a high 
degree of coordination (in technology develop-
ment, production and consumption investments, 
and infrastructure facilities) may be needed. The 
organization of agricultural production to pro-
vide secure supplies of raw materials for process-
ing facilities will almost certainly require govern-
ment involvement in producing countries. 
Policies that facilitate the international movement 
of capital and expertise, that provide security and 
access to resources and markets, that set terms for 
exploiting the resources are all keys to successful 
development of energy sources. 
Indirect-solar, gravitational, and geothermal 
energy resources all require extremely capital-
intensive technologies for their development. To 
advanced, capital-abundant countries, develop-
ment would generally be undertaken by public 
utilities selling power to a wide range of con-
sumers on a grid system. Additions to capacity to 
meet demands from particular processing facili-
ties can, in general, be relatively easily accommo-
dated at some degree of arm's length - as, for 
example, with the current generation of coal-
fired power stations to service the demands of a 
growing aluminum industry in Australia. This is 
not to say, however, that there are no policy 
problems associated with developments 
(Department of the Treasury 1981; Clarke et al. 
1981). 
In capital-scarce, developing economies, how-
ever, significant exploitation of these kinds of 
resources will be much more closely tied to the 
requirements of specific energy-intensive activi-
ties dependent on export markets. The role of 
foreign investment is likely to be crucial not only 
in development of the energy-using activities and 
securing of markets for their products but also in 
the provision of capital and technological exper-
tise for the development of the energy resource 
itself. 
Direct conversion of solar radiation is also 
highly capital intensive, and exploitation of this 
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energy form in capital-scarce countries may thus 
be limited. Given the diffuse, small-scale uses to 
which direct-solar energy may be put, and the 
limitations on its use in the production of trad-
able goods, private foreign capital is unlikely to 
contribute to its development. In many areas, 
however, investments in direct-solar conversion 
equipment are capable of yielding high rates of 
return so that such investments may represent 
desirable ways of employing scarce capital 
resources. This is especially the case where, 
because of domestic-resource endowments and 
problems in the establishment of coal-fired 
power development based on imports, the alter-
native form of energy is oil or oil-derived. The 
major barriers may lie in provision of adequate 
information and in the channeling of funds to the 
diffuse individual investors whose decisions are 
critical. Although these problems may be 
avoided by smoothly functioning markets for 
capital and for solar-conversion equipment in 
advanced, capital-abundant countries, in devel-
oping countries government-sponsored pro-
grams may be required to improve information 
and capital flows. Given that comparative advan-
tage in the development and manufacture of 
solar-conversion equipment lies with more 
capital-abundant countries and that a significant 
trade in such equipment can be expected to 
develop, the information and capital barriers of 
developing countries may sensibly be reduced by 
appropriate channeling of the technical assis-
tance and capital available in aid programs. 
Resource Rents 
Both in the development of agricultural energy 
resources and in the exploitation of the various 
site-specific, concentrated energy resources, rents 
will be earned as a result of the fixed supply of the 
natural resources involved and their differential 
quality. It will be rare to find these energy re-
sources being "sold" to foreign consumers (or 
foreign-owned consumers) at arm's length on 
competitive markets. This is particularly the case 
for the site-specific alternatives but is likely to 
apply also to agricultural resources because of 
the market structures. As with exhaustible 
resources, there will be important policy issues 
, relating to the appropriation of those resource 
rents by the resource owners and to the sorts of 
controls on foreign ownership and control that 
are desirable. 
Appropriate taxation arrangements for the 
collection of mineral rents have received consid-
erable attention (Garnaut and Clunies Ross 
1975; Smith 1979; Garnaut 1981; Lloyd and 
Emerson 1981), and the same principles apply 
here. However, the high degree of vertical inte-
gration that is likely in the transfer of the tradable 
products creates particular difficulties for ensur-
ing that resource rents are revealed as taxable 
profits. For agricultural energy resources, this 
may be a transitory problem. Ultimately, a large 
international trade in relatively homogeneous 
agricultural-based energy products could 
develop, from which taxation authorities would 
be reasonably able to judge appropriate transfer 
prices. 
In the early stages of development of nonex-
haustible substitutes for fossil fuels, rents earned 
by the natural resources employed will be small 
because, by definition, developments undertaken 
will be only marginally worthwhile. However, as 
fossil fuels move closer to exhaustion and as 
energy prices rise, rents on nonexhaustible-
energy substitutes will increase. To reduce the 
uncertainties facing potential investors, govern-
ments should determine the mechanisms for 
appropriating rents in advance. 
Concluding Remarks 
In the immediate future, development of coal 
resources and a growing international trade in 
coal provide the most important area of substitu-
tion occurring in the energy area. Coal, or second-
ary fuels derived from coal, can be substituted for 
oil in any use but are most readily substituted in 
the provision of concentrated heat or electric 
power. Initially, at any rate, coal will principally 
be used in large-scale electricity generation and in 
the provision of process heat, thus conserving oil 
and gas for use as transport fuel and raw mate-
rials. This use will reduce the incentive for early 
development of all nonexhaustible substitutes. 
However, in future, and at present in areas where 
the scale of demand and its diffuse nature create 
problems for the establishment of coal-fired elec-
tricity based on imports, one would expect a 
relatively strong substitution of direct-solar 
alternatives in domestic and commercial use. The 
principal area in which one would not expect 
rapid substitution of nonexhaustible substitutes 
is in the agricultural production of liquid fuels 
and petrochemical feedstocks, because of the 
high opportunity costs of doing this on a signifi-
cant scale, reflecting the displacement of produc-
tion of foodstuffs. 
On the one hand, one could suppose that, past 
a relatively moderate price of coal, concentrated 
power will be available competitively at any loca-
tion in any quantity through some alternative 
technology (nuclear fusion), in which case coal 
would be reserved from that point on principally 
to meet liquid-fuel and raw-materials demands. 
Under this assumption, energy demands in 
densely populated, resource-poor economies 
might be expected to switch almost entirely to 
electric power (with electrified transport systems) 
and the demand for liquid fuels would be largely 
concentrated in land-abundant countries with 
diffuse transport systems. Liquid-fuel and raw-
material requirements would be met from coal 
and from agricultural resources, with the latter 
becoming increasingly important as coal is 
exhausted, but the aggregate effect on land use 
and competition with food-producing activities 
might never be great. 
On the other hand, the possible substitutes in 
provision of concentrated power may be limited, 
with sharply increasing costs, and they may occur 
in areas that are not densely populated. Then coal 
would continue to be focused mainly on this use 
until it was exhausted, with increasingly large 
demands being placed on agricultural resources 
to meet liquid-fuel and raw-materials require-
ments and, ultimately, with the bulk of the energy 
requirements of densely populated regions 
depending on tradable agricultural energy 
products. 
These extreme scenarios quite clearly would 
have dramatically different effects on the terms of 
trade of countries and on the patterns of compar-
ative advantage in energy production and in the 
production of energy-intensive goods. Put 
simply, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, and Taiwan (among others) would clearly 
prefer the first scenario, whereas Australia and 
Canada in particular would benefit substantially 
from the second. 
Importantly, either of these extreme scenarios 
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could be an accurate prediction of the ultimate 
outcome, given the high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding technologies and resources avail-
able to provide substitutes for fossil fuels, partic-
ularly in concentrated-energy forms, and, indeed, 
about the future availability of fossil fuels them-
selves. Albeit a relatively distant prospect, the 
possible adjustments required in densely popu-
lated, resource-poor economies, in particular, 
provide a community interest in reducing uncer-
tainty that will not necessarily be reflected in 
private levels of investment in the assessment of 
available resources and the development of 
appropriate technologies for exploiting those 
resources. The "public-good" aspects of such 
assessments and research efforts extend beyond 
national boundaries, both in terms of the reduc-
tion in risk for individual countries associated 
with a perceived level of economic cooperation in 
the development of strategies for providing 
energy security and in terms of the efficiency with 
which resources are allocated to minimize the 
opportunity costs of this. 
We noted that capital-intensive technologies 
are required for most nonexhaustible-energy 
production and suggested policy intervention by 
governments. The uncertainties surrounding 
possible directions of development and the novel 
aspects of such development are a strong impetus 
to government involvement and economic coop-
eration. The first of these is probably inevitable, 
whether it is necessary or not, and, without the 
second, may involve substantial duplication and 
waste of research and capital resources in the 
pursuit of energy substitutions that appear desir-
able in particular countries for reasons of diversi-
fication and energy security. 
Discussion 
Miguel S. Wionczek: I found the Smith and 
Saddler paper intellectually attractive on a 
number of counts: 
• Its analysis of factors that may determine 
the nature of resource substitution for fossil fuels 
and the possible implications of substitution for 
trade and investment; 
• Its attempt to pose the questions that one 
must answer to make predictive judgments; 
• Its treatment of indirect-product substitu-
tion of exhaustible by nonexhaustible resources 
(the return to the use of natural fibres - wool 
and cotton, for example - instead of space heat-
ing and the use of timber as a substitute for other 
structural, relatively energy-intensive materials); 
and 
• Its useful and clear distinction between con-
centrated and diffuse energy resources, between 
tradable and nontradable resources, and between 
those that are highly substitutable in different 
uses and those that are not. 
I have, however, serious difficulties in accept-
ing the paper's basic assumptions that lead the 
authors to the belief that the substitution of non-
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exhaustible resources for fossil-fuel energy and 
industrial raw-material resources not only is inev-
itable but will be forthcoming relatively soon. I 
particularly distrust the assumptions that the 
exhaustible fossil-fuel resources are not only 
finite but also limited and that their depletion is 
fast because of the size of the resources compared 
with that of demand. It seems to me that this 
pessimistic vision of the future of fossil-fuel 
resources has been accepted by many people 
rather uncritically from the economic literature 
produced in the industrial countries in the 1970s 
and conditioned by the so-called energy crisis of 
1973-74. The validity of the projections of that 
literature is being questioned all over the world. I 
maintain on the basis of my exposure to world-
energy problems through the research programs 
undertaken from Mexico that this vision of the 
worldwide fossil-fuel shortages is largely mis-
taken. Although the fossil-fuel resources are 
finite, they are much larger than perceived in 
some circles in the Western industrial countries. 
The belief that the world will run out of commer-
cially exploitable fossil-fuel resources by about 
2000 is based partly on incomplete information 
and partly on the static view of the availability of 
such resources and the incorrect assumption 
about the future growth of world demand for 
energy. In fact, demand has been declining for 
some time from the unusually high levels regis-
tered in 1950-70 whenGNPs grew rapidly and oil 
was cheap. 
The world has already advanced substantially 
from the stage of total dependence on conven-
tional fossil fuel. However, before nonexhausti-
ble resources are substituted for fossil fuels as 
sources for energy and industrial raw materials, 
the present stage of use of nonconventional fossil 
fuels will have to run its full course. Heavy crude 
oil, shale oil, and tar sands, as well as coal and 
natural gas, are still abundant and have been 
replacing conventional crude oil for some time. 
Concentrating on the substitution of nonex-
haustible resources for fossil-fuel energy, the 
authors occupy themselves with the technologi-
cal and institutional aspects of the present stage 
of substitution - one fossil fuel for another. 
However, the present stage has involved consid-
erable capital investment in new technologies for 
commercial exploitation of nonconventional fos-
sil fuels or difficult-to-exploit conventional fuels. 
In the face of the manifold increases in the prices 
of crude oils, such exploitation has become not 
only possible but highly profitable. Most of the 
new technologies are the property of transna-
tional energy corporations that can hardly be 
expected to abandon their newly created profit 
possibilities to search for new resources along the 
lines suggested by Smith and Saddler. And, 
because, according to the authors themselves, the 
substitution of nonexhaustible resources for 
fossil-fuel energy is capital and technology inten-
sive even in the market economies, only very 
large productive units, usually transnational cor-
porations, could afford to engage in this new 
stage of substitution. 
Finally, Smith and Saddler leave largely 
untouched the question whether and to what 
extent the substitution of nonexhaustible re-
sources for fossil-fuel energy, envisaged by them, 
would be of help to energy-poor developing 
countries beyond some improvement in their 
international trade position through the return to 
the use of some raw materials like natural fibres 
and timber. One suspects that the position of 
developing countries would not be improved 
much by the new substitution stage. The develop-
ing countries need less-intensive, fossil-fuel sub-
stitution, small hydroelectric installations, and 
small solar technologies. Their energy planners 
will find little help in the Smith and Saddler 
paper. 
Prospects for Renewable Energy Resources in South Kore a 
Hoesung Lee and Jee Dong Kim 
Korea Institute of Energy and Resources, Daejeon, Chungnam, Republic of Korea 
The total energy supply and demand plan, which has been formulated by the South Korean 
government, is summarized, and potential sources and domestic quantities for each energy source 
are presented. The potential technology applications, implementation considerations, and research 
program are explained, as are the current status of renewable energy commercialization in Korea, 
the government's future plan, and current problems. 
Le present expose resume le plan global de demande d'energie etabli par le gouvernement de la 
Coree du Sud et ii en indique !es sources et Jes quantites possibles pour chaque categorie. Le 
document comprend le programme de recherche, Jes applications techniques eventuelles ainsi que 
diverses considerations relatives a la mise en oeuvre, de meme que l'etat actuel de la commercialisa-
tion de l'energie renouvelable, a l'echelle nationale, Jes difficultes rencontrees et le plan elabore par le 
gouvernement a cet egard. 
Korea has few energy resources. Conse-
quently, imported energy, especially oil, plays an 
important role in meeting energy requirements. 
The demand for energy is expected to increase in 
accordance with the continuation of industrializ-
ation and social development. The government 
places great emphasis·on enhancing energy sup-
plies; developing new and renewable sources is 
one of its major strategies. 
The annual growth of energy use in the next 5 
years is expected to be about 7.7% (Table 1). 
During the same period, the economy is expected 
to grow annually at 8%. In 1980, total consump-
tion of energy amounted to 38 Mt of oil equiva-
lent (toe). Petroleum accounted for 62%, anthra-
cite 26%, and fuelwood (a noncommercial 
source) 7%. Nuclear, hydro, gas (liquefied petro-
leum gas), and bituminous coal made up the rest. 
By 1985, the energy consumption will increase 
to 59 million toe. With this increase, the configu-
ration of supply sources will change significantly. 
Petroleum dependency is expected to decline 
markedly to 48% with rising substitution of 
alternative sources such as nuclear power, coal, 
and gas. The expansion of nuclear energy and 
bituminous coal will be particularly noticeable, 
each rising to 10-11 % of total energy 
consumption. 
Table I. South Korea's energy consumption plan, 1980-85 (1000 toe). 
1981-86 
average 
Energy 1980 growth 
resources (actual) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 rate(%) 
Petroleum 23566 25396 26916 28464 28027 27676 28667 2.5 
Gas 458 569 622 700 788 1833 2904 38.5 
Anthracite 9878 10198 10618 11235 11486 11740 12116 3.5 
Bituminous 199 880 1467 2245 4474. 6106 6154 47.5 
Hydro 496 537 535 537 536 690 726 6.2 
Nuclear 869 774 913 1484 3153 4561 6561 53.3 
Fuelwood 2517 2517 2343 2260 2180 2110 2070 3.8 
Solar I 3 5 
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Energy imports will play an increasingly 
important role in the next 5 years. In 1980, 
imports accounted for 69% of total energy con-
sumption, with petroleum imports being the 
largest. By 1986, import dependency is expected 
to increase to 79%. Petroleum will still be the 
largest energy import, but its relative position 
among energy imports will decline. The imports 
of bituminous coal and anthracite will almost 
double, and imports of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) will begin in 1985. 
The prospective sources for new and renewable 
energy in South Korea are the sun, wind, bio-
'.mass, tides, and inland waters. Research and 
development of all these sources are under way. 
Several hundred solar houses are under construc-
tion, and the interest in photovoltaic research is 
also high. The government is collecting data on 
wind power, with the intention of using it to 
supply electricity to remote islands and villages 
where high transmission costs make other energy 
supplies infeasible. Biomass studies in the coun-
try are primarily of forest products and crop-
residue conversion. These resources have some 
potential in South Korea, but their contribution 
to the total energy requirements of the country is 
small. The major increases in the utilization of 
biomass resources will come from improved effi-
ciency in end use. . 
South Korea's small hydro resources are eco-
nomically recoverable, and, currently, three 
small plants are operating. In addition, the 
government has started a feasibility study on the 
construction of a 400 000-kW capacity tidal 
power plant at Garorim Bay, and its construction 
is expected to be finished by 1988. 
The country has invested only relatively small 
amounts in the development and utilization of 
new and renewable energy because of uncertain 
economic feasibility, engineering constraints, 
lack of capital for infrastructure, and unfamiliar-
ity with alternative energy sources. Technical 
personnel and testing facilities for such work are 
scarce in this country. For example, mass con-
struction of solar houses could only be under-
taken if engineering design capability were 
improved substantially. 
The potential for implementing new energy 
systems depends on how economic they are com-
pared with other sources, whether they are mar-
ketable, and whether there are institutional or 
cultural constraints on their acceptance. Even if 
designs were possible, the infrastructure neces-
sary to distribute them to the public and to ensure 
maintenance is at present not available. 
To expedite the development of new and 
renewable energy sources worldwide, we suggest: 
• Increased international cooperation and 
coordination in research, development, and 
demonstration in new and renewable energy 
(e.g., joint-venture and licencing arrangements 
between developed and developing countries); 
• Strengthened information exchange sys-
tems in new and renewable energy (e.g., estab-
lishment of a data bank on sources of energy); 
• A commitment to increased financial and 
technical assistance from rich countries; and 
• An international commitment to expanded 
education and training in new and renewable 
energy. 
Solar Energy 
The direct solar resource base in South Korea 
is small in terms of both total and direct-beam 
insolation. During the course of a year, average 
daily insolation ranges from 180 cal/ cm2 (7 .5 
MJ/m2) to 318 cal/cm2 (13.3 MJ/m2). These 
averages represent 25-45% of annual extraterres-
trial radiation, indicating relatively few clear 
days and low direct-beam insolation. The high 
end of the range is comparable to insolation in 
New England and the north-central United 
States. 
Because of the rugged terrain and complex 
weather patterns affecting the peninsula, there is 
also substantial variation in available insolation 
within regions. For example, Jeongeub and 
Buan, two cities near the western coast, fewer 
than 30 km apart, receive daily average insolation 
of 180 cal/ cm2 and 244 cal/ cm2, respectively - a 
difference of more than 30%. 
Potential applications for solar energy in 
South Korea include water and space heating. 
Electricity-generating systems are also possible 
with photovoltaic and high-temperature thermal 
processes, the latter of which is less feasible at 
present levels of technology. 
Photovoltaic systems, which directly convert 
insolation to electricity via semiconductor mate-
rial, can be either flat-plate arrays or concentrat-
ing systems. The grid-connected, south-facing, 
flat-plate, nontracking array appears to be the 
most cost-effective configuration. Flat-plate 
arrays are particularly suited to the cloudy 
Korean climate, where most of the available solar 
radiation is diffuse insolation. The collectors 
maximize annual insolation if tilted from the 
horizontal at the latitude angle, which ranges 
from 33°31" at Cheju to 37°34" at Seoul. 
The output is estimated to be about 8% of the 
total energy incident on the collector surface and 
is based on a photovoltaic-cell efficiency of 12%; 
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the estimate takes into account the effects of cell 
packing, angular sensitivity, and power-
conditioning losses. The performance of the pho-
tovoltaic system was estimated for four sites in 
South Korea: Kyungju, Seoul, Kwangju, and 
Cheju Island. Estimated annual outputs range . 
from 76 kWh/ m2 in Kyungju to 102 kWh/ mi on 
Cheju Island. 
In high-temperature thermal processes, con-
centrating collectors are used to produce high 
temperatures that operate a heat engine to gener-
ate electricity. The most cost-effective technolo-
gies for solar energy are the point-focusing dis-
tributed receiver (PFDR) and the power tower. 
The PFDR uses a field of hundreds of thousands 
of parabolic-dish concentrators, with a high-
efficiency stirling cycle engine at each focal point. 
The power tower consists of a single receiver that 
is mounted on a tower surrounded by a large field 
of sun-tracking heliostats. Both systems are at 
present not technically or economically feasible 
in South Korea. 
The economics of solar-energy systems cannot 
be projected with complete certainty but do not 
appear attractive for the most part; consequently, 
the potential market is expected to be limited. 
Despite government efforts to encourage solar 
energy, institutional constraints limit its potential. 
The Ministry of Energy and Resources (MER) 
has announced plans to encourage the use of 
solar energy in new housing. MER projects 
annual construction of solar homes (estimated at 
45 homes in 1979) to be 2400 in 1980, 4500 in 
1981, and 250000 by 1990. To encourage solar 
construction, MER has set up a special housing 
fund to provide loans of up to 9.5 million won per 
solar house, has introduced tax exemptions for 
solar home builders, and has waived the require-
ment to purchase housing bonds (amount to 
2-7% of the price) for solar homes. These incen-
tives decrease the initial costs of solar homes by 
10-30%. 
The government program for research on solar 
energy is under way in the Korea Institute of 
Energy and Resources (KIER). For 1980, it 
includes photovoltaic technology (67.0 million 
won), solar-thermal heating and cooling (62.0 
million won), standard development (35.0 mil-
lion won), industrial applications (14.5 million 
won), and house construction and information 
programs (223.0 million won). KIER has con-
structed three demonstration houses using active 
and passive solar-energy systems. It is also devel-
oping photovoltaic systems for use in remote 
areas, such as lighthouses, buoys, and pumping 
stations. 
The Korea Institute of Science and Technol-
ogy (KIST) is also involved in solar-thermal, 
electric-power systems development. It is install-
ing a combined wind and solar-thermal electric 
system, using a parabolic-dish system (manufac-
tured by Omnium-G), on an island off the west 
coast. 
In addition to government-supported 
research, housing developers and other private 
entities have shown much interest in solar sys-
tems. The Korean Housing Corporation is par-
ticularly active and is now sponsoring a design 
competition to select three to five prototype solar 
homes, on which construction will start in 
August. In addition, several companies are 
manufacturing solar panels and complete solar-
energy systems both for the domestic market and 
for export. 
Wind 
The characteristics of the country's wind 
resource (estimated at 3.4 x 1010 kWh) make it 
particularly attractive for electricity generation 
(19 900 MW capacity) either on a large scale, for 
interconnection to the mainland grid, or on a 
small scale, for local use on the islands to the west 
and south. In the late 1990s, wind-generated elec-
tricity will provide 2.5% of the total electrical 
needs, if sufficient land can be made available for 
large wind farms. 
Wind velocity and direction are recorded 
hourly by the Central Meteorological Office at 86 
stations throughout South Korea and are sum-
marized monthly and yearly. Most of these sta-
tions are located on small hills in or near large 
towns and cities. Wind velocities are not avail-
able for the offshore islands or for peaks and 
ridge tops on the mainland, which are presum-
ably potential sites for wind-generation systems. 
Average wind velocities are low to moderate 
(0.9-4.5 m/ sec); the greatest average velocities 
are found along the southwestern and southern 
coasts. 
Wind energy traditionally has been used on a 
small scale in South Korea to provide mechanical 
power for such uses as grinding and water pump-
ing. Until 1975, wind power was not used for 
electricity generation, but, as a result of some 
recent developments by the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST), the government is now 
considering wind machines for electricity genera-
tion on the islands, where wind is already compet-
itive with alternative power systems such as diesel 
engines. In some regions (e.g., on the southwest-
ern coast), average annual wind speeds are suffi-
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cient to generate large quantities of electricity 
with large-scale wind machines. 
Because most of the mainland is already con-
nected to the main electric grid, the major market 
for wind systems smaller than 50 kW will be the 
offshore islands, which are too sparsely popu-
lated or too far from the mainland to make grid 
connection cost-effective. The government is cur-
rently preparing a census of the offshore islands 
to estimate the potential of small wind systems 
for providing electricity and mechanical power. 
The preliminary results of this census indicate 
that the optimal size for a small system is IO kW. 
A successful small-scale wind system must 
meet several technical and economic criteria. 
From a technical standpoint, these machines 
must be carefully designed to resist the frequent 
typhoons that destroyed previous wind-energy 
systems. Imported machines cannot be used 
because they are not adapted to Korean wind 
conditions. From an economic viewpoint, small 
wind machines on the island must be competitive 
with diesel for electricity generation. 
For both small- and large-scale wind-energy 
systems, economics are the primary concern. The 
economics of the two types of systems are basi-
cally different. Unlike small-scale systems, large-
scale wind-energy systems must be competitive 
with pumped hydro or thermal plants. On a cost-
per-kilowatt-hour basis, wind systems would be 
competitive for average sites in South Korea only 
if large economies of scale could be achieved. 
Small wind machines must compete with small 
diesel engines, which have high generation costs. 
Although generation costs for small wind-
powered systems are generally highly competitive 
with diesel, the storage capacity that is needed for 
2-3 consecutive days without wind, which occur 
fairly often, greatly increases costs and makes the 
economics of small wind systems Jess favourable. 
The market for IO-kW wind machines is 
expected to be IOOO units in 1990. However, the 
machines, which are considered optimal for 
average electricity demand on the islands, cannot 
be standardized because of the variations in wind 
characteristics. For example, a IO-kW machine 
installed at Choongmu, where the average wind 
speed at IO mis 2.73 m/sec and the maximum 
available power is 278 kWh/ m2 annually, should 
have a diameter of 12.6 m, whereas a 7.61-m 
diameter machine located at Mockpo, where the 
average wind speed is 4.37 m/sec and the maxi-
mum available power is 784 kWh/ m2 annually, 
would suffice. This simple comparison shows 
how difficult it would be to lower manufacturing 
costs by economies of scale. 
In addition to economics and market potential, 
the potential for wind-energy systems will be 
affected by government policies, resource require-
ments, and environmental impacts. A major ob-
jective of the government is to provide electrical 
supplies to the islands. Alternative energy re-
sources, especially wind, may play a major role in 
achieving that objective, because they will be eco-
nomic in the near future. At present, however, 
there are no financial incentives to develop wind 
systems. Korea Electric Company (KECO), the 
state monopoly, has not pursued wind-energy sys-
tems because they are not competitive on a 
marginal-cost basis with alternative sources of 
electricity. 
A small-scale wind machine industry would 
not be constrained by a shortage of materials, 
because the market for small-scale systems 
appears limited. Training personnel to design 
and operate the machines and to select the sites 
can be easily accomplished. 
Wind power does not present major environ-
mental problems; however, there is an aesthetic 
impact associated with installing large wind 
farms. Each large wind machine requires 0.3 ha 
plus land for access roads and transmission lines. 
Such extensive land use may not be possible, 
especially in the plains areas because of compet-
ing land uses, such as agriculture or housing. 
Finally, some preliminary studies suggest that 
large wind-powered generating machines have 
physiologic effects on nearby populations, 
because of their low-acoustic frequencies. How-
ever, such impacts have not yet been fully 
evaluated. 
There is currently no research program on 
large wind machines in South Korea, but KECO 
has expressed interest in coupling wind-energy 
systems with pumped-storage hydro projects. 
The Korean Advanced Institute for Science 
(KAIS) and KIST are currently performing a 
limited research program on small-scale wind 
machines from 2 to 10 kW, for electricity genera-
tion, water pumping, and lighthouse operations. 
Biomass 
The country's biomass resources include 
human and animal residues; agricultural crop 
residues; and forest fuels and residues. Solid and 
liquid urban wastes do not appear to constitute a 
significant resource at present. The annual net 
energy recovered from these biomass resources is 
estimated to be 6.8 PJ; as much as 41.6 PJ were 
potentially available in i 978. By 1986, the poten-
tial is estimated to range from 50. 7 P J /year to 
89.6 P J /year, and by 2000, 42.6-115.0 P J /year. 
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This estimated increase in the resource base 
would result if the expected switch from tradi-
tional fuels (wood, agricultural residues) to more 
convenient fossil fuels takes place and if expected 
increases in forest outputs are realized. However, 
available technology for the use of traditional 
fuels could provide convenience similar to that 
with fossil-fueled technologies and would have 
the advantage of using local resources. 
Biogas from animal residues could replace 
about 32% (on a net-energy basis) of the coal used 
in the rural residential sector. By 1986, crop 
wastes burned in district heating systems and 
biogas from animal residues could replace about 
67% of the coal, kerosine, and gas projected to be 
needed by the rural residential and commercial 
users. 
A large percentage of the fossil fuels could be 
replaced if some of the residues not currently 
burned could be recovered without environmen-
tal damage or detriment to farming activities. 
The same resource base could replace more than 
50% of the fossil-fuel requirements for the rural 
residential and commercial sectors by the year 
2000. Wood-fired boilers or gasifiers could 
replace 3.6% and 5.7% of the energy supplied by 
oil to industrial users, by 1986 and 2000, 
respectively. 
Direct combustion ofbiogas could supply heat 
for cooking or space heating. The useful energy 
potentially available from direct burning, at a 
heating value of 5500 kcal/ rnJ and a conversion 
efficiency of 60%, is 6.8 PJ/year. The energy 
required by a family of five for daily cooking has 
been estimated at about 3600 kcal. Therefore, the 
net energy recoverable from biogas combustion 
could supply the yearly cooking needs of 1.24 
million households, or about 56% of rural house-
holds. Alternatively, biogas could supply the 
cooking and heating needs of about 150 000 
households during the winter months. 
Biogas could also be used to generate electric-
ity. Experiments conducted in other countries 
indicate an efficiency of about 20%. In this case, 
the cooling water can supply the heat required to 
maintain the digester temperature and some pro-
cess heat (hot water). It is assumed that 60% of 
the heat that would have been rejected can be 
recovered as process heat. 
Grain straws can be used to produce energy 
through direct combustion, gasification to low-
Btu gas, anaerobic digestion, or ethanol produc-
tion. Of these processes, ethanol production, 
which involves preprocessing of the feedstock 
(i.e., chemical or enzymatic hydrolysis) to release 
the ferrnentable sugars, has not yet been corn-
rnercialized. Gasification to low-Btu gas was 
extensively demonstrated during World War II 
for automotive transportation and is now being 
revived. The efficiency of anaerobic digestion of 
crop residues may be limited, because of the 
liquor content of the feedstock and its sometimes 
unfavourable ratio of carbon to nitrogen. This 
problem can be corrected in part through the 
addition of animal urine. Chopping the residues 
before they are introduced into the digester is 
recommended to increase digestibility. Chemical 
pretreatment can also improve digestibility but is 
probably justified only for large-scale operations. 
Wood fuel can be used in direct combustion 
systems, converted to low-Btu gas through gasifi-
cation, or converted to methanol fuel. 
With the present technology in South Korea, 
residential direct combustion results in a net util-
ization of about 30% of the energy content of the 
fuel. With state-of-the-art technology, the effi-
ciency of residential stoves could probably be 
increased to about 50%. Small industrial boilers 
that are wood fired could be used for process heat 
for small industries: they have overall efficiencies 
of about 70% - comparable with that of oil- or 
gas-fired boilers. Thus, forest products can be 
burned more efficiently by industrial boilers that 
have been converted from oil or gas fuel than by 
the stoves in most homes. 
Gasification of wood to low-Btu gas for local 
use has been demonstrated. The current opera-
tions of pilot processes in the United States sug-
gest that about 70% of the energy content of the 
wood can be recovered if the gasifier is closely 
coupled to the end user. 
Methanol fuel produced from wood can be 
used directly in vehicles or converted to synthetic 
gasoline by the Mobil process, although there are 
currently no operations of this type. Analysis of 
the economics of this process indicates that 
plants with capacities to convert about 900 Mt of 
oven-dried wood daily would be required to 
achieve economies of scale. At present, annual 
productivity levels (i.e., 0.6 rnJ /ha), about 1 Mha 
of forest would have to be earmarked to sustain 
one such methanol plant, and such plants are not 
feasible for South Korea. 
Biogas production technology is well estab-
lished, the potential of the technology being 
based on adequate operation of the digesters. To 
achieve the full benefit, the government would 
have to introduce training programs for village 
leaders and employ the services of trained exten-
sion agents. Government incentives could also be 
offered to induce villagers to set up village-scale 
biogas digesters. The ongoing rural development 
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program could be a vehicle for such incentives. 
Treatment of residues by anaerobic digestion 
reduces pathogen content while maintaining nu-
trient value. Collection of the residues within a 
village for delivery at the biogas facility may 
create a risk of disease, although it would proba-
bly be no more serious than that incurred by the 
spreading of raw manure on fields. 
Biogas can be stored and distributed; it offers 
the same convenience as oil or natural gas and is 
more convenient than coal for household users. 
Therefore, the anaerobic digester should be read-
ily accepted if its introduction is preceded by 
adequate information. 
Crop residues could make a significant contri-
bution to meeting energy demand in rural areas. 
Bio gas derived from them is expected to compete 
well with energy from other sources and may 
have significant market potential. Institutional 
and environmental constraints should not pres-
ent serious problems. 
Both energy from combustion of residues and 
biogas produced from residues are best utilized in 
the rural residential and commercial sectors, 
because the feedstock resources are close to the 
users and because the technologies can be inte-
grated into the agricultural environment (e.g., 
through the recycling of ashes and sludge to the 
land). 
The implementation of heating systems may 
require the formation of cooperative utilities or 
the extension of the charters of existing utilities 
to provide this service. As with utilization of 
animal wastes, use of crop residues would require 
an infrastructure of trained personnel to main-
tain and operate the technologies. Also, incen-
tives may be required to induce businesses to 
manufacture the appropriate technology and 
equipment. 
The major environmental risk of using crop 
residues for fuel is the soil deterioration and loss 
of nutrients resulting from the removal of the 
residues. The risk may be decreased somewhat by 
the recycling of digested sludge to the land. 
The best candidates for using the wood-to-
energy technologies are industries in rural or 
semirural areas. Wood fuel could supply 3.6% 
and 5.7% of the net energy obtained from oil in 
1986 and 2000, respectively. Oil displacement 
could be increased if the fuel wood resource base 
were expanded. 
Except in the forest products industries, wood 
is not a common industrial fuel. Technology-
transfer programs to promote use of fuelwood 
could be initiated. The best vehicle for such a 
program is likely the Office of Forestry. Tax 
incentives for promoting the use of renewable 
fuels may also increase adoption of the technol-
ogy. Also, wood utilization is labour intensive, 
and a fuelwood program would create stable jobs 
in rural areas. 
The major environmental concern is adequate 
management of the forests to sustain productiv-
ity and to avoid the environmental damage that 
results from deforestation. This concern is par-
ticularly acute in mountainous areas where the 
danger of erosion and runoff is great. 
Geothermal Energy 
The geothermal-energy resource in South 
Korea does not appear to be sufficient to make a 
significant contribution to the country's energy 
requirements. It is limited to low-temperature 
springs and wells. The Korean Institute for Geol-
ogy and Minerals has identified 20 sites on the 
mainland with outflow temperatures greater than 
20° C. The maximum temperature observed was 
73° C, and only five sites have temperatures 
greater than 50° C. Moreover, all these resources 
flow more slowly than 8000 m3/ day and exhibit 
moderate to severe drops in their water tables 
even at modest pumping rates. 
Most of the hot springs identified are in south-
eastern Korea, although a survey indicated 
geothermal resources on the island of Cheju. The 
four volcanic eruptions on Cheju in the last 1000 
years (in 1002, 1007, 1455, and 1670) suggest 
large volumes of hot rock and molten magma at 
shallow depths, good sources of geothermal 
energy. Similarly, the volcanic island of Ulreung-
do may have potential. 
High-temperature geothermal resources can be 
used for electric-power generation. South Korea 
does not appear to have exploitable resources of 
sufficient temperatures (200° C or greater) for 
these systems, although some may be discovered 
on Cheju. Lower-temperature resources can be 
used for space heating by "district-heating" sys-
tems, in which the hot water would be pumped to 
nearby residential and commercial buildings, and 
used for space and hot-water heating. However, 
district-heating applications are difficult at the low 
temperatures of most of the springs in South 
Korea because of the large volumes of water and 
the large, well-insulated, expensive piping 
required. In addition, geothermal use will acceler-
ate the water-table drop at these sites. 
Ocean Energy 
The oceans can provide tidal power, thermal 
power, and wave power. The use of tidal power 
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for electricity generation at six sites along South 
Korea's northwest coast appears promising. 
These sites have a combined annual output of 
12 000 GWh. Although a number of implementa-
tion issues remain unresolved, one of the six sites 
has already been selected for detailed study by 
KECO, with the aim of building a tidal power 
plant in the near future. Ocean thermal systems 
operating in the warm waters of the mid-Pacific 
about 2200 km south of Korea may also be eco-
nomically used for ammonia generation, 
although electric-power production does not 
appear economically feasible. Wave-power sys-
tems may be economically feasible near Hupo, 
but the cost performance of these systems is 
uncertain. 
KECO identified 10 sites for tidal power with a 
total potential of 7050 MW and potential annual 
energy production of 18 675 GWh. However, 
development of some sites would interfere with 
development of others. In addition, several other 
factors affect the utilization of the proposed sites. 
As a result, only 7 of the 10 sites can be used for 
tidal-power developments. The maximum poten-
tial of these is 5000 MW, and their maximum 
energy output annually is 12000 GWh. 
Ocean thermal systems are potentially usable 
only off the east coast in the Sea of Japan, where 
temperature differentials (AT) between the warm 
surface waters and cold depths can be as much as 
25°C during the summer months. Normally, a 
plant cannot be designed to operate efficiently for 
a range for AT greater than 10° C; if the plant is 
designed for a maximum AT of 25° C, it will not 
operate if AT is less than 15° C. Such a plant 
would operate in South Korean waters only from 
June through November. 
According to these assumptions, such a plant 
would have an annual output of 772.3 GWh. 
Each plant would require an area of about 2000 
km2 to operate in a renewable mode, i.e., without 
affecting the water temperatures significantly or 
interfering with adjacent ocean thermal plants. 
The sea within 200 km of the South Korean shore 
has an area of about 100 000 km2. This area 
would support 50 plants for an annual output of 
38.6 TWh, which is 1.7 times the country's 1977 
electricity consumption. 
Wave power may also become feasible along 
the eastern coast. A study estimated the total 
wave energy around the coastline and major 
islands to have a maximum potential of 8620 
MW. The power availability has a marked sea-
sonal variation, most of the power being avail-
able in the winter months and relatively little in 
June or July. 
For a typical wave-power system having a con-
version efficiency of 50% and a capacity factor of 
50%, the estimated maximum extractable wave-
power potential is 4300 MW capacity, with an 
18 800 GWh energy output. 
Tidal-power plants, formed by the damming of 
large bays or sections of the ocean, can be oper-
ated in several modes. The simplest tidal-power 
plant uses fixed-blade turbines to generate energy 
from the flow of water from the basin to the 
ocean. In certain cases, it may be possible to use 
variable-blade turbines, which pump water into 
the basin against a low head at high tide, using 
power generated elsewhere in the electrical grid. 
Such pumping increases the reservoir water level 
above the normal high-tide level; the extra water 
is then released at low tide, against a much higher 
head. 
Tidal plants can also be designed to generate 
power from both ebb and flood tides, using bidi-
rectional turbines with adjustable blades. This 
design would increase the time the unit is avail-
able to the grid. In studying the inner Asan Bay 
project, we found that this method increased the 
operation time of the generators from 43% to 
68%. However, the annual power output 
increased only 1%, from 1466 GWh to 1480 
GWh, because variable-pitch turbines are less 
efficient than fixed-blade turbines, the average 
head being lower. In addition, because the 
method doubles the number of output pulses, it 
may mean increased maintenance both for the 
tidal-power plant and for cycling units in the 
utility grid. However, the method may be jusfr-
fied on the basis of the increased flexibility in 
integrating the tidal plants and the utility grid. 
The tidal plants can utilize double-paned ba-
sins. One is operated as a high basin, generating 
power from the ebb tides; the water level inside 
this basin is usually higher than that outside it. 
The other basin is operated as a low basin, gener-
ating power from the flood tide; the water level 
inside this basin is lower than that outside. 
Through coordinated operation of the two ba-
sins, power can be generated at almost any hour 
in response to system requirements. However, 
the low basin generally provides lower energy 
than it would if operated as a high basin. Depend-
ing on the shape of the basin, the loss in energy 
may be as much as 20%. 
Finally, tidal plants can utilize double-linked 
basins. In this scheme, two basins are connected 
with the ocean and share a common dike. One 
basin is operated as a high basin, the other as a 
low basin .. The main advantage of this mode is 
that the basins can produce energy at any time. 
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The most appropriate mode for operating a 
tidal-power basin depends on the load on the 
system and the mix of modes used in generating 
electricity. In the short term, while a significant 
portion of the generating capacity is oil fired, 
tidal plants will probably be operated in the 
single-basin, single-effect mode to maximize 
their energy output and minimize capital costs. 
After 1995, nuclear and pumped hydro will be 
most important and oil- and coal-fired generat-
ing units will represent a smaller portion of the 
total generating mix; then, the operating modes 
that allow retiming of the energy will become 
more important and will need to be examined as 
part of a comprehensive study of plans for utility 
systems. 
Two major ocean thermal energy conversion 
(OTEC) technologies can be used to generate 
electricity from the ocean temperature differen-
ces. One uses a thermodynamic "open cycle," in 
which the working fluid is sea water at 25-30° C 
pumped at the surface and then vapourized at 
low pressure. The vapour drives a large-diame'ter 
turbine. The cooler, deeper waters are brought to 
the platform by a long pipe and used to condense 
the turbine exhaust, producing fresh water as a 
by-product. This device is being studied by the 
French, who built such a plant off the Ivory 
Coast some 25 years ago. The other technology, a 
"closed cycle," uses an intermediate fluid, such as 
ammonia, to drive a much smaller and less costly 
expansion turbine. The latter technology has 
received the most intensive study. 
The electricity generated at the plant can be 
either transmitted to the shore by expensive sub-
marine cables or used in situ to produce a valu-
able, storable, and shippable product, e.g., 
ammonia, aluminum, or chemicals that require 
electricity for production. The in-situ approach 
would rely on "grazing" plant ships cruising 
warm waters at reasonable distances from South 
Korea (e.g., off the Philippine Islands), produc-
ing a storable fuel such as ammonia, which can be 
used domestically as a fertilizer or a fuel or 
exported to other countries. 
None of the possibilities for ocean thermal 
power have been commercially demonstrated. 
Several countries, such as Japan, the United 
States, and France, are entering the pilot phase of 
OTEC development and expect to prove its eco-
nomic feasibility in the next IO years. 
Likewise, technologies for using wave power 
have not yet been demonstrated on any large 
scale. Many concepts have been described, but 
almost no data are available on performances 
because no pilot plant has yet been built. The 
dam-atoll consists of a large concrete dome with 
an open bottom. Waves are focused by the shape 
of the dome to the central point, where they form 
a vortex inside a tube that empties out the bottom 
of the dam-atoll. Inside this tube are vanes that 
are turned by the waves entering the top and used 
to drive a generator. 
Development of all seven feasible sites for tidal 
power would require a capital investment of 
about U.S.$11.5 billion. Domestic portions of 
the project construction costs are estimated to be 
95%: 25% for electrical machinery (primarily the 
low-head turbines, blades, and controls) and 70% 
for the civil works (dam, roads, and other infra-
structure) and other items. 
Tidal-power plants would interfere with land 
reclamation projects. The high-basin systems, 
which are most economic, would flood lowlands 
in the basin area; in addition, any reclaimed areas 
would reduce the volume and thus the potential 
energy output of the basin. However, low-basin 
schemes may not entirely preclude land reclama-
tion. Selecting the optimal trade off between 
tidal-power production and land reclamation 
requires a careful cost-benefit analysis for each 
site. 
Cost estimates ofOTEC plants both for power 
generation and for ammonia production exhibit 
tremendous variaton. A U.S. government design 
for a 325-MW power-generation plant is esti-
mated to cost U.S.$2100/kW in 1993-95. In 
addition, a power-transmission cable must be 
constructed from the sites to the mainland, about 
100 km. The cost of this cable would be U.S.$1 
million/ km. Therefore, the total plant cost would 
be U.S.$782 million. With an annual fixed-
charge rate of0.113 ( 6% capital cost, 30-year life,. 
4% annual maintenance costs), the energy cost 
would be 114 mills/ kWh, or 55.4 won/ kWh. This 
energy cost is not competitive with projected 
costs of oil-fired generating units. 
Estimates of wave-system costs also exhibit 
tremendous variation, primarily because of the 
wide variety of proposed systems and the lack of 
actual operating experience. These estimates 
range from a low ofU .S.$2500/ kW for the Lock-
heed dam-atoll system (for the period 1990-2000) 
to $14000/ kW for a proposed British system. 
Although detailed data on the Lockheed sys-
tem are not yet available because no pilot plant 
has been constructed, the estimated costs, if 
valid, indicate that only at one site, near H upo, is 
wave energy economically competitive with oil-
fired electricity generation in the near future. 
However, if wave-power systems were combined 
with breakwaters for harbour development, 
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other sites along the eastern coast would be 
practical. 
A detailed feasibility study of a tidal-power 
plant for the Garorim Bay site is being carried 
out. This study will pave the way for construction 
of a tidal plant in Garorim Bay between 1982 and 
1988. OTEC research and development are not 
currently funded by the government, although 
wave-power research is receiving assistance at 30 
million won a year. 
Small Hydropower 
Development of small hydropower systems in 
Korea is technically feasible and economically 
attractive. The small hydro resource base of 596 
MW represents 18% of the total hydro potential, 
with an annual output of5.2 billion kWh. Of this 
potential, the use of 1.51 billion kWh is expected 
to be economically favourable in 1985, and 1.93 
billion kWh in 2000. This potential is small rela-
tive to the total hydro development planned by 
KECO and will be constrained by KECO's pur-
chasing practices and by local demand, which is 
not always near the small hydro sites. 
More than 85% of South Korea's total area is 
at least 100 m above sea level. Although the aver-
age height of the mountains is relatively low 
(maximum of2000 m), the terrain is rugged with 
many streams and rivers. 
Rainfall ranges from 979 mm at Pohang Sta-
tion to 1440 mm at Cheju Station. This rainfall, if 
harnessed in an optimal hydro system, could 
provide as much as 30.2 billion kWh/year at an 
average altitude of 100 m. Small hydro systems 
comprise facilities with a generating capacity 
between2and15 MW. The total installed capac-
ity of small hydro systems was 9.5 MW in 1978. 
MOST recently conducted a nationwide study 
of the mountainous catchment area and identi-
fied 2600 potential sites for small hydropower 
development, representing a potential of 582 
MW. 
The hydro resource has two major characteris-
tics. First, 43% of its potential is concentrated in 
one province - Kangwon - and more than 75% 
in three provinces. Second, the resource base is 
highly seasonal. More than 50% of the yearly 
total precipitation occurs during the rainy sea-
son, from June to October, creating a high hydro 
potential. The winters are dry and would not fuel 
production to meet the high demand for electric 
power in the colder months. 
The discrepancy between hydro supply and 
power demand makes small hydroelectric pro-
jects unattractive for electricity generation unless 
they are developed - as multipurpose applica-
tions - in conjunction with other projects in 
water-flow management and control, irrigation, 
or land reclamation. However, small hydro 
applications are not basically oriented toward 
mass electrical generation anyway. Essentially, 
small hydro applications consist of limited elec-
tricity generation for local needs in remote areas, 
isolated from the grid, and multipurpose applica-
tions (e.g., electricity production and water man-
agement). Many technical features are similar for 
the two types of application, and, as a general 
rule, if a small hydro project proves economic for 
electricity generation alone, it will be economic 
for multipurpose applications. 
A small hydroelectric plant consists primarily 
of electromechanical-equipment installation and 
civil engineering (i.e., construction of dams, spill-
ways, etc.). The civil engineering is highly 
dependent on the physical qualities of the site, 
but the turbine, which accounts for the major 
part of the electromechanical equipment, is 
selected on the basis of hydraulic considerations. 
The net head available (the head less losses 
from water flow to and from the turbine) dictates 
what type of turbine is suitable for use at a partic-
ular site. The rate of flow determines the capacity 
of the turbine. Several types of turbines are de-
signed for operating under the conditions com-
mon in Korea (i.e., heads from 10 to 40 m, and 
flow rates up to 100 m3 /sec). Two types of tur-
bines are particularly adapted to South Korea -
the Francis and the Tubular turbines. 
In addition, limited flow variation and proper 
site preparation are essential for maximizing 
hydro output. The only way to limit seasonal and 
daily flow variation is to develop storage capac-
ity, the optimal size of which will depend on such 
factors as the flow duration curve, the type of 
reservoir and dam, the evaporation, and the soil 
permeability. The optimal amount of storage 
capacity must be determined. Site preparation is 
aimed at maximizing the available hydraulic 
head at the site. Water heads of9-l l m can often 
be obtained from 3000 m river loops, where the 
river slope is 3-4 m/ 1000 m. 
The extent to which small-scale hydro plants 
will be implemented depends primarily on their 
economics but is also affected by local utility 
regulations and utility purchasing practices. 
The systems affect local farming. For example, 
a small hydro project proposed at Nong-Won 
will provide an additional 528 000 m2 of farmland 
valued at 6600 won/ mz. The project will allow 
upgrading of an additional 805 000 m2 from dry 
paddy to wet paddy, increasing their value by 
3300 won/ mz. The additional costs of these 
improvements (i.e., clearing, landscaping, build-
218 RENEW ABLE RESOURCES 
ing irrigation ditches) have not been estimated. 
Moreover, use of the site for irrigation may 
reduce its power output. There is no simple way 
to evaluate these peripheral impacts. 
Local demand may be insufficient to utilize the 
total capacity of the plant. In N ong-W on, the 
local electrical requirements (primarily for light-
ing) are about 100 kW, while the plant capacity is 
1000 kW. Attracting small-scale industry to local 
areas may be feasible, but this process is long and 
involved. Excess energy cannot readily be sold to 
KECO, which is not interested in promoting 
small hydro systems for a number of reasons, 
e.g., powerline costs, synchronization system 
reliability, and maintenance. As a result, KECO 
will pay only 15-20 won/ kWh for excess 
hydropower; small hydro generation costs 
exceed this level. 
The turbines and associated equipment may 
have to be imported. At present, the government 
is considering development of a domestic capa-
bility to manufacture Francis and Tubular tur-
bines in sizes under 1000 kW. For higher power, 
the South Koreans will need to turn to imports, at 
least temporarily. In the ab;ence of a domestic 
manufacturing capability, the cost of turbines 
will be increased about 30% (as a result of trans-
portation costs). 
The primary environmental impact of small-
scale hydro development is the increased risk of 
flooding in the surrounding areas, which may be 
inhabited or devoted to agriculture. This risk 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. There is 
no formal research program for this energy 
source because small-head hydro technology is 
relatively mature. The government is financing 
studies of potential sites for small-scale hydro-
power development. 
Conclusions 
Keeping a proper balance between energy 
supply and demand is essential for the future 
economic growth of South Korea. As the country 
is poorly endowed with energy resources, all pos-
sible efforts for using renewable energy should be 
explored. For the optimal application of renew-
able energy, new technologies need to be devel-
oped, and older ones adapted. The development 
of a national renewable energy plan as well as the 
creation of laws to enforce it is essential. To 
broaden the opportunities for the use of renew-
able energy sources, the government must also 
enhance research and development programs. 
Under the direction of the South Korean 
government, a vigorous solar-energy research 
and development program has been formulated, 
and substantial progress has been made in recent 
years. By July 1981, more than 500 solar-housing 
units had been constructed, and 25 000 have been 
projected for construction by 1986. Hundreds of 
lighthouses in remote islands already use photo-
voltaic cells for their power source, and the 
government is providing tax and loan incentives 
for solar houses in rural areas, tax incentives for 
imported materials to be used in solar systems, 
and loan incentives for solar products. 
Wind energy traditionally has been used on a 
small scale in South Korea to provide mechanical 
power. Current development efforts are oriented 
toward electricity generation on the islands. At 
present, wind-energy installations in the country 
are relatively new. Most of these systems have 
been installed by the scientific organizations for 
demonstration purposes. The systems of small 
capacity ( lOkW) could serve as power sources in 
remote areas. The market for 10-kW wind 
machines is expected to be 1000 units in 1990. 
Anaerobic digestion of animal wastes and gasi-
fication or pyrolysis of wood and agricultural 
residues are being examined for use in rural 
areas. The objective is to make more energy-
efficient use of those materials and make rural 
areas more self-sufficient. These resources, how-
ever, have only limited potential in South Korea. 
The major increase in the utilization of biomass 
will come from improvements in the end-use con-
version efficiencies. 
Unlike biogas, ocean energy has considerable 
potential in South Korea, although only tidal 
power is feasible for use in the near future. The 
Korean government has started a feasibility 
study on the construction of a tidal-power plant 
with a 400-MW capacity, which is expected to be 
finished by 1988. 
The contribution of small-scale hydro poten-
tial to the country's total energy needs is small. 
Nevertheless, such resources could play a signifi-
cant role in the development of rural areas in 
South Korea. Currently, three small hydro plants 
are operating with a total capacity of 40 MW. 
At present, the widespread use of renewable 
energy in South Korea is hindered by: 
• Lack of a system-design capability, of a 
system-construction technique, and of system-
maintenance personnel; 
• High initial investments; 
• High maintenance costs; 
• Lack of knowledge among consumers and a 
need for education about renewable energy; and 
• A bad public image caused by problem 
installations. 
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Discussion 
Romeo M. Bautista: The Lee and Kim paper 
complements the Smith and Saddler paper to 
some extent. Smith and Saddler give a theoretical 
treatment of the substitution of nonexhaustible 
resources for exhaustible and the implications for 
trade and investment flows, whereas Lee and 
Kim focus on the prospects of the development of 
renewable-energy resources in an energy-poor 
developing country. 
Smith and Saddler start with a simple model, 
in which energy is considered a homogeneous 
product derived from either an exhaustible 
source or a nonexhaustible source. Costs for 
extraction are assumed to be zero for the exhaust-
ible resource. I suppose this assumption is in 
recognition that extraction accounts for only a 
small fraction of the fossil-fuel price. But this is 
true only for developed oil fields; large invest-
ments are made in wells that are still being pros-
pected, and standard cost calculations make 
some annual allowance for development. Smith 
and Saddler do make allowances in the model for 
the costs of employing factors of production to 
convert nonexhaustible resources (geothermal, 
gravitational, and solar) into usable forms. They 
assume that energy-pricing policy follows the 
Hotelling rule (a rather odd assumption given 
present realities). They also assume constant 
energy demand and a fixed supply curve relating 
to the nonexhaustible resource, the eventual 
("ceiling") price of energy being determined by 
the total stock of the exhaustible resource and the 
price at which it becomes economic to start pro-
duction from the nonexhaustible source. 
The authors introduce complications by allow-
ing nonhomogeneity of product in an attempt to 
distinguish between alternative energy uses and 
also by allowing product substitution. These 
supply-demand models are clever and, based on 
the authors' assumptions, are logical. But they 
fail, in my view, to capture some of the character-
istics of the existing energy market. For one 
thing, I think it unrealistic to assume a fixed stock 
of the exhaustible resource (fossil fuel), consider-
ing the massive oil exploration activities that 
have been going on and attendant changes in the 
estimates of oil reserves in many countries. Ris-
ing oil prices provide the incentive for countries 
to initiate or expand oil-exploration efforts, 
which for some of them have yielded significant 
increments in domestic oil production. In other 
words, increased supply of the supposedly 
exhaustible resource is, at least in the medium 
term, as much a response to higher oil prices as 
the development of alternative (nonexhaustible) 
energy sources. 
I found very illuminating the discussion by 
Smith and Saddler on actual substitution possi-
bilities and on trade and investment issues. The 
distinctions - between concentrated and diffuse 
energy resources, between tradable and nontrad-
able energy resources, and between forms of 
energy that are highly substitutable and those 
that are not - are highly useful. Such distinc-
tions provide guidelines for policy intervention at 
the national level as well as for international eco-
nomic cooperation and policy coordination. 
Nonetheless, the Smith and Saddler discussion 
could have benefited from an examination of the 
actual changes in trade and investment patterns 
since 1973 as a means to validate the speculative 
statements concerning future changes. A compli-
cating factor is, of course, the uncertainties relat-
ing to future technological developments that 
may make obsolete some of the parameters that 
Smith and Saddler used in their predictive 
judgments. 
The Lee and Kim paper is competently written 
and highly informative. However, I would have 
liked to have found rate-of-return estimates in 
the paper. Because I did not find them and 
because I suspect that such calculations were in 
fact not done by the South Korean authorities, I 
am led to think that South Korea is adopting 
what seems to be a typical approach to the 
energy-security problem in resource-poor devel-
oping countries. The development of indigenous-
energy sources is such a priority in these countries 
that it is pursued without regard for efficiency 
considerations. For diversification and security 
reasons, domestic capability in providing new 
and renewable sources of energy has been ele-
vated to a position of primary importance. 
It is worth noting, however, that South Korea 
is, in fact, planning to increase energy imports 
relative to total energy consumption - from 69% 
in 1980 to 79% in 1986. In shifting away from 
petroleum imports (which nonetheless will con-
tinue to be the largest energy import) to imports 
of coal and liquefied natural gas, South Korea 
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achieves substantial diversification of import 
supply, presumably contributing to an improve-
ment in the perception of energy security. 
It speaks well of South Korea's energy pro-
gram, I think, that it is widely discussed and that 
two research and development institutes, the 
Korea Institute of Energy and Resources and the 
Korea Institute of Science and Technology, are 
actively involved. These two institutions, given 
their resources and technical capability, do not 
have effective counterparts in most other energy-
poor developing countries. The authors make 
reference to the major problems South Korea 
faces in the development and utilization of new-
and renewable-energy sources, namely, uncertain 
economic feasibility, engineering constraints, 
and lack of infrastructure investment. To some of 
us who are familiar with the planning and imple-
mentation of similar programs in other develop-
ing countries, it appears that South Korea will be 
relatively able to cope with its problems. 
The dilemma confronting energy-poor devel-
oping countries is a serious one. It concerns, on 
the one hand, the need to expand domestic capa-
bility in providing energy supply and, on the 
other, a need to invest their precious physical and 
human capital wisely. To what extent and iii what 
forms should the enhancement of energy-supply 
capability be undertaken? In deciding their prior-
ities, they would be aided immensely by an analy-
sis of the socioeconomic impacts of alternative-
energy programs. Such analysis would need to 
examine the extent of substitutability among var-
ious energy sources and possibilities of trade in 
energy products, as suggested in the Smith and 
Saddler paper. To some extent, infant energy 
industries may need to be subsidized, but where 
to draw the line represents a difficult policy 
decision. 
The policy decisions are, in fact, what I would 
have liked to have seen examined in South 
Korea's energy program. In their paper, Lee and 
Kim give a useful description of the resource 
base, potential technology applications, and 
implementation considerations of each compo-
nent of the renewable-energy program. It would 
have made more interesting reading for me, as a 
general economist, ifthe economic factors under-
lying the allocation of budget funds to the various 
projects involving the development of renewable-
energy sources had been treated more explicitly. 
Energy Constraints andthe OpenEconomicStrategy in China's 
Modernization 
Li Guong-on and Luo Yuanzheng 
State Planning Commission and Institute of World Economics, Beijing, People's Republic of China 
The People's Republic of China is in the midst of transition - opening its doors to the outside 
world and reorienting its policies toward upgrading the standards of living of its people. The changes 
are extensive and have profound implications for all sectors, including energy. The major implica-
tions are that China will be expanding its exports substantially and increasing production and 
marketing of consumer goods, especially from light industries. It will be looking to the rest of the 
world for markets and for technical expertise. The country has a long history of using resources other 
than crude oil for energy. Sun, wind, biomass, and water power are used extensively throughout the 
country. Currently, however, energy is being consumed inefficiently. The available resources and 
some programs to use them effectively are presented in this paper. 
La republique populaire de Chine vit une periode de transition qui se traduit par une ouverture 
sur le monde exterieur et la reorientation de ses politiques vers !'amelioration du niveau de vie de la 
population. II s'agit d'une evolution profonde dont Jes repercussions s'etendent a tous Jes secteurs, 
notamment l'energie. Les effets majeurs de ce changement impliquent une augmentation considera-
ble des exportations ainsi que l'accroissement de la production et de la commercialisation des biens 
de consommation, surtout de l'industrie legi:re. La Chine a !'intention de prospecter Jes marches 
internationaux et de solliciter Jes conseils d'experts etrangers. Depuis toujours, elle utilise de 
nombreuses sources d'energie autres que le mazout; le soleil, le vent, la biomasse et l'eau sont 
exploites a l'echelle du pays. Cependant, !'utilisation de l'energie n'est pas toujours fonctionnelle et le 
present document propose divers programmes visant a corriger cette situation. 
The Sixth Plenum in Beijing recently reviewed 
economic policy and progress in China since the 
establishment of the People's Republic. The find-
ings are noteworthy. In presenting them, we will 
focus on recent problems of economic develop-
ment, although we do not wish to give the impres-
sion that development in new China has been 
without its achievements. Since the People's 
Republic was established and throughout the 
past 30 years, agricultural production and farm-
ing methods, for example, have improved 
markedly. More than 400 000 industry and 
transportation enterprises have been established, 
and a relatively integrated system of industry and 
national economy has been founded. Between 
1952 and 1979, the total value of industrial and 
agricultural production has increased 8 times, 
fixed assets of state enterprises have increased 21 
times, national income has increased 4 times, and 
the standard of living has doubled, after allow-
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ance has been made for inflation. But for all this, 
China remains a poor country. In 1980, per-
person GNP was about U.S. $270. 
In the past, the country put forward good ideas 
for development planning, such as taking agricul-
ture as the foundation and industry as the leading 
factor; mapping out the national economic plans 
in the sequence ofagriculture, light industry, and 
heavy industry; giving energetic support to agri-
culture. However, it implemented many incorrect 
policies. First was the failure to persevere in 
modernizing the economy and the failure to bring 
about improvements in the people's material and 
cultural life. The scientific bases of economic 
plans, policies, and measures were ignored - a 
fact that resulted in waste and losses. The country 
not only failed to abandon the highly centralized 
system of management but also pursued unbal-
anced development, giving priority to heavy 
industry to the detriment of that of agriculture 
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and light industry. It also set high targets and 
sought excessively high rates of investment, well 
beyond its real capabilities. In addition, the con-
stant transformation in the relations of produc-
tion slowed progress and greatly damaged the 
economy. In the past decade or more, the invest-
ment rate (including fixed assets and circulating 
capital) exceeded 30% of national income, a rate 
much higher than that of many developed coun-
tries. Capital, squeezed from agriculture and 
light industry, was mainly invested in heavy 
industry. During 1950-80, heavy industry 
increased it's production by 64 times and light 
industry by 20 times, whereas agricultural pro-
duction only doubled. Improvements in people's 
living standards were substantial but were held 
back by the low level of production of consumer 
goods. 
The first 8 years after the founding of new 
China witnessed rapid progress in both produc-
tion and people's livelihoods - a fact that con-
tributed to enthusiasm among the working peo-
ple. However, the country's economic develop-
ment suffered two major setbacks: the Great 
Leap Forward, which lasted 3 years beginning 
from 1958, and the Cultural Revolution, 
1966-76. These two events - along with the high 
rate of investment in industry - made it impos-
sible to improve people's incomes appreciably. 
Thus, their initiative in production suffered. 
China could have reoriented its economic 
development after the downfall of the Gang of 
Four in 1976, but only recently has it fully 
assessed the damage done during the 10 calami-
tous years of the Cultural Revolution and the 
dangers inherent in investing such a high percen-
tage of national revenue in one sector. A number 
of impractical, overambitious goals and slogans 
were put forward in 1978, when the savings rate 
was as high as 36.5% and the appropriation of 
funds for investment was 50% greater than in 
1977. The scale of capital formation was further 
expanded, particularly as a result of the govern-
ment's hasty entry into many contracts for 
imports of equipment from abroad. 
Since the Third Plenum of the Central Com-
mittee in 1978, the country has been summarizing 
the experiences- and lessons of its economic 
development since establishment and has identi-
fied several mistakes in its past approach; these 
include overestimating the capability of eco-
nomic strength, ignoring the actual conditions, 
neglecting the people's livelihood, and being too 
anxious to get quick results. By recognizing these 
weaknesses, it has laid a good foundation for 
economic readjustment and modernization. 
The Readjustment 
Based on the experiences and lessons of the 
past, the Chinese government, in 1979, put for-
ward a policy of readjusting, restructuring, con-
solidating, and improving the national economy. 
This policy aims to build a Chinese model of 
socialist economic construction. It recognizes, 
first and foremost, that the aim of socialist pro-
duction is to satisfy, to the greatest extent possi-
ble, the people's material and cultural needs and 
that production is not for production's sake. A 
major premise, therefore, was that the former 
practice of constantly redoubling the production 
of heavy industry while allowing stagnation in 
light industry and agriculture and failing to 
satisfy the basic needs of the people had to be 
reversed. In future, the government will focus on 
the relationship between economic investment 
and the people's livelihood. Peasants account for 
the greatest proportion of China's population; 
improvements in their livelihood are the key to 
stability. Past development efforts neglected 
improvements in the people's living standard and 
emphasized savings to the neglect of consump-
tion. In future, investment must be balanced with 
better living conditions. 
With such a guiding theory, the country is now 
working to readjust the ratio between the various 
branches of the national economy, slowing the 
growth of heavy industry, and laying more 
emphasis on developing light industry and agri-
culture. Significant progress has been made in 
this respect. Agricultural production has been 
developing rapidly over the last few years. Pro-
duction teams have exercised more decision-
making power, and purchase prices for farm prod-
ucts have been raised. Whereas, in the past, the 
growth of light industry had been slower than 
that for heavy industry, for the last 2 years it has 
outstripped the latter. In fact, for 1980, produc-
tion increased by only 1.4% in heavy industry but 
by 18.4% in light industry. The people's purchas-
ing power has greatly increased in the past 2 
years, and a shortage of commodities has been 
mitigated by increases in production of consumer 
goods. The goal of improving the people's liveli-
hood has meant a shift in economic development 
such that investment production develops in 
harmony with consumer production. Increases in 
peasants' incomes have allowed them to purchase 
not only basic commodities but also some goods 
earlier considered luxuries, such as watches, 
radios, and TVs. The increase in the demand for 
consumer goods has boosted production; both 
the heavy and the defence industries, after having 
met their own quotas, shift unused capacity to the 
production of consumer goods such as cameras, 
electric fans, record players, radios, and furni-
ture. Formerly, it was inconceivable to produce 
such goods in defence industries. 
Energy 
The changes do not mean that China is not 
going to develop heavy industry. Some branches 
of heavy industry will continue to expand, while 
the production of others will be scaled down. The 
energy industries, for example, will receive con-
tinued investment, the energy supply in China 
being rather tight at present. Efforts will reflect 
large, capital-intensive investments in essential 
energy and smaller, more labour-intensive 
investments in noncommercial energy. The latter 
will include investment in renewable energy 
resources, which are of considerable importance 
to the maintenance of adequate energy supplies 
to the end of this century. 
In the past few years, the country has concen-
trated on fulfilling annual quotas in energy pro-
duction and has slackened efforts in oil and coal 
exploration. To set right the disproportionate 
ratio between extraction and reserve, it will not 
increase energy production for several years to 
come. Rich in energy resources, China is the third 
largest coal producer in the world with an annual 
output of600 Mt and is the yearly source for 100 
Mt crude oil, ranking ninth in the world. 
Huge amounts of energy have been wasted in 
production. The annual energy consumption in 
China is roughly the same as in Japan, although 
the value of total output is only one-quarter that 
of Japan. There is great potential for increasing 
efficiency in the use of energy; the shift of empha-
sis from heavy to light industry will make consid-
erable difference because a given amount of 
energy can support several times more output of 
light than of heavy industry. 
But, even if China takes advantage of all eco-
nomic opportunities for increasing output of 
large-scale commercial energy and for reducing 
consumption, the energy constraint on moderni-
zation will remain. For this reason, and also 
because energy can directly contribute to raising 
living standards in rural areas, much emphasis is 
being placed on the development of renewable, 
largely noncommercial energy. 
Noncommercial energy is already important in 
China, contributing about 270 Mt of coal equiv-
alent, or 0.3 t per person; these figures compare 
with commercial energy's contribution of about 
567 Mt or0.6 t per person. Virtually all of the non-
commercial energy is from renewable sources, 
whereas about 10% of the total commercial elec-
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tricity production is from renewable (hydro-
power) sources. 
Massive utilization of energy sources like bio-
mass, the sun, wind, and water has a long history 
in China. The people have long depended on 
cattle for cultivation, firewood for cooking, 
horses for travel, junks for sailing, water power 
for milling, wind power for pumping, solar radia-
tion for fire, and hot springs for health treatment. 
China has abundant hydropower resources. A 
recent survey indicates that the hydropower 
potential is 680 000 MW, of which 133 000 MW 
have been tested. However, 70% of the hydro-
power resources are located in the sparsely popu-
lated southwest. Only 3% of the potential has 
been utilized. There is, thus, great opportunity to 
expand hydropower production in China; cur-
rent plans are to build large hydropower bases in 
the form of staging stations on some river sec-
tions and to complement these by the develop-
ment of small hydropower stations. At present, 
18 large (more than 250 MW) hydropower sta-
tions contribute more than 40% of the total 
hydroelectric capacity. Nearly 90 000 small (less 
than 12 MW) hydropower stations already exist 
in China and contribute more than 30% of the 
total hydroelectric power. 
The largest hydropower station in China is 
Liujiaxia, on the upper reaches of the Yellow 
River; it has a 1225 MW installed capacity as well 
as an annual electricity-generation capacity of 5. 7 
million MW. The Gezhou ba hydro power station, 
being built on the Yangtze River, has an esti-
mated installed capacity of 2700 MW. 
Capital and management for large hydro-
power stations are provided by the central 
government and for medium ones by the provin-
cial, regional, or central government. Minihydro 
requires less technology and investment so that 
small-scale stations are built and managed by the 
counties, communes, or production teams. The 
government provides an appropriate subsidy or 
loan for minihydro and practices a policy of 
"owned, managed, and profited by those who 
build them." More than 1500 of2000 counties in 
China have built minihydro stations, covering 
some 40% of rural electricity consumption. Now, 
about 12 000 minihydropower stations are under 
construction with a design capacity of3500 MW. 
China's 18 000-km coastline provides tre-
mendous potential for tidal power - an esti-
mated 28 000 MW. However, only a few pilot 
power stations have been built along the coast of 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shandong 
provinces, with a total capacity of 6.3 MW. The 
Jiangxia tidal-power station recently built in 
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Zhejiang province has a designed capacity of 3 
MW. 
Biomass is also an important renewable energy 
resource in China; in fact, it constitutes the main 
source of energy consumed in China's rural areas. 
In 1978, the total energy consumed in the rural 
areas was 320 Mt of coal equivalent, of which 
84.1 % came from biomass resources and 15.9% 
came from commercial sources. Biomass is 
commonly burned directly, at a heating efficiency 
of only 10%. Direct burning causes a loss of 
organic fertilizers, reduction in soil fertility, de-
struction of the ecosystem, and pollution of the 
environment. In some regions, such as Guang-
dong and Jiangsu provinces, organic matter is 
fermented to produce biogas as part of the fuel 
for daily life. In 1975, 460000 and by 1978 6.39 
million small digesters for domestic use were 
built in various places. Some large digesters for 
power generation were also available by 1978. 
The National Leading Group for Biagas Devel-
opment and National Office for Biogas were set 
up in 1979. The development ofbiogas had been 
incorporated in China's national economy pro-
gram as an important part of the modernization 
of agriculture. The present annual output of bio-
gas is about 7 x 1 os mJ, a much more environmen-
tally acceptable source of energy than direct 
burning of biomass. A 10-mJ digester can gener-
ate enough gas to satisfy the energy needs for 
cooking and lighting for a family of five. 
Biogas is merely one aspect of the important 
biomass branch of new and renewable sources of 
energy. In recent years, China has been cultivat-
ing high-energy plants and firewood forests in 
addition to vigorously developing the biogas 
program. 
In a broad sense, biomass energy resources are 
one application of solar energy, a resource China 
has in abundance. With an annual insolation of 
more than 2000 hours, two-thirds of China has 
annual solar radiation greater than 140 kcal/ cm2. 
There is a clear intention to put technologically 
and economically feasible solar devices into wide 
use. A great deal of scientific research in solar 
energy is being carried out. However, the energy 
technology is still generally in an experimental 
stage. Its application started in the middle 1970s: 
·two national solar-energy application confer-
ences were held in 1975 and 1979, at which a 
research and development program was worked 
out. Since then, solar-energy research has been 
undertaken in most provinces, and a couple of 
solar-energy demonstration plants have been 
established. A number of factories have been set 
up to produce solar collectors, solar cookers, and 
photovoltaic devices. 
Solar cookers are widely used in rural areas 
that are rich in sunshine but poor in fuels. These 
cookers are locally manufactured with local 
materials. They can be afforded by most peas-
ants. Already there are more than 2000 solar 
cookers in daily service, and their numbers will be 
further expanded. 
Solar heaters are also becoming popular. In 
large cities, solar collectors are now being used 
for hot-water supply to public bathrooms, hotels, 
hospitals, and offices. There are about 100 000 
l-m2 solar collectors in service at present, and 
various solar dryers are being tested for food 
drying. Plastic solar greenhouses are being used 
in vegetable plantations, covering a total 6000 ha. 
These facilities are both technologically and eco-
nomically practical and are steadily being 
expanded. 
China has a long history of wind-energy utili-
zation. In central and southern China, some civil 
transportation networks in the river still rely on 
sailboats, and about 600 000 t of cargo were 
transported by junks in 1979. Some small wind 
turbines have been developed in Inner Mongolia, 
Gansu, and Zhejiang, with their power varying 
from 100 W to 0.01 MW. The state of technical 
and economic development in China suggests 
that the first priority of government should be to 
produce simple technologies for energy genera-
tion that can be applied by virtually all house-
holds in the country. Wind energy is an ideal 
source for remote regions lacking conventional 
energy resources. Animal power is also exten-
sively used in the country. Cattle, horses, mules, 
donkeys, and oxen have played an important role 
in moving carts, transporting goods, tilling 
farms, etc. The use of oxen on farms is still quite 
common in Chinese villages, especially in hilly 
areas and irrigated farms with varied topog-
raphy. Most farm products are still transported 
by horse-drawn carts in the northern rural areas. 
China's geographical features and technical and 
economic conditions dictate that animal power 
will continue to be important for a rather long 
time, particularly since it would not be possible to 
meet rural transport needs through the supply of 
petroleum products. Fifty million draft animals 
are in use currently, and the number will grow in 
future in line with agricultural production. 
The scale of investment over the past 20 years 
in China has been larger than capabilities. The 
level of investment that can safely be undertaken 
is the· portion of a year's aggregate social product 
that remains after the deduction of depreciation, 
of public spending including that for administra-
tion and defence, and of consumption at a level 
that allows an appropriate rise in the people's 
living standard. Based on this definition, the 
government, among other things, reduced 
investment by 40% (it had accounted for 40% of 
the total budgetary expenditure in the past); 
defence and administrative spending has also 
been cut. 
The allocation of investment to different sec-
tors of the national economy is set forth in the 
state plan, increases currently going to agricul-
ture, light industry, communications, and energy 
as ·well as the service sectors. Investment in heavy 
industries o.ther than energy has been reduced. 
Soine increase in expenditures on consumer 
goods has been necessary in an effort to bring 
supply in line with demand and to avoid prob-
lems that recently have resulted from purchasing 
power exceeding the supply of consumer goods. 
Another readjustment for China is the expan-
sion of the role of the market. A number of 
concrete steps are being taken. The first is the 
abolition of the system by which the state pur-
chased and sold all commodities, although some 
commodities - grain, cotton cloth, and others 
that are in short supply - will still be controlled 
by the state. The commercial departments may 
map out procurement plans according to market 
demand, and factories will arrange production to 
conform with the commercial procurement plan. 
Some commodities can be sold at stores set up by 
factories themselves. The capital goods rationing 
system is to be gradually changed, with' some 
goods entering the market for exchange. Other 
common commodities can be exchanged freely. 
Remarkable results have already been achieved, 
some machinery and electric products entering 
the market in 1979 and easing some of the 
shortages. 
The second step is the abandonment of the 
system of "sole dealing" where the state acts as 
sole agent. Under the new system, a producer 
wanting to sell products may now directly 
approach customers. The rural communes and 
the production teams can market their products 
in city fairs. Many commercial units of collective 
ownership and a certain number of small private 
shops in addition to the state-owned commercial 
departments are being developed. Competition 
among them is allowed, and the government 
encourages individuals, especially youths, or 
families, to set .up small shops .such as bicycle-
repair shops, inns, restaurants, and tailor shops 
to open employment channels. The service and 
light industrial sectors have provided employ-
ment for 29 million youths in recent years. 
The third step is the drafting of a long-term 
program for price adjustment, within which 
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prices are more flexible. Except for those prod-
ucts allocated by the state plan, local authorities 
and enterprises will likely be given some flexibil-
ity to readjust prices of their commodities. The 
prices of many goods ought to vary, and sea-
sonal, regional, and quality price differences ful-
fill a useful social role. 
The successful expansion of the role of the 
market will require adjustments in the arrange-
ments for tax and bank credit. In the meantime, 
the market administration will be maintained as a 
necessary control on speculation and prices. 
More attention will be attached to the develop-
ment of Jabour-intensive, energy-economizing, 
and raw material-saving industries or products 
that can make use of available resources. 
The new economic program emphasizes the 
control of population growth. Certain privileges 
will be awarded couples who have only one child 
- for example, monthly payments of 5 yuan. In 
the city, such inducements can be effective, but in 
rural areas traditional attitudes are still powerful. 
The old adage that "having children is like 
accumulating grain to ward off hunger" has to be 
overcome by policies that provide security for old 
people. 
During the current economic readjustment, 
China must correctly handle the relationship 
between readjustment and reform. Although 
both readjustment and reform are intended to 
place the economy on a more rational basis, dur-
ing implementation, they supplement and com-
plement each other in some ways and contradict 
one another in others. As a result, in a period 
when readjustment is more important, reform 
must play a supplementary role. It must help the 
readjustment and not hinder it. The current 
requirement is to sum up the country's past expe-
rience of reform and to analyze and solve the new 
problems that have appeared during the reforms. 
In sum, during readjustment, the pace of reform 
must be slow, steady, and accurate. 
The Open Economy 
To achieve modernization, China must adhere 
to an open policy on foreign economic relations. 
Both foreign and domestic experience suggests 
that, under the current global conditions of 
international production and division of Jabour 
and of rapid development of science and technol-
ogy, the adoption of a closed-door policy will 
only bring serious harm to the national economy 
and culture. Therefore, the implementation of an 
open policy on foreign economic relations is an 
important Jong-term decision for China. 
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The new approach to foreign economic policy 
will mean that China's relations with the rest of 
the world will become much more important. 
The adjustments in domestic policies will have a 
much greater impact on the rest of the world than 
did earlier policy changes. China will become a 
market for goods and services that are necessary 
for modernization; its foreign exchange will 
come partly from increased capital inflow but 
mainly from increased exports of goods and 
services. 
The change in policy over the last few years will 
generate levels of capital inflow that are larger in 
quantity and more varied in form than at any 
time since the establishment of the People's 
Republic. Substantial commitments of credit 
have come from foreign governments and inter-
national agencies. Joint ventures with foreign 
corporations have become important: more than 
20 joint ventures have been signed with Western 
corporations for the production of machinery, 
textiles, tourism, and other services. Four joint-
venture contracts have been signed with French 
and Japanese companies for offshore oil pros-
pecting and exploitation. Compensation trade, 
processing, and assembling have gained new sta-
tus as a vehicle for the transmission of foreign 
capital and expertise, with agreement having 
been reached on about 350 small and medium-
sized compensation trade ventures and more 
than 8000 contracts for processing and assem-
bling imported materials and equipment. Inter-
national joint ventures have been established to 
allow the leasing of equipment. 
China's exports over the next few years will 
expand annually at about 4%, or roughly the 
expected rate of growth of total world trade. 
Later, from about the middle of the decade, they 
will grow substantially faster than world trade, at 
about an annual rate of 13%. 
China's new policy of building on its greatest 
competitive strengths, and emphasizing light 
industry ahead of heavy industry, will mean that 
exports will grow much more quickly for some 
products than for others. Exports of all mineral 
products will grow only at 4-5% annually 
throughout the decade. 
The strongest export growth will be for light 
manufactures. Although much of the increase in 
production of light manufactures will go to rais-
ing consumption standards of China's people, 
industries will be much more oriented toward 
export markets. In 1980, only 3% of China's pro-
duction of manufactures was exported, but, by 
1990, exports will be increased to 7%. Exports of 
manufactured goods are expected to increase at 
an annual average between 15 and 20%. 
Total exports of manufactured goods, mostly 
from light industry, were valued at about U.S. $5 
billion last year. At prices operating last year, 
these exports are expected to rise to $15 billion in 
1985 and $31 billion in 1990. The increase in 
exports of light manufactures throughout the 
decade will approach the combined volume of 
exports from Taiwan and South Korea in recent 
years. 
The changes in the level and composition of 
investment in the course of the readjustment of 
domestic policy will profoundly affect China's 
imports. Processing enterprises that cannot be 
operated because of shortages of energy and of 
supplies of raw materials will be closed down, 
and imports oflarge equipment will be reduced in 
the next years. However, there will be increases in 
the import of materials, technology, and equip-
ment needed for transforming and developing 
existing industries, especially the industries that 
have been given high priority. China will be selec-
tive in introducing advanced technology and 
modern managerial methods. The imports of 
equipment, technology, and raw materials that 
will add to its export capacity will be given prior-
ity. Large amounts of foreign funds and technol-
ogy are needed for improvements in port, rail-
way, and telecommunications facilities and 
urban infrastructure, which are lagging far 
behind the needs for expansion of external trade. 
One should not pretend that China's moderni-
zation and new open policy can be implemented 
without problems. In the days shortly after the 
downfall of the Gang of Four, little attention was 
given to the feasibility and overall balance of 
projects set forth in new development plans. The 
adverse effects became so apparent last October 
that a thorough readjustment was considered 
essential for the future of the national economy. 
Thus, some projects were pared or suspended, 
although the government adhered to the princi-
ple of respecting contracts and commitments. 
Another example of problems in implementing 
the new approach is apparent from complaints by 
foreign business executives that China has too 
many departmental and administrative tiers in 
foreign trade and that responsibilities are not 
clearly defined, the result being slow response 
and low efficiency. These shortcomings exist 
because China was once a closed society, and, 
when it opened to the outside world, the old 
management system, its organization, and per-
sonnel were not able to adapt. At present, China 
is trying to establish a foreign economic and trade 
management system suited to both international 
customs and domestic conditions. The general 
direction of reform in China's foreign trade sys-
tem is to grant autonomy to enterprises and 
incorporated entities in foreign trade, within a 
framework of strengthened central coordination 
to ensure consistent approaches to foreign trade. 
Conclusions 
The success of the new policies will require 
adjustments not only in China but also in other 
countries. The cooperation of the industrialized 
countries, and especially those of the Pacific area, 
is vital to the new modernization program in 
several ways. Only through cooperation will 
China be able to expand light industrial exports 
that will provide foreign exchange and permit the 
domestic economic restructuring that is essential 
for higher rates of industrial growth. Also inter-
national cooperation is vital if China is to enlist 
foreign technology, capital, and expertise in the 
modernization of large-scale production and 
transport of energy, and in the modernization of 
production more generally. 
International cooperation in energy develop-
ment and research is beneficial to the economic 
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development and scientific and technological 
progress of all participants. China has carried out 
technological exchange and cooperation in eco-
nomic and scientific research in energy develop-
ment with countries who are willing to do so, on 
the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In the 
field of renewable energy resources, China has 
begun building hydropower stations with loans 
from Japan and is exploring possibilities with the 
World Bank for cooperation in building other 
hydropower stations. The United Nations has 
sanctioned yearly training courses in China for 
the developing countries and exchanges of tech-
nology and experience, with a view to solving the 
rural-energy problem by promoting the devel-
opment of biogas in these countries. In coopera-
tion with West Germany, China will establish a 
village operating on nonconventional sources of 
energy. Realizing that increased supplies of con-
ventional energy alone will not solve the energy 
problem, the Chinese government is undertaking 
research and development of renewable sources 
and focusing on advanced technologies and 
experiences from other countries. It is particu-
larly keen to cooperate in these efforts with Asian 
and Pacific countries. 
Discussion 
Jan J. Solecki: First of all I wish to say how 
much I enjoyed reading the paper by Li and Luo. 
Most of you probably are unaware that I was 
born in China, in fact in Inner Mongolia, and 
lived there the first 20 years of my life. Last 
summer, my wife and I (incidentally my wife too 
was born in China) revisited the country of our 
birth and were able to see for ourselves the 
improvements that have taken place during the 
past 40 years and sense the changes that were 
taking place that are reflected in the open eco-
nomic strategy, discussed in the paper. 
I am greatly honoured to be called to comment 
on the Li and Luo paper. I have read it with great 
care and found it interesting and informative. 
The most important feature of it is that it con-
tains pragmatic assessment of the current situa-
tion in the People's Republic of China and indi-
cates the path of the expected future 
developments. 
The theme of the paper - the energy con-
straint - is familiar to us in North America, 
because we too have had to face the problem of 
energy constraint, although to a lesser degree and 
in a different form. Our attempts to solve our 
own problems in many areas parallel those in 
China, and, for this reason, the present meeting 
by offering an opportunity to exchange views and 
experiences is of particular importance. Let us 
hope that it will help in the organization of sys-
tematic exchange visits by scientists and experts, 
who, by studying on the spot what has been 
achieved in other countries, will be able to 
transfer the knowledge to their own country. 
Here in Canada we are particularly fortunate 
that along with being well endowed with re-
sources, through free exchange of information 
with the United States and other developed coun-
tries, we have access to the latest technology, 
some aspects of which are transferable to China. 
Similarly, as in China, scientists here have been 
working on harnessing hydro, solar, tidal, and 
biomass energy. Efforts have been made at 
energy saving through insulation (I might say not 
always to everyone's satisfaction), through novel 
designs, as for example in the case of houses 
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being built almost entirely underground to con-
serve heat, through heat collectors, reflectors, 
and conductors. It is paradoxical that Canada, so 
well endowed with forest resources, should be 
one of the leaders in the fields of full and inte-
grated wood and other resources utilization and 
energy conservation. The secret, of course, is in 
producing specifically for consumers. Under 
such a system, misdirected capital investments 
are. rechanneled as a normal part of economic 
functioning of the system. Production capacities 
are augmented or reduced as need arises. It is 
highly gratifying, therefore, that in China too the 
policy is to move the economy in the direction of 
greater flexibility and more decision-making at 
the production levels. 
China's efforts to develop hydroelectric power 
are of particular interest to us in British Colum-
bia because more than 90% of our power supply 
comes from water resources. As in China, our 
hydro resources lie away from the population 
centres, resulting in construction oflong-distance 
transmission systems. 
China's studies of tidal power sound very 
interesting. As the report states, China's long 
coastline provides enormous possibilities, and, 
furthermore, it is likely that new ways of tidal-
power utilization will be discovered and devel-
oped in the near future. The Jiangxia tidal-power 
station, with a design capacity of 3 MW, is indeed 
a surprise, especially because, as the report states, 
a 0.5-MW generation set is already in operation. 
While in China last year, we were shown biogas 
systems used for cooking. We were pleasantly 
surprised that the system was efficient, odourless, 
and inexpensive to install. Construction of more 
than 6 million such biogas units must have 
resulted in a saving of millions of tonnes of fossil 
fuels and what is equally important in many mil-
lions of hours of human labour that would have 
been needed to collect fossil fuel or firewood, 
transport it, make and keep up domestic fire 
stoves, and remove the effects of the pollution 
produced by them. The importance of this devel-
opment can only be appreciated when one is 
familiar with the enormity of the effort needed to 
prepare food for the large number of people in 
China. 
I am disappointed that, apart from a passing 
remark, the report does not deal with such an 
important renewable resource as forests, espe-
cially as China has done so much in reforestation. 
My interest in the subject is understandable, the 
forest industry being the most important one in 
British Columbia. 
The latest report from China shows that, in 
1980, China logged 53.6 x J06 mJ of wood, which 
was 1.5% less than in 1959. Both these figures 
indicate to me that China's attitude to this valu-
able renewable resource is realistic and sound. 
May I be permitted to say a word on another 
subject - one that is excluded from the paper 
presented by the nature of its theme but that, I 
think, is of great interest to those present here, 
namely China's fishing industry. China's 1980 
output of aquatic products was 4.5 Mt, which is 
less than one would expect for a country with 
such a large population and an extensive coast-
line. One can, therefore, expect, in the light of the 
present stabilized conditions, a vigorous expan-
sion in the development and utilization of aquatic 
resources both in inland waters and on high seas. 
It would be reasonable to expect China to double 
its fishing efforts during the current decade. 
But to return to the report, I note that China 
suffers, although probably less acutely, from the 
West's illness when "purchasing power exceeds 
the supply of consumption goods." With an 
increase in flexibility of the economy, the prob-
lem will probably grow more serious. In Cana-
da's economy, provision of services to the popu-
lation results in a reduction of pressure generated 
by the excess of purchasing power. 
The open policy on foreign economic relations 
stated in the report is welcome to all, but in the 
climate of present-day low-level economic activ-
ity in the developed countries, it will not be an 
easy thing to sustain. A look at hopelessly strug-
gling Poland is enough to serve as a warning. 
Relying on being able to secure new markets for 
Chinese manufactures may bring disappoint-
ments because of the large number of other coun-
tries trying to do exactly the same. China, with its 
rich and unique historical and cultural heritage 
and its extensive variety of natural conditions, 
should be able to expand tourism, to provide a 
wide range of services based on unrestricted con-
tact between the population and tourists. Italy 
could serve as a good model. 
Trade and production relations through inter-
national agreements, joint ventures, compensa-
tory deals for delivery of plants are, of course, 
important but will probably be more difficult and 
more time-consuming to realize. The key issues 
will be, as the paper points out, an access to 
markets and the keenness of competition, which 
determines the profit margin. As in the domestic 
economy, an important factor in China's foreign 
relations will be an increase in flexibility in deal-
ing with foreign enterprises. 
The paper sums up by stressing that essentially 
what China needs from abroad is up-to-date 
technology to modernize and an access to foreign 
markets. For a long time, China had cut itself 
away from close association with other countries 
and, as a result, it will have to redevelop its "feel" 
for foreign markets. Technology largely can 
neither be sold nor given; it must be learned, 
assimilated. What is essential is understanding, 
which can only be developed through exchanges 
and frank discussions of views; this, as the 
absence of Li and Luo at this meeting shows, is 
not as simple as one would wish. 
Lawrence B. Krause: I greatly welcome the 
paper by Li and Luo. It is interesting, informa-
tive, and professional. There are three parts to the 
paper: an overview of the macroeconomy of 
China; a discussion of energy; and some com-
ments on several strands of current policy. 
As the authors note, China is still a poor coun-
try, having an income of only U.S.$270 per per-
son in 1980. However, China has had rapid 
growth, 5.2% a year during the 1960s and 5.8% a 
year during the 1970s. What is quite impressive is 
that the adult literacy rate of 66% of the adult 
population is above that oflndonesia and the life 
expectancy from birth, 64 years, is about the 
same as South Korea, a country with six times the 
per-person income. 
Nevertheless, as the authors note, mistakes 
have been made in the past. The question to be 
asked is whether mistakes are still being made. 
The forecast for 1981 indicates growth of only 
4%, which is less than earlier. Because economic 
mistakes cause political change in China, one can 
question whether China will be politically stable 
over the next several years, as it goes through 
economic readjustment. 
The recognized mistakes of the past include the 
failure to raise people's income standard, exces-
sive priority given to heavy industry, and invest-
ment in general, and frequent twists and turns of 
policy, which have left the bureaucracy trauma-
tized and which will continue to cause problems 
in the future. 
With respect to energy, China recognizes it has 
a problem, as supplies are short, particularly of 
electricity. Despite this and the favourable poten-
tial in oil and coal, efforts to develop energy have 
slackened in recent years. Why? One answer may 
be that developing new sources, particularly of 
petroleum, requires technology not available in 
China. As this must be obtained through the 
FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSTITUTES: DISCUSSION 229 
cooperation of foreign firms, it has strained the 
capacity of the Chinese bureaucracy. Deals can 
be made, but not quickly, given the inexperience 
of the Chinese. 
The Chinese efforts in renewable, noncom-
mercial sources of energy are very interesting, 
and their experience might be of great value to 
developing countries of the Pacific, such as the 
Philippines and Thailand, if China is willing to 
share it with them. The question one must ask is 
what is the cost of producing energy from sources 
like minihydro or large biomass digesters. Even 
draft animals might be expensive, as they are 
known to be land intensive. 
Two current policies are of great interest: the 
enhanced use of the market mechanism and the 
opening of China to world markets. Although the 
direction of policy change seems eminently sensi-
ble, there is a question of whether the exceptions 
might ruin the policy. For instance, as the market 
will not be permitted to allocate grain, cotton 
cloth, or major commodities in short supply, it 
would appear that China will not rely on the 
market when it is needed most. Furthermore, the 
banning of speculation and so-called improper 
pricing suggests that the market will not be per-
mitted to work. 
The opening of China to foreign trade and 
investment is very encouraging. One can wonder, 
however, why China is so cautious in borrowing 
abroad. Is this another sign of the bureaucracy 
being traumatized? Many problems remain in 
establishing joint ventures and compensation 
deals. Also, the increase in trade anticipated in 
manufactured goods is so large as to raise con-
cerns. Only South Korea has achieved such 
growth rates in the past. The discussion of the 
administration of foreign trade also sounds as if 
China is trying to achieve irreconcilable goals in 
wanting to grant more autonomy to enterprises 
and also trying to strengthen central coordina-
tion. 
There is clearly mutual benefit to be gained 
from Chinese cooperation with other countries of 
the Pacific. China can obtain assistance in tech-
nology but also share its knowledge with others. 
China should also be aware of the economic 
impact it is likely to have on other countries as it 
buys materials on world markets and sells manu-
factured goods on those markets. This suggests 
that some institutional arrangement for consulta-




Location of MechanicalProcessing of Tropica/Hardwood1 
K. Takeuchi 
Economic Analysis and Projections Department, World Bank, Washington, D. C., USA 
Two characteristics ·of mechanical wood-processing industries favour ·the .location of these 
industries in the log-producing developing countries - their labour-intensive nature and the 
potential savings in transport costs brought about by their bulk-reducing nature. ·Historically, 
government interventions have played a decisive role in the determination of their location - direct 
and indirect subsidies, tariff escaiation, and aggressive industrial export-promotion policies - in 
log-importing countries. Recently, however, ·major log-producing countries have taken steps to 
discourage or restrict log exports. The paper analyzes cost data for plywood production at various 
locations, policy measure.s affecting location of these industries, and the pattern of tropical hard-
wood trade and discusses policy options for log-producing developing countries. 
Deux caracteristiques inherentes ·aux usines de conversion du. bois soit economie de frais de 
transport par ia reduction du volume des charges et forte proportion de main d'oeuvre- militent en 
faveur de leur etablissement dans Jes pays en developpement producteurs de bois en grumes. Le choix 
du site des i.ndustries a traditionnellement ete influence par Jes gouvernements interesses, subven-
tions directes ou indirectes, escalade des tarifs et politique agressive de inise en valeur des produits 
d'exportation dans l\!S pays importateurs. Cependant, Jes pays producteurs de bois en grumes les plus 
importants viennent de prendre des mesures pour decourager et reduire Jes exportations. La presente 
communication a.nalyse Jes coiits de production de contreplaque a divers endroits, Jes politiques 
influant sur le choix du.site de ces industries; le modele du commerce du bois de feuillus tropical ainsi 
que les°formules possibles pour Jes pays en developpement prodlicteurs de bois en.grumes. 
There are two apparent factors that favour 
mechanical processing of wood in the log-
producing developing countries. First, the activ-
ity is considered relatively labour-intensive (Lary 
1968; Balassa 1977) and, therefore, is thought to 
be a suitable (comparatively .advantageous) 
industrial activity for areas where the opportuni-
ty cost of labour is low. Second, the first stage of 
the activity - i.e., production of sawnwood, 
veneers, and plywood - is highly bulk- and 
weight-reducing and, hence, ·should markedly cut 
the cost of moving. the product from the log-
producing to the importing countries. Despite 
1This.paper is a summary of the results of a research 
study: "Mechanical Processing of Tropical Hardwood 
in Developing Countries: Issues and Prospects of Ply-
wood Industry Develop.ment in the Asia-Pacific 
Region" to be published by the World Bank as Division 
Working Paper 1982-1. 
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these two factors, major log-producing countries 
in the Asian-Pacific region continue to export an 
enormous volume oflogs (about 80% as of 1978). 
A majority (65-70%) of the logs exported from 
the producing countries are veneerlogs that are 
used mainly for plywood making in the import-
ing countries. The value added to the material is 
generally higher in plywood production than in 
sawnwood production, and, therefore, there is a 
greater interest in plywood manufacturing than 
in sawtnillirig on· the part of the major log-
exporting countries. 
That the cost of ocean transportation oflogs is 
relatively high is illu.strated by. the fact that 
freight cost accounted for roughly 25% of the 
CIF unit value of Japan's imports of lauan logs 
from the Philippines in 1958~67 (Japan, Ministry 
of Finance 1958-67; Japan, ·Bureau of Forestry 
1970). The logs are mostly transported from the 
log-producing regions in Southeast Asia to 
Japan and other wood-processing regions by 
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special log carriers on a charter basis. As only 
about one-half of the log volume is actually re-
covered in sawnwood and plywood, one may 
presume that, if processing were done in the log-
producing regions, substantial savings in trans-
port cost would be made. However, if shipping of 
processed products were done on a liner basis, 
these savings would not materialize. Only if the 
flow of processed products from a producing 
region to a consuming region were large enough 
to justify shipping on a charter basis, would 
transferring processing facilities from Japan, 
Korea,2 the Province of Taiwan, etc. to the log-
producing areas result in cost savings. 
Plywood Trade in the Pacific Basin 
In Asia, plywood was produced in Japan, 
India, Korea, and the Province of Taiwan before 
1945. The details of early plywood operations in 
these regions are not known, but, at least in 
Japan and Korea, the history of plywood produc-
tion goes back to pre-World-War-I days (AID 
1972; Kitamura 1976). It can also be safely 
assumed that plywood was produced in India 
well before 1940 and in the Province of Taiwan, 
at least during the Second World War (although 
under Japanese management). 
In the immediate post-World-War-II years, 
plywood production expanded very rapidly in 
Japan, rose at a modest pace in India, and rees-
tablished itself in Korea and the Province of Tai-
wan. In the few years immediately after World 
War II, plywood production in Asia (Japan, 
India, Korea, and the Province of Taiwan) was 
primarily for domestic consumption, and exports 
were only incidental. 
Beginning in 1948, Japan started to import 
lauan logs from Southeast Asia (mainly the Phil-
ippines). The importation of logs was urged by 
the United States military-occupation forces to 
meet their needs of hardwood plywood at their 
facilities in Japan. Log exports from Southeast 
Asia expanded rapidly as plywood producers 
received priority allocations of foreign exchange. 
Japan started, also, to export plywood in the late 
1940s. The main destination was the United 
States. Small quantities of plywood produced in 
Malaysia began to be shipped to the United 
Kingdom. 
During 1946-60, Japan was the only country in 
Asia where the government undertook a rigor-
ous, all-out export-promotion policy, taking pos-
itive measures to promote exports (Krause and 
2Korea in this paper refers to the Republic of Korea 
unless otherwise noted. 
Sekiguchi 1976). In contrast, the Province of 
Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Indonesia were still consolidating their nation-
statehood, having become independent only after 
the War. They were following the so-called 
inward-oriented trade and industrial policies. 
After peaking in 1959, Japanese exports of 
plywood stagnated at about 350000 mJ during 
the 1960s, except for the second peak year of 
1968. In the meantime, Philippines' exports 
increased to about 150 000 mJ in the mid-l 960s 
and further to a peak of 390 000 mJ in 1973. 
A new development in the early 1960s was the 
emergence of, first, the Province of Taiwan and 
then the Republic of Korea as major exporters of 
plywood. Their exports kept on increasing 
rapidly until the boom year of 1973, when the 
Province of Taiwan and Korea exported I. I x 106 
mJ and 1.3 x IQ6 mJ, respectively. The exports of 
plywood from Japan, the Philippines, the Prov-
ince of Taiwan, and Korea during this period 
were closely geared to the U.S. market. The lead-
ership in plywood exports to the U.S. dramati-
cally changed (Fig. I). 
One important factor that led to dramatic 
increases in the exports of plywood (and other 
"light" manufactures such as textiles) from the 
Province of Taiwan and Korea in the 1960s was 
the industrial policy reforms carried out around 
1957-62 (Kim 1975; Hong 1979; Ranis 1979; Lee 
and Liang, forthcoming). Their new export-
promotion policies involved substantial, effective 
export subsidies as well as various non-
quantifiable incentives for exports of manufac-
tures. Both in the Province of Taiwan and Korea, 
plywood exports benefited from substantial 
subsidies. 
In the Province of Taiwan, perhaps the most 
important incentive from the viewpoint of ply-
wood exports was the provision that allowed 
firms to retain rights to foreign-exchange earn-
ings so that they could import raw materials and 
machinery: this provision included the privilege 
of selling such rights to other firms. In Korea, a 
significant change among the series of new policy 
measures was the devaluation of the exchange 
rate in 1964 to about half, even though the real, 
effective exchange rate has been maintained since 
1965. Another factor that contributed to the suc-
cess of Korea in expanding its plywood exports 
to the U.S. market during this period was lower 
ocean-freight costs than were enjoyed by the Phil-
ippines, the Province of Taiwan, and even Japan 
(UNCTAD 1970). 
In contrast to policies in both the Province of 
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Fig. I. Share of major Asian suppliers in total U.S. imports of hardwood plywood 1950-78. 
continued to be extremely inward-oriented, and, 
although the government in the Philippines did 
make some attempts to encourage industrial 
exports, overall policy remained inward-looking 
(Power and Sicat 1971). 
By the mid-1960s, plywood exports from 
Malaysia and Singapore were modestly signifi-
cant and have risen steadily since. The United 
Kingdom has always been an important destina-
tion for them (partly because of the Common-
wealth preference). Most of Malaysia's plywood 
exports have been from Peninsular Malaysia, not 
from Sabah and Sarawak, which have been the 
more important sources of.log production. 
An important factor that affected develop-
ments in the plywood trade during 1960-73 was 
the growth of domestic demand in Japan. In 
1972, Japan accounted for 19% of world-
plywood consumption (Fig. 2); by 1973, the share 
of exports in total production had declined to less 
than 20% (Fig. 2). Because of the worldwide 
recession following the oil crisis in 1973-74, 
world export trade in plywood collapsed in 1975, 
and the recovery has been rather slow. Because of 
this stagnant growth in demand and the sharp 
appreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar, 
plywood exports from Japan decreased sharply 
in 1973-75 and further declined subsequently. 
The industry has been trapped in structural 
stagnation. 
The Province of Taiwan's plywood exports 
also stagnated in 1974-77, but Korea's continued 
to rise. Similarly, exports of plywood from 
Malaysia (mainly Peninsular Malaysia) and 
Singapore increased steadily, with their exports 
to the Middle East rising rapidly. Their reputa-
tion for quality in the U.K. opened other Euro-
pean markets in the late 1960s. The timber indus-
try boards in the two countries played a key role 
in promoting exports ofsawnwood and plywood. 
Recent Developments in Timber-Export 
Policies 
Since 1978, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia have taken steps to restrict log exports, 
as their governments became increasingly aware 
of the possible exhaustion of prime tropical 
hardwood resources in their natural forests. They 
have reconfirmed their determination to step up 
local timber-processing industries to replace log 
exports with sawnwood, veneer sheets, plywood, 
and eventually with mouldings, doors, window 
frames, flooring materials, and "knockdown" 
furniture. Having observed the spectacular suc-
cess of the oil-producing countries in petroleum 
exports, the major log-exporting countries have 













.:·.1 \A I\ 
.. . . · ... ··"· . : i"·.. !,... .i \ 



































t , .. .'f".: I .. . . -. . \ . ·.\ ' : """ 







~~. v /X \I: \ I \ .. ')·:·4 . 
ljl i' I I\ : v . I}.~ 
60 1;\I:/'
1 I\ ,_ .... , ,.\ff~·. 
I I 1 : S I '- _ .r ' / 1 " I 1. I """ 0 
e:, I : \.' I I \ ,, \ I I I • \,:1 \ \ \ . I .'\ 11 I I . I 
"' ~ .... 
0 
0. 
I y• \ I; I\ y I I I \ I \' 
" I .:v \ -J 1 

















I:: ~ : /\, ·n \ 
'·I 





1948 1960 1970 1978 
Year 
Fig. 2. Plywood exports as percent of production from selected Asian producers. 
come to realize the opportunities to extract 
greater economic rent from their forest resources. 
In the Philippines, the government decided in 
1972 to ban log exports in principle and to phase 
them out by 1976.3 However, balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties have forced the government to 
permit log exports on an exceptional basis by 
quota allocations. Nevertheless, according to the 
official statistics, the Philippines' exports of logs 
declined from 9.6 x J06 mJ in 1970 to less than 
1 x J06 mJ in 1980. 
Forest resources in the Philippines have been 
Jit is widely believed that unrecorded exports of logs 
have increased in recent years. Even if such "extra-
official" exports are allowed for, it is undeniable that 
the Philippines' log exports have come down substan-
tially over these years. 
depleted far more than the official data indicate. 
Unless a policy of strict conservation and rational 
utilization is implemented, forests in the Philip-
pines will not be able to sustain any substantial 
growth of the wood-processing industry, or per-
haps even the present level of capacity in the 
industry, beyond a few years (Anonymous 1980). 
In Peninsular Malaysia, also in 1972, a ban was 
imposed on the exports of logs, although it was 
somewhat liberalized in 1977 to allow exports on 
a quota basis. Exports of logs from Peninsular 
Malaysia declined from 1.6 x J06 mJ in 1970 to 
practically nil in 1979, and the state has recently 
been suffering from log shortages. Although the 
overall level oflog production in the area has not 
decreased since 1970, Peninsular Malaysia has 
now clearly become a log-importing region. 
In the state of Sabah, exports oflogs peaked in 
volume in 1973, declined during the oil crisis 
( 1974-75), and then sharply increased to more 
than 12 x 106 mJ in 1976-78. In 1979, the state 
government adopted a policy to reduce log 
exports gradually, introducing export quotas 
and increasing royalty rates. The new· royalty 
rates raised the share of government revenue in 
FOB log prices dramatically - i.e., from 32% to 
60%. The declared objective of the Sabah 
government was to reduce annual log exports to 
6 x 106 mJ by 1981 and to nil by 1985. 
In the state of Sarawak, where logging condi-
tions are not as favourable as in Sabah or Penin-
sular Malaysia, log exports declined in 1970-75, 
from 3.1 x 106 mJ to 1.3 x 106 mJ, but they have 
been rising rapidly since 1976, reaching 6. 7 x 106 
mJ in 1980. There have been modest exports of 
processed timber, but they have not been increas-
ing in volume terms. Sarawak has taken a rather 
liberal log-export policy. The government 
charges (royalty, export tax, etc.) have been 
rather low - about 10-15% of FOB prices, 
depending on species - and there is not much 
discrimination against log exports in favour of 
processed-timber exports. Commercially attrac-
tive virgin forests in Sarawak are estimated to last 
for another 20 years at the current rate of exploit-
ation, but the second round of cutting is expected 
to yield substantially less than the first. If the 
present liberal log-export policy is continued, log 
exports from Sarawak could rise to 8 x 106 mJ by 
1983. 
In Indonesia,4 hardwood log production, hav-
ing peaked in 1974 (at 26.2 x 106 m3) and plum-
meted in 1975 (to 16.3 x 106 mJ), recovered to 
26.9 x 1Q6 mJ in 1979. Very recently, exports of 
sawnwood and plywood began to take off. 
Indonesia's forestry-sector policy has been 
based on three principles - export quotas, selec-
tive cutting, and domestic processing. These 
principles were incorporated in legal decrees in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, the 
government had not enforced these principles 
until 1978. In February 1978, the government 
increased the export tax (ADO) on logs from 
10% to 20% of the government-determined 
"check prices." In summer 1979, a new export 
tax, at 5%, was imposed on roughly sawn timber 
to discourage the practice of exporting roughly 
squared logs. Currently, the government levies 
4Statistics on forestry and forest industries in 
Indonesia vary widely, depending on the sources. It is 
difficult to reconcile production, export, local process-
ing, etc. The figures cited are based on data reported by 
FAO (1979b). 
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about 11 separate charges on log exports, total-
ing as much as 40-45% of the FOB prices oflogs. 
In April 1980, the ministers of agriculture, trade, 
and industry announced their decision to link the 
allocations for log-export quotas to the conces-
sionaires' past and current performance in local 
processing. 
The overall effects of these initiatives have 
been remarkable. Indonesia's log exports were 
down in 1980 and 1981; export-log prices climbed 
sharply in 1979, stayed at high levels until fall 
1980, but declined subsequently because oflower 
demand. At the same time, a large differential 
developed between the prices of export logs and 
those of almost comparable logs in the local 
market. This price differential provides a power-
ful incentive for local processing as long as 
exports of processed products are subject to no or 
little tax. It is reflected in the rush of applications 
for government approval on wood-processing 
(especially plywood-production) projects. By 
May 1980, 22 plywood factories, with a total 
annual capacity of 1.1 x 106 mJ (plywood) were in 
operation - compared with 16 plants at the end 
of 1978; an additional 20 or so had been approved 
to bring the country's annual capacity to more 
than 2. l x l 06 mJ (plywood) by the end of 1982. 
Reportedly, another 50-80 projects have been 
proposed. 
In April 1981, government authorities issued a 
decree (78/KPTS/DJ/I/1981) that log-export 
quotas would be allocated only to concession-
aires who have processing facilities in operation 
or under construction. This means that conces-
sionaires who have filed applications for appro-
val on construction will not be permitted to 
export logs until the facilities are being built. 
In Papua New Guinea, log exports peaked in 
1974 and have been stagnating at about 
0.4-0.45 x 106 m3/year. In early June 1979, the 
Ministry of Finance issued the Revised National 
Forest Policy, which reversed restrictions on log 
exports and called for revenue generation, 
national ownership, regional development, and 
political stability (PN G Office of Forests 1980). 
Whether or not log exports from Papua New 
Guinea could increase substantially in the future 
depends, among other things, on the govern-
ment's success in establishing export-logging 
enterprises. 
Other countries in the region are only minor 
exporters of logs. Thailand has become a net 
importer. Burma could potentially increase log 
exports but is likely to do so only gradually. 
Vietnam has a wood deficit. Thus, with the 
exception of Sarawak, Papua New Guinea, 
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Burma, and possibly Laos, countries in the 
region are likely to continue to reduce their 
exports of logs significantly in the future. 
Government Interventions as Locational 
Determinants 
Incentives provided by governments have 
played an important part in the development of 
export-oriented plywood industry in Japan, 
Korea, and the Province of Taiwan, especially 
during the takeoff stage. The most effective 
incentive measures involved linking foreign 
exchange allocations for raw-material imports to 
export performance of the industry; generous 
"wastage" allowances constituted an effective 
subsidy for plywood exports. Also, special ties 
with the U .K. played a significant role in facilitat-
ing exports of processed products from Malaysia 
and Singapore. Yet another important noncost 
factor that helped expand processed-timber 
exports in Malaysia and Singapore seems to have 
been the work of timber-industry boards in qual-
ity control. 
Furthermore, there are other government 
interventions that affect the location of process-
ing through cost of production. Tariff escalation 
in major importing countries has played a role in 
influencing the location of processing. More 
recently, differential government charges (export 
taxes, royalties, etc.) on logs for export versus 
logs for local processing as well as restrictions on 
log exports also appear to have had significant 
influence. -
The Cost of Production Structure -
an Intercountry Comparison 
Rough cost data have been collected for six 
locations - Indonesia, Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sabah and Sarawak (Malaysia), Philippines, 
Singapore, and Japan. The data are fairly re-
cent -within the last 2 years. However, the con-
ditions affecting wood material supply, demand 
for plywood, and profitability of the plywood 
industry in the region have recently clianged rad-
ically. Therefore, comparing and interpreting the 
cost data must be done with extreme caution. 
Estimates for entry costs in mechanical process-
ing of tropical hardwood vary considerably; they 
depend on the type of machinery used, the process 
(e.g., whether or not kiln drying is involved in 
sawmilling), the number of working hours 
assumed, and the extent of need for supporting 
facilities (transportation, housing, medical ser-
vices, etc.). On the whole, in the Asian-Pacific 
region, costs to start minimum economic opera-
tions in sawmilling and veneer/plywood produc-
tion do not seem to have been the key obstacle to 
the establishment of processing plants. In con-
trast, entry costs in starting economic particle-
board production are substantial and have been at 
least one of the major problems - although not 
the most important problem. 
Costs of producing plain plywood to be deliv-
ered to the Japanese market have been estimated 
(Table 1). In all cases other than Japan, the pro-
duction cost up to exfactory accounts for about 
68-75% of the total cost of plywood delivered to 
Japan. This means that overseas producers are 
"handicapped" by postfactory costs of roughly 
30% in competing with domestic producers in 
Japan. 
Fixed Cost 
The fixed cost - consisting of depreciation, 
interests, and general management - varies 
widely, ranging from U.S.$25/m3 to $57/m3, 
6-15% of total cost. The financial charges ( depre-
ciation and interests) are relatively small for the 
plants in Japan, Singapore, and the Philippines, 
which have been operating for at least 7 years and 
are well depreciated by now. The plants in 
Indonesia, Sabah, and Peninsular Malaysia are 
either recently established or proposed projects. 
While the differences do affect the competitive-
ness of individual producers, costs of the new 
projects are more suitable for discussions on the 
location of processing. "General management" 
accounts for 3-6% of total cost except for the 
plant in the Philippines, where it includes a high 
cost for the "office in Manila." 
Variable Production Costs 
The most important cost in all cases is raw-
material logs, accounting for 41-53% of exfac-
tory cost in the log-producing countries and for 
60% and 71 % in log-importing Singapore and 
Japan, respectively. The enormous variation in 
the costs oflogs is striking in view of the fact that 
all the plants are using similar material (species 
and sources). The prices of logs, rather than the 
wood-recovery rates, make the difference. For 
the producers in log-producing regions who 
obtain logs from their own logging concessions, 
the pricing of the logs they "buy" is a rather 
arbitrary accounting decision, whereas produc-
ers who actually buy from arm's-length suppliers 
must pay the going prices. Also, producers in 
log-importing countries such as Singapore and 
Japan must pay international market prices, 
which are substantially higher (even on an FOB 
basis) than local-market prices. Because of the 
dwindling availability of logs and increased 
Table I. Estimated cost (U.S.$/mJ) of production for plain plywood at selected locations in Asia as of early 1980. 
Peninsular 
Malaysia: a Philippines: an 
Indonesia: a Sabah, Malaysia: model plant to operating plant Singapore: a Japan: "typical" 
hypothetical plant, a plant operatin~ operate at 70% (perhaps not so plant operating at cost conditions of 
East Kalimantan' at 65% capacity capacity' typical)d full capacity' existing plants1 
Plywood capacity (ml/year) 36000 43000 110000 80000 5000 Not available 
Product size (mm x m x m) 4 x 1.2 x 2.42 4 x 1.2 x 2.42 4(?) x 1.2 x 2.42 4(?) x 1.2 x 2.42 3.0-3.6 x 1.2 x 2.42 12 x 0.91 x 1.82 
Wood recovery rate(%) 52.7 52.0 45.0 50.0 50.0 67.0 
Final cost 57 53 41 53 38 25 
Depreciation• 24 21 II 5 13 5 
Interests 14 20 12 6 5 4 
General management" 19 12 18 42 20 16 
Variable cost 233 237 173 203 304 377 
Logs 152 127 100 99 201 286 
Glue 28 30 28 34 26 32 
Other supplies 22 38 8 22 27 20 
La hour, direct x service 24 20 24 25 35 36 
Packaging 5 9 6 10 8 3 
Transportation to the port 0 4 3 8 3 0 
Charges at the port' 2 9 4 5 4 0 
Sales tax 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Total cost up to FOB 294 290 214. 256 342 402 
(Export price) (323) (310) (270) (303) (358) (385) 
Ocean freight and insurance 
to Japan 43 26 31 23 26 
Ocean freight 40 23 28 20 23 
Insurance 3 3 3 3 3 
Japanese import duty 73 67 60 65 77 
Cost of plywood, delivered Japan Not wholly 
Without Japanese import duty 337 317 245 279 368 comparable due to 
After import duty (20%Y 410 383 305 344 445 difference in product 
(size)k 
•A hypothetical project in East Ka.limantan. Most of the log input is to be supplied by the associated companies engaged in logging. Assumes 3-shift operations. More than two-thirds of output is to be exported. Wood 
residues are to be used as fuelwood at the plant. 
b Ajoint-venturecompany operating in Sa bah. The plant is located in the vicinity of a port. All output is exported. About 55-60% of log input is from the company's own logging concession inSabah. The plant is operated 
on a 2-shift basis. Wood residues are used as fuelwood at the plant. 
cEstimated cost data provided in the "Report on Industrial Strategy Studies," prepared by Michael Roemer and Malaysian Economic Planning Unit, are used to obtain the estimates in 1980 dollars. The model plant is 
assumed to be located about 60 km from Kuala Lumpur, in Seremban. 
dEstimates based on data supplied by a consulting company, with a warning that the data's reliability is questionable. The data provided have been adjusted for inflation to obtain the estimates in 1980 dollars. Log inputs 
are supplied by the firm's own logging concession. The unusually high general management cost must be noted; 27% of it is attributed to "office in Manila"; 80% of output is exported. The plant is operated on a 2-shift basis. 
c A plant in operation for more than 5 years. Operated on a 3-shift basis. Log input is entirely imported. 
rEstimates based on the partial data provided by industry and government sources in Japan. Most of the log input is presumed to be ''South Sea" tropical hardwood. The product is used mainly for concrete forms. 
Therefore, the quality of logs used tends to be below average. 
'Includes amortized preinvestment expenses. 
hlncluding some "welfare" costs such as health room facilities and technical fees (e.g., outside engineers). 
'Includes the cost of loading the ship. 
JThe amount of duty is calculated on the "import price" (i.e., the export price plus freight and insurance), not on the cost up to FOB plus freight and insurance. 
kSomewhatmore comparable price would be that for4 mm thickness plywood, whose wholesale price averaged $468/ m3 in January-July 1980. But note that the Japanese size is 0.91 m x 1.82 m rather than 1.2 m x 2.42 m. 
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government charges on export logs from tradi-
tional sources, international log prices rose 
·sharply in the l;:ist 2 years. The national average 
price oflauan, cir meranti, veneerlogs delivered to 
mills in Japan,: thus, rose from U.S.$92/m3 in 
1978 to $21 l/m3 in April-June 1980. The "two-
tier" prices. of logs resulting from the policies to 
promote local processing critically affect the 
cost-competitive positions of plywood and other 
processing industries. 
Another important aspect in the plywood-
production cost structure is wood-material recov-
ery rate. The wood-material recovery rate in 
Japan (67.0%) is substantially higherthan that in 
other countries (45.0-52.7%). The main reason, 
according to industry experts, is the difference in 
the size of the products. The unique specifica-
tions of Japanese building designs result in the 
bulk of Japanese demand being for 0.92 >< 1.82 m 
plywood. Recovery is much higher for this size 
(so-called three by six) than for 1.22 >< 2.42 m 
(so-called four by eight) plywood -the standard 
elsewhere. According to Japanese industry 
sources, if 1.22 >< 2.42 m plywood were made in 
Japan, the wood-material recovery rate would be 
as low as 54%. This difference in recovery rate 
reduces the cost of logs per cubic metre of ply-
wood output substantially (perhaps by as much 
as 25%). 
There does not seem to be a large variation in 
the cost of glue used by plywood producers in 
different locations. Whether the producers use 
locally produced· glue or imported glue does not 
seem to make much difference. "Other supplies" 
usually include electricity, repairs and mainte-
nance, machinery parts, tapes for mending dam-
aged veneers, etc. The Peninsular Malaysian 
"model" calculation may have omitted some 
items and thus underestimated the costs here. 
Energy costs seem to have been contained· well 
everywhere because of both the swift change 
from oil-based fuels to wood residues and the 
introduction of energy-saving measures. Wood 
residues that had been either used in particle-
board or pulp and paper production or simply 
thrown away are now being used as fuelwood for 
veneer drying, hot press, and. sometimes electric-
ity generation. · 
The labour costs are higher in Singapore and 
Japan than in Malaysia, Indon·esia, and the Phil-
ippines. Although differences in labour produc-
tivity are difficult to calculate and to be properly 
allowed for, rough estimates of wages are avail-
able from industry sources (Table 2). A compari-
son indicates an enormous difference. between 
Japan and all the other countries, and wages are 
substantially higher in Singapore and Malaysia 
than in the Philippines and Indonesia. Even 
within Indonesia, wages in East Kalimantan are 
3.5-4 times the levels in Java. 
Accurate comparisons of packaging costs are 
not possible because the data are not available. 
However, some observations can be made. As 
plywood made in Japan is usually delivered to 
nearby customers, relatively simple packaging 
for short-distance trucking is sufficient, and, 
thus, packaging can be presumed to cost less in 
Japan than for producers elsewhere who are 
shipping their products to cross-ocean destina-
tions involving loading and unloading of vessels. 
However, the variations in the cost of packaging 
probably do not have a decisive impact on the 
competitive advantage of the countries 
considered. 
Postfactory Costs 
Beyond the exf actory costs including packag-
ing costs, there are usually costs of transportation 
Table 2. Wages (U.S.$/month) in plywood industry in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Japan, as of 1980. 
Type of labour 
Unskilled Semiskilled Skilled 
Indonesia 
Java 16 24 40 
East Kalimantan I 56 68 128-176 
East Kalimantan II 60 72 127-175 
Malaysia 102 na• na 
Peninsular Malaysia 102 na na 
Sabah (including housing) 114 155 273 
Philippines 47 68 100 
Japan 634 1062 na 
•na = not available. 
Source: Estimates are based on information provided by industry sources; conversion of local currency data 
into U.S. dollars is based on official exchange rates. 
to ports, and possibly some taxes, before the 
goods are on board oceangoing vessels. The reli-
ability of"estimates for these items is uncertain. 
They represent only broad orders of magnitude. 
The costs for the hypothetical plant in East Kali-
mantan may be somewhat underestimated 
because a part of such costs seems to be already 
included under "general management," "other 
supplies," and "labour." Differences in these 
costs do not seem to be important enough to 
make a critical difference in the determination of 
the competitive advantage of each location. 
Plants in Japan, of course, are presumed to enjoy 
some advantage in this respect over overseas 
suppliers. 
Ocean-freight and insurance costs account for 
6-10% of the total delivered cost of plywood in 
Japan. An interesting and relevant question is: 
Does the structure of ocean-transport cost 
encourage or discourage· location of plywood 
production in the log-producing countries, other 
things being equal? Comparative calculations 
could be made for Sabah, for example. A wood-
recovery rate of 54% would result in the use of 
1.85 mJ of logs for each 1.0 mJ of four-by-eight 
plywood. The transport cost for 1.85 mJ of logs 
amounts to U.S.$47.26. In contrast, the shipping 
cost for 1.0 mJ of plywood is U. S.$26. Even if a 
packaging cost of U.S.$9 were added, the 
transport-cost economics would favour the loca-
tion of plywood plants in Sabah rather than in 
Japan for production of four-by-eight plywood. 
How do similar calculations work for East Kali-
mantan? The cost of shipping 1.852 mJ of logs 
from East Kalimantan to Japan works out to be 
U.S.$57. 78. This is to be compared with the ship-
ping cost plus packaging cost for 1.0 mJ of ply-
wood of U.S.$48. If "liner rates" were used, the 
plywood-shipping cost would be higher by 
U.S.$10-15. On the other hand, if many plants 
were located near the same exporting point so 
that the volume of traffic is increased and the port 
conditions improved, then the transfer-freight 
cost could be reduced by U.S.$5-7 /m3. Thus, 
although under the current conditions, the cost 
savings would not be great for shipping plywood 
instead of the equivalent volume of logs, at the 
margin, transport-cost economics seem to favour 
plywood production in East Kalimantan rather 
than in Japan. 
The Japanese import duty of 20% on the CIF 
value amounts to 17.3-19. 7% of the total cost of 
plywood delivered to Japan from the five loca-
tions in Southeast Asia. This tariff represents a 
rate of effective protection greater than 60%. 
Obviously, this is one of the key factors for the 
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continued survival of the plain-plywood produc-
tion sector in Japan. 
Benefits of Increased Processing in 
Log-Exporting Countries 
Local processing of primary commodities that 
are being exported in raw form is desirable on the 
grounds of various macroeconomic benefits for 
the countries producing the primary products. 
Value-Added and Linkage Effects 
Some indications of the gross value added to 
logs by processing in Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
the Philippines are available (Table 3). The gross 
value added to logs is indicated by the difference 
between the FOB export-unit value for logs and 
the "log-equivalent" FOB unit value for the pro-
cessed products. On this basis, the value-added is 
equivalent to 23-65% of the log-export unit value 
for sawnwood, 26-150% for plywood, and rather 
negligible for veneer sheets. There are several 
problems in such an approach. On the one hand, 
log-export prices contain substantial elements of 
resource rents that are not collected on logs 
locally processed. Thus, in this method, the value 
added to log material exported is underestimated 
by the amount of these charges. On the other 
hand, the approach ignores "leakages" in value 
added to foreign industries that provide materials 
to the processing industry. The leakages to for-
eign industries should not be a part of the value 
added locally. 
To estimate the true gross value-added in ply-
wood producion, I have used cost data for the 
hypothetical plywood project in East Kaliman-
tan (Table 1). I converted the cost data for ply-
wood into costs per cubic metre oflog input. For 
U.S.$80/ m3 of log cost, the gross value added to 
the log input is $90.12/ mJ of logs. From this 
amount, I obtained the amount of gross value-
added in a standard sense by deducting the costs 
of inputs provided by other industries, including 
logs, from the total price, $61.63/m3(r). Now 
even if the ownership of such an enterprise 
happens to be 100% local, there are some leak-
ages to foreigners who often are a source of 
equipment and funding. So, domestic gross 
value-added works out to be about U.S.$50/m3 
of roundwood (Table 4). Currently, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Philippines together export about 
36.7" 106 mJ of logs (estimate for 1979). If one-
half of this volume were exported in the form of 
plywood, it could mean $1.1 billion worth of 
gross value-added, or some $0.9 billion of gross 
value-added excluding "foreign leakages." 
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Table 3. Estimated gross value added (U.S.$/m3 of Jogs; % of Jog unit value) to Jog material by processing in 
selected countries in Asia, 1977 and 1978. 
1977 1978 
Country and product $/ml % $/ml % 
Indonesia 
Sawnwood (-) 0.5 (-) 1.0 15.9 34.3 
Plywood 124.6 82.6 na• na 
Veneer sheets na na na na 
Malaysia 
Sawn wood 25.3 65.5 25.6 59.5 
Plywood 58.4 151.3 60.3 140.2 
Veneer sheets (-) 8.6 (-) 22.3 (-) 17.3 (-) 40.2 
Philippines 
Sawn wood 15.2 23.2 16.0 24.3 
Plywood 17.0 26.0 28.6 43.5 
Veneer sheets 3.3 5.0 2.7 4.1 
'na = not available. 
Source: Data have been derived from issues of the FAO Forestry Yearbook (Tape), Rome, Italy, FAO. 
As the plywood factory would purchase sup-
plies (apart from logs) from other industries, 
these purchases represent partly the value-added 
of other industries- $26/m3(r) from domestic 
suppliers - and may be considered to represent 
backward linkage effects. 
Foreign-Exchange Earnings 
In the East Kalimantan case, the FOB price of 
plywood is U.S.$170/m3 (roundwood), com-
pared with the log price of$80/m3. If the price of 
logs were equal to the FOB price of export logs, 
then the extra value of$90/ mJ(r) would represent 
the increase in gross foreign-exchange earnings, 
from which foreign leakage costs associated with 
plywood production would be deducted in calcu-
lations of net increase in foreign-exchange 
revenue per cubic metre of logs. 
In reality, the calculations are not so simple 
because of the resource-rent taxes imposed on 
export logs but not on locally processed logs. For 
example, in Indonesia, currently, governmental 
charges made on each cubic metre of meranti logs 
exported amount to about U.S.$50. Most of 
these are not required on locally processed logs. 
As a result, there is a price spread of U.S.$50 or 
more between the FOB export prices of logs and 
the prices of logs sold locally. Therefore, until 
this kind of subsidy becomes no longer needed to 
promote local processing, net earnings resulting 
from local processing will be substantially less 
than the value-added calculations indicate. On 
the other hand, because of the steep resource 
rents and the stringent log-export restriction pol-
icies, FOB prices of logs have been raised 
inarkedly, which is a welcome effect from the 
viewpoint of the log-exporting countries. 
Employment Effects 
Estimates of direct-employment effects of ply-
wood production are rather divergent, partly 
because of the divergent assumptions made 
about the operations and sizes of mills. The 
number of persons required for annual produc-
tion of 1000 mJ of plywood ranges from about 4 
to 14, including managerial staff. As for sawmil-
ling, industry-source estimates indicate about 
3.2-6.0 persons/ 1000 m3 ofannual production of 
sawnwood under the current conditions of 
Indonesia, Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), and 
the Philippines. 
Order-of-magnitude estimates for the direct 
effects of complete export substitutions can be 
made for local-employment opportunities in four 
log-exporting countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Philippines, and Papua New Guinea). On the 
basis of rule-of-thumb labour requirements asso-
ciated with typical plymilling and sawmilling 
operations in this region, direct extra employ-
ment, for the four countries as a whole, would be 
for 100000-120000 workers in plywood and 
50000-60000 workers in sawnwood. 
Regional-Development Effects 
The deliberate policies in the Philippines, 
Sabah, and Indonesia to subsidize an expansion 
of local processing of logs at the expense of 
foreign-exchange earnings from log exports and 
resource rent on logs mean that the net effects of 
local processing on value-added and foreign-
exchange earnings are not likely to be as large as 
they would be normally. Also, direct-employ-
ment effects of increased local processing of logs 
in the major log-exporting countries in the Asia-
Pacific region are rather modest in the context 
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of total population and total labour force in these 
countries. 
Processing facilities, however, are likely to be 
established in the remote areas of these countries 
because of the location of forest resources. This 
means that sawmilling and plymilling activities 
could make a significant impact on employment 
and industrialization in areas (Kalimantan, 
Sumatra, Mindanao, Sa bah, Sarawak, etc.) that 
need it most and for which there are few alterna-
tive opportunities. 
Policy Issues and Prospects 
In considering policy options for tropical-
hardwood-producing countries m the Asia-
Pacific region, one must take into account five 
important features of tropical-hardwood re-
sources: 
• Heterogeneity of the current stands, which 
contain hundreds of species, only a fraction of 
which are currently utilized commercially; 
• Semirenewable nature of the resources; 
• Strong long-term growth prospects of 
demand; 
• The remote and undeveloped areas of the 
countries concerned (Mindanao, Sabah, 
Sarawak, Kalimantan, Sumatra, West Irian, 
Papua New Guinea, etc.); and 
• The ownership of the resources, which are in 
the state-owned forests. 
Furthermore, there are two important features 
of mechanical wood processing that also are 
noteworthy: 
• It is a relatively unskilled, labour-intensive 
activity; and 
• It is typically weight reducing and, in the 
long run, transport-cost saving. 
Now, the ultimate policy question is how to 
utilize the resources to the best advantage of the 
countries that own them. In terms of current 
policy stance, the major areas producing tropical 
hardwood in the Asia-Pacific region can be 
divided into two groups: states attempting to 
reduce log exports (Philippines, Peninsular 
Malaysia, Sabah, and Indonesia) and those with 
liberal log-export policies (Sarawak, Papua New 
Guinea, other Pacific islands). 
Policies of the Philippines, Peninsular Malay-
sia, Sabah, and Indonesia have recently been to 
apply quantitative restrictions on log exports, to 
increase government charges per unit of logs 
exported, and to promote local processing of 
logs. Their objectives are to conserve the semi-
renewable resources, to collect maximum 
resource rent, and to secure benefits from 
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increased local processing of logs. Increased 
exports of processed products would presumably 
result in higher export earnings, higher value-
added, higher employment, and regional devel-
opment of "remote" least-developed areas. The 
measures taken in these areas seem to be making 
a significant impact on the market, bringing 
about the desired restructuring of tropical-
hardwood trade in the Asia-Pacific region. 
In contrast, policies of Sarawak in Malaysia, 
Papua New Guinea, and other Pacific-island 
countries have been to encourage log exports. As 
a result, these areas have been experiencing rising 
log exports and increasing foreign-exchange 
earnings but only a slow growth in processing 
and low government revenues from forest 
utilization. 
A distinction must be made between two objec-
tives: deriving benefits from local processing and 
deriving maximum resource rent from semi-
renewa ble resources. The latter objective requires 
a careful consideration of the projected long-
term increases in tropical-hardwood log prices 
in real terms and the fact that standing trees grow 
over time. 
In Peninsular Malaysia and the Philippines, 
the appropriate policy direction to take is quite 
clear. There, forest resources have been exploited 
for more than 3 decades, and the remaining forest 
resources are severely limited. Wood-processing 
industries are well established. The appropriate 
policy prescription is to phase out log exports 
completely and to take measures to improve the 
cost-competitiveness ofthe processing industries. 
Experience in Japan, Korea, the Province of 
Taiwan, and Singapore suggests that the wood-
processing industries would be strengthened if 
the government were to adopt more aggressive, 
outward-oriented industrial policies. 
In Papua New Guinea, the liberal log-export 
policy seems to be clearly superior. The timber 
resources are commercially not as attractive as 
those of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
(excluding West Irian) because of the low inci-
dence of commercially attractive species, difficult 
terrain, long distances from the main markets, 
etc. At present, therefore, it is more urgent to 
develop markets for the country's species. 
In Sabah and Indonesia, which are currently 
the most important log-exporting areas, policy 
options are more open than in Peninsular Malay-
sia and the Philippines or in Papua New Guinea. 
Sabah and Indonesia (except West Irian) happen 
to have the richest forest resources in terms of 
commercially attractive species per unit area. The 
extraction cost per cubic metre of logs is lower 
than in Sarawak or Papua New Guinea. Attract-
ing necessary labour to these places is a problem. 
The infrastructure required to introduce process-
ing in these areas would be a heavy financial 
burden. Until exports are built up, transport-cost 
economics work against such industries. Further-
more, substantial resource rent that could be col-
lected from log exports will have to be foregone 
during the period of establishment of export-
oriented processing industries. Nevertheless, 
Sabah and Indonesia may consider it politically 
desirable to develop some kind of industries in 
the currently "remote" regions for the sake of 
regional development. For this objective, timber 
processing is a good possibility and could be used 
as the core of a regional-development strategy, 
along with agriculture. 
To facilitate the rapid growth of mechanical 
wood-processing industries, the government 
should adopt an overall export-promotion strate-
gy like the Republic of Korea's as the general 
development strategy and, more specifically, 
undertake necessary steps to: 
• Minimize the use of price ceilings and other 
interventions in the domestic market, which 
affect negatively the spontaneous growth of the 
wood-processing industries; 
• Improve the efficiency of domestic trans-
port (especially shipping) and port facilities; and 
• Develop a few wood-product terminals at 
strategic locations for smooth and efficient ship-
ment of locally processed wood products to 
world markets. 
At the same time, the industry in these coun-
tries should take necessary steps to improve the 
quality control that is critical in the export busi-
ness. Joint ventures with experienced foreign 
companies can be an effective approach at this 
stage of development.5 
As for Sarawak, there seems to be room for it 
to collect higher resource rent on log exports than 
it does now. The forest resources in Sarawak are 
not as attractive as those in Sabah or in major 
forest areas of Indonesia, but commercially valu-
able species are more numerous and more accessi-
ble than in Papua New Guinea. Sarawak may be 
foregoing both resource rent on logs and benefits 
of local processing. It may well be a case of bene-
fiting a group of private businesses at the expense 
of the public interest. 
SJ oint ventures with foreign companies do not neces-
sarily guarantee a faster achievement of technological 
mastery; however, a recent report prepared by Benjamin 
F. Sanvictores (1980, unpublished) identifies a vast 
scope for joint ventures. 
One of the issues in plywood trade has been the 
import duties in industrialized countries, espe-
cially their escalated nature. Although the Euro-
pean Community offers preferential duty-free 
access to developing countries under the Lome 
Convention and the Generalized Systems of 
Preferences, other major industrialized countries 
(Japan, the United States, Canada, etc.) do not 
give any preferential access on tropical-
hardwood plywood. Furthermore, even the EC's 
preferential duty-free imports are subject to 
quota ceilings, although the quotas have been 
steadily increased over time. Because of tariff 
escalation, the effective rates of protection have 
been high on tropical-hardwood plywood and 
have distorted the pattern of trade in tropical-
hardwood products. 
One reaction of industrialized countries to the 
recent changes in the log-export policies of major 
log-producing countries has been to reduce 
import barriers on veneers and sawnwood, either 
on the most-favoured-nation basis or on a prefer-
ential basis. This is, of course, a welcome trend. 
However, as the basic economics seem to indicate 
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that log-producing, labour-abundant countries 
have the competitive advantage in exporting 
plain plywood, industrialized countries should, 
ideally, reduce or eliminate import barriers on 
tropical-hardwood plywood. Until they do so, 
the second-best solution in terms of maximizing 
world economic efficiency is to offset the distor-
tion: log-exporting countries' subsidizing their 
domestic plywood industries through "two-tier" 
pricing of logs. 
Plywood manufacturing should be the core of 
a development strategy for mechanical wood-
processing industries. If the plywood industry 
were promoted, sawmilling and production of 
other wood-based panels, e.g., particleboard, 
which are complementary to plywood manufac-
turing, would be automatically promoted. The 
key to a successful export-oriented sawmilling 
industry is superior marketing, whereas the key 
to a successful wood-based panel industry is 
availability of a large enough market to justify 
full operation because it is relatively capital 
intensive compared with other mechanical wood-
processing activities. 
Discussion 
Alhambra Rachman: Let me first congratulate 
Takeuchi for his fine efforts preparing this 
manuscript. It was written with finesse, its con-
tent well balanced, reviewing changing condi-
tions in prospects for trade of wood products in 
Southeast Asia. 
In accordance with my assignment, my discus-
sion will focus on probable changes of the loca-
tion of processing in response to policy decisions 
of governments in timber resource-owning coun-
tries, which would initiate a restructuring process 
in the trade pattern of those products in that area. 
In Takeuchi's Table 1, which summarizes a 
cost comparison of plywood production, data 
about Japan are included. IfTakeuchi's rationale 
were to indicate the validity of a policy decision 
to relocate Japanese plywood industry to timber 
resource-owning countries, I wonder why he did 
not also include data for South Korea, as it con-
sumes about 50% of its total production, and its 
industry will be affected by lesser availability of 
raw material. This is only one of several examples 
of statistical bias. 
In addition, I can't help getting the impression 
that the analysis carried out in this paper is 
limited to the present flow of trade, with the U.S. 
as principal market. This may be misleading in 
the long term because relocation of an industry 
would affect the magnitudes of all existing 
markets and supply points within the Pacific re-
gion. Countries that originally are exporters of 
plywood can become importers, because of scar-
city of raw material. 
With respect to Takeuchi's coverage, I feel that 
the analysis is too simple and that his conclusions 
would have been more reliable if he had 
expanded his analysis to cover: 
• The impact and implications of a more func-
tional integration in the timber business where a 
company is involved not only in logging opera-
tions but also in subsequent processing and mar-
keting activities (a sizable number of logging 
operations in timber resource-owning countries 
are set up in the form of joint ventures between 
local companies and foreign-based partners, and 
such integration can distort the operation of 
market forces); 
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• Future trends of sea transportation costs, 
which are an important component of import 
unit value; 
• Capital costs, including comparisons of dif-
ferent degrees of capital-intensive operations 
limited to overall employment generation; 
• The impact of negotiated trade agreements 
on trade flows of plywood in this region; 
• Projections of domestic demand for ply-
wood in timber resource-owning countries; and 
• Prospects for new markets and new process-
ing technology related to the plywood industry. 
My conclusions do not differ much from those 
of the author. I feel that in the long run there is a 
necessity for the countries that do not own 
resources to relocate their timber-processing 
industry near the raw-material base, but I suspect 
the present pattern of trade of plywood will still 
function for a few more years. 
Countries where at present the bulk of the 
plywood industry is located are in a position to 
slow the process because they have a solid footing 
in the market and heavy involvement with 
managerial, financial, and ownership aspects of 
logging operations in timber resource-owning 
countries. Their position will provide them with 
extra margin in negotiations. In addition, the 
possible emergence of a new and feasible tech-
nology could contribute to an increase of busi-
ness risk in restructuring for timber resource-
owning countries, as it will make the present 
technology obsolete and therefore more 
expensive. 
The right solution to the freight-cost problem 
would certainly aid restructuring of the timber 
industry. The problems in industrial or building 
standards will also affect entry of Southeast 
Asian plywood products into the Japanese 
market. Standard specifications of plywood prod-
ucts in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
are "four by eight," whereas the Japanese stand-
ard is "three by six." The difference in size also 
affects the log-conversion rate of plywood, which 
is 54% for the non-Japanese and 65% for the 
Japanese standard. 
Cooperative Fisheries Arrangements between Pacific 
Coastal States and Distant-Water Nations 
GordonR. Munro 
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
The widespread implementation of extended fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ) throughout the world 
has meant that substantial fishery resources, which hitherto had been international common 
property, have become the property of coastal states. One question that this development raises is 
what is the future role of cooperative fisheries arrangements between coastal states and distant-water 
nations in the newly created zones. I address the question of whether such arrangements should be 
viewed as temporary, with the ultimate elimination of distant-water activity in coastal state zones, or 
as permanent components of the new framework of world fisheries management emerging as a 
consequence of EFJ. Although many coastal states at the dawn of EFJ viewed cooperative fishery 
arrangements largely as temporary expedients, the economics of such arrangements indicate that 
coastal states in the Pacific and elsewhere would benefit from maintaining many, and perhaps most, 
such arrangements on a permanent basis. This is true whether the coastal states are developing or 
developed. However, the opportunities for long-term cooperative arrangements in the Pacific and 
elsewhere are endangered by uncertainties and ambiguities in coastal states' rights to the fishery 
resources within their zones. Two major sources of uncertainty are the inadequate management 
capacity of some coastal states and the trans boundary nature of many of the stocks in their waters. 
L'extension de la juridiction des peches (EJP), ratifiee par le monde entier s'est traduite par 
!'appropriation par Jes etats riverains de ressources autrefois propriete internationale. Que! sera, 
dans ce nouveau contexte, le role des accords de cooperation relatifs aux peches dans Jes nouvelles 
zones, qui interviendront entre Jes etats riverains et continentaux. On se demande aujourd'hui si ces 
conventions doivent etre temporaires - et debaucher sur !'elimination de la peche dans la zone 
eJoignee relevant des etats riverains - OU permanentes, - et constituer des elements d'un nouveau 
cadre de gestion mondiale des peches resultant de l'etablissement des EJP. Meme si plusieurs etats 
riverains considerent ces accords comme des expedients, leur interet au point de vue economique 
commanderait de maintenir certaines de ces dispositions, sinon toutes. Et cela s'applique aussi bien 
aux etats riverains developpes qu'en voie de developpement. Ce pendant, l'etablissement d'accords de 
cooperation a long terme dans le Pacifique et ailleurs est compromis dans plusieurs regions par 
!'incertitude et l'ambigurte des droits de propriete des etats riverains sur Jes ressources halieutiques de 
leurs zones. L'incertitude se rapporte principalement aux capacites de gestion de certains etats 
riverains et a la nature migratoire des populations de poissons. 
As other papers in this conference have stressed, 
fisheries in the Pacific, as well as in other parts of 
the world, have been dramatically influenced by 
the Third Law of the Sea Conference. Extended 
fisheries jurisdiction (EF J) has become fact, and 
important fishery resources, which had been inter-
national common property, became the property 
of coastal states. So extensive has this transforma-
tion been that the fishery resources remaining as 
international common property account for no 
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more than 1 % of the world's fishery harvests 
(Gulland 1980). 
One important issue that the implementation 
of EFJ raises is the role to be played by distant-
water nations - and, thus, cooperative fishery 
arrangements - in the exploitation of fishery 
resources within the newly created coastal-state 
fishery zones. A cooperative fishery arrangement 
is one in which a distant-water nation partici-
pates in the harvesting of a fishery resource in a 
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coastal state zone, the processing of the harvested 
fish, or the marketing of the products. This defi-
nition covers all joint ventures and so-called fee 
fishing in which the distant-water nation under-
takes all harvesting, processing, and marketing 
activities and compensates the coastal state in 
cash or kind. I 
I would argue that the common view among 
coastal states as they contemplated the advent of 
EFJ in the mid-1970s was that cooperative fishery 
arrangements were temporary, and rather unfor-
tunate, expedients to be endured until local har-
vesting and processing capacity had been built up 
to utilize fully the newly acquired resources. Thus, 
the authors of a 1975 study on joint ventures in 
fisheries argued:" ... the joint venture should per-
haps be regarded as temporary, since coastal 
nations, developed and developing alike, nowa-
days tend to demand greater participation in the 
fisheries off their shores" (Crutchfield et al. 
1975:2). 
The question arises, therefore, whether there is 
a long-term future for cooperative fisheries 
arrangements between coastal states and distant-
water nations in the Pacific or whether the 
distant-water fishing activity will gradually dis-
appear. The economics of cooperative fisheries 
arrangements suggest that, in many instances, 
these arrangements will prove advantageous for 
the coastal state indefinitely. 
However, opportunities for long-term cooper-
ative arrangements will, in some parts of the 
Pacific, be undermined by uncertainty or ambi-
guity in coastal-state rights over fisheries in the 
newly formed coastal-state zones. Although the 
customary international law has granted coastal 
states property rights, it cannot ensure that such 
rights will become established in fact. 
Basic Economics 
The economics of cooperative fisheries ar-
rangements are a blend of the standard econom-
ics of fisheries management and the economics of 
international trade. Thus, in evaluations of coop-
erative arrangements, one must begin with an 
analysis of fishery management in which cooper-
ative arrangements are not an option and move 
to an analysis in which they are. It is assumed the 
fishery resource is wholly within the waters of a 
coastal state. 
1 Instead of thinking of separate categories of cooper-
ative arrangements, it is more sensible to think in terms 
of a continuum of arrangements, running from the 
polar extreme of no foreign participation to that of pure 
fee fishing in which all harvesting, processing, and mar-
keting activities are undertaken by foreigners. 
Because the resource is renewable, it is capable 
of producing a sustainable harvest and, hence, a 
stream of net benefits to society through time. 
The object of management is to maximize, over 
time, the stream of social benefits, however they 
are measured. This involves ensuring that the 
harvest flow at any one time yields the maximum 
benefit to society and ensuring that the optimal 
stock, or biomass level, is achieved through 
appropriate investment (or disinvestment) in the 
resource. Investment (or disinvestment) in the 
resource is seen to occur whenever the actual 
harvest falls below (or exceeds) the sustainable 
harvest or yield, simply by virtue of the fact that, 
if the harvest is less (or greater) than the sustain-
able harvest, the resource stock or biomass will 
increase (or decrease). 
The size of the resource stock or biomass influ-
ences not only the level of harvests but also, 
often, the harvesting and processing costs - for 
example, the greater the numbers of fish, the 
easier the capture and the lower the cost of har-
vesting. Likewise, stock density can affect pro-
cessing - the size of groundfish, for instance, 
varies with stock density and may have an influ-
ence on consumer acceptance as well as 
processing. 
For the sake of simplicity, I have assumed that 
the price of the fish products accurately reflects 
the marginal social benefit society enjoys from 
the harvested fish, that the demand for fish prod-
ucts is perfectly elastic, that the costs of labour 
and capital constituting fishing effort accurately 
reflect social costs, and that the supply of the 
inputs is perfectly elastic. Given these assump-
tions, the flow of net benefits to society from the 
harvest can be represented as: 
7Ts(x,h,t) = [a(x)pi{x,t) - e:i(x,t) - c1(x,t) - m(x)] h(t) 
where h(t) denotes the harvest rate; x, the bio-
mass: Pi(x,t), the price of the fish product; a(x) 
the proportion of raw fish usable as finished prod-
uct; c1(x,t) and ei(x,t), unit harvesting and pro-
cessing costs respectively; and m(x) unit man-
agement costs (which relate to fleet size). The 
object of management can be seen as maximizing 
the present value of this stream of net benefits, 
i.e., 
max P.V.= fe-ll 1(7T,[x,h,t]) dt 
0 
where l'> denotes the "social rate of discount." 
The central problem of fisheries management 
has traditionally been that fishery resources are, 
with few exceptions, common property. If no 
controls are imposed upon the exploitation of a 
commercially valuable common-property 
resource, the efforts to exploit it will expand until 
the sustainable net. economic returns from the 
resource have been fully dissipated (Gordon 
1954).2 Moreover, the resource stock will be 
reducedlo a level well below that which is socially 
optimal. 
In fact, the depletion of the resource that 
occurs in an unregulated, common-property 
fishery would be socially optimal only if{)= co 
(Clark and Munro 1975). The reason is simple. 
The individual fisherman (or company) has no 
incentive to conserve the resource, to look for-
ward to future harvests: refraining from harvest-
ing likely does no more than increase the harvests 
of competitors. 
It has also been learned, often painfully, that 
managing fishery resources through the use of 
global harvest restrictions alone is inadequate 
from an economic point of view. Thus, if the 
authorities establish a global harvest quota in a 
given fishery to maintain the size of the biomass 
at some desired level but make no attempt to 
restrict the number of fishing vessels, sustainable 
net economic benefits are certain to be dissipated. 
Although fishermen cannot increase the total 
harvest if the quotas are effective, they can com-
pete with one another for shares of the available 
harvests. This competition invariably leads to 
economic waste through the emergence of exces-
sive labour and capital in both the harvesting and 
processing sectors (Crutchfield 1956). 
What is required is some form of control over 
individuals and vessels. In Canada and else-
where, attempts have been made to impose direct 
restrictions on the fleet size and on the number of 
fishermen in the fishery. The programs have, at 
best, been partially successful because the incen-
tive for fishermen to expand their fishing effort 
has not been removed. Economists have advo-
cated the use of landings taxes or individual 
harvest quotas as alternatives, but these have yet 
to be used to any significant degree and must be 
regarded as still being experimental. 
Now let it be supposed that the coastal state 
authorities do have the option of entering into 
cooperative fisheries arrangements with distant-
water nations. Optimal fisheries management 
now demands that the coastal-state authorities 
consider the use of foreign harvesters and pro-
cessing capabilities as alternatives to domestic 
harvesters and processors. 
2If the demand for fish products or supply of fishing 
effort exhibited finite elasticity, not all net economic 
benefits from the fishery would be dissipated (Copes 
1972a). 
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The basic argument for cooperative fisheries 
arrangements is no more than a variant of the 
argument for free trade. Certain distant-water 
nations may possess a comparative advantage in 
the provision of particular harvesting or process-
ing (or marketing) services. Hence, it can be mu-
tually advantageous to coastal state and distant-
water nation for the coastal state to hire, i.e., 
import, the relevant distant-water services. The 
obvious advantage for the coastal state would be 
reduced unit costs of harvesting or processing at 
any one time. 
Thus, consider a fishery for which coastal-state 
authorities have only one cooperative arrange-
ment option - the use of a distant-water fleet as 
exclusive harvester of the resource - the unit 
cost of harvested fish to the coastal state under 
the cooperative arrangement would be the ex-
vessel price paid to the foreign vessels, p1(x,t). 
The price would be determined by bargaining but 
would presumably reflect the harvesting costs 
incurred by the foreign vessels. If p1 (x, t) < c1 (x, t), 
for all x, then the coastal state would minimize its 
costs for obtaining raw fish by entering a cooper-
ative arrangement. 
A less obvious advantage is reduced risk of 
overinvestment in the resource whenever 
p1(x,t)< c1(x,t) for all x and t. If the coastal 
authorities do not enter a cooperative arrange-
ment for the lower-cost foreign services, they 
must offset their extra costs in harvesting by 
reducing the effort per unit harvest. One way to 
do this is to increase stock density - overinvest-
ment. When a resource has been excessively 
depleted, the consequences of overinvestment are 
an increased investment or stock rebuilding dur-
ing which harvests are below the sustainable 
leveJ.3 Overinvestment may also result in smaller 
long-run sustainable harvests. 
The advantages of such arrangements to 
distant-water nations are much less obvious. The 
argument that cooperative fisheries arrange-
ments promise them assured supplies of fish is 
unconvincing, given the existence of a well-
developed world market for fish. A somewhat 
more satisfying argument is, simply, that these 
arrangements offer profitable exports-of-services 
opportunities. 
Many of the factors giving rise to the cost 
advantages of distant-water nations are familiar 
from the standard literature in international eco-
nomics, whereas others are peculiar to the nature 
of the fishery. 
Jlf the stock is not to be rebuilt but rather depleted, 
e.g., a virgin stock, then overinvestment implies a short-
er period of harvesting in excess of sustainable yield. 
250 RENEW ABLE RESOURCES 
Factors familiar from the international trade 
literature include relative capital and labour 
costs. Thus, in the northeast Pacific relative 
labour costs have probably been a factor explain-
ing the development of cooperative fisheries 
arrangements between East-bloc countries, 
South Korea and Taiwan, on the one hand, and 
the United States and Canada, on the other. Sim-
ilarly, Japan would probably be an attractive 
distant-water partner among developing coun-
tries in the Pacific because of its rich physical and 
human capital (skilled crews). 
Factors peculiar to the fishery include'season-
ality of fisheries combined with nonmalleability 
of capital, the control of fishing effort, and man-
agement costs. Many fisheries are seasonal, last-
ing a few weeks or a few months. Also, some of 
them require the use of special equipment that is 
nonmalleable - it has limited uses during the 
off-season (Baker 1980; Clark et al. 1979). The 
combination of seasonal fishing and nonmallea-
bility of capital can easily give rise to attractive 
cooperative arrangements. 
For example, a hake fishery in British Colum-
bia waters normally runs from early July to late 
October, although the commencement and 
length of the season are often uncertain. Hake, a 
low-valued groundfish, has the characteristic of 
having soft flesh that deteriorates rapidly after 
capture. The fish is caught far enough from shore 
that it must be either processed offshore or frozen 
immediately. Before EFJ, Canadian companies 
displayed little interest in the fish for several rea-
sons, one of which was that vessels with freezing 
or processing capacity had inadequate opportu-
nities for use in the off-season. Elsewhere, I 
(1980) have detailed the consequences of inade-
quate utilization. 
Distant-water nations shift their vessels to dif-
ferent parts of the world over the course of the 
year; the capital embodied in their vessels is, thus, 
more malleable than that embodied in vessels 
confined to a particular region as exemplified by 
the British Columbia groundfish fleet. As a con-
sequence, when Canada acquired the resource 
under EFJ, Canadians found it most profitable 
to exploit the resource through cooperative 
arrangements (Munro 1981). 
Indeed, the hake fisheries in both British 
Columbia and the American Pacific northwest 
(northern California, Oregon, and Washington), 
along with the pollack fishery in the Gulf of 
Alaska illustrate the complex arrangements with 
distant-water nations that nonmalleability can 
produce. In all of these fisheries, joint ventures 
are for the domestic (i.e., U.S. or Canadian) 
trawlers to harvest the groundfish species and 
deliver the harvest to foreign vessels with process-
ing capacity. The domestic trawlers that engage 
in these activities invariably regard them as ancil-
lary to their other harvesting activities. For 
example, many of the U.S. fishermen harvesting 
pollack in the Gulf of Alaska regard crab fishing 
as their primary activity. They harvest pollack in 
the crab off-season when their vessels would 
otherwise be underutilized. Thus, the perceived 
marginal cost of harvesting pollack is low. At the 
same time, it has not proved attractive financially 
to construct vessels whose primary function 
would be that of harvesting pollack. Similarly, it 
has not proved attractive financially to construct 
vessels whose primary function would be that of 
harvesting hake farther south. 
The result is that the domestic fleets are incapa-
ble of harvesting the total allowable catches 
(TA Cs) for these resources. This in turn has 
meant that the joint ventures coincide with sub-
stantial fee fishing of the resources by distant-
water nations. In 1979, for example, joint ven-
tures accounted for only 9% of the total hake 
harvested in the Pacific. 
Earlier, I argued that one of the unresolved 
problems of managing wholly domestic fisheries 
is that of preventing the emergence of redundant 
fishing effort. One of the advantages to the coast-
al state of cooperative arrangements involving 
foreign harvesting is that the burden of eliminat-
ing redundant fishing effort is passed to the 
distant-water nation. This fact could induce 
authorities to employ the services of distant-
water nations even though immediate cost con-
siderations suggest that the harvesting should be 
done by domestic fleets. 
The relevance ofresource management costs to 
cooperative fisheries arrangements arises from 
the need to control policing costs. If a coastal 
state refuses to enter into cooperative fisheries 
arrangements, the surveillance and enforcement 
costs in preventing poaching by resentful distant-
water fleets could prove prohibitive, even if the 
coastal state were a wealthy developed state. 
Thus, just prior to EFJ, J. Alan Beesley, the 
leader of the Canadian delegation to the Law of 
the Sea Conference, argued that an important 
reason that Canada was seeking to ensure the 
cooperation of distant-water nations was to keep 
surveillance and enforcement costs to a manage-
able level (Munro 1977b). 
Admittedly, the management-cost argument 
for cooperative fisheries arrangements strains the 
definition of comparative advantage and perhaps 
would be more appropriate in discussions of 
bribery. Another noncomparative advantage 
argument for cooperative fisheries arrangements 
that deserves recognition concerns prices, rather 
than costs. Up to this point, the assumption has 
been that the prices of fish products are unaf-
fected by cooperative arrangements or the lack 
thereof. This assumption is not always valid. 
There may be cases in which the cooperative 
arrangements will result in reduced trade barriers 
and thus a higher return on the fish products. 
Thus, for example, a distant-water nation enters 
into a cooperative arrangement with a coastal 
state and imports the resultant product: the tariff 
authorities within the distant-water nation, 
regarding the fish as being in part their own 
national product, may impose a lower duty on 
the product than they would had the products 
involved coastal-state harvesting and processing 
exclusively. Hence, even though a comparison of 
costs might favour exclusive domestic harvesting 
and processing, maximization of the coastal 
state's net economic benefits from the resource 
could well call for the establishment of coopera-
tive fisheries arrangements. 
The actual form that a cooperative fisheries 
arrangement takes depends upon cost factors 
along with what might be termed special bargain-
ing considerations. It has been argued that fee 
fishing provides the coastal state with less con-
trol, and presumably less bargaining power, than 
do joint ventures where the coastal state plays a 
direct role in the harvesting or processing of the 
resource (Tomlinson and Brown 1979). If this is 
in fact the case, then the coastal state has an 
incentive to establish joint ventures, even though 
comparative advantage considerations alone 
point to fee fishing as optimal. 
Given that the basic argument for cooperative 
arrangements is no more than a variant of the 
standard free trade argument, then, as to be 
expected, the arguments advanced within coastal 
states against such arrangements are no more 
than the standard arguments for protection. 
Indeed, if one were to turn to any major elemen-
tary textbook in economics and list the argu-
ments, both legitimate and fallacious, for protec-
tion contained therein, one would be hard 
pressed to find any that have not at some time 
been used in opposition to cooperative fisheries 
arrangements. 
For example, attempts in Alaska to establish 
cooperative arrangements in which American 
vessels harvest groundfish for delivery to foreign 
processing vessels have been vigorously opposed 
by domestic processors who complain about the 
unfair competition from foreign offshore proces-
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sors that have access to cheap labour. As well, the 
supporters of the domestic processors warn of the 
adverse consequences for the U.S. balance of 
payments of allowing foreigners to process Alas-
kan fish (Munro 1981). A much more respectable 
argument is for the development of infant 
industries. 
Before EFJ, many· coastal-state fishing indus-
tries, without distant-water nation pretensions, 
viewed fisheries under international jurisdiction 
to be unduly risky. The attitude was particularly 
true for fisheries requiring special equipment. 
Distant-water nations were much less concerned 
by the uncertain future of the resources. Indeed, 
in many instances, distant-water fleets engaged in 
"pulse fishing" (Tanaka 1980:2) in which the 
resources were heavily exploited on a temporary 
basis and then abandoned until they were 
restored. 
With the coming ofEFJ, resource uncertainty 
was reduced and coastal-state fishing industries 
took a greater interest in their exploitation. 
However, the coastal-state fishing industries 
were at a disadvantage vis a vis distant-water 
counterparts because they lacked necessary fleet 
and plant capacity or necessary skills and tech-
niques. Thus, at least some of the relevant fisher-
ies advanced the argument that they would prove 
to be the more efficient exploiters of the resources 
if only given the necessary time to develop the 
requisite harvesting and processing capacity or 
the time to acquire the appropriate skills. The 
infant-fishery argument could be used to support 
either the proposition that cooperative fishery 
arrangements should be banned or the proposi-
tion that such arrangements be allowed, but on a 
temporary basis only. 
Unquestionably in some instances, the argu-
ment will prove to be valid. Like all versions of 
the infant-industry argument, however, it can be 
easily abused by those who demand protection 
for infants who have negligible prospects for 
reaching maturity. 
The Future of Cooperative Fisheries 
Arrangements 
At the dawn ofEFJ, a view prevailing in many 
coastal states was that voiced in 1974 by the then 
Canadian federal minister responsible for fisher-
ies (Tomlinson and Vertinsky 1975:2570): 
The long term is for Canadians. Canada is not 
only going to reach out and encompass all of the 
living resources of her continental slope and 
shelf, we are going to make sure that they are 
harvested by Canadians in Canadian owned ves-
sels and processed in Canada as well. 
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This argument - that current cooperative 
fisheries arrangements are no more than tempo-
rary expedients - is simply an argument to the 
effect that, where cost (or price) relationships 
currently favour a cooperative arrangement, 
these relationships will be reversed over time. To 
illustrate, one can return to the original example 
of a cooperative arrangement in which foreign 
harvesting is combined with domestic processing 
(and marketing) and in which p1(x,t,)< c1(x,t). It 
will be recalled that p1(x,t) denotes the exvessel 
price to foreign vessels and c1 (x,t) denotes domes-
tic unit harvesting costs. 
The cooperative arrangement can be viewed as 
temporary if there exists a switching time t = T, 
0 < T < 00 , such that p1 (x, t) < c1 (x, t) for 
O~ t< T and p1(x,t)> c1(x,t) for T~ t~oo. On 
the other hand, ifT <( 00 , then the conditions exist 
for a permanent arrangement. A switch or rever-
sal is possible ifthe coastal state's fishing industry 
actually proves to have a comparative advantage 
when it has acquired the necessary skills or built 
up its capacity. 
In part, industry factors may well produce cost 
reversals in selected cases. However, this admis-
sion is quite different from the argument that 
they will be sufficiently powerful and pervasive to 
bring about cost (price) reversals in all cases. 
Whereas it is difficult to prove that cooperative 
fisheries arrangements will have a long-term 
future in the Pacific and elsewhere, the reverse 
argument - that all cooperative arrangements 
will eventually be undermined and eliminated -
is unreasonable if not untenable. In North Amer-
ica at least, the view has lost ground. In Canada, 
despite protectionism, the policy of marine 
autarchy advocated by the former fisheries minis-
ter in 1974 is no longer taken seriously, and the 
likelihood that the cooperative arrangements for 
harvesting hake, for example, will give way to 
exclusive domestic harvesting and processing in 
the foreseeable future is regarded as negligible 
(Munro 1981). 
In the United States, the shift in attitude has 
been even more striking and is illustrated by the 
decisions taken about groundfish in Alaska. As a 
consequence of EFJ, the United States gained 
control over immense groundfish resources in 
waters off Alaska, the bulk of which consisted of 
low-valued pollack. In the late 1970s, the annual 
harvests of Alaskan groundfish of some 1.4 Mt 
accounted for an estimated 9%. of the world 
supply of groundfish and exceeded the entire 
U.S. consumption of groundfish (Stokes 1980b). 
Of these harvests, less than 1 % was accounted for 
by American fishermen, the remainder being 
accounted for by several distant-water nations of 
which Japan was the most prominent (Munro 
1980). 
Nonetheless, the American authorities expected 
a large expansion of the U.S. fishing industry 
based upon these resources. The resources were 
mentioned specifically in the legislation establish-
ing the American EFJ [U.S. Congress, Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Sec-
tion 2(b) (6)] and figured prominently in the 
National Marine Fisheries Service plan for the 
development of American fishing activities (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1976). 
The United States, in allowing distant-water 
nation participation, made no attempt to maxi-
mize its return from the fishery. Quotas were 
assigned on the basis of historical fishing rights, 
and the fees paid by distant-water fleets were set 
at low levels. Although this behaviour reflected 
an ambiguity in the U.S. view of its property 
rights over the resources, it also reflected in large 
measure a belief, on the part of the American 
authorities, that foreign exploitation of the 
resource would be all but eliminated by an 
expanded American fishing industry (Munro 
1981; Stokes forthcoming). 
By 1980, it was becoming evident that the 
expected expansion in the U.S. industry was not 
going to come about unless the economics of the 
fishery underwent a radical change (Stokes 
forthcoming). The infant appeared to be 
stillborn. 
The American authorities were thus faced with 
the option of either tolerating the presence of 
distant-water fleets in their Alaskan waters on an 
indefinite basis or reducing their presence by 
legislative means. Ultimately, the authorities 
accepted the former option, passing the Ameri-
can Fisheries Promotion Act (AFP A) in 
December 1980 (U.S. Congress l 980a). With this 
legislation, the American authorities adopted a 
new policy of attempting to extract a positive 
return from foreigners harvesting within the 
American zone. In so doing, the American 
authorities tacitly conceded that the foreign pres-
ence in the Alaskan groundfish fishery would be 
indefinite. 
Under the new policy, popularly referred to as 
the "fish-and-chips" policy, the Americans are 
now prepared to abandon their historical fishing 
rights approach and to use harvest allocations as 
bargaining counters or "chips." The legislation 
clearly allows the Americans freedom to use fees 
imposed upon foreigners as a means of extracting 
resource rent [AFPA Section (b) (IO)]. 
Although I cannot speak with equal authority 
on shifts in attitudes in other Pacific coastal 
states, it would be surprising ifthe experience of 
Canada and the United States proved to be 
unique. 
Although the prospects for long-term coopera-
tive fisheries arrangements are good, in several 
parts of the Pacific an important barrier exists to 
their development. The barrier takes the form of 
uncertainty or ambiguity in the nature of coastal-
state property rights to the fishery resources 
acquired under EFJ. 
Three observable reasons are: inadequate 
management capabilities in the coastal states, 
existence of shared stocks, and ideological or 
philosophical constraints. If a coastal state lacks 
the capacity to provide effective stock assessment 
and effective surveillance and enforcement, then 
the property rights lack substance. As a conse-
quence, the resources revert, on a de facto if not 
de jure basis, to their former common-property 
status. Distant-water nations that enter into 
arrangements with the coastal state are given 
every incentive to discount the future of the 
resources heavily and every disincentive to 
honour their obligations. Hence, the prospects 
for long-term arrangements are highly 
unpromising. 
The fact that fish are mobile has meant that 
many stocks encompassed by coastal-state 
fishery zones either are shared with other coastal 
states or are shared with distant-water nations 
because they cross the zone boundaries into the 
high seas. Thus, the resources constitute joint 
property. If the joint owners of a resource can 
cooperate effectively, they can introduce an 
optimal management program, even though their 
goals and interests differ (Munro 1979). How-
ever, without such cooperation, the common-
property conditions emerge (Levhari and Mir-
man 1980) and the prospects for long-term 
cooperative arrangements would be seriously 
undermined. The greater the numbers of joint 
owners, the poorer are .the chances for effective 
cooperation. 
Uncertainty attributable to inadequate man-
agement capabilities and the transboundary 
nature of stocks is illustrated by the tuna fisheries 
in the southwest Pacific, the Pacific islands 
region. Because tuna are highly migratory, the 
major species in the region (yellowfin and skip-
jack) are widely shared among the island states 
and territories. Although there is not the problem 
of tuna crossing zone boundaries into the high 
seas in large numbers (Gulland 1980), tuna do 
cross the boundaries of23 diverse states and terri-
tories - a fact that makes difficult the coordina-
tion of a management policy. In addition, many 
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of the states and territories have small popula-
tions, are underdeveloped, and, hence, are 
seriously lacking in surveillance and enforcement 
capabilities (Miles 1981). 
There does exist a regional coordinating body 
in the form of the so-called South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency, which includes the island states 
plus Australia and New Zealand. The agency has 
proved unwieldy, however, and, thus, of ques-
tionable value as a coordinating body. An 
attempt is now being made to establish a more 
cohesive coordinating body consisting of Papua 
New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Solomons, 
Nauru, and Paulu. This group's zones account 
for 70% of the yellowfin and 90% of the skipjack 
harvests (Miles 1981). Whether it will prove to be 
effective is uncertain. 
Many of the states and territories in the region 
will probably not have the capacity to harvest the 
tuna resource for many years. Hence, the scope 
for cooperative arrangements is substantial, a 
considerable number of arrangements having 
already been established. Japan, by far the most 
important of the distant-water nations operating 
in the region, has established arrangements with 
16 of the 23 states and territories in the region. 
At present, however, distant-water nations 
have an incentive to underreport their harvests 
and a complementary incentive to fish heavily 
now in fear of uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
entry of new distant-water nations in the future 
(E. Miles, personal communication). How 
coastal-state surveillance and enforcement 
capacity and coastal cooperation can be 
improved sufficiently to prevent the common-
property syndrome from developing unchecked 
is not at all clear. 
Another source of ambiguity of coastal-state 
property rights arises from ideological or philo-
sophical constraints. In this case, a coastal state 
may have ample power to manage the relevant 
resources and may have to share them with no 
one but is reluctant to lay explicit claim to prop-
erty rights over the newly acquired resources. 
Although I would be hard pressed to point to a 
case in the Pacific where such reluctance has 
damaged the prospects for long-term arrange-
ments, I can point to an important near miss 
involving the American groundfish resources off 
Alaska. The American position on fisheries dur-
ing the preparations within the UN leading to the 
Third Law of the Sea Conference was that coastal 
states should have exclusive management, but 
not property, rights to fishery resources within 
their zones; that, as manager, or steward, of the 
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resources, they should be allowed preferential 
harvesting rights within their zone; that they 
should allocate any surpluses within the total 
allowable catch (TAC) to distant-water nations; 
that they should not expect a return on such 
surpluses; and that the fees imposed on the 
distant-water fleets should be for the sole purpose 
of defraying management costs (Munro 1981). 
The Law of the Sea Conference rejected the 
American approach in favour of an approac)l in 
which the coastal states were to be given explicit 
property rights to the fishery resources in their 
zones. Nonetheless, the spirit of the American 
position became embodied in the Fishery Con-
servation Management Act of 1976 (Munro 
1981). 
Economists had long objected to the American 
approach on the grounds that, although appar-
ently altruistic in nature, it could easily lead to 
economic mismanagement of coastal-state 
resources (Anderson 1974; Christy 1973; Munro 
1977a). The coastal state would be faced with an 
irresistible temptation to acquire property rights 
over the resources in its zone indirectly by min-
imizing surplus portions of the TA Cs. 
The implications for cooperative fisheries 
arrangements were twofold. First, although joint 
ventures would not be precluded, their future 
would be dubious because any foreign involve-
ment in the fisheries would weaken the coastal 
state's indirect property claims to the fishery 
resources (Munro 1981). Second, fee-fishing 
arrangements would, almost by definition, be 
eliminated over time. 
The largest fishery resources acquired by the 
United States under EF J consisted of the ground-
fish resources in the Bering Sea and Gulf of 
Alaska. An overwhelmingly large percentage of 
the harvest of these resources has, since EFJ, 
been taken, not by domestic vessels for onshore 
processing nor under joint-venture operations, 
but by foreign vessels on a fee-fishing basis (in 
1979, 96% of the harvest) (Munro 1981). 
In keeping with the philosophy that coastal 
states should not profit from foreign harvests in 
their fishery zones, the American authorities 
levied only very modest fees on foreign vessels 
exploiting Alaskan groundfish. Indeed, the fees 
were probably not adequate to compensate the 
United States for the management costs implied 
by the presence of the foreign vessels (Munro 
1981). When it became clear that domestic har-
vesting was not going to expand and exploit the 
resources, the Americans were faced with the 
option of tolerating the presence of distant-water 
fleets in their zone indefinitely or of removing it 
by legislative force. Although they eventually 
adopted the former option, there was, in Con-
gress, a serious attempt to adopt the second 
option. 
Conclusions 
Two policy questions still require serious 
investigation. The first concerns the require-
ments for long-term cooperative arrangements 
that will be mutually beneficial to the partners. 
To date, the majority of cooperative arrange-
ments have been short term and ad hoc in nature. 
The second, and more difficult, question is how 
to upgrade coastal-state management capacity 
and to ensure acceptable management of trans-
boundary stocks. In the regions where this ques-
tion remains unresolved, it will threaten not only 
the future of cooperative fisheries arrangements, 
but the EFJ itself. 
Funding for this paper was provided by the Donner 
Canadian Foundation through a grant to the Institute 
of International Relations' research project on Canada 
and international trade at the University of British 
Columbia. 
Discussion 
K. Hemmi: One should look at Gordon Munro's 
provocative paper carefully. It deals with pros-
pects for cooperative arrangements over the long 
run. As Catherine Wallace pointed out, joint-
venture arrangements have a multiple function. 
However, the prevailing view in many coastal 
states is that joint ventures are temporary expe-
dients. Gordon Munro does not think so. In his 
opinion, excluding foreign fishing fleets from 
some fisheries will result in economic losses 
because the fishery resource is renewable. 
Moreover, he comments that, if a coastal state 
refuses to enter cooperative arrangements, the 
surveillance and enforcement costs in preventing 
poaching by resentful distant-water fleets may 
prove prohibitive. 
He is pessimistic about the possibility of devel-
oping infant industries in the coastal states, 
although cooperative arrangements, especially 
joint ventures, are seen by some as a shortcut to 
the development of the fishing industry (provid-
ing skills, technology, capital and equipment, 
processing and marketing advantages). Past 
records of efforts by coastal states to develop 
their fishing industries, generally speaking, sup-
port the author's pessimism. However, I hope 
that the efforts of Japan, both public and private, 
to support development of the fishing industries 
in the South Pacific, for example, will be success-
ful. I do believe that fishing industries in develop-
ing countries could play an important role in 
overall economic development. 
As a consequence of EFJ in American and 
Soviet waters alone, 1000 Japanese vessels 
became underutilized. This is an important statis-
tic in view of Munro's discussion of the seasonal-
ity of some fisheries combined with the nonmal-
leability of capital investments. I agree with his 
concern for stressing such facts. I would add that 
marketing of catch also is extremely important, 
especially when the species of fish are not con-
sumed in the coastal state. 
The free-trade position taken by Munro 
assumes that both parties have or will acquire 
perfect knowledge about the optimum amount to 
be harvested, about harvesting and processing 
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techniques, and about markets for the products 
in cooperative fisheries arrangements. The expe-
rience of the Japanese in negotiations with coast-
al states for licenced fishing quotas is that there is 
a lack of such knowledge. I think that securing 
perfect knowledge about the fishing industry is 
an important bargaining point in most coopera-
tive arrangements. Arrangements that actually 
provide the necessary knowledge to coastal state 
personnel are, by their nature, temporary and 
will not ever be a permanent component of the 
new scheme of world fisheries management. 
Finally, as pointed out repeatedly during this 
conference, unemployment problems in the fish-
ing industry are very serious, and coastal states 
facing such problems may have a legitimate rea-
son for supporting development of this domestic 
industry. 
In summary, I believe that Munro's paper is a 
landmark in fishery economics but that he should 
not be so pessimistic about the prospects for 
developing infant fishing industries, especially in 
developing states with extended fisheries jurisdic-
tion. I also believe that unemployment or under-
employment may be regarded as more important 
than his economic arguments and may be a legit-
imate basis for efforts to develop domestic capac-
ities in newly acquired jurisdictions. 
Fiscal Policies and Resource Rents 
in the Extraterritorial Oceans 
Ross Garnaut 
Natural Resource Regimes, Technical Assistance Group, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 
England 
A new Ia w of the sea was essential if the potential economic value of the old extraterritorial seas 
were to be put to the service of humanity. The informa!Dreft Convention from theThird Law of the 
Sea Conference went a long way toward developing a system that avoids the dissipation of economic 
rents for the natural resources in the oceans. It does this mainly through the creation of the 200-mile 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for coastal states. For the ocean resources that remain outside the 
extended sovereignty of nation states, principally a minor part of world fisheries and the deep-sea 
polymetallic nodules, new international regulatory systems have been required. The new law of the 
sea provides for a flexible system of fisheries management based on regional organizations. More 
detailed arrangements were laid down for deep-sea mining. If deep-sea mining turns out to be highly 
profitable, the proposed arrangements will restrict its expansion but leave a considerable part of 
economic rent with investors. This might eventually be seen as a weakness of the system, which could 
be reduced through the introduction of general income tax obligations and competitive bidding for 
leases. If deep-sea mining turns out to be a marginally profitable activity in favourable conditions, 
the proposed fiscal arrangements will not be an important deterrent to development. 
L'etablissement d'un nouveau droit de Ia mer constituait une mesure essentielle pour mettre au 
service de l'humanite la valeur economique de !'exploitation des eaux extra-territoriales. L'avant-
projet informel de Ia Ille Conference sur le droit de la mer va tres loin dans la mise en oeuvre d'un 
systeme de droit de propriete des ressources maritimes visant a eviter le gaspillage de Ia rente 
economique. Ce systeme repose principalement sur Ia determination d'une "zone economique 
exclusive" de 200 milles reservee aux etats riverains. Quant a !'exploitation en-de9a de cette zone, qui 
concerne une faible partie des peches mondiales et Jes nodules metalliques qui tapissent Jes grands 
fond oceaniques, ii a ete necessaire d'instaurer de nouvelles legislations internationales. Le nouveau 
droit de Ia mer permet a des organismes regionaux d'exercer une gestion des peches tres sou pie. Cette 
formule paralt rationnelle et la politique fiscale etablie offre une gamme de choix aux futures 
organisations. La politique internationale de Ia conference a elabore des clauses plus detaillees en 
prevision de !'exploitation miniere des oceans. Si ces operations s'averent tres rentables, la conven-
tion proposee Iimitera Jes activites des investisseurs mais elle leur garantira une grande part de rente 
economique. Ce peut etre Ia la faiblesse du systeme qui pourrait cependant etre corrigee par 
!'imposition de taxes sur le revenu et Ia mise en encheres des permis d'exploitation. Mais si 
!'exploitation miniere des fonds marins ne devenait qu'une activite marginale, Jes mesures fiscales 
proposees ne devraient pas constituer un frein au developpement. 
For nearly 8 years, the Third Conference on 
the Law of the Sea has been meeting under 
United Nations auspices in an attempt to estab-
lish a system of law for the nonterritorial oceans 
and to delimit individual nations' sovereignty in 
the oceans. Early in 1981, Ambassador Koh of 
Singapore, who chairs the conference, expressed 
hope that a session in August would reach 
agreement on the long negotiations, based on an 
informal draft of August 1980. However, the new 
United States administration is reviewing the 
United States' position on the draft and has 
warned that this timetable is unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, the progress that has been made 
so far in negotiations provides substantial insight 
into the system of law that is likely to be estab-
lished and therefore allows one to say something 
about systems of fiscal policy that would be 
appropriate under the new law. The 1980 draft 
discusses in considerable detail fiscal arrange-
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ments in deep-sea mining but is less specific for 
fisheries. Although the Reagan administration 
has taken strong exception to some elements of 
the draft arrangements on deep-sea mining, the 
fiscal arrangements do not seem to be a main 
contention at this stage, presumably because they 
favour the interests of private investors from the 
advanced industrial countries (Jagota 1981). 
However, if the United States sends other issues 
in the draft back to the negotiating table, other 
countries may take the opportunity to reopen 
discussion on the fiscal arrangements. 
The issues revolving around the fiscal arrange-
ments have been introduced in earlier Pacific 
Trade and Development conferences (Alexander 
and Christy 1977; Gorham 1978). Although the 
issues concern the whole of the international 
community, they have a special relevance for the 
Pacific: the Pacific is the most important habitat 
of the highly migratory species of fish, especially 
tuna, whose management will be greatly affected 
by the new arrangements; and the Pacific at this 
stage seems to provide the most favourable sites 
for the mining of polymetallic nodules from the 
ocean floor. The prospective new law of the sea 
has already precipitated the formation of one 
new subregional resource management agency, 
the Forum Fisheries Agency, in the southwest 
Pacific region. 
Natural Resource Rents 
A characteristic of natural resources is that in 
favourable circumstances they can generate eco-
nomic rent, that is, their exploitation can yield 
income in excess of the sum of the supply prices 
of all the economic inputs that are necessary for 
the activity. 
The favourable circumstances include the 
presence of a system of law that restricts entry 
into resource exploitation through the estab-
lishment of property rights. In the absence of 
controls on access to a resource, more and more 
other resources will be applied to its exploitation, 
beyond the point where the marginal cost of 
inputs exceeds the value of the incremental 
resource-based production, until total costs of 
inputs equals total value of output (Gordon 
1954). At this point, by definition, the common-
property resource yields no rent. 
The theory of economic rent applies to both 
renewable and nonrenewable resources, 
although there are characteristic differences 
between the two types of natural resources that 
become important to the analysis of economic 
rent in some circumstances. The classical theory 
of resource rent was originally developed for a 
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renewable resource: agricultural land, which, 
with good management, could be cropped con-
tinually without loss of productive power. Part of 
the classical interest in resource rent was that it 
was potentially a source of nondistorting 
taxation. 
In the classical theory, renewable-resource rent 
arose from the fact that the quality of the 
resource determined its ability to generate out-
put. Economic rent was a measure of the differen-
tial and depended on the amount by which the 
unit cost of production on a specific piece of the 
resource (land) was below that on a marginal 
piece. 
Clunies Ross and I (forthcoming) have 
recently demonstrated that the classical concept 
of economic rent is directly applicable to nonre-
newable (mineral) resources in terms of total 
output over long periods but not in terms of 
annual output. In place of a rising marginal cost 
of production in a single time period from renew-
able resources, one must think of a rising margin-
al cost of production over the whole of the eco-
nomically relevant future. Prices and unit costs 
from different times must be made relevant to the 
present by the application of appropriate dis-
count rates. For mineral resources, this means 
that the marginal resource is the highest-cost 
mineral deposit being exploited not only at a 
particular time - as is the case with renewable 
resources - but also indefinitely. 
Although the conceptual bases for rents from 
renewable and nonrenewable natural resources 
find common ground on the simple classical 
assumptions, the characteristic difference is that 
nonrenewable resources are not sustainable at 
any economically realistic level of production. A 
renewable resource takes on this property of a 
nonrenewable resource when either the environ-
mental or biologic components necessary for 
renewal are destroyed by too-high levels of pro-
duction. The destruction may be to the physical 
environment. Environmental destruction is 
exemplified by soil erosion; biologic, by overfish-
ing. To avoid biologic destruction, scientists have 
introduced the concept of maximum sustainable 
yield, unique to renewable resources. The classi-
cal theory of rent can be applied only to levels of 
production at or below the maximum sustainable 
yield of a renewable resource. 
Common-Property Resources 
Uncontrolled access to natural resources dissi-
pates economic rents in two ways that are com-
mon to renewable and nonrenewable resources 
and a third that occurs only with renewable 
resources. In the first, resources continue to be 
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attracted into the expansion of production from 
the common-property resource untH average cost 
of production equals price, when, by definition, 
the resource yields no rent. In the second, addi-
tional resources are attracted into exploitation of 
a natural resource even when they are unneces-
sary to the full utilization of the resource - that 
is, there is wasteful duplication of investment. 
The investment is attracted by the opportunity to 
share in the economic rents even when the addi-
tional investment adds nothing to total output. 
The extreme case is pure duplication of invest-
ment, which occurs when production units race 
each other to deplete a nonrenewable resource or 
the periodic yield of a renewable resource. 
Examples include oil producers drilling the same 
field, thousands of diggers bearing the overhead 
costs of migration in a gold rush when hundreds 
could have fully exploited the field over a longer 
period, or a large number of boats producing in a 
short time a catch that could have been managed 
in a proportionately longer time by a small 
number utilizing their capacity more fully. In the 
third, when the price of the resource-based prod-
uct is higher than is necessary to induce produc-
tion at the maximum sustainable yield, total out-
put actually contracts, and potential economic 
value is dissipated to an even greater extent than 
with either the first or the second way. 
When application of ancillary resources yields 
positive but diminishing increments in resource-
based produce, none of the additional inputs 
duplicates existing productive capacity. This 
level of production is exemplified by the exploita-
tion of a fishery below the intensity required to 
generate maximum sustainable yield or the 
exploitation of a mineral deposit. (I have 
assumed that the resource is sufficiently small for 
its output not to affect world prices of the 
resource-based product.) 
hi Fig. 1, unit prices and cost of production are 
shown on the vertical and quantities of produc-
tion on the horizontal axis. MC represents the 
marginal cost and AC the average cost of produc-
ing the natural resource-based product. With 
uncontrolled access to the resource, output 
expands until average cost equals the given price, 
OP at OQ2• However, the addition of productive 
inputs to expand output beyond OQ1 is asso-
ciated with unit costs in-excess of the price of the 
product. The total excess cost of producing 
beyond OQ1 is represented by the horizontally 
shaded area BCD. 
The economic rent generated by exploitation 
of the resource is maximized when production is 
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Fig. I. Dissipation of economic rents in the common-
property resource: no decline in total output and no 
pure duplication. 
production equals the product price. The total 
economic rent is the total surplus of revenue over 
production costs, at point Q1 (described by the 
obliquely shaded area FBP). The area FBP 
equals the area BCD. 
I should distinguish the dissipation of rent de-
scribed in Fig. 1 from the more extreme case 
where there is pure duplication of productive 
effort so that at least part of the additional 
resources applied to exploitation yields no out-
put, quite independently of considerations asso-
ciated with overexploitation of a renewable 
resource. 
In practice, uncontrolled access to a natural 
resource is likely to lead to the dissipation of 
economic value simultaneously through the first 
and second ways. When the resource is renew-
able, the first and second processes of dissipation 
will be, if product price is sufficiently high, 
accompanied as well by the third. 
Fig. 2 ·describes how, in the application of 
·increased productive capacity to the exploitation 
of a renewable resource beyond a maximum ( cor-
responding to output OQ*), production falls. 
Average costs continue to rise. The marginal cost 
curve is discontinuous at point OQ*: marginal 
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Fig. 2. Dissipation of economic rents in the renewable 
common-property resource: possible decline in total 
output and no pure duplication. 
remains below OP*, the analysis is similar to that 
for Fig. 1: productive effort is expanded until 
average cost equals price and, beyond the point B 
at which marginal cost equals price, causes dissi-
pation of renewable-resource rent. The maxi-
mum sustainable yield of a common-property 
resource is always an inefficient level of produc-
tion at the price that encourages it; at this price, 
economic rent would be maximized if production 
were restricted to OQ1, corresponding to the 
point at which marginal cost equals the price 
OP*. 
Renewable resource rents could be maximized 
at the maximum sustainable yield only at a price 
equal to or greater than OP**, greater than OP*, 
at which price equals the marginal cost of pro-
duction at the maximum sustainable yield. 
Resource rents are maximized when access to 
the resources is restricted so that price is equated 
with marginal costs of production or when pro-
duction is restricted to the maximum sustainable 
yield when price exceeds the marginal cost of 
producing the last marginal contribution to max-
imum sustainable yield. In most modern socie-
ties, mechanisms have been established for re-
stricting access to land-based natural resources in 
the interests of economic efficiency through the 
assertion of state ownership, with exclusion 
rights being granted to private investors by 
agreement with the state (for example, minerals 
in all Pacific countries except the United States) 
or with the establishment of a system of private 
property rights (for example, agricultural land). 
The conferences on the law of the sea have been 
working toward the establishment of a system of 
property rights that will allow the exploitation of 
extraterritorial ocean resources by private inves-
tors by agreement with various international 
authorities. The new system requires mechanisms 
for limiting access to ocean resources to generate 
economic rent and to secure appropriate distri-
bution of that rent. A closely related matter is the 
relationship between resource rents and the rents 
from monopoly in commodity markets. 
Resource Rents and Monopoly Rents 
The consumer is an often-forgotten participant 
in the exploitation of resources; in fact, conflict 
may arise between producers and consumers. 
Although demand is infinitely elastic over the 
relevant range of production, consumers are 
indifferent to the level of production; however, 
when price is responsive to the level of produc-
tion, consumers benefit from higher levels of 
production even if resource rent is dissipated. 
Much of the fisheries-management literature 
overlooks this distinction and proceeds as if rent 
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maximization through the equation of marginal 
cost and marginal revenue defined an economi-
cally efficient level of production (Young 
1977: 115-117 and the references cited therein). 
This is the opposite error common among mod-
ern libertarian neoclassical economists who tend 
to see all resource rents as monopoly rents (note 
the popular statements of Milton Friedman on 
OPEC). 
I propose that: 
• Producers and consumers taken together 
are better off (abstracting from the possibility of 
the marginal utility of money being greater for 
consumers than for producers) by restricting 
production to the level at which marginal cost of 
production equals price, than with the normal 
outcome in the common-property resource 
where output expands to equate average cost and 
price. Consumers alone are better off with the 
common-property resource, so long as produc-
tive effort in relation to the exploitation of a 
common-property resource is not greater than is 
necessary to produce the maximum sustainable 
yield. 
• Producers and consumers taken together 
are better off when marginal cost is equated with 
price than when producers use monopoly power 
in the product market to equate price with mar-
ginal revenue, although producers alone may be 
better off, in a similar position, or worse off 
through restricting production to equate margin-
al cost with marginal revenue. . 
• The interests of consumers coincide'with the 
interests of producers in restricting maximum 
productive effort to the level that is necessary to 
produce at the maximum sustainable yield. 
Fig. 3 compares welfare effects to equating 
marginal cost and price with the common-
property resource equation of average cost with 
price, i in a world that is defined as in Fig. 1 in all 
respects other than the downward sloping 
demand curve. 
DD! is the demand curve, CMC the marginal 
cost curve, and CAC the average cost curve. In 
the common-property resource, output is OQ1 
and price OP1• Marginal cost of production, P3 , 
is in excess of the level that consumers are pre-
pared to pay for the product at output OQ1• 
Marginal cost equals price at point E, corres-
1Some of the argument in Fig. 3 and 4 will be made by 
Clunies Ross and me in a forthcoming publication. The 
use of analysis along these lines in welfare economics 
was surveyed by Currie et al. (1971). The argument is 
valid so long as income effects are relatively small - a 
condition that would seem to be met for analysis of 
extraterritorial ocean resource production at present. 
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Fig. 3. Welfare effects of natural resources with exclu-
sive property rights and common-property resources. 
ponding to the lower output OQ2 and higher 
price P2 . Consumer surplus is greater at the 
higher than at the lower output, the reduction in 
consumer surplus being measured by the quadri-
lateral P2P1 AE. Resource rent is greater at the 
lower than at the higher level of output, the 
increase being the triangle P2CE. 
The sum of resource rent and consumer sur-
plus in the common-property resource is the area 
covered by the triangle DP 1 A. (There is no 
resource rent.) The sum of resource rent and 
consumer surplus when marginal cost equals 
price is given by the triangle DCE. The quadrilat-
eral DP1GE is common to both areas so that the 
sum of consumer surplus and natural resource 
rent in the common-property resource is less than 
the equivalent sum when marginal revenue 
equals price ifthe residual area EGA is less than 
the residual area P 1 CG. The theory of the 
common-property resource indicates that the 
area P 1CG equals the area GAB. Since EGA is 
contained by GAB, the sum of the surpluses is 
lower in the common-property resource. 
Fig. 4 compares welfare effects of equating 
marginal cost and price with the situation that 
would exist if monopoly power were used in the 
product market so that marginal cost was 
equated with marginal revenue. 
The marginal cost curve CM C and the demand 























Fig. 4. Natural-resource rents and consumer surplus 
with monopoly and competitive product markets. 
product markets, marginal cost and price are 
equated at A, corresponding to output OQ 1 and 
price P1• If monopoly power in the product 
market is fully exploited, production is restricted 
to OQ2, at which product price is P2 and marginal 
cost of production the lower level P3 • 
The sum of resource rent and consumer sur-
plus is described by the area DCA with competi-
tion in product markets. With the exercise of 
monopoly power, resource rents are reduced to 
P3 CB and consumer surplus to DP2E. However, 
monopoly rents totaling P2P3 BE accrue to the 
producer in the latter situation. The total of 
resource rents, consumer surplus, and monopoly 
rents is described by the quadrilateral DCBE 
when monopoly power is exercised. DCBE falls 
within the area DCA, demonstrating that the 
total of consumer and producer surplus is greater 
with competitive markets. 
The exercise of monopoly power increases 
total producers' rents if the monopoly rents 
P2P3BE exceed the loss of resource rents P 1P3BA. 
The quadrilateral P 1P3 BF is common to both 
areas. The residual gain in monopoly rents 
P2P 1 FE may be less than equal to or greater than 
the residual loss of resource rents FBA, depend-
ing on supply and demand elasticities. Total pro-
ducers rents are more likely to be raised through 
the exercise of monopoly power the greater the 
rate of increase in production costs for expan-
sions of output beyond OQ2 and the more inelas-
tic the demand function. 
The analysis of Fig. 1 and 2 becomes indeter-
minate when applied to a renewable resource 
with the possibility of producing beyond the 
maximum sustainable yield. There is no longer 
any certainty that the demand and average cost 
curves will cross. If they do not, price increases, 
productive effort increases, and production 
declines successively until the resource is totally 
depleted. Even the interests of the consumer 
would be served better by controlled access than 
by the maintenance of the common-property 
resource, even if control were maintained by a 
monopolist restricting output, below maximum 
sustainable yield, to equate price with marginal 
revenue. 
Husbanding and Taxation of Resource 
Rents 
Economic efficiency from an international 
viewpoint will be promoted by the restriction of 
access to natural resources in such a way that: 
• Producers have an interest in avoiding 
wasteful duplication of investment and in equat-
ing marginal cost with price; 
• No single producer can exercise monopoly 
over product markets; and, 
• Above all, the productive effort does not 
exceed the maximum sustainable yield of the 
resource. 
Private investors or state-owned corporations, 
which are directed to maximize profits, should be 
given exclusive rights of access to natural resources 
so that the desiderata for natural resources of a 
fixed location are secured. Mobile natural re-
sources, most notably fish, are more difficult to 
manage, because the conferring of exclusive rights 
of access to particular geographic areas will not 
generally remove their common-property charac-
teristics. To secure desiderata, some regulatory 
agency must enforce its view on the optimal level of 
output from a fishery as a whole, establish exclu-
sive rights of access to certain levels of output 
rather than to the resource itself, and also enforce 
its view on the optimal level of fishing effort to 
avoid wasteful duplication of investment. 
There are difficult practical problems and high 
transaction costs in selecting and enforcing 
optimal levels of productive effort and produc-
tion. Apart from problems of securing interna-
tional cooperation in the regulation of fisheries 
extending beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of a 
single state, the technical difficulties are consid-
erable in ascertaining the maximum sustainable 
yield of a fishery, and, where the optimal eco-
nomic level of production is clearly below maxi-
mum sustainable yield, in estimating the eco-
nomic parameters that determine the level of 
output at which marginal cost equals price. The 
best that can be attained in any important fishery 
is a rough approximation to the optimal. 
The regulatory agency enforces its views on 
optimal levels of fishing effort and output by 
various means. Perhaps the most common means 
currently applied are prescribing technology and 
limiting the fishing season. Other means are 
direct controls on total output and specific as well 
as ad valorem taxes on production that reduce 
net revenue to investors to levels at which they 
voluntarily produce at the desired level. Cooper 
(1976) in an interesting survey of these issues in 
the context of early discussions of the new law of 
the sea correctly condemns the prescribing of 
some technology or the limiting of the fisheries 
season as introducing new sources of dissipation 
of rent. However, he goes too far in criticizing the 
use of quantitative controls on output on the 
same grounds and in preferring deliberately dis-
torting taxation for its presumed superiority in 
these respects. Direct controls on total output do 
not inhibit the application of lowest-cost tech-
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nology. Moreover, when market prices are in 
excess of those required for economically effi-
cient production at the maximum sustainable 
yield, the regulatory agency requires less infor-
mation to apply quantitative controls than to 
apply optimal taxes. To enforce optimal quantita-
tive controls in these circumstances, only biologic 
data are required. However, the application of 
optimal distorting taxation requires data on price 
and production costs, in addition to the biologic 
data. 
When the regulatory agency controls such 
large amounts of a resource that prices are 
responsive to its own behaviour, it will be in a 
position to appropriate monopoly rents. To 
avoid the use of monopoly power, it must ensure 
that no single investor is granted access to such a 
large part of a resource that the investor's pro-
duction decisions can affect price. In the case of 
quantitative controls on output from a large 
fishery, rights must be allocated among a suffi-
ciently large number of producers to exclude this 
possibility. 
The establishment of a suitable system of 
property rights can avoid the dissipation of 
resource rent but raises the issue of how the rent 
should be distributed. The regulatory agency can 
in principle claim the rents as a condition for 
granting private investors access to resources, but 
it is not an easy matter to collect all the rent 
without dissipating part of it through the distor-
tion of investment and production decisions. 
There is now a large literature on this matter 
(Garnaut and Clunies Ross, forthcoming), but a 
summary of the main propositions is warranted. 
Optimal Taxation 
The regulatory authorities can obtain revenue 
by requiring that investors pay a fee before being 
given access to a resource (prior fixed payments) 
or by charging the investor royalties, or taxes, the 
total payments of which are conditional upon the 
amount of production, or of profit, or of net cash 
flow (conditional payments) (Garnaut and Emer-
son 1981). The optimal combination of prior 
fixed and conditional payments depends heavily 
on what is assumed about the risks occasioned by 
the commercial and political environment within 
which an investment decision is made and on 
what is assumed about the manner in which 
investors and governments take risk into account 
in investment decisions. 
A great variety of forms of prior fixed cash 
payments and conditional payments are applied 
in practice by governments regulating access to 
natural resources within their control. Neither 
competitive cash bidding nor taxes on net present 
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value can be relied upon in all circumstances to 
collect the whole of the resource rent without 
distortion. 
The most nearly ideal system of setting prior 
fixed payments in practice is competitive sealed 
tenders, as used, for example, by the U.S. federal 
government in the allocation of petroleum licences 
in known geological structures of producing oil 
or gas fields. This system appears to work well in 
allocating rights over resources with calculable 
risk and modest rent value (Mead 1977). How-
ever, there are problems of collecting the full 
economic value of rights over highly valuable 
natural resources by this method, especially when 
risk is high. Apart from considerations arising 
from investors' aversion to commercial risk, the 
collection of resource rent through competitive 
cash bidding is highly vulnerable to investors' 
fears that the fiscal rules will change after invest-
ment has been committed: bids will be discounted 
for fears that successful outcomes will eventually 
be taxed. Also when the bid required to win a 
lease is large, competition between possible 
investors may be eliminated by collusion or some 
other factor (Norgaard 1977). Many mineral 
deposits, for example, promise such large 
amounts of cash flow that only a few corpora-
tions can finance the bids. 
Although the problem of financing prior pay-
ments could be overcome if the investor were 
allowed to pay from later cash flow during min-
ing operations, this change would transform the 
payment from a prior fixed payment to a condi-
tional payment. Allowing the bid to be honoured 
at some later time would produce a conditional 
payment if the bid were large in relation to the 
assets of the successful tenderer. If the explora-
tion or mining activity were unsuccessful, the 
corporation would be driven into bankruptcy. As 
a profit-maximizing strategy, owners of corpora-
tions may make large bids for licence areas of 
high but uncertain value, in the knowledge that 
they must achieve outcomes in the upper end of 
the probability distribution of outcomes or face 
bankruptcy. 
The most efficient systems of conditional pay-
ments are taxes on positive net present value (to 
prevent distortion of investment), collected as a 
levy on "surplus" cash flow (to prevent distortion 
of production from established resource-
exploiting facilities). The most nearly ideal sys-
tem of conditional payments currently is the 
resource rent tax (RRT), as defined by Garnaut 
and Clunies Ross (1975) and as used in recent 
mining and petroleum agreements and taxation 
legislation in Papua New Guinea and several 
other developing countries (Palmer 1980). The 
RR T does not distort production decisions for 
established investments: in this it is superior to 
conventional ad valorem and specific royalties, 
conventional corporate income tax, and annually 
progressive profits taxes. It is not collected until 
investment in a project has been recouped with 
interest at a specific rate, so that in form it is a tax 
on realized net present value. It can be neutral 
with respect to investment decisions so long as 
tax parameters are set correctly in relation to 
discount rates applied by investors to future cash 
flows in the evaluation of investment possibili-
ties. However, the RRT can distort investment 
decisions if taxation parameters are not set per-
fectly, and it cannot be used to collect the whole 
of the resource rent without disincentives to eco-
nomizing behaviour (Garnaut and Clunies Ross 
1979). 
Under ideal conditions (under which both 
competitive cash bidding and conditional pay-
ments are able to collect the whole of the resource 
rent without distortion), the relative reliance on 
prior fixed payments and conditional payments 
that maximize the value of revenue collected 
would depend on the attitudes toward risk of the 
investor and the regulatory agency. If the inves-
tor and the regulatory agency respond to risk 
consistently with von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility theory and are equally averse to risk, half 
of the expected payments would take the form of 
prior fixed payments and half, conditional pay-
ments (Leland 1978). If the investor were more 
averse to risk than the regulatory agency, more of 
the expected revenue would take the form of 
conditional payments, but some revenue would 
be collected as prior fixed payments. The oppo-
site conclusion would follow if the investor were 
less averse to risk. 
If the investor and the regulatory agency 
respond to risk by applying a risk premium to the 
discount rates that they use to evaluate invest-
ment possibilities and if they apply the same dis-
count rates, it is of no consequence whether 
expected payments take the form of prior fixed 
payments, conditional payments, or any combi-
nation of the two (Garnaut and Emerson 1981). If 
the investor applies higher discount rates than the 
regulatory agency, the value of revenue collected 
would be maximized by conditional payments 
and vice versa if the regulatory agency discounted 
future cash flows at a higher rate. The use of other 
common responses to risk, such as the require-
ment that the investment be recouped in a speci-
fied period or that there is zero or low probability 
of a totally unfavourable outcome, generally 
favours relatively heavy reliance on conditional 
payments (Garnaut and Emerson 1981). 
The imperfections of prior fixed payments and 
conditional payments suggest that a mixed fiscal 
strategy is optimal because, applied together, the 
two types of payment support each other. Heavy 
reliance on competitive cash bidding is likely to 
be least satisfactory when the size of the bid 
required to collect the economic rent is large; the 
application of RRT with prefixed parameters 
lowers the scale of the bid that is necessary to 
reflect the economic value of the resource. At the 
same time, the higher the rates at which RRT is 
applied, the higher the risk of removing necessary 
incentives to economizing behaviour; the use of 
competitive cash bidding to collect the residual 
economic value of a resource after tax payments 
have been taken into account reduces pressure to 
raise RRT rates to levels that might distort 
expenditure decisions. 
There are characteristic differences between 
renewable and nonrenewable resources that sug-
gest heavier emphasis on competitive cash bid-
ding for nonrenewable resources than for renew-
able. There are two reasons for this, one 
depending on degrees of uncertainty about 
investment outcomes and the other on character-
istic scales of investment. 
First, the exploitation of a renewable resource 
has the nature of a repeatable experiment. This is 
especially true for fisheries, where a large part of 
the capital committed to investment can be 
moved for use in alternative locations with little 
cost. Expectations about the outcomes of future 
investment are informed by the experience of the 
past. Although investment outcomes remain 
uncertain, in general they are less uncertain for 
renewable than for nonrenewable resource 
exploitation. Because investors are normally 
averse to risk, and more averse to risk than the 
regulatory agency in relation to the outcome of a 
single investment, reliance on competitive cash 
bidding is less satisfactory the more uncertain the 
outcomes and, therefore, more satisfactory in 
relation to renewable than to nonrenewable 
resources. 
Second, the economically efficient scale of 
investment, and the scale of resource rent likely 
to be generated by a single investment, is typically 
larger for the exploitation of nonrenewable than 
for renewable resources, mainly for accidental 
technological reasons. Because competitive cash 
bidding as a means of collecting resource rent is 
less efficient than conditional payments for large 
bids, it is more appropriate for renewable than 
for nonrenewable resources. 
Third, applying distorting charges on revenue 
(specific and ad valorem duties) results in only 
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small penalties in terms of reduced value of 
revenue collections for a mobile renewable 
resource such as a fishery, so long as the charges 
do not exceed certain maximum levels (the dif-
ference between price and the marginal cost of 
production at optimal output). The reason is that 
economic efficiency requires some degree of dis-
tortion of production from levels that would rule 
in the absence of regulation. In this respect, 
mobile resources such as fisheries are different 
from stationary resources. In the latter, regulat-
ing agencies avoid dissipation of resource rent by 
establishing exclusive property rights over 
defined geographic areas and then secure alloca-
tive efficiency by allowing production up to the 
point at which marginal cost equals price. The 
difference between price and the marginal cost of 
production at the optimal level of output is diffi-
cult to determine in practice. However, so long as 
substantial amounts of revenue are collected as 
prior lump-sum payments, collecting the whole 
rent may not be necessary if it means setting taxes 
so high as to risk unproductive distortion. The 
use of specific and ad valorem duties may, how-
ever, even in ideal conditions, lead to a less satis-
factory allocation of risk between the regulatory 
agency and the investor and, therefore, some 
reduction in the value of revenue to the regula-
tory agency, in comparison with RRT applied in 
ideal conditions. 
Rents and the Law of the Sea 
The Draft Convention from the Third Law of 
the Sea Conference establishes property rights to 
the natural resources of the old high seas. So far 
as economically valuable resources are con-
cerned, it does this mainly through the extension 
of the exclusive control of individual states over 
the natural resources of the sea within 200 miles 
of their shores, carefully defined archipelagic 
waters, and for mineral and sedentary living 
resources, the extremities of the continental 
shelves. This division leaves less than 10% of the 
world's fish catch from the oceans and deep-sea 
polymetallic nodules as the main economically 
valuable natural resources of the extraterritorial 
oceans. The proposed system of regulation of 
extraterritorial fisheries is loose and capable of 
development in various ways, whereas the system 
of regulation of deep-sea mining is extraordinar-
ily tight and elaborate. 
The extension of national control over such a 
large part of the natural resources of the oceans, 
including virtually all of the prospectively highly 
valuable petroleum resources, is probably as 
good a system as any from the point of view of 
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economic efficiency (that is, avoiding the dissipa-
tion of natural resource rents), especially when 
the transaction costs of international regulatory 
agencies are taken into account. However, the 
large benefits that it conveys are distributed arbi-
trarily among states, amounting to, as Cooper 
(1976:115) hoped it would not," ... one of the 
major missed opportunities for ... [humankind] 
... to build towards a world community." 
The new national resources in the oceans will 
require management in the same way as territo-
rial land and sea resources in the past. Whether 
the new system will realize its potential for 
improving the efficiency with which natural 
resources are used depends on the management 
capacities of nation states. Most of the develop-
ing countries, especially the small islands, will 
face difficulties in providing domestically the new 
skills that are required to regulate efficiently 
access to ocean resources and in stretching the 
existing stock of old skills to cover more tasks of 
the old kind. The success of the new system would 
seem to require the development of mechanisms 
through which technical assistance in a wide 
range of scientific, economic, and administrative 
areas can be supplied internationally. 
Extraterritorial Fisheries 
The Draft Convention lays down some rules 
for claims on fisheries confined to extraterritorial 
waters and on those that lie partly within the 
exclusive economic zone of one state and partly 
in extraterritorial oceans or in the exclusive eco-
nomic zones of other states. In both cases, the 
proposed regulatory system depends heavily on 
cooperation between states that are affected 
either as fish producers or as proprietors of 
exclusive economic zones. 
The minimum geographic area over which a 
single regulatory agency must operate is the full 
extent of the fishery if the common-property 
characteristics are to be removed. This minimum 
necessary size is probably also the maximum effi-
cient size, as the costs of establishing and main-
taining an international agency grow rapidly as 
the number of states participating in it increases. 
These desiderata are reflected in the Draft Con-
vention, which places on ". . . states whose 
nationals exploit identical resources, or different 
resources in the same area ... " an obligation to 
" ... enter into negotiations with a view to adopt-
ing the means necessary for the conservation of 
the living resources concerned." The Draft Con-
vention directs such states to " ... cooperate to 
establish subregional or regional fisheries organ-
izations to this end" (United Nations 1980:43, 
Article 118). 
The end point of this cooperation is " ... to 
maintain or restore populations of harvested spe-
cies at levels which can produce the maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant envi-
ronmental and economic factors .... " (United 
Nations 1980:43, Article 119). The group 
enjoined to cooperate reflects the interests of 
producers rather than natural resource propri-
etors and, therefore, would maximize production 
rather than resource rents. These rules are incon-
sistent with the emergence of rents of fisheries in 
extraterritorial waters until product prices are 
sufficiently high to prompt productive effort in 
excess of that required to produce at the maxi-
mum sustainable yield. Most professional opin-
ion is that this point is at least several years away 
for the main extraterritorial fisheries of the 
Pacific. 
However, rising world incomes and limited 
opportunities to increase world fish supplies sug-
gest that limiting production to maximum sus-
tainable yield will generate substantial resource 
rents in the extraterritorial Pacific soon enough 
to warrant some thought now about what should 
be done with the rents. Leaving the resource rents 
to traditional fishing states or fortunate fishing 
personnel is hardly reasonable and would not be 
acceptable in the international community. One 
way out is to establish a regulatory agency that 
comprises representatives from all Pacific states 
rather than just the fishing states. Such an agency 
would need fiscal policies for the collection of 
resource rents - policies similar to those needed 
by regional groupings that include one or more 
states whose exclusive economic zones cover part 
of a fishery. 
Rather different regulatory arrangements are 
envisaged for fisheries that extend from the 
exclusive economic zone of one state into the 
economic zones of other states or into extraterri-
torial oceans. The resource-owning states are to 
cooperate with each other in the regulation of the 
fishery unless the fishery extends into extraterri-
torial waters, in which case both resource-owning 
and fishing states are to be members (United 
Nations 1980:25, Article 63). The emphasis on 
resource-owning states rather than fishing states 
means that the objective of the agencies will 
probably be the generation of economic rents 
rather than maximum production, and this like-
lihood is reinforced by the absence of any explicit 
concern for production at the maximum sustain-
able yield. A special article lays down this same 
approach for a number of highly migratory spe-
cies (mainly tuna) but places a stronger require-
ment of cooperation on the interested resource-
owning and fishing states: "In regions where no 
appropriate international organization exists, 
the coastal state and other states whose nationals 
harvest these species in the region shall cooperate 
to establish such an organization and participate 
in its work" (United Nations 1980:25, Article 64). 
The different objectives of resource-owning, 
fishing, and fish-consuming states will often be in 
conflict. The first will be concerned with the max-
imization of economic rents, and possibly of 
monopoly rents as well. The fishing states, in this 
capacity, will be concerned with maximizing 
production, except where restrictions on produc-
tion allow them to enjoy monopoly rents. The 
different interests coincide only when price 
equals or exceeds the marginal cost of production 
at the maximum sustainable yield. Some agree-
ment may be possible if it is based on the objec-
tive of maximizing resource rent and distribution 
of the revenues collected by the regulatory 
agency. 
In any case, resource rents for these fisheries 
will emerge earlier than for those in the extrater-
ritorial oceans, even if restrictions on productive 
effort and production are set through crude polit-
ical processes. How would these rents best be 
collected for the revenue? 
An ideal system might involve the division of 
the desired level of fish catch into a number of 
parts and auctioning them for lump-sum cash 
payments, with limits on the total level of catch 
allowed a single investor. The cash bidding could 
usefully be accompanied by a profits tax - most 
ideally in RRT form or - if market price 
exceeds, by a wide margin, the marginal cost of 
production at the desired level - by an ad valo-
rem or specific tax within the margin. 
But regulatory agencies should expect to take 
some time in getting to this ideal position. Some 
of the fisheries covered by these arrangements 
would probably not generate genuine competi-
tion in an auction. The effectiveness of a bidding 
system needs to be tested case by case, with the 
authorities reserving, and where necessary exer-
cising, the right not to allocate fishing quotas 
when the highest bid does not reflect the true 
value of the resource. The bidding system should 
be complemented by a conditional payment that 
would reduce the loss of potential revenue from 
failure of competition in bidding. In clearly non-
competitive situations, competitive bidding on 
prior cash payments should be replaced by nego-
tiated lump sums. 
Administering conditional payments and cash 
flow-based taxes such as the RRT has its own set 
of problems. The costs of policing the returns 
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upon which taxation is assessed would be justi-
fied only for fisheries with high-rent value. Until 
fisheries have this value, reliance should be on 
specific and ad valorem duties, at rates clearly 
within the margin between market prices for 
fisheries products and marginal cost of produc-
tion at the level of productive effort that is 
expected to maximize resource rents. It may not 
cost the regulatory agency much in terms of the 
value of revenue to rely heavily on the simply 
administered specific and ad valorem duties, 
especially when they are accompanied by sub-
stantial lump-sum payments determined by auc-
tion or negotiation. 
Rents in Polymetallic Nodules 
The Draft Convention spells out arrangements 
for deep-sea mining of polymetallic nodules in 
great detail. This task was obviously necessary to 
secure agreement among states with widely dif-
ferent objectives, of which the generation of 
revenue for international purposes was only one 
and, because it was a central concern of no state, 
relatively minor. The result is that the arrange-
ments are likely to yield relatively little revenue 
from the economic rent value of ocean resources, 
and an important part of whatever is generated 
will be consumed in the financing of the elaborate 
international administrative infrastructure. 
Unlike the arrangements for fisheries, the 
Draft Convention makes the resources of the sea 
the "common heritage" of humanity, the prerog-
atives of which are to be exercised by an agency 
drawing its membership from all states that are 
members of the United Nations and participants 
in the law of the sea conferences. 
The main interests reflected in the elaborate 
draft are those of land-based producers of nickel 
and the minor metals in the nodules (most impor-
tantly Canada but also a number of developing 
country exporters of metals), those of the major 
industrial countries who have sought favourable 
investment opportunities for their private corpo-
rations, and those of the "Group of 77" of devel-
oping countries. The last group have professed a 
special concern for the common heritage of 
humanity and have sought mechanisms through 
which natural resources of the ocean can be made 
to yield a role for a major new mining corpora-
tion, the Enterprise, to be owned by the interna-
tional community, and also revenue for interna-
tional development purposes. 
The first set of interests is represented in the 
control on the expansion of production of metals 
from the sea (United Nations 1980:56-58, Article 
151). The controls limit production to the growth 
in world demand for metals in the period up to 
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the commencement of commercial production, 
and then 60% of either the trend of the actual 
increase in demand or 3% annually, whichever is 
greater. The controls are only restrictive if seabed 
mining is successful, in which case they will 
introduce an element of monopoly rent into the 
returns of those investors who are fortunate 
enough to be allowed entry into deep-sea produc-
tion, as well as land-based metal producers. 
The second and third interests were in direct 
conflict, and the treatment of the Enterprise and 
the fiscal arrangements for private investors must 
be seen as a package and evaluated together. 
Although the fiscal arrangements viewed in isola-
tion seem highly favourable to private investors, 
they were accompanied by, and were no doubt a 
quid pro quo for, requirements that private inves-
tors provide special assistance to the Enterprise. 
One half of the value of successful exploration by 
private investors must be made available to the 
Enterprise. This is equivalent to a 100% tax on 
exploration expenditure. On land, this amount 
would be seen.as burdensome on an activity that 
should be encouraged but might escape this 
judgment in relation to mining investments that 
were expected to be highly profitable and lightly 
taxed. Private investors are also required to make 
technology available to the Enterprise on condi-
tions that are not specified in detail but that can 
be expected to reduce the return to investors of 
investments in research and development. 
The fiscal framework is highly complex. One 
feature is the absence of normal corporate and 
personal income taxes, or any version of the 
common sales and import duties, on the activities 
of extraterritorial miners and their employees. In 
the absence of international taxation, which had 
the potential for being a major source of revenue 
for international purposes (Cooper 1976), there is 
some prospect of competition for taxation juris-
diction, for example between home governments 
of investors and their employees and the govern-
ments that are hosts to processing facilities. 
However these matters are resolved, deep-sea 
mining will probably be treated more favourably 
for general taxation purposes than is land-based 
mining in most countries. Although this favour-
able treatment may not cause uneconomic over-
expansion of deep-sea mining because of the 
production controls, it may occasion higher prof-
its for investors than would otherwise rule. The 
absence of normal taxation on extraterritorial 
mining would seem to be undesirable on both 
distribution and allocation grounds. Perhaps it is 
not too late to effect some change in these 
arrangements. 
A second feature is the elaborate rules for allo-
cating production licences among private inves-
tors. They establish an orderly queuing system in 
which the first in is served first but only once until 
all have been served - a setup that would seem to 
preclude competitive bidding for licences. Minor 
prior cash payments are provided for in the Draft 
Convention, but most revenue can be expected to 
derive from conditional payments. 
The Draft Convention defines a complex 
hybrid of ad valorem charges on sales revenue, 
annually progressive profits tax, and resource 
rent tax. The component on the annually pro-
gressive profits tax shows clear signs of having 
been received via Papua New Guinea's 1974 
Bougainville Copper Agreement, whereas the 
resource rent tax component takes the form of 
Papua New Guinea's Ok Tedi Agreement. 
The Draft Convention defines two parallel sys-
tems of conditional payments, between which the 
investor may choose (United Nations 1980: 139-
145, Article 13). The first is a straightforward 
system of ad valorem charges on revenue, of the 
type that is familiar from, and at rates that are 
fairly common in, traditional mining agreements 
and legislation. The second is a combination of 
ad valorem charges at low rates and an annually 
progressive profits tax, both becoming larger 
after the investor has recovered cash outlays with 
interest as in the resource rent tax. The investor 
declares once and for all which of the two systems 
it will follow within I year of the commencement 
of commercial production. 
The ad valorem charges alone will be applied at 
the rate of 5% in the first 10 years of commercial 
production and 12% thereafter. The lower rates 
in the earlier years are designed to reduce risk and 
so assist financing and can also be justified in 
terms ofrevenue maximization on the reasonable 
assumption that private investors would apply 
higher discount rates to future tax flows than 
would the regulatory agency. The rates are suffi-
ciently high, especially after the 10th year, to 
distort production decisions through their incen-
tives to "high grading" - even on the highly 
profitable seabed mining operations to which the 
ad valorem taxation option is most likely to be 
applied. 
The alternative fiscal arrangement is divided 
into a less severe early period and a more severe 
later period, based on the good reasons underly-
ing the ad valorem system. The two periods are 
separated by the time at which cash outlays are 
recouped in real terms with interest at 10%/year 
on the basis of the formula of the resource rent 
tax. The use of an economic rather than temporal 
basis for dividing the period of lower from that of 
higher taxation allows the objectives of maintain-
ing taxation in early years to be met with lower 
cost, all other things being equal. 
In the early period of the alternative tax arrange-
ment, investors will be required to pay an ad 
valorem production charge of 2%, plus 35% of 
profits that represent a return on investment 
(indexed to current values) between 0% and 10%, 
42.5% of profits that represent a return on invest-
ment between 10% and 20%, and 50% of profits 
that represent a return on investment in excess of 
20%. In the late period, the rate of ad valorem 
payments rises to 4%, and the profit shares to 40% 
on profits representing up to 10% return on 
(indexed) investment, 50% on profits representing 
a return between 10% and 20%, and 70% on prof-
its representing a return in excess of 20%. 
The definition of investment is taken from 
Papua New Guinea's Bougainville Copper 
Agreement, but there is an automatic indexing of 
past outlays. Like the Bougainville Copper 
Agreement, the Draft Convention defines capital 
investment generously by adding in to the capital 
base all capital expenditure and deducting depre-
ciation and amortization only on capital items 
being replaced. 
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The fiscal arrangements had to come to grips 
with the allocation of outlays and revenue to the 
mining component (covering mining, transport, 
and shipping). In this respect, the Draft Conven-
tion was generous to the investor by allocating 
profits in proportion to capital outlays in the 
various activities. This stipulation provides a 
clearcut solution to a practical problem but is 
hardly consistent with the theory of resource rent 
because the high profits deriving from resource 
rent are properly attributable to the mining phase 
that is to be the subject of the proposed fiscal 
arrangements. 
The alternative fiscal framework should 
induce only minor "high-grading" effects and 
have less effect in inhibiting marginal invest-
ments than the ad valorem system. The balance 
of incentives would seem to favour the investor's 
election for the ad valorem system in projects that 
are expected to be highly profitable and the 
mixed system in projects that are expected to be 
moderately profitable. Paradoxically, the intro-
duction of the choice of two fiscal systems proba-
bly makes the system as a whole both more dis-
torting and less onerous in terms of expected 
revenue yield than a profit-based system alone. 
Discussion 
T.K. Shoyama: In my view, Ross Garnaut has 
contributed an outstanding paper to the proceed-
ings of the conference. It blends basic economic 
theory about resource rent with an exposition of 
the principles of fiscal analysis and fiscal struc-
ture applicable to the collection of such rents. It 
considers the possibilities afforded by the new 
law of the sea not only for the collection ofrents 
on fisheries resources but also for the collection 
of rents that may inhere in the seabed mineral 
resources, producing helpful parallels and useful 
distinctions between renewable and nonrenew-
able resources. 
The paper notes that resource owners - and 
particularly the state - can seek to capture rents 
in a variety of ways as long as the rents are not 
dissipated by the uncontrolled entry of harvesters 
with excess capacity. The problem is overcapital-
ization, and it has been especially familiar in 
common-property resources such as fisheries 
where the state is often called upon to provide 
subsidies rather than being in a position to cap-
ture rents. In seabed mineral resources, or other 
natural resources where rights of access can be 
definitely assigned, the essential approach is to 
provide exclusive property rights on the basis of 
either the prior fixed payment (e.g., disposal on 
the basis of competitive bid) or a series of condi-
tional payments extending over a period of pro-
duction. This latter can be in the form of specific 
royalties or taxes. 
In practice, there is much to be said for a fiscal 
strategy combining both approaches, taking into 
account all the inherent production and market 
risks that the commercial producer and the fiscal 
authority, both, are anxious to minimize. Gar-
naut strongly favours the concept of a resources 
rent tax (RR T). Here, the most important feature 
is that little or no tax is payable until the initial 
investment has been recouped by the enterprise, 
together, of course, with interest. When the basic 
payout has been achieved, a variety of tax struc-
tures of increasing severity can be applied. 
This basic approach has been applied, accord-
ing to Garnaut, in the exploitation of mineral 
resources in Papua New Guinea, and it would be 
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interesting to observe the actual workings of the 
system - particularly the structure and level of 
rents ultimately recovered. A similar approach is 
followed in the fiscal terms for oil and gas devel-
opment in frontier Canada. The difference is that 
a modest ad valorem royalty is applied as a 
bottom-tier tax, and, more importantly in the 
case of potentially attractive petroleum resources 
extending over large areas, a significant part of 
the property right itself and significant rent are 
also captured. This approach has evolved in 
Canada, where policymakers started with the 
notion of "checkerboarding" petroleum lands 
and went on to carefully manicured schemes for 
lease selection of production areas. 
One of the comforting and helpful notes from 
Garnaut is the suggestion that, although the 
analysis elaborated early in the paper leads to 
certain conclusions about ideal tax systems on 
efficiency grounds, in practice the difficulty in 
judging risk, discount rates, and other variables, 
makes it sensible for policymakers to adopt 
mixed systems. 
As a general principle, moreover, no matter 
how much one might espouse economic neutral-
ity in the tax system, adjustment for the nature of 
the particular resource in question is inevitable. 
There is a world of difference between the large, 
multinational mining enterprise and the individ-
ual inshore fisherman. Garnaut's discussion of 
the problem of monopoly enterprise makes this 
clear, but it applies not only to monopoly profits 
but also to a monopoly-based wage structure. 
Collecting rent from fisheries resources has 
been made possible by the introduction of 
extended jurisdiction. It has not been made easy, 
however. A coastal state must have the ability to 
devise, administer, impose, and enforce its sys-
tem ofrent collection, whether or not it decides to 
grant rights of access to distant-water fleets. 
Neither domestic nor foreign fleets have had to 
pay for the rights before; in fact in many, if not 
most, fisheries, the rents have long since been 
dissipated by a buildup in excess personnel and 
capital. Reference has been made in several 
papers to the welfare-employment role of fisher-
ies both in developed and in developing coun-
tries. Far from seeking to capture rents, the state 
as resource owner is more likely to be committed 
to providing subsidies to maintain employment, 
sustain incomes, and preserve or enhance the 
resource at public expense. However desirable or 
equitable a tax or royalty scheme may be on 
efficiency grounds, the imposition of a tax 
burden in any form involves a major reversal of 
traditional policy. 
There is a further, closely related social phe-
nomenon - the romanticism and emotional at-
tachment to fishing as a way of life, rather than 
just a means oflivelihood. Despite obvious phys-
ical hazards, hard work, economic risk, and low 
returns, fishing appeals to many as an occupa-
tional way of life. One suspects that many fisher-
men want to be fishermen even more than many 
farmers just want to be farmers. I am not sure 
that any politically feasible system of transferable 
catch quotas, as suggested in the interesting Mol-
oney paper or in the parallel Garnaut model of an 
auction in small bits, would lead to a significant 
outflow from the industry. However elegant and 
persuasive the theoretical analysis is, it doesn't 
seem to offer politically practical solutions. 
Be that as it may, the Garnaut paper shows 
how the Draft Convention has set out a general 
framework under which it is possible to envisage 
the introduction of fiscal systems designed to 
ensure the capture of rents by coastal states from 
their extended fishing zones. The main obstacles 
are political nationalism and an inability to 
devise and enforce effective regulatory systems. 
Like fisheries, forests are a renewable resource, 
but they are not plagued by the common-
property problems that have surrounded fisher-
ies. Presumably, however, the ideal tax model for 
rent collection would apply to the softwood 
resources of the Pacific northwest or the hard-
wood resources of Southeast Asia, wherever they 
have not already been alienated to private owner-
ship. At present, rent collection for forests is far 
from ideal. In British Columbia, for example, a 
major share of the economic rent has probably 
been appropriated by strongly organized labour 
unions, and the resulting high-wage structure 
poses a major obstacle to the emergence of a 
more diversified manufacturing, processing, and 
service economy. This example may provide an 
object lesson for developing countries on the 
importance of timely tax policies to appropriate 
forest rents. 
Finally, Garnaut's account of the provisions of 
the Draft Convention covering seabed mining 
impresses upon one the complexity of conflicting 
interests and the elaborate structures and fiscal 
schemes to deal with this inherent conflict. But one 
can only regret Garnaut's broad conclusion that 
the arrangements are likely to yield relatively little 
of the economic rent value of ocean resources as 
revenue for international purposes. My impression 
is that, whatever theory and analysis might suggest 
for the broadest public (international) benefit, the 
narrower; vested objectives of countries with their 
own interests to pursue tend to prevail. 
There is something of a parallel here with the 
situation in countries possessing a federal struc-
ture - the U.S., Canada, Australia, Malaysia, 
etc. - where subnational states or provinces are 
constitutional owners of resources and compete 
with each other and with the federal government 
for tax revenues or for accelerated exploration 
and development. The subnational governments 
often take one of two views: that development 
and employment under private ownership are 
more important objectives than is the capture of 
rents or that maximum rents should be captured 
even to the point of squeezing normal profits and 
employment income, thus deterring investment. 
In Canada, both views are espoused, and the 
broadest national interest defended by the central 
government may give way to the particular objec-
tives of the regional governments. One can only 
hope that the international Enterprise will suc-
ceed in due course in the capture ofrents through 
its acquisition and profitable exploitation of the 
exploration rights assigned to it under the Draft 
Convention. 
Hugh Patrick: I was glad to read, and admire, 
the analytical papers of both Munro and Garnaut 
on the issues ofrents. Munro's analysis is sensible 
and reasonable. I think one of its most important 
virtues is that it takes on a number of the myths, 
shibboliths, and incorrect assumptions that have 
been bedeviling fisheries policies in recent years. I 
am delighted by the clear arguments for reliance 
on comparative advantage in fishing services and 
for efficient ways of collecting rents as well as 
prevention of their dissipation to various interest 
groups through assorted protectionist devices. It 
seems to me that the United States and Canada, 
or any of the other high-income countries, cannot 
justifiably make infant-industry arguments or 
arguments about low-opportunity costs for capi-
tal and labour for their fishing industries. Protec-
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tionism, in fishes or forest products, appears to 
have little economic, or even social, justification 
for these countries. Although the infant-industry 
argument may be appropriate for numerous 
South Pacific countries, they may decide that 
collecting rents (if they can actually do so) is 
better than working on shipping vessels - the 
latter lifestyle not being all that superb, according 
to Copes and others. 
It is not clear who will be the real beneficiaries 
of the extended fisheries jurisdiction in the South 
Pacific. My guess is that the beneficiaries will be 
Australia, New Zealand, and other major aid 
donors who simply will reduce aid grants as rents 
increase. The development dilemma for the tiny 
nations will not be resolved even though they 
have claimed control over their fishing zones. 
Can an infant-industry argument be success-
fully made for the coastal fisheries or the forest 
products of larger developing Asian-Pacific 
nations? Or should fisheries, and perhaps forest-
ry, be viewed mainly as a highly elastic supplier of 
very low-productivity, low-skilled jobs, to be 
phased down as better job opportunities are 
created? I would like to know where fishing and 
forestry fit into the overall developmental strate-
gies of the developing Asian nations. 
One of the most important points this confer-
ence has clarified for me is how large a role pro-
tectionism plays in domestic industries in the 
Pacific. Effective protection rates, although not 
spelled out in the papers in this conference, must 
surely be substantial. And these protectionist 
measures force developing countries into second-
best policies such as prohibitions on log exports, 
as were discussed by Takeuchi. As the United 
States and Japan have been taking the lead in 
developing and maintaining a relatively open and 
free multilateral trading system, they should lib-
eralize trade in these areas, as should all the coun-
tries in the Pacific and elsewhere. 

Conference Summary 
Keith A.J. Hay 
Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada 
At first blush, it might seem that fish, forest, 
and fuel problems have little in common. How-
ever, they are intricately related in the world's 
ecological system; a microcosm of their interac-
tion exists in the mangrove swamps, which pro-
vide a habitat for aquatic organisms, such as 
shrimp, and are a source of wood often used for 
fuel purposes. The mangrove highlights how eas-
ily the system can be disturbed: when too much 
wood is taken from it, the result is the degrada-
tion of the marine-life breeding grounds, erosion, 
or sedimentation. It also demonstrates that indis-
criminate exploitation of a resource by one sector 
incurs immediate external costs to another. 
The choice of appropriate mechanisms to 
reduce such costs, to enforce socially beneficial 
harvesting practices, and to capture the rents 
from the available resources were the recurring 
themes of this conference. 
The world is passing through a phase of 
resource nationalism. Those countries gener-
ously endowed with resources wish to undertake 
domestically a high proportion of their harvest-
ing and a great share of their processing. At the 
same time, concern that open-access resources 
have been overexploited in the past has led to 
formulation of management plans for fisheries 
and forests. The ocean commons have been 
enclosed by 200-mile limits and logging ventures 
and log exports constrained. 
These policies have already affected patterns of 
trade and investment in the fisheries and forestry 
business of the Pacific basin and will continue to 
do so throughout the 1980s. They raise questions 
about the economics of harvesting and process-
ing, especially about the comparative advantage 
of locating canneries, process plants, sawmills, 
plywood operations, and pulp-and-paper plants 
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in the harvesting rather than consuming coun-
tries. Are resources in primary and processing 
activities being optimally allocated at present? 
Would markets in the consuming countries 
remain if the activities that they had previously 
undertaken - catching, cutting, refining- were 
done by others? Can bilateral monopoly dead-
locks on international pricing and market access 
be resolved between Pacific-basin partners? 
Even in the energy sector, there are prospects 
for new trade patterns in the Pacific region. The 
switch from reliance on liquid hydrocarbon fuels 
to coal is already under way. Moreover, as rela-
tive prices adjust more and more unconventional 
fossil fuels will be tapped. Many countries are 
seeking to replace foreign fuels in part with indig-
enous energy and thereby to reduce their vulner-
ability. Often such developments are high cost 
and may be a misallocation of resources in the 
short term. Widespread use of nonexhaustible 
energy would substantially reduce energy trade in 
the Pacific region, but this is in reality a scenario 
for the 21st century. More immediate are the 
requirements for shared technology and interna-
tional industrial cooperation to ensure the 
medium-term energy future of the Pacific-basin 
countries. 
Considerations of this sort led to views at the 
conference that cooperation among Pacific 
neighbours must be enhanced. On issues such as 
management of transboundary migratory fish 
stocks; joint ventures between distant-water fish-
ing fleets and coastal nations; foreign investment 
in forest harvesting and wood processing; access 
for products of developing countries to devel-
oped-country markets; and technology transfer 
and cooperation at the research frontiers of con-
servation and utilization in fish, forests, and 
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fuels, Pacific nations must work together to pre-
serve the riches of the resource endowment while 
providing a continuing flow of benefits to the 
peoples of the region and the rest of the world. 
Forest Economics 
For 2 centuries, there appears to have been a 
deficiency in supply of forest products worldwide 
that has caused the relative price of wood to 
continue to rise. This suggests that, although the 
forest is generally looked upon as a renewable 
resource, it has not always been replaced when 
cut. Forest continues to exist if the opportunity 
cost of the land upon which it grows is maximized 
for forest use and not for other purposes such as 
agriculture, industry, or urban development. The 
alternative land uses have, in many instances, 
proved more valuable than reforestation. As 
wood prices have risen, forest products have been 
sought in more inaccessible areas through a 
Ricardian-type process. 
Scott, in his forest-economics overview, dis-
tinguished between extensive and intensive forest 
harvesting. Under extensive exploitation, cutting 
and clearing has followed a path of development 
from Europe to North America and eventually to 
the Pacific, along Ricardian lines. Intensive 
harvesting has involved: 
• Polycyclic methods - selective harvesting 
of species within a continuing forest, and 
• Monocyclic methods - the growing of 
plantations, often of only one species. 
But Scott believes that not much is really known 
about the economics of such intensive methods. 
Forest economists still must cope with many 
unresolved problems. What does optimizing the 
stream of benefits to society from the forest mean 
in changing circumstances at the extensive mar-
gin where alternative land uses and their asso-
ciated rates ofreturn can impact rapidly? Further-
more, there are many ways in which the forest 
interacts with the agricultural economy in rural 
areas. Indeed, Bene noted that only 20% of wood 
appears in world trade and that 80% is used 
locally in developing countries, where wood-
cover supplies not only building materials and 
firewood but acts as an environment for wildlife, 
attracts rainfall, retains moisture, and adds to the 
overall ecological balance of the region. These 
externalities are social benefits that have not been 
accurately evaluated and, therefore, have been 
ignored in private forest harvesting and renewing 
decisions. 
The economics of forestry production are an 
aspect of capital theory in which the role of"wait-
ing" is crucial. In tropical hardwood forests, 
where the waiting may be several generations but 
the social rate of discount (as implied by rural 
lending rates of IOOo/o+) is very high, it is not 
surprising that forests are rapidly cut, often ille-
gally, and rarely replaced. Even reforested areas 
can be slashed and burned by shifting cultivators. 
In these circumstances, it may not be possible, as 
Drysdale advised, to have the resource developed 
by the most-efficient operators, which would lead 
to the maximum flow of national resource rents. 
Akrasanee noted that, in Southeast Asia, defor-
estation is proceeding apace (particularly in Thai-
land), where the forest stock is shrinking, possi-
bly never to recover. Once more, enforcement is a 
problem, as there is widespread illegal logging, 
which is often ignored in classical forest-
economics analysis. The usual tax-subsidy de-
vices have high administrative costs, and even 
monitoring of log exports can be overcome by 
illegal levies. 
Fast-growing plantations of the intensive, 
monocyclic type may reach maturity in 10-15 
years, in which case the associated "waiting" may 
be economically acceptable. Sedjo presented 
simulation results from investments in two types 
of tree plantations - one producing pulpwood 
and the other, both sawlogs and pulpwood. The 
highest regional payoffs for these plantations 
were found to be in Chile, Borneo, and New 
Zealand. However, Hemmi was concerned that 
the estimated rates of return (all more than I 0%) 
could be misleading, as plantation development 
costs were ignored. Scott suggested that the 
Fisherian rate of return over all opportunity 
costs, particularly of alternative land use, is a 
more appropriate measure. Sedjo replied that 
most plantation land is marginal for agriculture 
and that prices of imports were at world-market 
rates when entered in the simulation, although 
external benefits and costs may not have been 
wholly incorporated. As the relative price of 
wood may not continue to rise, these rates of 
return are open to revision. Nevertheless, Sedjo 
quoted data from Lanly and Clement that sug-
gest that industrial plantations in developing 
Asia and the Far East will increase from 2.9 Mha 
in 1975 to 8.25 Mha by the year 2000. If develop-
ments of this scale occur, they will go some way 
toward relieving the forecast tightness in many 
wood fibre markets. 
Darr described the wood supply-demand 
situation in the Pacific northwest forests of 
Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and British 
Columbia, while noting that the period of 
exploiting underdeveloped timberlands in the 
Pacific northwest of North America has ended 
and that intensive management must now take 
over. 
Aird and Calow pointed to four reasons that 
forest production in the Pacific northwest, par-
ticularly in Canada, may decline: timberland 
withdrawals for other uses and rationalization 
through forest management, reduced yields from 
second-growth forests, lower regeneration rates 
because of past logging practices, and low levels 
of reforestation. Because most of the resources in 
Washington and Oregon are privately owned, 
supply responses differ from those in Canada 
where most of the resources are public property. 
In general, tenure arrangements are long term in 
British Columbia, whereas this rarely is the case 
on public lands in the states. Darr found the 
outlook for the forest industry, especially in the 
U.S., clouded by uncertainties. Competing sup-
plies from Canada, USA, New Zealand, and the 
USSR make predictions of price and trade 
volume, especially with Japan, difficult. 
Solecki outlined, in detail, the potential for the 
Soviet role in Pacific-region, forest-products 
trade. On the import side, Darr noted that Japa-
nese demand is stable or declining for solid wood 
but is growing for pulp, newsprint, and paper-
board - a fact that should trigger increased trade 
in chips from many suppliers around the Pacific 
rim. 
Japan continues to search for new timber 
sources of unprocessed wood products in the 
Pacific region and, as Aird and Calow noted, is 
buying more logs from Papua New Guinea. 
Moreover, log restrictions elsewhere in the region 
are causing Japan to look for further processed 
products from the forest-resource nations. 
Restrictions on log exports from the USA, 
Canada, and, more recently, the nations of the 
Southeast Asian Log Producers' ·Association 
have distorted the comparative advantage prin-
ciple for the location of plywood processing, 
according to Hong. In many instances, these re-
strictions result in price discrimination that 
favours domestic processors. As Japan now rec-
ognizes a loss of comparative advantage in ply-
wood processing, and South Korea and Taiwan 
are losing it very rapidly, there are reasons to 
inquire about the comparative advantage of 
lumber processing in the North American Pacific 
northwest. Smith noted that, as long as tariff and 
nontariff barriers restrict access to East Asian 
markets for plywood products, it is not obvious 
where comparative advantage lies, but Sedjo 
pointed out that many Japanese tariffs are set at 
rates similar to those in North America and the 
European Economic Community. 
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The issue of efficient locations for wood-
processing activities around the Pacific rim and 
especially in Southeast Asia was addressed by 
Takeuchi and was also brought up in the Indone-
sian context by Birowo. The latter paper revealed 
a slump in Indonesia in log exports in 1980. 
Byron suggested that doubling the log export to 
processing ratio together with production bottle-
necks caused the decline. Rachman added that 
domestic prices set at about 60% of log-export 
prices had also stimulated processing and 
diverted logs to the home market. Takeuchi 
asked in his paper whether this was a rational 
economic policy. 
Takeuchi reviewed factor-input costs and 
determined that there are sound economic rea-
sons for the development of mechanical wood-
processing industries in certain Southeast Asian 
nations. However, these activities would have to 
be established in remote regions of Malaysia 
(Sabah and Sarawak), and Indonesia (Kaliman-
tan), and possibly the Philippines. Although log 
export bans distort trade, Takeuchi suggested 
that the infant-industry argument is less appro-
priate if one waits for the "right" time - when 
comparative advantage in wood processing has 
clearly shifted to the forest regions - because in 
the meantime the best log resources will have 
been exhausted. 
Not only is the development of timberland and 
local processing an important issue in Southeast 
Asian development, but the use of land for plan-
tation tree crops is also of significance. Such 
crops can have a growth cycle of 3-5 years so that 
the "waiting" problem is minimized. Indeed, in a 
plantation setup, illegal access to the resource is 
lessened, and negative externalities are dimin-
ished. Chan discussed the role of palm oil and 
rubber plantations in the growth and diversifica-
tion of the economy of Peninsular Malaysia 
between 1960 and 1978 and the importance of 
cocoa-coconut plantations in the development of 
Sabah and Sarawak. A decline in the early 1970s 
of the competitiveness of natural rubber with 
synthetics appears to have led Malaysian policy-
makers to diversify output by encouraging exten-
sive development of palm-oil plantations on new 
and former rubber-growing lands. Moreover, 
there was a desire to shift away from overdepend-
ence on rubber and exposure to external shocks 
arising from this monoculture. This diversifica-
tion again raises questions about the opportunity 
costs of land in alternative uses, especially in 
other timber production, rubber, palm oil, or 
other agricultural husbandry, and also points to a 
trade off between risk and return in land use. 
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Ariff argued that rubber prices have been more 
stable than those of palm oil (for which Malaysia 
has India as a "single" buyer) and that there were 
greater forward-backward links in output 
employment for rubber than for palm oil, as well 
as greater flexibility of production and less-
demanding requirements for soil nutrients. Even 
if the private internal rate of return from palm oil 
exceeds that of rubber, there has been little eco-
nomic analysis of the relative net social benefits 
from these Malaysian tree crops and there are 
several external factors that could favour rubber 
over palm oil. Krause noted that introduction of 
Stabex-type schemes for rubber, palm oil, coffee, 
or cocoa would reduce uncertainty and, there-
fore, probably increase output, but with long-
term downward pressures on prices and rates of 
return. The potential viability of Stabex pro-
grams for some commodities and not others 
makes choice of an alternative land use more 
difficult. 
Economics of Fisheries 
The enclosure since the mid- I 970s by national 
jurisdictions of the world's common-property 
fisheries resources has had important implica-
tions for the biological management and efficient 
exploitation of the fish as well as the distribution 
of the wealth. 
In the Pacific region, a disproportionate share 
of productive fishing grounds was gained by the 
developed countries, particularly the USA, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Canada, and the USSR. 
Among the developing countries, only Indonesia 
ranked high in the list of beneficiaries. The poten-
tial for additional fisheries development in the 
region now lies mainly in the Indian Ocean and 
western-central Pacific. 
The distant-water fishing fleets historically 
took most of their catch off the coasts of the 
developed countries. Thus, enclosure of the 
marine commons has redistributed the potential 
for capturing the largest share of fisheries rents 
from one developed nation to another - for 
example, from Japan to the USA - and from 
developing nations to developed nations -
South Korea to the USA. 
Closing open-access to fisheries can lead to 
improved fisheries management, reduction of 
overexploitation resulting from overcapitaliza-
tion, and better long-run returns for the control-
ling nation's fisheries industry. The price for 
these gains is the administrative and enforcement 
costs of reducing (or eliminating) the external 
diseconomies of the fishery, whether or not these 
are caused by fleets from other countries. 
Global fisheries production amounted to 
approximately 65 Mt in 1978, but, according to 
sources quoted by Copes, the maximum sustain-
able yield on a species basis could be 120 Mt 
annually. Even the larger figure is not enough. A 
1980 FAO study by Michael Robinson predicts 
that rising protein requirements, especially in the 
developing world, will cause a demand for 125 Mt 
in 2000, with likely production of only 92.5 Mt. 
The forecast "deficit" suggests that there will be 
adjustments through shifts in the relative prices of 
fish to other protein. 
What is needed to maximize over time the 
stream of net benefits to society from the fisheries 
resource? In the short run, introduction of the 
200-mile fisheries jurisdiction for coastal nations 
has probably reduced efficiency in some measure 
by displacing globally efficient distant-water fish-
ing fleets by less productive local ones. Many 
developed countries have higher input costs per 
unit of fishing effort than do the fleets that have 
been dislodged from their waters. This is a 
supply-side reason for recent increases in world 
relative prices of fish. As Copes noted, in many 
cases, global irrationality has been replaced by 
national irrationalities, and, as Munro pointed 
out, most of the ind us trial adjustment costs have 
fallen on the distant-water fleets. 
In a number of jurisdictions, enforcement costs 
are high and, at the margin, outweigh benefits 
from controlling the fishery. According to 
Panayotou, this may be the case in several South-
east Asian countries. Boundary problems still 
exist for transboundary stocks, both between 
adjacent jurisdictions and between each jurisdic-
tion and the high seas. There are still "free riders" 
on the high seas, although Munro and Copes 
suggest that at maximum their catch is only I% of 
total catch. 
To capture rents from thefr fisheries resources, 
coastal nations may: 
• Develop an indigenous capability, subsidiz-
ing an infant industry initially but ensuring that 
subsidies are not maintained or assumed in such a 
way as to become essentially protectionist; 
• Enter joint ventures with foreign operators 
to gain skills, capital, and market access ; and 
• Allocate access to the resources by Iicencing 
foreign vessels. 
Optimal mechanisms for capturing rents were 
discussed by Garnaut. 
The shift from ocean commons to national 
jurisdictions will affect the directions and prod-
uct mix of fisheries trade as a result of the exclu-
sion of distant-water fleets from traditional fish-
ing grounds. It will also affect patterns of 
investment in vessels and processing. At present, 
the global fisheries industry is still in transition 
- and further autonomous shifts in indigenous 
fisheries supply curves are probable. 
In his paper, Copes reviewed important 
aspects of international fisheries economics in the 
context of the changed jurisdictional arrange-
ments since 1977. He expressed some optimism 
that the 200-mile jurisdictions had already 
improved fisheries management, reduced fishing 
effort, and allowed stock rebuilding in many 
regions. However, management is not yet com-
pletely rational within many zones because of 
local political and social constraints. Moreover, 
there exist many boundary problems to be 
resolved by bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments. If the remaining external diseconomies in 
the fishery were corrected, then, according to 
Copes, yield might increase by a factor greater 
than two. 
Christy was less optimistic that the impedi-
ments to efficient increases in production from · 
world fisheries could be overcome, citing exam-
ples of weak enforcement leading to continuing 
overcapitalization of the resource, especially in 
the developing world. As Bautista remarked con-
cerning both fisheries and forestry exploitation, 
such problems inevitably boil down to differ-
ences between private and social costs and 
benefits. 
Christy agreed with Copes that, on many 
fisheries questions, criteria for efficient alloca-
tion of the resources become enmeshed with ob-
jectives for income distribution. The tangle is 
particularly thorny for countries in which a large 
population of artisanal fishing personnel have 
been at work - as in many developing nations -
harvesting protein for local consumption. In such 
circumstances, the opportunity cost of labour is 
close to zero. Wilimovsky remarked that the key 
to success in fisheries development still lies with 
these artisans who could provide for the growing 
demand for fish more efficiently than the rela-
tively new and overcapitalized commercial fish-
ing operations of many Southeast Asian nations. 
Panayotou pointed out that, because control of 
the national fisheries common-property resource 
involves high-enforcement costs in Southeast 
Asia, control measures would work only in an 
environment of broad-gauge rural development 
that aims at relieving the survival and unem-
ployment pressures. These pressures have 
resulted in widespread depredation of public 
property, both fish and forests. This point 
underscored Christy's concerns that enforcement 
of economically rational rates of exploitation of 
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the fishery is not necessarily closely related to the 
severity of penalties for rule infringement, most 
of which is done out of sight ofland. Indeed, high 
penalties may simply mean higher bribes to 
enforcement officers with awkward distribu-
tional effects. Thus, in the developing world, 
pressing food requirements, low opportunity 
costs of labour, and expensive enforcement may 
mean that many fisheries remain, de facto, open-
access resources. 
These discussions suggested that, for the devel-
oped nations of the Pacific rim who have 
expanded jurisdiction over fisheries resources, 
there are good prospects for improved stock 
management because the enforcement and admin-
istrative costs are outweighed by the potential 
benefits from the managed resource. The ques-
tion for these nations is how resource rents can be 
captured and maximized. 
For Pacific-rim countries with distant-water 
fleets, the problem is eliminating redundant fish-
ing effort, either by seeking access to the new 
jurisdictions or retiring fleet and processing 
capacity. Matsuda noted that Japan had had 
only modest success with joint ventures in 
skipjack-tuna operations. The scope for 
increased international trade in fisheries prod-
ucts will depend on the extent to which distant-
water fleets are replaced by new national fleets, 
the catch probably still being sold to markets in, 
for example, Japan or South Korea. 
For many developing countries on the Pacific 
rim, expanded jurisdiction confers nominal 
rather than substantive property rights to their 
fisheries because of the adverse cost-benefit ratio 
of stock assessment and surveillance. These 
fisheries will continue for some time to reflect all 
the economic and environmental drawbacks of 
open-access exploitation. 
The econometric work by Lin et al. on fisheries 
trade among Pacific-area countries is novel; 
hence, several model-formulation and data-
management problems still have to be overcome. 
As the data straddle a period of changing prop-
erty rights in the Pacific, Rhee commented that 
there are several distorting factors that may have 
affected the trends and development of trade. 
Moreover, it may be pertinent for Lin et al. to 
look at fisheries factor costs as determinants of 
supply capabilities rather than relying on land-
ings. There was also some concern over the sepa-
ration of exchange-rate effects from relative price 
effects in the models by Lin et al., although there 
may be separate responses by consumers to these 
variables. More market-structure analysis will be 
undertaken in future by Lin et al., and the role of 
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barriers to market entry in the USA and Japan 
would be incorporated. 
Six case studies on various aspects of national 
fisheries developments were presented to the con-
ference. Stokes reviewed the Alaska groundfish 
case; Moloney spoke of the Canadian experience 
in the northeast Pacific fisheries; Doulman dis-
cussed the western Pacific tuna fishery; Wallace 
analyzed the economics of the New Zealand 
squid fishery; Kamphol and Thanwa estimated 
costs and benefits of shrimp culture in Thailand; 
and Sakiyama looked at long-term trends of 
fisheries development in the South China seas. 
The Stokes and Moloney presentations were 
concerned with the optimal utilization of fisher-
ies resources brought under U.S. and Canadian 
control by extended jurisdiction. Stokes pointed 
out that the world market for groundfish (demer-
sals) has been depressed since 1979, with real 
prices falling. Also, fuel costs, capital equipment 
costs, and interest rates have all increased, 
impairing, further, the profit outlook for indig-
enous fleet development to take Alaska ground-
fish stocks. Although the building and operating 
of a subsidized U.S. fleet is remotely possible, a 
more probable and certainly more efficient use of 
the Alaskan resource would be continued exploit-
ation by foreign fleets, with allocations being 
based on a fee structure rather than on historical 
catch. 
The problem for the U.S. is to devise arevenue-
earning system that maximizes benefits from 
access gained for the American fishing industry, 
earnings from joint ventures, and fees charged for 
foreign vessels. Matsuda objected that the Japa-
nese should not have to pay to enter a fishery that 
they had originally developed. 
Moloney, in discussing the Canadian west-
coast fishery, noted that even after enclosure 
there continues to be overcapitalization and over-
exploitation of stocks, to the extent that rents 
have been reduced. Attempts to restrict entry to 
the fishery through licencing vessels have not 
reduced the total effort because of the potential 
for capital stuffing. One approach to the entry 
problem is to introduce taxes that effectively 
remove all rents from the fishery; another device 
is to allocate transferable quotas that make 
fishermen communal owners of the resource. 
Copes noted that this latter approach is likely to 
be difficult to enforce and is sometimes incom-
patible with biological escapement controls 
aimed at protecting stocks. 
Non transferable licences might be a better 
effort-controlling device, even though, as Scott 
observed, they can perform like a "tontine." He 
suggested that a system of internationally 
transferable fishing rights would resolve many of 
the rent-maximization problems on a global 
scale. As both the U.S. and the Canadian Pacific 
fisheries produce items for export - principally 
to Japan - there is also a potential problem of 
balancing countervailing power in the setting of 
access fees for Japanese vessels. As Smith noted, 
this problem could be solved by a cooperative 
framework set up to divide the rents. 
Doulman discussed the prospects for local 
involvement by the small states of the western 
Pacific in the skipjack fishery. Because tuna is a 
highly mo bile species, there are strong arguments 
favouring a regional fisheries program to over-
come transboundary management problems. 
However, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the 
Solomons only tacitly support such a program, 
believing that they will be able to gain greater 
benefits, such as processing industries, from uni-
lateral management. Christy argued that rents in 
tuna long-line fisheries in the South Pacific prob-
ably exceed those of the skipjack fishery. Stokes 
doubted that these nations were able to lay any 
more than a nominal claim to their fisheries 
because of lack of enforcement capability. Scott 
wondered whether the theory of alliances could 
not suggest ways to resolve the problems of coop-
eration among the South-Pacific nations. The 
need for cooperation probably extends to tuna-
processing activities as well because the min-
imum capacity for an efficient cannery is 6000 
t/year. 
Wallace analyzed the returned-value and 
value-added gains from two methods of develop-
ing the New Zealand squid fishery. Because 
neither New Zealand consumers nor fishermen 
had shown any interest in squid before 1979, the 
issue of maximizing the flow of net social benefits 
from this fishery had not been dominated by 
protectionist arguments for the buildup of indig-
enous fishing. Both licencing and joint-venture 
arrangements had recently been made with J apa-
nese, South Korean, and Taiwanese squid 
jiggers. Wallace's analysis showed a wide range of 
performance under each type of arrangement but 
with similar average earnings across the two 
fleets. The New Zealand government's use of 
export incentives, in the presence of an over-
valued currency, thoroughly distorted the results 
and led to revenue losses and resource misalloca-
tions. Wallace's research offers a unique oppor-
tunity to examine the quantitative implications 
of two access schemes. 
Sakiyama focused on factors bearing upon the 
long-run outlook for South China seas fisheries, 
with particular emphasis on Thailand. He noted 
the role of the mangrove swamp as a habitat for 
shrimp and a source offuelwood, and the impor-
tant ecological function of the mangrove was 
emphasized in comments by Librero. Both 
Sakiyama and Librero were concerned that the 
delicate balance in use of the mangrove swamps 
would not be maintained; the value of mangrove 
to the shrimp industry is greater than its imme-
diate return as firewood. 
Shrimp production in all parts of the world 
results in large catches of fish that are discarded. 
This by-catch often contains the young of com-
mercially valuable fish. Sakiyama was concerned 
that, in instances where the fish are landed, they 
are used by fish-meal industries and that this use 
has precluded the development of a wider market 
for human consumption. Several participants 
argued that relative prices could quickly shift the 
allocation of fish from meal processing to human 
consumption. However, the speed and extent of 
such adjustments remain an empirical issue. 
Both Librero and Panayotou went to some 
length to familiarize the conference with the 
range of problems confronting the artisanal fish-
ing sector in Southeast Asia. High discount rates 
and low opportunity costs of labour have driven 
Southeast Asians to catch everything and to use 
any method, regardless of potential penalties. 
Librero argued that attempting to raise produc-
tivity - even where access to the resource can be 
controlled - is difficult because fishermen prefer 
a low-gain, low-risk technology, which guaran-
tees survival, to a high-gain, high-risk technol-
ogy, which may not. Wilimovsky contended that 
the underlying issue in global fisheries manage-
ment remains that of population growth, causing 
demand to press against scarce resources. 
Renewable Energy Resources 
As a prelude to the main theme of the 1983 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference, a 
few papers on energy-resource issues were pre-
sented and discussed. Smith and Saddler exam-
ined the substitution of nonexhaustible resources 
for fossil-fuel energy and industrial raw mate-
rials. Their analysis drew on the Hotelling rule 
that exploitation of exhaustible resources should 
be such that their prices rise over time at a pace 
equal to the rate of interest. The existence of 
nonexhaustible substitutes affects the time path 
of use of exhaustible resources, but the precise 
patterns depend crucially on the abundance of 
exhaustible resources and their substitutability 
with each other and alternative inexhaustible 
resources. The substitution includes, for exam-
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pie, the use of natural fibres to replace synthetics 
in the manufacturing industry. The range of pos-
sibilities for substitution makes it difficult to 
relate substitution incentives to the price of 
energy from exhaustible sources. 
The most important sources of nonexhaustible 
energy cited are solar energy (including direct 
sunlight, wind power, marine current, hydro-
electric power, chemical energy, and biomass), 
heat contained in the earth's core (geothermal), 
and gravitational power (tidal). There are also a 
wide range of nonexhaustible or renewable, 
inputs that could replace products that are based 
on exhaustible resources. In many instances the 
move toward use of renewable resources is 
merely a reversal of the trend over the last 40 
years to replace natural inputs. Reversing the 
trend would, if relative prices were right, lengthen 
the period over which fossil fuels could be used in 
key production processes. 
Smith and Saddler noted that exhaustible fuels 
such as oil and coal are easily transportable and 
therefore suitable for international trade but 
most nonexhaustible fuel sources are (in princi-
ple) not tradable, e.g., solar, geothermal, and 
gravitational. Of this type, only agricultural 
sources of energy are internationally tradable 
and could eventually substitute for fossil fuels in 
many instances. Comparative advantage in such 
renewable resources coincides generally with 
labour scarcity and large land endowments. 
In the short run, fuel trade will exhibit a shift 
from oil to coal, which will continue until eco-
nomic exhaustion is reached. Bautista pointed 
out that exhaustion is only a matter of relative 
prices. At some juncture, fuels from agricultural 
products will become economically viable and 
therefore more evident in foreign trade. Australia 
and Canada will retain and increase stature as 
suppliers of fuels from exhaustible and, later, 
nonexhaustible resources, to markets in the 
densely populated, resource-poor economies of 
the Pacific basin. 
Wionczek argued that exhaustible fuel re-
sources are much larger than generally thought. 
When nonconventional hydrocarbons are 
lumped with conventional fuels, there are suffi-
cient supplies to defer tapping ofnonexhaustible 
sources until well into the 21st century. Relative 
abundance and prices will determine the speed at 
which consumers shift from conventional to non-
conventional exhaustible fuels and later to non-
exhaustible fuels. Helliwell stressed the uncer-
tainty of future fuel-supply prices and 
afailabilities. He argued that the cost of building 
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greater technical flexibility and adaptability into 
generating processes may, in the end, outweigh 
foregone scale economies because predicting 
energy supplies and trading is highly complex 
and, therefore, risky. Patrick noted that there 
was also vulnerability for areas that become too 
dependent on a single overseas source or specific 
fuel for industrial use. 
South Korea's program for lessening depend-
ence on exhaustible fuels and increasing use of 
indigenous renewable resources is discussed in 
Lee and Kim's paper. They examine the South 
Korean potential for energy production from 
solar, wind, biomass, tidal power, and small 
hydro, while noting capital, research and devel-
opment, skill, and infrastructure constraints. 
They call for increased international cooperation 
in technology development so that South Korea 
and other developing countries can realize a por-
tion of their nonexhaustible-fuel potential, par-
ticularly in the rural sector. Bautista was con-
cerned that alternative-energy strategies can 
involve high opportunity costs, especially when 
infant, nonexhaustible energy industries are 
highly subsidized. What value should be placed 
on indigenous fuel development at a time when 
countries still have options for a wide mix of fuel 
imports and a broad range of suppliers? Similar 
issues arose from the discussion of energy con-
straints in China in the paper by Li Guong-on 
and Luo Yuanzheng. In parallel with a switch in 
development emphasis from heavy to light indus-
try and agriculture, China will favour more 
labour-intensive investments in rural noncom-
mercial energy, including increased stress on 
biomass, solar, wind, and small hydroelectric 
power projects. Chinese planners intend to 
further open their economy to foreign commer-
cial relations and technology transfer and to 
make increased use of market mechanisms. Less 
reliance is to be placed upon expanding China's 
coal and petroleum exports and more emphasis 
on light-industry exports, supported by renew-
able fuel sources. However, several participants 
were skeptical of China's hopes of successfully 
instituting such a program, particularly because 
the plans are optimistic and the likelihood of 
resource misallocations remains high. 
This set of energy concerns - related to China, 
the developing nations, and the industrialized 
economies of the Pacific basin - will be dis-
cussed in detail at the 1983 Conference. 
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